Governing Gaza by Feldman, Ilana
Bureaucracy, Authority,  
and the Work of Rule, 
1917–1967
Ilana Feldman





























Marred by political tumult and violent conflict since the early twentieth century, Gaza has been subject 
to a multiplicity of rulers. Still not part of a sovereign 
state, it would seem too exceptional to be a revealing site 
for a study of government. Ilana Feldman proves other-
wise. She demonstrates that a focus on the Gaza Strip un-
covers a great deal about how government actually works, 
not only in that small geographical space but more gener-
ally. Gaza’s experience shows how important bureaucracy 
is for the survival of government. Feldman analyzes civil 
service in Gaza under the British Mandate (1917–48) and 
the Egyptian Administration (1948–67). In the process, 
she sheds light on how governing authority is produced 
and reproduced; how government persists, even under 
conditions that seem untenable; and how government af-
fects and is affected by the people and places it governs.
Drawing on archival research in Gaza, Cairo, Jerusalem, 
and London, as well as two years of ethnographic research 
with retired civil servants in Gaza, Feldman identifies 
two distinct, and in some ways contradictory, governing 
practices. She illuminates mechanisms of “reiterative au-
thority” derived from the minutiae of daily bureaucratic 
practice, such as the repetitions of filing procedures, the 
accumulation of documents, and the habits of civil ser-
vants. Looking at the provision of services, she highlights 
the practice of “tactical government,” a deliberately re-
stricted mode of rule that makes limited claims about 
governmental capacity, shifting in response to crisis and 
operating without long-term planning. This practice made 
it possible for government to proceed without claiming 
legitimacy: by holding the question of legitimacy in abey-
ance. Feldman shows that Gaza’s governments were able 
to manage under, though not to control, the difficult 
conditions in Gaza by deploying both the regularity of 
everyday bureaucracy and the exceptionality of tactical 
practice.
Ilana Feldman is Assistant Professor of Anthropology and 
International Affairs at George Washington University.
“Through a historical ethnography 
of everyday bureaucratic practices 
in British- and then Egyptian-
ruled Gaza, this path-breaking 
and lucidly written book offers 
challenging new perspectives on 
what government is and how it 
operates. Governing Gaza is a work 
of remarkable theoretical sophis-
tication that makes a unique 
contribution to the anthropology 
of government and the state while 
remaining firmly grounded in the 
specificities of this crisis-ridden 
place and in the experience of its 
long-suffering people.”—Zachary 
lockman, author of Comrades 
and Enemies: Arab and Jewish 
Workers in Palestine, 1906–
1948
“Governing Gaza is a brilliant 
exploration of the everyday 
work of rule. In examining how 
people produce authority under 
exceptional circumstances, Ilana 
Feldman offers an original inter-
pretation of the general condi-
tions of modern bureaucratic 
power.”—timothy Mitchell,  
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map 1.  Map of Mandate Palestine’s Administrative Boundaries. source: the lionel pincus and
princess firyal map division, the new york public library, astor, lenox and tilden
foundations. redrawn by hamdi attia.
map  2. Detail from map of Gaza area, survey of Palestine. source: the lionel pincus and
princess firyal map division, the new york public library, astor, lenox and tilden
foundations.
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and the place of  gaza
Gaza has had more than its share of di≈cult times andcrisis conditions. It is often described as, and has often
seemed to be, on the verge of being ungovernable. Yet it also has had, if
anything, a surfeit of government. While one can easily imagine the security
concerns that mobilize certain extraordinary government measures, the ev-
eryday work of government continues even (and sometimes especially) in
crisis conditions. What constitutes such everyday work is to a considerable
degree shaped by the situation itself. Under certain conditions—such as
those pertaining in Gaza after 1948—providing daily rations to refugees
becomes part of everyday government work. Similarly, in other settings—
such as the Gaza of the 1920s—public utilities such as electricity are not part
of this field. The terrain explored in this book—a historical ethnography of
the civil service in Gaza during the British Mandate (1917–48)∞ and Egyptian
Administration (1948–67)—is persistent conflict and ongoing tension as
well as ordinary bureaucratic procedures and unremarkable o≈ce work.
Consideration of this slice of Gazan history highlights the tremendous sig-
nificance of such quotidian bureaucratic practices even in unstable places.
Even with all of the changes in Gaza over the course of the fifty years
under consideration here (as well as before and after) and the crises that
produced and accompanied them, there have been important continuities in
its government. This persistence of government attests to the fundamental
correctness of Max Weber’s insights into the role of bureaucracy in produc-
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ing stability when state regimes change. At the same time, even as bureau-
cratic practice can continue across regimes, it is also dramatically reshaped by
changing conditions and circumstances of rule. Cognizant of this complexity,
I give attention to both continuity and rupture, both stability and crisis, in
bureaucratic practice. In this exploration it becomes possible to see not just
how government in Gaza worked, but how its workings shed light on more
general (even more ‘‘ordinary’’) conditions of modern rule.
In focusing on the daily work of government, this book calls attention to
distinct rhythms of history, charting processes of transformation that do not
always match the ruptures of Palestinian political history.≤ My primary
interest here is not the significant dates, battles, and political maneuvers in
Gaza’s history, but life and government in the in-between: the time and space
between such dramatic events, the tenuous domain of the everyday that was
never entirely lost. This attention not only sheds light on quotidian forma-
tions of place and people, but can also produce a new sense of events them-
selves. To understand what may be the defining date in Palestinian history—
the nakba (catastrophe) of 1948—and the utter transformation of life in Gaza
produced by it, for instance, we need to know more than the political facts of
dispossession. We need to comprehend the multiple mechanisms through
which such loss was managed—whether it be the transformation of an ethics
of care, the reconfiguration of service bureaucracies, or the development of
new forms of documentation. Each of these areas (and many more) is most
clearly illuminated in the workings of everyday government. In focusing on
bureaucratic practice, this study explores the e√ects of government on those
caught up in its dynamic.
This book is an exploration of government in Gaza, yet what Gaza is and
was has changed significantly over time. In terms of administrative classifica-
tion, Gaza has been variously a region, a district, a subdistrict, and, after
1948, a strip—a unique entity. Gaza City, the administrative and commercial
center of the area, is also known simply as Gaza. During the British Man-
date, the Gaza district was an inseparable part of the larger entity of Pal-
estine. During the Egyptian Administration, the Gaza Strip was decisively
and painfully cut o√ from the rest of this territory. In the course of this book,
I refer to all of these di√erent senses of Gaza. I also explore how transforma-
tions in the shape of the place have influenced what it has meant to be Gazan,
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and what impact such identification was likely to have on people’s lives.
These transformations were at once a result of shifts in government and
something to which government had to respond.
I consider a variety of service sites and practices, attending to both the
specificity of particular services and the general conditions of civil service
bureaucracy. The first part of the book (chapters 2, 3, and 4) examines
general practices and procedures of rule, exploring the production of author-
ity that is crucial for governing. Under conditions where government was
tenuous and lacked a stable ground, it was the repetitions of filing pro-
cedures, the accumulation of documents, and the habits of civil servants that
produced the conditions of possibility for authority. The second part of the
book (chapters 5, 6, and 7), which looks at a variety of government services
(shelter, utilities, and education among them), examines the practice of what
I call tactical government—a means of governing that shifts in response to
crisis, that often works without long-term planning, and that presumes little
stability in governing conditions. It was through tactical government that the
crises and di≈culties which were endemic in Gaza during this period were
managed by government. And it was this practice that contributed to the
tenacity of government, despite its instabilities.
To do the research for this exploration of fifty years in Gazan government,
I spent two years in Gaza (1998 and 1999) during another distinct moment in
its troubled history. I conducted both ethnographic and archival research,
the latter taking me also to Cairo and Jerusalem. I subsequently undertook
further research in London and in the United States and also returned to
Palestine in the summers of 2003, 2004, and 2005. The bulk of my ethno-
graphic work was conducted with retired civil servants, with whom I spent
time in government o≈ces, in retirees’ associations, and in their homes with
their families. Archival and ethnographic research sometimes came together,
as it was my reading of government documents that a√orded me the oppor-
tunity to spend extended time in government o≈ces—the Pensions Admin-
istration, Gaza City Municipality, Awqaf (pious endowments) Administra-
tion, and Housing Ministry among them. While I lived in Gaza City, my
research took me throughout the Gaza Strip—to Rafah and Khan Yunis (the
other main towns) and to refugee camps such as Nusseirat and Jabalya.
The amount of movement necessary to carry out my research—not only
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within Gaza, but between Gaza and the West Bank—serves as a reminder
that I was extremely lucky in the timing of my fieldwork. I conducted the
bulk of the research for this book during what turned out to be the latter part
of the Oslo period.≥ What at the time seemed to be part of a new stage in
Palestinian history appears now to have been only a lull in the violence of
conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. While the luster of the Oslo
Accords—which had been heralded as bringing an end to conflict between
Israelis and Palestinians and leading to the establishment of a Palestinian
state—had worn o√ by 1998, replaced by growing frustration with Israeli
intransigence and Palestinian National Authority (pna) corruption, the
easiness of everyday life (for someone like me, at least) had not yet been
disrupted. Aided by my American passport and the Michigan license plates
on my car (which I had shipped from the United States), I was able to travel
freely and easily. The fact that the only way to get from here to there in
Palestine was with an American car—and that with an American car there
was almost no di≈culty—speaks volumes about the peculiar and di≈cult
conditions of the post-Oslo world. Cars with Palestinian license plates were
not generally allowed out of Gaza, and cars with Israeli plates were not
allowed in. More important, Palestinians were not allowed to travel between
the West Bank and Gaza without di≈cult-to-obtain permits, so the two
parts of the Palestinian territories were almost entirely cut o√ from each
other. The overt violence of occupation had, for the moment, been replaced
by a system of bureaucratic stricture and degradation.
In the wake of the establishment of the pna in 1994, American, Japanese,
and European aid money had flowed into the West Bank and Gaza, generat-
ing numerous improvement projects. The ‘‘de-development’’∂ of the Israeli
occupation was replaced with a drive for both economic and political develop-
ment (the latter a favorite of the U.S. Agency for International Development).
As I talked with people about the governing work of the Mandate and
Administration, projects of infrastructure development were all around.
Roads were paved, water networks improved, hospitals built, parks created,
and tra≈c lights installed. The permanent nighttime curfew imposed in Gaza
by Israel was replaced by vibrant street activity after dark. At the same time,
even as life was easier in these ways, the economy of Gaza su√ered terribly
from the Israeli closure policy, which dramatically reduced the numbers of
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people permitted to work inside Israel. Seizures of Palestinian land con-
tinued, and the natural resources of the area remained disproportionately
available to the eight thousand Jewish settlers in Gaza.∑ Compounding peo-
ple’s frustrations with Israeli actions was the deep disillusionment with the
pna—as, for example, ‘‘returnees’’ and political cronies got jobs over better
qualified ‘‘local’’ candidates.∏ As frustrated as people were, though, this was a
moment when people expected something from government.
Even as troubles were in the air and people spoke frequently about the
possibility of another intifada, the newly possible ordinariness of life had yet
to be disrupted. The civil servants who worked in government o≈ces where I
conducted so much of my research were able to focus on the everyday work
of government. These places did not form a space apart from the politics of
Palestinian experience—political talk was ubiquitous in o≈ces and every-
where else—but they did allow for ‘‘getting stu√ done,’’ that is, for keeping
electricity flowing, streets clean, police patrolling, and schools operating. Not
long after I completed my fieldwork, the second intifada broke out, and in
the years since everyday life in Gaza has been disrupted to an almost unimag-
inable extent. Not only has the level of violence been extremely high, but the
daily work of government has been upended, both by the demands placed on
it by the increasingly di≈cult conditions in which people live and, more
recently, by the cutting o√ of financial support (including the money needed
to pay civil service salaries) in the wake of the Hamas victory in Palestinian
elections.π
Ruling Histories
While conditions during the intifada have been extreme, it is obviously not
the first time Gaza has experienced trouble and disruption. Throughout its
long history, Gaza has often been a battleground between empires, located at
the crossroads of major incidents and historical transformations, though its
inhabitants have rarely directed those events.∫ The twentieth century was no
exception. The histories in which Gaza was engulfed during the British
Mandate and Egyptian Administration were also dramatic. The dramas of
colonialism, anticolonial nationalism, and nation-state building have all had
an impact on Gaza, though none can entirely define its government.
During the Mandate, Gaza was a district within the larger territory of
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Palestine. Palestine was part of the larger British colonial empire, though
mandates, authorized by the international community in the form of the
League of Nations and designed to end (even if in practice bringing them to
an end required forms of resistance typical of other colonies), were a quite
distinct form of colonialism.Ω The mandate system was developed in the
aftermath of World War I to manage German colonial holdings and the ter-
ritories of the Ottoman Empire. Emerging out of negotiations over the
future these areas should properly have, this system proceeded from the
claim that ‘‘the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred
trust of civilization.’’∞≠
Mandates were commissioned by the League of Nations, which, formally
at least, retained authority over them.∞∞ The countries which were granted
mandates were supposed to shepherd the native population to indepen-
dence, providing ‘‘administrative advice until they can exist unaided.’’∞≤
Where sovereignty actually lay, however, was never a fully settled question.∞≥
In practice the mandatory powers exercised the powers normally associated
with sovereignty, though they purported to be doing so on behalf of the
governed territory and its ‘‘latent sovereignty.’’∞∂
This was, then, a colonial form that was intimately connected to the
nation-state, albeit a nation-state that was more envisaged than actual.∞∑ As
Antony Anghie argues about the mandate system, ‘‘It did not seek merely to
qualify the rights of the sovereign, but rather to create the sovereign.’’∞∏ The
language of legitimacy deployed by the mandatories (when it was deployed)
was that not of a general ‘‘civilizing mission,’’ but of ‘‘trusteeship’’ specifically
connected to the idea of a future independent state.∞π In the case of class A
mandates, places such as Palestine which were in a ‘‘high stage of develop-
ment,’’∞∫ that future was supposed to be near.∞Ω While the mandatory powers
did not entirely share visions of imminent independence, the idea of a future
nation-state was important to their operations. And although to the popula-
tions subject to it the mandate system may have felt very similar to other
forms of colonialism, its distinct form did make a di√erence.
Within the mandate system, Palestine was unique, in part because of the
multiple and conflicting responsibilities the British had assumed there.≤≠ In
addition to its obligations to the native population of the country, Great
Britain had taken on the task of promoting a Jewish national home.≤∞ A great
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deal of British policy and practice over the course of the Mandate was
comprised of e√orts to manage, however imperfectly, its ‘‘dual obligation.’’≤≤
Over time, it became increasingly di≈cult to conceive how the Mandate
could succeed in the face of these conflicts.≤≥ At the same time, the increasing
conflict on the ground made it di≈cult to envision an end to the Mandate.
As one of the many commissions sent to Palestine to investigate the causes of
strife noted, ‘‘The Mandate cannot be fully and honourably implemented
unless by some means or other the national antagonism between Arab and
Jews can be composed. But it is the Mandate that created that antagonism
and keeps it alive. . . . Real ‘self-governing institutions’ cannot be developed,
nor can the Mandate ever terminate, without violating its obligations, gen-
eral or specific.’’≤∂ One e√ect of these circumstances was that despite the
international authorization of the Mandate the language of legitimacy in fact
provided a very poor foundation for government. Distraction and deferral,
on the other hand, proved to be crucial to Mandate government.
As particular as British rule in Palestine was, the Egyptian Administra-
tion of the Gaza Strip was even more so. The 1948 war over Palestine was a
life-shattering experience for Palestinians, and Gazan government and so-
ciety were utterly transformed.≤∑ When Great Britain gave up on the Man-
date and turned the problem over to the United Nations, the un agreed on a
plan to divide Palestine into two states—one Jewish and one Arab. The
Palestinians and surrounding Arab countries rejected the legitimacy of this
dispensation, and fighting over the territory began well before the British
departed in May 1948. The war concluded disastrously for the Palestinians,
with massive displacement and dispossession of most of their land. The
armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt which ended the fighting
around Gaza defined the ‘‘provisional’’ boundaries of what was now the Gaza
Strip—an area twenty-eight miles long and six miles across at its widest
point. The prewar population of eighty thousand was joined by around a
quarter million refugees.≤∏ The Egyptian government, which had entered the
war to prevent the partition of Palestine, found itself instead the custodian
over this small sliver of Palestinian territory.≤π
The terms of Egyptian rule over this territory were profoundly unclear.
The armistice agreement stated that the boundary line ‘‘not be considered a
political or territorial border and that it does not prejudice the rights and
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demands that derive from settling the Palestine question.’’≤∫ In the immedi-
ate aftermath of the war there were negotiations over a U.S.-supported
suggestion that Israel take over the area (in exchange for the repatriation of
some refugees),≤Ω British discussions about taking over Gaza as a base for its
troops then stationed in the Suez Canal zone,≥≠ and even suggestions by
some Palestinians that Egypt annex the territory.≥∞ While none of these
outcomes may have been terribly likely, that they were discussed at all indi-
cates how uncertain Gaza’s status was. British o≈cials, after some question
about how to understand the territory, identified it as ‘‘res nullius, i.e.
nobody’s property, since Egypt which is in control does not claim sover-
eignty.’’≥≤ The British position did, though, recognize Egypt as the control-
ling authority in the territory.≥≥
The status of the ‘‘Egyptian controlled areas of Palestine’’ thus remained
undefined and contested. Yet, even as the Egyptian Administration had a less
certain legal status than the Mandate, it had greater, though still limited,
capacity to reference authenticity and legitimacy in its rule. Without ever
claiming sovereignty and at least formally supporting the All-Palestine Gov-
ernment, which did claim such authority, Egypt administered the territory
until 1967 (except for a four-month Israeli occupation of Gaza in 1956–57).≥∂
While Jordan annexed the West Bank, the other portion of Mandate Pal-
estine still in Arab hands, Egypt presented itself as the sole remaining de-
fender of Palestine and insisted that Gaza be governed as a separate Palestin-
ian space.≥∑ It was not insignificant to Gazans that Egypt ruled as a result of a
war on behalf of Palestine. It was also not insignificant that Egyptians, while
foreign, were also Arabs. Egypt defined its role in Gaza as that of a caretaker,
preserving the space of Gaza to take its future place in the Palestinian nation-
state. In part because of its concern not to lay claim to Gaza, the Egyptian
Administration was reluctant to undertake major policy initiatives, although,
like Mandate o≈cials before them, Egyptian government o≈cials, in the
work of governing Gaza, ultimately produced many significant transforma-
tions in legal, economic, and political structures.
The Administration took a more proactive stance in the second period of
its rule in Gaza. As Gamal Abdul Nasser’s government was pursuing a broad
governmental agenda in Egypt, many similar policies and procedures were
enacted in Gaza. The tremendous expansion in educational opportunities,
Introduction • 9
the concomitant expansion of civil service, the provision of housing to civil
servants, the ubiquity of security services, all these policies had counterparts
in Egypt. The similarities of practice may have derived in part from Egyptian
reluctance to intervene too deeply in Gaza and therefore to develop distinct
initiatives for this territory. Aspects of this similarity were connected as well
to general Egyptian security concerns, which mandated strict control over
political expression. At the same time, these practices inevitably had specific
e√ects on and in this space. There was, as well, a distinction of scale between
the initiatives in Gaza and major public works projects enacted in Egypt.
This disparity was immediately connected to the di√erence between govern-
ing the nation-state and governing the uncertain territory of Gaza.≥∏
Political activity in Gaza was severely curtailed throughout the Admin-
istration, as it was in Egypt itself. After the outlawing of political parties as
breeders of factionalism, the only sanctioned means of organized expression
were the Legislative Council and the government-sponsored Arab National
Union. The council, established in 1957, gave Gazans a greater voice in
government, though the governor-general retained final authority. The Na-
tional Union, the only party allowed in Gaza, was established in 1959. It was
created, as the governor-general put it, ‘‘with the goal of actualizing the
message of Arab nationalism and building a democratic socialist society and
to engender cooperation among all Palestinians to liberate the rest of their
homeland.’’≥π This was Gaza’s version of the National Union established in
Egypt during the same period and, like that union, should be seen less as an
opportunity for independent political action than as a mechanism for involv-
ing Gazans in the Nasserist project.≥∫ In 1964, when the Palestine Liberation
Organization (plo) was established, Nasser formally, though not practically,
declared it to have authority in Gaza.≥Ω Under the auspices of this new
organization, which was by no means independent of Egypt and the other
Arab states, the Palestine Liberation Army (pla) was created, and in 1965
military conscription was instituted.∂≠
A distinguishing feature of the governmental terrain in Gaza was that,
from 1950 on, Egypt shared administrative responsibility with the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency (unrwa). unrwa, which provided aid to
Palestinian refugees wherever they lived, was itself a unique un agency.∂∞
Whereas all other refugees are ‘‘serviced’’ by the United Nations High Com-
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mission for Refugees (unhcr), Palestinian refugees have an agency devoted
specifically to them.∂≤ This distinctive attention recognized the long-stand-
ing involvement of the international community in, and its responsibility for,
the fate of Palestine.∂≥ This agency has also had a more expansive jurisdiction
than the unhcr, being responsible, as its name suggests, not only for relief,
but for works (rehabilitation).∂∂ That refugees formed a large majority of the
Gazan population gave unrwa an especially prominent role in this locale
and meant that it, as much as Egypt, governed Gaza.
As the presence of these two governing bodies indicates, government had
considerable reach during the Egyptian Administration. The Mandate wit-
nessed a significant expansion of government, but during this earlier period
there were people who had little direct relation with its o≈ces and o≈cials
(often relying on intermediaries such as mukhtars [village leaders] to manage
whatever contact was necessary) and who therefore may not have felt govern-
ment as a daily presence in their lives. The number of such people dimin-
ished steadily over the course of the Mandate, especially in the later years,
when government employment opportunities increased. After 1948, owing
in large part to their tremendous need, almost no one would have been able
to avoid involvement with the governing apparatuses—whether through the
receipt of rations, participation in the expanded educational opportunities,
or employment by either the Administration or unrwa. Despite the ab-
sence of a stable state structure, then, Gaza provides an example of a remark-
able degree of government. While defying classification according to any
state model, therefore, rule and life in Gaza can be comprehended through
an analytics of government.∂∑
Analytics of Government
An analytics of government requires attention to the form, context, and
details of the exercise of rule. In Gaza’s case, the rich body of work on
colonial processes of control is a helpful starting point for such an explora-
tion. In the literature on colonialism, there is considerable debate about how
to classify colonial relations with subject populations. Do legitimacy, hege-
mony, and governmentality apply in colonial conditions? Or does the impor-
tance of force and coercion to the persistence of colonial rule render such
instruments irrelevant?∂∏ Does continued resistance to colonial rule mean
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there is no consent? Or does the tenacity of colonialism indicate that it could
not have been sustained through force alone?∂π Ultimately, it seems that
understanding the character of colonial rule entails not choosing consent or
coercion as the significant factor, but rather recognizing the dynamic relation
between them. As John Comaro√ suggests, studies of colonial governance
must seek to understand its ‘‘essential paradox’’: ‘‘its capacity to be ordered
yet incoherent, rational yet absurd, violent yet impotent; to elicit compliance
and contestation, discipline and defiance, subjection and insurrection. Some-
times all at once.’’∂∫
Students of colonialism also remind us that such explorations must trace
the specificities of di√erent colonial conditions—in the case at hand the
specificities of the mandate system and of that system as applied in Pal-
estine.∂Ω One of these distinguishing features, as I noted, was that mandate
governments were not as fully ‘‘states without nations’’∑≠ as were other colo-
nial forms. The idea, if not the actuality, of the nation-state was crucial to
their operations. In the Egyptian Administration, the deferred nation-state
occupied an even more central place in the dynamics of rule. The Egyptian
Administration should not be easily subsumed under the category of colo-
nialism, if for no other reason than that Gazans do not consider it to have
been colonial. Unlike mandatory powers, which claimed the colonial pre-
rogative both to develop the capacity for self-rule and to judge that capacity,
the Administration claimed merely to be a placeholder for the nation-state,
safeguarding the territory from annexation or occupation by those who
might wish to dissolve Palestinian national ambitions. While this future-
oriented stance, under conditions in which the future was murky at best,
helped promote the persistence of Administration rule, it also ensured that
such rule operated without a stable basis for legitimacy in the present. Such
lack of stability and clarity characterized government during both the Man-
date and the Administration.
What analytic approach is, then, the most helpful in understanding gov-
ernment in Gaza during this di≈cult period, when government was both
colonial and not and was concerned with the nation-state though not defined
by it? Clearly one must give attention to the significance of mandates and
their relation to broader colonial conditions; one has to attend as well to the
peculiar form of Egyptian authority in Gaza. Yet there is clear evidence of a
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governing dynamic not entirely defined by the political periods of Palestinian
history, by the nationality of its rulers, or by the legal status of the territory
itself. An understanding of government across this period must do more
than define its state.∑∞ To this end, this book explores three main sets of
questions. How is governing authority produced and reproduced? How does
government persist, particularly under conditions that seem untenable? And
what does government do? How, that is, does it shape (and how is it shaped
by) the people and places that are its objects and agents?
In this exploration, a careful balance is required between identifying
Gazan distinctiveness and capturing its general characteristics. Neither Pal-
estinian exceptionalism∑≤ nor an undi√erentiated understanding of govern-
mentality∑≥ can provide su≈cient analytic purchase. Government in Gaza
persisted within a field in which the familiar catalogue of ruling techniques
associated with governmentality—expertise, statistical exactness, administra-
tive certitude, resource concentration—was present, but not dominant. This
di√erence suggests that the analytic of governmentality which has been so
fruitful for thinking about the work of modern rule needs to be given further
nuance. If governmentality is meant to describe ‘‘governmental rationalities,’’
as Michel Foucault suggested, then such rationalities and their associated
practices must be explored in their historical specificity.∑∂
In addition to its clear connections with the large anthropological and
historical literature on state and government, this book builds on the insights
of scholars concerned with the history and practice of everyday life.∑∑ Such
work, diverse in its interests, highlights the ‘‘micro-physics’’ of power that are
enacted in the most apparently ordinary of interactions.∑∏ Training attention
on putatively marginal people and seemingly insignificant moments, explora-
tions of the everyday show the import of the mundane.∑π Rather than focusing
on ordinary experiences in the home, the marketplace, or the neighborhood,
though, I highlight the domain of the o≈ce and the circuits of quotidian
practices of bureaucracy.∑∫ This space of ordinary bureaucratic operation
provides a helpful entry point for understanding Gaza’s government.
The combination of archival and ethnographic perspectives on bureau-
cracy makes it easier to approach it not as a bounded institution, but as a
regime of practices. Bureaucratic practices ‘‘are not just governed by institu-
tions, prescribed by ideologies, guided by pragmatic circumstances . . . but
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possess up to a point their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-
evidence, and ‘reason.’ ’’∑Ω With bureaucratic practice at the center of analysis,
it becomes possible to see how contradiction and connection, rupture and
continuity, regularity and exceptionality participated in a governing dynamic
that was both tenuous and e√ective. Archival research in government docu-
ments illuminates how compilations of minutiae both follow and produce a
governing logic that exceeds the scope of their immediate interests. Eth-
nographic work with civil servants makes clear that governing dynamics
persistently overstep the boundaries that formal structures try to set up. It is
in ordinary encounters and daily practice that the workings of government
become clear.
Spending time with retired civil servants as they lived their postwork lives
and with working civil servants as they managed the daily struggles of the
o≈ce helped me better understand both the constraints of government in
Gaza and the dynamics of governance more broadly. I saw how the uncertain
status of the post-Oslo Palestinian Authority found expression in the ways
that civil servants debated proper procedure among themselves. I saw as well
how the imperative to appear authoritative meant that they rarely voiced
such uncertainties in interactions with the public. At the same time, I wit-
nessed many occasions in which members of the public explicitly challenged
civil servants’ authority—sometimes by refusing to accept their directives or
to acknowledge that they had the authority to make such decisions, some-
times by comparing Palestinian civil service unfavorably to other regimes
that had ruled Gaza, the most pointed criticism being to say they were acting
worse than Israeli occupying forces. The ways that past and future governing
arrangements remained present in people’s understandings of their daily
bureaucratic experiences further underscored the importance of understand-
ing these regimes.
Within the methodological attention to the ordinary (under conditions
that were almost always extraordinary) emerges the closely connected theo-
retical insight that the authority and tenacity of government in Gaza derived
not so much from legitimacy, authenticity, or even ‘‘good policy,’’ but from the
form, shape, and habits of its daily practice. The unstable governing condi-
tions that almost always existed in Gaza, conditions which provided so little
grounding for ruling authority, illuminate the significance that bureaucratic
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practice has for government. Rather than measuring practice against policy—
whether to judge the degree of perfection in its enactment or to highlight the
failures of ideal types in capturing bureaucratic complexity—the Gazan case
suggests that we need to consider this practice as itself productive of govern-
ing form, intent, and direction. The intersections and occasional collisions of
the habits of civil servants and the paths of papers that were part of everyday
work helped define the terrain of government. This was not a terrain marked
by coherence and unity, but rather was a domain in which seemingly, and
often actually, contradictory practices coexisted. Government regularities—
expressed, for example, in the codification of bureaucratic forms and o≈ce
procedures—existed alongside extraordinary and sometimes even erratic
governing work, such as ‘‘crisis services,’’ which were meant to be temporary,
were not intended to generate further governmental obligation, and often
shifted rapidly.
During both the Mandate and the Administration, such contradictions
were not simply managed by government but were made productive for it.
While there were moments of political crisis that threatened their per-
sistence, these governments utilized both the regularity of repetitive bu-
reaucracy and the mobility of tactical practice to manage the unstable condi-
tions in Gaza. Under very di≈cult conditions, they were able to persist by
turning those di≈culties to their advantage, for instance, by deflecting the
questions of legitimacy that neither administration could answer. The ad-
vantage of such practices was that governments were able to survive chal-
lenges that seem as though they should have brought the entire edifice
crashing down. Their disadvantage was that, being tactical more than strate-
gic, it was nearly impossible to predict what outcomes might result from
their enactment or what shape the persisting government might take. Both
the British Mandate and the Egyptian Administration survived by, in e√ect,
relinquishing control over their future.
Reiterative Authority
For any government bureaucracy, the question of authority is a crucial one.
However highly developed its mechanisms, however organized its networks,
it cannot long function unless both its practitioners and the public recognize
its demands as being authoritative. Considered through the lens of its daily
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practice, this authority is best understood not as an objective achievement,
but rather as an ongoing process. Richard Sennett describes it as a ‘‘process
of interpreting power.’’∏≠ Authority is enacted through practice, not estab-
lished once and for all. All bureaucracies depend on such repetition; Gaza’s
experiences shed much light on this dynamic. As this book highlights, rela-
tions of authority within the civil service are never so ‘‘rationalized’’ as an
ideal-type definition of bureaucratic organization might imagine. Authority
does not rely simply on clearly stated regulations or minutely plotted juris-
diction. Its formations are much more di√use, traversing boundaries that
from a purely administrative perspective might appear inviolate.
While, following Weber, they recognize bureaucracy as the quintessential
form of modern government (and of management more generally), explora-
tions of governing authority in modern states often highlight formations of
authority that lie elsewhere. For instance, the nation-state, the still-dominant
global state form, seems to deploy the authority of a√ective ties, moral claims,
and authentic arrangements.∏∞ Michael Herzfeld emphasizes the importance
of this last term in engendering not only authority, but the related capacity for
domination in bureaucracies that claim foundation in the nation. He argues
that ‘‘it is the claim to authenticity that allows the bureaucrat to justify a stance
of intransigence.’’∏≤ In Gaza, and in colonial conditions generally, this claim to
national authenticity could not provide a basis for authority. In the absence of
a felt organic connection between government and population, the formation
of governmental authority demands other mechanisms.
In the elaboration of authority in Gaza during the Mandate and the
Administration, when conditions on the ground o√ered little stability, the
capacity of bureaucracy to produce its own authority was crucial.∏≥ This
auto-authorization was a distinctly circular process, and the extent to which
it was successful was owing precisely to its circularity. While external sources
of authority were occasionally called upon—whether the promise of future
independence, the benefits of reform, or the connection to cultural identity—
none could provide a stable ground for authority. Promises, improvements,
and connections were too often undermined by betrayals, regressions, and
dislocations. Most reliable, in fact, were the general characteristics of bu-
reaucracy itself—the reiterative networks of filing (see chapter 2) and the
repetitive habits of civil servants, habits which, as I explore, were expressed in
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both belief and practice (see chapters 3 and 4). By demanding that attention
be paid to these routines of governmental operation, Gaza thus shows clearly
how bureaucracy works more generally.
Bureaucracy is certainly not the only space in which reiteration is impor-
tant to authority. Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler indicate the importance
of reiteration to discursive authority, though there are di√erences with the
form I am describing. They argue that discursive authority relies both on
citational practice and on the obscuring of this practice.∏∂ As Butler puts it, it
may be that a subject ‘‘appear[s] as the author of its discursive e√ects to the
extent that the citational practice by which he/she is conditioned and mobi-
lized remains unmarked.’’∏∑ Subjects appear agentive by not seeming to be
merely repetitive. If this is so, then dissimulation marks a divergence between
discursive and bureaucratic authority. In bureaucracy, not only is repetition
not obscured, it is highlighted. Files must not only be like other files, but also
appear like them. Every personnel file needs to look alike; every government
form needs to fit the mold. Civil servants are anything but surreptitious as
they accumulate and repeat habits of service; they trumpet their mastery of
these habits as signs of their competence.
Citational practice also worked distinctively in Gaza. Michel de Certeau
identifies citation as ‘‘the ultimate weapon for making people believe . . .
replacing doctrines that have become unbelievable, citation allows the tech-
nocratic mechanisms to make themselves credible for each individual in the
name of the others.’’∏∏ Citation, he suggests, makes people believe without
‘‘providing any believable object.’’ In the case of Gaza’s bureaucracy, reitera-
tion did not stand in for an original belief that had lost its power. To the
extent that belief was invoked, people were asked not so much to believe that
bureaucracy stood for something else as to believe in it for itself. Perhaps
even more vital than such belief, though, they were asked to participate in its
workings. It was, again, authority (of bureaucracy itself) rather than legit-
imacy (of the regime) that bureaucratic repetition promoted.
The self-referential characteristics which produced authority in Gaza are
the same features that often lead to bureaucracies being criticized as obscu-
rantist, opaque, and antidemocratic.∏π A common complaint about bureau-
cracies is that they privilege rule over reason, following their own internal
procedures even to ridiculous and unjust ends.∏∫ Weber certainly identified
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the all-encompassing character of bureaucratic organization as potentially
deadening, and not only for the broader society. As he notes, bureaucratic
authority subjects not only the population, but also its civil servants. He
describes these employees as ‘‘small cog[s] in a ceaselessly moving mechanism
which prescribes to [them] an essentially fixed route of march’’∏Ω and argues
that ‘‘the individual bureaucrat cannot squirm out of the apparatus in which
he is harnessed.’’π≠ At the same time, this expansive and referential governing
domain did not work simply to control people, but also defined a space of
maneuver within which challenges, demands, and contestations were en-
acted. The reliance of Gaza’s government on the self-referential, reiterative
aspects of bureaucracy o√ers an opportunity to explore more precisely how
they work.
Even with Gaza’s peculiarities then, readers who are familiar with regions
and states that have more ‘‘normal’’ governing structures will find much that
is familiar in the processes described here.π∞ For this reason, exploring how
they worked to produce governing authority in Gaza can help explain the
more general condition of modern rule. The Gazan instance suggests the
importance of considering how seemingly exceptional bureaucratic features
may also be part of more regular governing conditions. Their importance
may be masked precisely by this regularity. The claims of the nation-state,
for instance, to provide stable authority for rule may in fact obscure the ways
in which reiterative authority, which does not rely on the claim to authen-
ticity, is also crucial in those conditions.
Tactical Government and the Abeyance of Legitimacy
Bureaucratic authority made possible people’s continued participation in
government, whether working in it as a civil servant or approaching it as a
private citizen. Yet such continued participation should not be taken as
evidence of legitimacy. While authority and legitimacy are generally thought
to be essentially the same—in Weber’s formulation authority is legitimated
dominationπ≤—in the Gazan instance, at least, they need to be distin-
guished.π≥ Bureaucratic authority is, and was, di√erent from the legitimacy of
a specific government.π∂ In the Gaza of the Mandate and the Administration,
any sustained claim to legitimacy was almost certain to fail, a circumstance
which demanded even more reliance on bureaucratic authority. There were,
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to be sure, instances in which each government made gestures toward legit-
imacy (as well as moments when Gazans confronted this question), but they
were localized, often aborted, and never dominant modes of governing.
This is not to say that an absence of legitimacy cannot undermine bureau-
cratic authority, for it often does. The two do not simply exist apart but
rather need to be held apart by government work. Lisa Wedeen’s analysis of
Hafiz al-Asad’s rule in Syria identifies ways in which governments sustain
themselves neither by relying on legitimacy nor by using force in every
instance.π∑ I draw insight from her work in this exploration of a variant sort
of avoidance of legitimacy. While the Syrian government relied upon public,
often spectacular displays of support for Asad, in Gaza no such declaration
was demanded. If anything, the less attention paid to the regime, the better.
Rule in Gaza worked not so much through the absence of belief—an absence
which Wedeen argues added to the power of the Asad regime—as through a
lack of attention. That is, if rule in Asad’s Syria was characterized by a
politics of ‘‘as if,’’ in which people performed a consent they may not have
felt, in Gaza, rule operated through a dynamic of abeyance, in which ques-
tions of consent and coercion remained suspended.π∏
To understand how this worked, one must turn to the details of govern-
ment services, details which also accentuate the distinctions between the
Mandate and the Administration. Questions of what services to o√er and
how to provide them were answered somewhat di√erently by each admin-
istration. Even in this domain of distinction, however, the service practice of
each evidenced a shared governing style. Responding to the di≈cult condi-
tions in Gaza and to the uncertain status and future of rule itself, government
there was tactical, that is, focused more on coping with current conditions
than with long-range planning, took actions based on partial understandings
rather than comprehensive analysis, and could count only on limited re-
sources and often tenuous authority as it did so. All governments are tactical
to some—even a considerable—degree. Some governments, though, whether
by legitimacy or by a degree of force that could render legitimacy irrelevant,
achieve a degree of stability that allows them to be strategic also. In Gaza such
stability was largely absent.ππ
In developing the term tactical government, I draw from de Certeau’s work
in The Practice of Everyday Life, but I am expanding his insights about
persons’ responses to a disciplinary environment to include the domain of
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governmental practice. In de Certeau’s view, the tactical is eminently the
realm of the everyperson, the consumer, the ordinary subject.π∫ Tactics are,
he suggests, the preserve of the weak. To call government tactical, though, is
not to say that it does not exercise power over persons, but rather to note its
distinctive style of operation. This di√erence is not about degrees of pur-
posefulness, aggressiveness, or meaningfulness in government practice. Fou-
cault calls attention to the ‘‘coherence of a tactic.’’πΩ The distinction, rather,
has to do with scale of action, scope of imagination, range of planning, and
stability of resources.
The remarkable extent and depth of the di≈culties facing o≈cials were
one of the distinctive features shaping Gaza’s governmental practice. Neither
British nor Egyptian administrators had time, space, or money to settle
down in Gaza. Not only were government budgets severely constrained, but
government policies were often exceedingly uncertain.∫≠ As noted earlier, the
British Mandate was charged both with overseeing the development of Pal-
estine (an internally contradictory proposition that entailed both shepherd-
ing it to independence and establishing a Jewish National Home) and with
maintaining order in the country (a goal which privileged the status quo).
Egyptian administrators, who came into Gaza as a consequence of the failed
attempt to defend Palestine in 1948, were concerned both with maintaining
Gaza as Palestinian space (which mandated preserving existing legal struc-
tures) and with protecting Egyptian interests in the region (which required
strong control over the space of Gaza). How to both stand for Palestine and
not provoke either retaliatory action by Israel or interference by the interna-
tional community was a source of tension throughout.
Even as they tried to mitigate the contradictions of administration, each
regime was confronted by a persistent temporal uncertainty. Both the Man-
date and the Administration were governments that were supposed to end,
but neither had a clear path to that end. At the same time, each feared the
end might be not so much produced, as forced. Temporal insecurity meant
that even when government attempted to plan, to develop policy, it was never
possible to imagine with any degree of accuracy what future it might be
planning for. When Mandate o≈cials averred that after a successful e√ort to
promote greater adherence to building regulations in Gaza, town planners
could begin ‘‘concentrating on the future,’’∫∞ they turned out to be wrong, not
so much about the success, as about the future (see chapter 5). When Egyp-
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tian authorities insisted to unrwa that educational policies should prepare
refugee students not to settle where they were living, but to be ‘‘good citizens
[muwatinin salahin] when they return to their country,’’∫≤ this insistence
reflected more an imagined future than an evident possibility (see chapter 7).
Similarly, when refugees refused a service expansion proposed by unrwa
in order not to be settled in their exile, they could not have anticipated
that their unsettled conditions might persist for another forty years (see
chapter 6).
Tactical government o√ered a means for the Mandate and the Admin-
istration to cope with these conditions. Furthermore, it provided a mecha-
nism through which questions of legitimacy that could never be resolved or
entirely occluded could be held in abeyance. In this dynamic, the very in-
stability of government was mobilized to promote its persistence. If it was
unclear what the future would bring, how long any particular government
would be in place, what ruling arrangements might come next, then (this
practice seemed to argue) it might not be necessary to direct too much
attention to the question of the legitimacy of that government. Abeyance
suggested that these questions need not be resolved; tactical government
provided a mechanism through which such resolution could be diverted.
With its preference for the temporary, the piecemeal, the makeshift,
tactical government permitted deferral and distraction to occupy the space of
resolution. Deferral meant putting aside questions of legitimacy to a vaguely
imagined future time when there would be Palestinian self-determination in
Gaza. Distraction meant that the attention of government, of civil service, of
the population was averted from the challenges of consent and coercion and
focused on the mundane, the day to day, the getting by. In this way the
stakes, and the possible outcomes, of practices and policies were often not
discerned, by either practitioners or the public. The dynamics of abeyance
permitted the persistence of rule, under always fraught and uncertain condi-
tions, in Gaza.
Governing Practices and the Shaping of Gaza
As I explore authorization and persistence, in each part of the book I am also
concerned with what government does and with how it shapes and is shaped
by Gaza and Gazans. Having discussed the historical trajectory of its ruling
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forms, here I briefly outline shifts in its local formations. Before 1948, Gaza
City was a moderately prosperous town, as noted, the administrative and
commercial center of a provincial district. It had a long history that its
residents termed illustrious; it could not compare to Jerusalem or Ja√a per-
haps, but was not without its charms. While the city housed government
o≈ces, courts, a port, and major markets, most of the inhabitants of the Gaza
district would have gone there only occasionally. The vast majority of Gaza’s
population, like that of most of Palestine, were peasants (fellahin), who
worked either their own or other people’s land. The years of the Mandate
were a time of crisis for the Palestinian peasantry, a crisis connected in part to
the increase in Zionist settlement in the country. It became increasingly
necessary for people to seek work outside their villages, and the needs of the
British army during World War II created large numbers of jobs.
Gaza City had a municipal council, established by the Ottomans in 1893,
as did Khan Yunis, the next largest town in the district. As in other facets of
Mandate governance, British o≈cials argued that their version of these coun-
cils was much improved over that of their Ottoman antecedents,∫≥ though
Palestinians often disagreed.∫∂ The formal regulatory framework for munici-
pal organization remained Ottoman until the promulgation in 1934 of a new
Municipal Corporations Ordinance. This ordinance confirmed a system of
centralized authority in which government oversaw and had to approve
almost all municipal decisions.∫∑ In general, there were elections for council
members, but the mayor and deputy mayor were appointed by the govern-
ment from among those elected.∫∏
The membership of the council over the years of the Mandate and beyond
illustrates the dynamics of local power, which was admittedly quite circum-
scribed. Like other regions of Palestine, Gaza was dominated by a number of
powerful families, including the Shawwa, Husseini, and Sourani, families
whose prominence was as much economic as political. As one Gazan recalled
about this time, ‘‘The people who had land, which gave them an income . . .
They were relaxed—compared to the exhausted worker, say, the peasant who
worked all year long to pay his taxes. . . . Family unity was political, eco-
nomic, social unity . . . the family situation was what determined one’s social
position.’’∫π
Gaza was identified by British and Palestinians alike as an area that was a
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bit behind the rest of the country. When the Mandate was first being sta√ed,
a British o≈cer was assigned to the Southern District, which encompassed
what was later called the Gaza district, with the comment, ‘‘The somewhat
backward district over which it is proposed to place him will, I confidently
believe, make considerable progress under his guidance.’’∫∫ Toward the end
of the Mandate a Palestinian o≈cial echoed this comment, saying that the
area had ‘‘always been backward and almost neglected.’’∫Ω Its economy was
almost entirely dependent on agriculture and lacked significant industry.
The town of Majdal was known for its weaving and Gaza City produced
soap and pottery, but these crafts had not been industrialized.Ω≠
Not only was Gaza perceived as backward, it was also provincial, far from
the center of political action and government decision making in Jerusalem.
This characteristic of Gaza has proved helpful to my investigation. Looking
at the history of government from the provinces makes it easier to focus on
practice, not policy, on how government is enacted rather than imagined, on
its e√ects instead of the intentions of its decision makers. At the same time, it
becomes possible to see how the conditions of the place also exerted an e√ect
on government, how it was never a simple process of application.Ω∞
Whatever hardships the Palestinian population might have endured dur-
ing the Mandate, they were nothing compared to the aftermath of 1948. The
massive dispossession and displacement of the population and the division of
what had been Palestine into three separate areas, West Bank, Gaza Strip,
and the new state of Israel, produced unprecedented impoverishment and
social disruption. In Gaza, the crisis was felt in the tensions and cooperations
that quickly developed among the new categories of the population—refugee
and native. The entire population shared the experience of dispossession, as
the land of many native Gazans lay beyond the armistice line, but refugees
embodied the meaning of displacement. Coping with these conditions, man-
aging this new population, was a primary task of government, whether
enacted by the Administration or by unrwa.
Driven in part by a desperate need for food, in part by attachment to their
homes, in the first years after 1948 many Palestinian refugees crossed the
armistice line to retrieve belongings and foodstu√s left behind.Ω≤ These
journeys were dangerous, and many people were shot by Israeli soldiers. The
crossings into what was now Israel also contributed to Egyptian suspicions
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about the population. Gazans told me that people caught crossing the border
were treated as spies. Although people also told me that these relations
changed as Egyptians came to know the population better, the period before
1956 was marked by considerable tension over Palestinian demands for arms
and the opportunity to defend themselves against repeated Israeli attacks on
Gaza. It was not until 1955, following a raid which killed a number of
Egyptian soldiers and which provoked large demonstrations in Gaza, that
the Administration acquiesced to these demands and established fida’iyyin
(guerilla) units.Ω≥ This change in policy indicated both a transformation in
Egyptian attitudes about confrontation with Israel and an e√ort to contain a
potential crisis in Egyptian rule.
It was the mechanisms which were developed to respond to crisis, as
much as the crisis itself, that shaped the new Gazan landscape. As educa-
tional opportunities were dramatically expanded in the latter part of the
Administration, for instance, families who had never before been able to
send their children to school produced university graduates, many of whom
took jobs in the also dramatically expanded civil service or went abroad to
teach and work in other Arab countries. These new conditions meant that
family was no longer entirely destiny. There were new opportunities for
social mobility, opportunities that, many people told me, refugees were quick
to take advantage of. As one native Gazan told me, ‘‘The refugees exceeded
us in education, and civilization. . . . In my house I had water and electricity,
but he was living in a shack, so he says to himself, ‘Why don’t I go to Saudi
Arabia and earn money?’ Of course he studied and worked. . . . The refugee
says ‘I want to have a better social status.’ . . . That is why they are more
educated than we are.’’Ω∂ In addition to the expansion of the public sector,
Egyptian policies also created new economic opportunities within the Gaza
Strip. Gaza was designated a free-trade zone, and it became a tourist destina-
tion for Egyptians seeking cheaper goods. Hotels went up along the beach,
and economic opportunity improved.Ω∑
These policies did much to improve life in Gaza from the low point of the
years immediately following 1948, but their impact should not be overstated.
Conditions in Gaza remained very di≈cult for large portions of the popula-
tion. Unemployment and impoverishment remained a problem throughout
the Administration. The large numbers of Gazans who went abroad to work
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reflected the continued paucity of opportunity in Gaza. An Egyptian report
from 1959 calculated unemployment at 87 percent.Ω∏ Even the end of the ‘‘era
of unemployment,’’ as the Executive Committee of Arab unrwa Employees
put it, did not mean an end to economic hardship. As the committee com-
plained, the greater economic activity in the strip had led to an increase in
prices, an increase that was especially burdensome for civil servants on fixed
salaries.Ωπ These di≈cult economic conditions, caused in no small part by the
continued lack of a political resolution to the Palestine problem that would
have permitted refugees to return home, created tension throughout the
Egyptian Administration. The place that Gaza became in the years after
1948 was shaped by multiple pressures of population and security, regional
political considerations and local demands.
That governmental practices can be fundamental in forming a place is
perhaps self-evident at this point.Ω∫ In Gaza, government practices were
shaped by the reluctance of the Mandate and the Administration to claim
too much connection with the place. The uneasy relationship between gov-
ernment and place that ensued was perhaps a more extreme expression of an
unease that characterizes modern government more generally.ΩΩ I highlight
here the complexity and multidirectionality of these processes in Gaza. The
relation was never simply that of government imposing itself upon a place
and transforming its character, whether by reorganizing local power relations
through the development of new ruling institutions or the transformation of
everyday life through the development of new infrastructure. Rather, this
place imposed just as much upon government—demanding deployments of
resources beyond what policy dictated and forcing interventions into areas
outside its apparent jurisdiction.
In the making of place and people, services play a crucial role. They both
bind and produce places, people, and government. The existence or absence
of paved roads between towns shaped senses of place. Significant transforma-
tions in the means through which water was procured for households shaped
social relations. Changing details in an ethic of care through which food
needs were met transformed people’s relationships not only with government
but with each other. It matters very much where one looks for help when one
is in need—to one’s neighbors, to the local mukhtar, or to a government
o≈cial. An expansion in government services necessarily increases the sites
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where the public and government o≈cials might meet. Even as services
expanded quite dramatically over the period under consideration here, how-
ever, the civil servants whom the public most often encountered were mem-
bers of that public themselves. The limits of services—processes by which
some people were excluded, some spaces not incorporated, or certain services
simply not o√ered—were equally important in shaping encounters among
people and personnel and in constituting places.
The Shape of the Book
I have relied on a multiplicity of sources to explore the trajectories of service
and the formations of government, place, and people in Gaza. As noted
above, my research was both archival and ethnographic. Here I want to say a
bit more about this research and the ensuing shape of the book. As I dis-
covered in the course of my research, the materials available for this inves-
tigation were both considerable and incomplete. Despite its di≈cult history
and sometimes marginal location, a considerable array of documentary mate-
rials from and on Gaza is available.∞≠≠ Despite the passage of time and the
existence of other pressing concerns, I found former civil servants to be
tremendously generous with their insights and recollections. Still, both the
archival and ethnographic record are filled with half-finished stories, some-
times because a change in regime truncated a governmental practice or a file
(or set of files) was lost, sometimes because memory failed or the subject was
changed.
I have sought to make analytic use of this expansive incompleteness,
considering a diversity of practices and moments as a means to understand a
regulative and regulated history, a style of government, a way of being. The
exploration of bureaucratic practice calls attention, as noted above, to dis-
tinct rhythms of history. These rhythms find expression on a small-scale—in
the form of a document, the layout of an o≈ce, the pattern of daily life—but
their import is broad. This is not to say, though, that bureaucracy constitutes
an autonomous domain, unconnected to the major political transformations
of the time; it is in fact entirely entangled in such transformations.
The historical record of bureaucracy displays these same complexities. In
the course of conducting research in the Israel State Archives, to give just one
example, I came across a file that seemed, literally, to be trash. It looked as if
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the documents in the folder had been scooped out of the garbage and trans-
ferred to the archives. The papers, which came from both the Mandate and
the Administration, were ripped and crumpled, some mere fragments, none
in any meaningful order. To the extent that their subject matter could be
discerned, they were an eclectic assortment of notices regarding landowner-
ship laws, letters from the agriculture department, town planning materials,
assorted blank forms. In contrast, most of the files I looked at in my research
o√ered relatively orderly collections of documents, often with clear refer-
ences to other files (see chapter 2). This assortment, then, was not a govern-
ment file in the usual sense. And yet there it was, in a box with other files
referring to Gaza (most from the Administration) and with a reference
number like any other file.∞≠∞ That governmental trash ended up preserved in
an archive speaks volumes about both the evident power of bureaucracy and
the history of Gaza. The fact that the material was acquired from the Egyp-
tian Administration and housed in Israeli archives helps explain the fate of
this o≈ce detritus.∞≠≤ Whoever took hold of these fragmented papers and
whoever placed them in the file must have recognized them as government
documents and seen their potential value. Whatever the specific trajectory of
decisions, in some sense Gaza’s history produced this file.
This di≈cult history—and the ways in which successive and rapid regime
change has helped shape the place, its people, and its government—is evident
almost anywhere one turns in Gaza.∞≠≥ A lot of my time was spent with
retired civil servants, who tend to have a lot of time on their hands for
conversation. Such conversations often shifted rapidly among complaints
about corruption in the Palestinian Authority, to recollections of Israeli
occupation policy, to debates about the impact of the British Mandate.
People rendered distinct political evaluations of these regimes and also were
highly cognizant of the ways in which governing work did not always follow
these same divides. As they recalled their careers, they described a persistent
tension between the goal of regularity in their work and the often exceptional
conditions under which that work was conducted.
The time I spent in government o≈ces, observing and to a limited degree
participating in the work of bureaucracy, enabled me to see some of these com-
plexities firsthand. I was not, of course, put to work filing but was sometimes
called on to be a participant in bureaucratic conversation, for example, in
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debating specific practices, or in bureaucratic ritual, such as accompanying
civil servants to o√er holiday wishes to the director of the bureau. Present-day
bureaucratic conditions are neither identical to the conditions of the Mandate
and the Administration, nor entirely disconnected from them. What I experi-
enced in these o≈ces, and everywhere in Gaza, helped me make sense of the
archival materials I gathered and interviews I conducted. Given that my object
of study was not only bureaucratic events, that is, the specific contests,
deployments, and services enacted in the Mandate and the Administration,
but also bureaucratic ethos, habits, and styles that were not contained within
the boundaries of regimes and that extend beyond the temporal limits of my
project, participant-observation in a time that was not the time of my study
proved to be immensely useful. While I do not often make explicit reference
to my experiences with Gaza’s bureaucracy, what I learned from them does
inform my analysis of the civil service condition.
The form of the book grew directly out of my experiences in researching
it. Part 1, with chapters on files and archives, civil service habits, and bureau-
cratic competence, is focused most directly on the formations of bureaucracy
and government itself. I examine the regulation of filing and the development
of civil service personas. Given my interest in explicating a work of rule that
is more evident in practice than in policy, more apparent in everyday work-
ings of government than in comprehensive reflections on it, it should not be
surprising that my focus is on middle- and low-level civil servants. I also
focus on Gazan employees, rather than on their British and Egyptian col-
leagues and superiors. These practitioners (rather than planners) of govern-
ment, who were also participants in the life and society of the place of rule,
o√er an especially good avenue through which to explore the work of govern-
ment.∞≠∂ The intersection of the civil service domain with the place and
public of Gaza is noted in these first chapters and is traced in more detail in
part 2.
It was through consideration of the experiences of ordinary employees,
apprehended through conversation, observation, and archival research, that
the distinctive rhythms of Gaza’s history became more clear to me. The daily
struggles of doing a job, of procuring a service, serve as a reminder that Gaza
is more than a stage for conflict and violence. It is as real—if also surreal—a
place as any in which we live, and people there continue to be concerned with
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and to strive to better their mundane quotidian lives. Gazans are not simply
martyrs and victims (or terrorists and fanatics, depending on your perspec-
tive), but also ordinary people with common concerns. While bureaucratic
practices were never simply regular in Gaza, their clear regularities highlight
Gaza’s location within a broader field of modern government. By opening
with them, I intend not only to describe the broad contours of the civil
service domain, but also to highlight the more ordinary face of Gaza.
Gaza’s distinctions are important as well, not only for understanding its
history, but for a broader consideration of governing practices. These speci-
ficities figure most prominently in part 2, where I turn to the details of
service work. This work and the challenges it produced illuminate the com-
plexity of relations among the various participants in government: civil ser-
vants, members of the public, foreign o≈cials. These chapters also fore-
ground the tremendous significance of crisis and crisis management in Gaza’s
government. Gaza’s government has always entailed both mundane and ex-
traordinary aspects, both regular and exceptional practices. In the organiza-
tion of the book I seek to permit consideration of each.
Gaza’s government, furthermore, in telling us about the shaping of this
place and these people, sheds light on broader dynamics. As distinctive as
Gaza’s governing techniques were, they were not entirely unique to this
place. The self-referential authorization so clearly evident in Gaza’s bu-
reaucracy also seems to be at work in governments that do claim authenticity.
The distraction and deferral that kept legitimacy in abeyance may be tac-
tically mobilized by states that do depend on an acceptance of legitimacy.
The centrality of these practices in Gaza’s government and the relative ab-
sence of other structures that might appear to authorize and stabilize this
government make it easier to see how they work. What we can learn from
looking at government in Gaza is helpful, then, in understanding Gaza, and
Palestine, as well as government generally. Thus this often extraordinary







The management of the modern o≈ce is based upon written docu-
ments (‘‘the files’’), which are preserved in their original or draft form.
. . . the body of o≈cials actively engaged in a ‘‘public’’ o≈ce, along with
the respective apparatus of material implements and the files, make
up a ‘‘bureau.’’
max weber, economy and society
Filing, as Max Weber reminds us, is among the most quin-tessential features of modern government. Almost every-
one is familiar with the need to gather and compile a huge amount of paper in
order to ‘‘succeed’’ in seemingly minor encounters with governing authorities.
Rule in Gaza has been no exception to this general condition. The British, of
course, are notorious documenters, and it is no surprise that Mandate rule
was file heavy. Building upon the sca√olding of Ottoman documentary pro-
duction, the Mandate developed an expansive system of paperwork.∞ The
Egyptian administrators who took over in Gaza after the departure of the
British were trained in government paper by years of British colonial rule, and
in addition they had their own histories and concerns which led to a prolifera-
tion of documentation. Bureaucratic authority in each of these governments
depended in significant part on the work of filing—work that was mundane,
repetitive, and (to the extent possible) unexceptional.
The conventions of filing, its methods for information presentation and
retention, are not particular to a given government or to any o≈ce within
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that government.≤ The generality of this technology of documentation,
which can be found in both colonial and national governments, in o≈ces
both private and public, with a multiplicity of intentions and e√ects, has had
specific importance in Gaza. Because it is so general in form, the governing
authority produced in filing does not immediately (or necessarily) connect to
the specificity of a regime. Files can be authoritative and can impart authority
to the government that does the filing without conferring legitimacy on that
government. Even as files are embedded in the particular conditions and
governments where they work, and even as they also are shaped by those
conditions, the mechanisms through which their authority is produced tend
to obscure this specificity.
The practices of filing in Gaza evidence the condensed presence of multi-
ple forces and administrative arrangements—the formation of Ottoman mo-
dernity, the practice of British colonialism, the struggles of nationalism, and
the shifting of regional and international authority. Even as I focus on British
and Egyptian practices, the very important Ottoman beginnings of this form
of documentary authority must be acknowledged. Carter Findley has traced
the emergence of what Foucault calls ‘‘disciplinary writing’’≥ in nineteenth-
century Ottoman filing practices. His descriptions of the new centrality of
uniformity and rationality in filing, as well as the increasing attention paid to
the individual as the subject of files,∂ illuminate Foucault’s argument that by
lowering the threshold of knowledge, disciplinary writing was able to make
of description ‘‘a means of control and a method of domination.’’∑
One of the ways filing contributes to governing authority is by defining a
space and style of interaction among people, whether civil servants or mem-
bers of the public.∏ Filing delimits both the terrain of possibility and modes
of objection. As it occupied an ever-larger place within the governmental
field of the Mandate and then the Administration, filing became the ground
on which confrontations and challenges to policy, behavior, and political
arrangements took place as well as the medium through which programs
were implemented and refined. To a certain extent, then, this was an author-
ity of expansiveness, one that worked by occluding other alternatives.
Expansiveness alone cannot ensure the potency of paper, though. This
potency relies just as much on the mechanisms of filing, on the system within
which a file circulates. The authority of government files was self-consciously
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connected to the uniformity and regularity of documents. Uniformity pro-
duced both familiarity—each document was recognizable—and grounds for
judging authoritativeness—resemblance to other documents. Regularity
helped manage the placement of documents within the broader network of
filing, which was crucial to the stability of that network. As Foucault under-
scores, one of the features of disciplinary writing was the development of
mechanisms to ‘‘integrate individual data into cumulative systems in such a
way that they were not lost.’’π Each of these aspects of filing authority is
largely self-referential, depending more on other files rather than external
forces to define and enhance this authority.
If the power of files is dependent to a great degree on the system of filing,
it is perhaps not surprising that one can most often study this authority only
when files have been re-placed into another system, that of the archive.∫
Archives themselves play an important role in the production and shaping of
governmental authority, but this role is not identical to that of files. Both files
and archives, though, are deeply concerned with temporal relations: collect-
ing information in the present which will be available to the future as a
record of the past.Ω This chapter opens with a consideration of the relations
among and distinctions between files and archives, highlighting their respec-
tive roles in the production of bureaucratic authority. Discussion then turns
to the moments of filing itself, exploring the writing, compilation, and stor-
age of files. In so doing, I draw on di√erent types and circumstances of filing,
in both the British Mandate and the Egyptian Administration.∞≠ Tracing the
filing process in its multiplicity illuminates the e√ectiveness and authority of
files as well as the confrontations and conflicts that are an inherent part of
the process.
Archives and Files: Disruption, Loss, and Accumulation
Because of their history of dispossession, Palestinians are acutely aware of
the importance of having evidence of their past and proof of their claims
about history. To this end, they have generally been scrupulous in their
preservation of evidence of their lives and property before 1948. Many Pales-
tinian families have the deed to their homes and lands, the keys to their
house, their land registry documents, or some combination of the above.
Discussion of ayyam al-balad (lit.: village days; fig.: pre-1948 period) often
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includes an o√er to produce these documents. At the same time, the condi-
tions of Palestinian existence have also made archival accumulation di≈cult.
Whether at the national level—evidenced in the Israeli seizure of documents
from the Palestine Research Center in Beirut—or at the local level—as when
the Gazan Civil Servants’ Association destroyed its own records in 1967 to
avoid their being captured by Israel and used in its e√orts to suppress
Palestinian resistance to occupation∞∞—the archives of Palestinian history
have been directly a√ected by the violence in Palestinian life.
Even under conditions far less fraught than those in Palestine, the pro-
duction of archives always involves procedures of exclusion. Archives have
conventions that allow entry to certain materials only; they deploy tech-
niques that can render lived experiences almost unrecognizable; they de-
mand conformities of form that can reshape documents. Archives them-
selves, that is (and not just the historians who use them), work ‘‘extractively’’
on the files of rule.∞≤ Whatever else they do, they necessarily displace and
disempower the documents that constitute them. The various processes of
archiving files, whether through state-issued regulations concerning deposit
of o≈cial papers, seizure in war, or individual extraction, remove them from
their systems of practice. In the transformation from file to primary source,
these documents are stripped of their authorizing location and operations, a
process which lessens and sometimes destroys their original authority. For
files to work for government, they need to resist extraction from the imme-
diacy of their practice.
Before going too far into this consideration of how files work and how that
work may be disrupted, it may be helpful to step back and define a file itself. In
the most basic terms, a file is a compilation of documents that is part of a larger
network of such compilations which relate both vertically and horizontally.
Horizontal relations include the keeping of similar files (with the same
subjects and numbers) in successive years and the keeping of the same type of
file about multiple subjects (as, for example, in personnel files). Vertical
relations include both di√erential scope of files (such as municipal files as
compared to central government files) and hierarchical distinctions among
producers of files (such as reports from low-level employees to their direct
superiors as compared to correspondence among high-level appointees). In
archives, all types of files are preserved, though these relations may not be.∞≥
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Whatever their power, as a technology of textual rule, files are notably
mundane. Their concerns may be either trivial or weighty, but they are
generally quotidian in their form. They are lowly texts, not often gracefully
written or especially well formed. While those who write the documents of
files take opportunities to reflect upon and critique the policies they pursue
and the frame of government within which they operate, filing as a process
does not encourage a bird’s-eye view of government. This kind of total
reflection is left more to the archival stage, where files become part of history.
Archives not only permit but encourage or demand the production of mean-
ingful narratives of their producing states.∞∂
Unlike other kinds of documents, which may acquire authority through
the status of their author, the elegance of their form, or the significance of
their content, files are authoritative by virtue of their compilation. Files do
not have clear lines of descent the way canonical texts might; the idea of the
authoritative original does not play the same role.∞∑ The accumulation and
reiteration of mundane detail in files help produce facticity and potency.
Furthermore, the mechanisms of filing, that is, their internal structure and
their means of dispersal in a system that regulates people, places, and things,
are crucial to the process of authorization. When files are archived, the
bonds of this network are loosened, but the files do not become free floating.
Rather, they are re-placed in the system of the archive, a system with its own
conventions and demands that are e√ective in shaping their use.
The particular files that constitute the materials for this study have had
distinct archival experiences.∞∏ This book explores and relies upon many
types of files, including administrative correspondence and o≈cial reports,
personnel files, and records of police, waqf (pious endowment) administra-
tion, municipal councils, and civic associations, all of which have distinctive
conditions of production and retention.∞π Not surprisingly, given the history
of Gaza, assembling the archive of this project required engagement with
several states and their institutions (including, Egypt, Israel, Great Britain,
and the Palestinian Authority). Not being part of a nation-state, Gaza has no
national archives. Because of the frequent wars and conflict, documents
‘‘belonging’’ to one state are often in the hands of another; Israel, for example,
seized and holds both British and Egyptian records. Because Gaza had
di√erent administrative status from one period to the next, there is little
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continuity in its documentary record (as one district among many during the
British Mandate, Gaza was the subject of less specific attention than during
the Egyptian Administration, when it was a distinct entity).
Many materials of Gaza are not in Gaza. The history of Mandate-era
documents of Gaza, housed largely in the Israel State Archives, highlights
the complications involved in archival collection. On the one hand, these
documents are among the most regular archival materials available about
Gaza. British mandatory o≈cials both created a considerable amount of
paper and formulated precise, comprehensive systems for archiving this pa-
per. In these papers one finds classic archival conventions such as series a–z
and files numbered sequentially and with clear referents and markers. Still,
the unfortunate history of Palestine has had its impact on this archive as well.
It was not supposed to be left behind when the British left Palestine. Appar-
ently, the documents of the Palestine government were prepared for shipping
back to Britain, but in the chaos that accompanied the departure something
went wrong, and they never made it there. Most of the materials were lost,
and those that were found were preserved in the archives of the new Israeli
state.∞∫ As complicated as the history of these archival materials appears, this
is the simplest collection in the documents of Gaza.
Consider Egyptian records housed in the Israel State Archives. These
papers from a variety of bureaus within the administration were seized by the
invading Israeli army in 1956 and 1967. These were active papers of govern-
ment, and no doubt many of them would have been destroyed over time in
the normal course of government business. And certainly those files saved
would have been categorized according to Egyptian methods and guidelines
about availability. Once in Israeli hands, this potential documentary trajec-
tory was halted. The documents appear to have been kept in their entirety by
the Israelis, though they have not been catalogued, organized, or, as it turned
out, classified.∞Ω
Normal archival processes have not been applied to these materials, a
condition which worked both to my advantage and disadvantage. Because
the files were not closed, I was able to do research in these materials. How-
ever, the files had never been formally declassified, and concern was raised
when another researcher requested permission to investigate ‘‘sensitive mat-
ters’’ in the Jordanian equivalent of the Egyptian papers. A decision was then
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made to shut the files until such time as someone could examine each docu-
ment and make a decision about whether to declassify it. Fortunately, I was
able to photocopy large portions of the files before this happened. These
records now lie in an in-between space, neither within the filing system that
gave them authority nor re-sorted according to archival conventions. Inves-
tigating the authority of these, and all the files under consideration here,
requires working back through the layers of their postwork histories to
understand their systems of operation.
Producing Files
The moment of writing—the drafting of documents, the production of
paper—lies at the core of the filing process. The conditions of document
production were not identical during the British Mandate and the Egyptian
Administration in Gaza, but during each both the content and the style of
file writing were heavily regulated.≤≠ Administrative writing during the Man-
date often included translation (both cultural and linguistic) as a fundamen-
tal component. There were three o≈cial languages in Palestine during the
Mandate, English, Arabic, and Hebrew, and document producers had dif-
ferent languages as their native tongue as well as di√ering levels of proficiency
in the others. During the Egyptian Administration, the local population and
the foreign administrators had a common language and cultural background.
They shared as well the experience of British rule and thus were familiar
with certain documentary forms.
The potential audience for files also varied between these periods. In
addition to the possible public perusal of certain files, documents produced
in Mandate Palestine had to consider three distinct governmental readers:
local administrators, o≈cials in Britain (in the Colonial or Foreign O≈ce,
say), and members of the League of Nations (under whose auspices Britain
governed Palestine and to whom it had to report). The Egyptian Admin-
istration, on the other hand, did not proceed as a subsidiary of a larger body.
The United Nations, the successor to the League of Nations, was a party to
rule in Gaza, but as a partner (through unrwa), not a supervisor. As these
disparities remind us, even where files appear to be self-contained, to have
only each other in mind, they are clearly also embedded in broader contexts
and produced for a multiplicity of audiences.
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regulating resemblance and managing
conversation in mandate filing
The extent to which files were shaped by the conditions in which filing took
place is highlighted in both the history and content of the filing regulations
of the Chief Secretariat, the central executive o≈ce of the Mandate govern-
ment. The extant records of these regulations are reiterations of the code of
procedure destroyed in the bombing on July 22, 1946, of the Secretariat
o≈ces in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem by Jewish militants. In the
aftermath of the bombing, which took the lives of more than ninety people
and was part of a process that led eventually to Britain’s departure from
Palestine, a series of o≈ce orders were issued restating the most important of
these regulations.≤∞ As unfortunate as was the need for this restatement of
o≈ce procedure, it did provide the opportunity to remind personnel of
existing procedures they may have been lax in observing.≤≤ The orders also
reflect the general character of filing practice.
As with filing more generally, the significance of these regulations did not
lie in their grandeur. On the contrary, the o≈ce orders provide instructions
for the most minute aspects of document drafting. One such regulation
governed the form of dating in correspondence: ‘‘No mention should be
made when quoting the previous correspondence to the current year. When
reference is made to a Secretariat letter it is not necessary to quote the file
number, e.g., a reference to Secretariat letter dated the 21st June 1947, if made
in the year 1947, should simply be ‘my letter dated 21st June’ and not ‘my
letter No. sf/—of the 21st June 1947.’ ’’≤≥ The reasons for such ordered
uniformity are not specified, though the regulation ensured that each letter,
each document, produced by government would resemble every other struc-
turally similar document. By providing grounds for determining documen-
tary equivalency, the enforcement of uniformity in written style contributes
to the consolidation of a largely self-referential authoritative field. That is, a
document could be judged accurate and authoritative by virtue of its equiva-
lence to other documents. This equivalence is not the resemblance of a copy
to its original—in the case of these files there is no original—but a resem-
blance of each to each.≤∂ At the same time, the specific form of a document
marked it as belonging to a singular bureaucratic realm: personnel files, for
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example, were all like each other and distinct from police files or committee
reports.
The extent to which the regulation of style was also a regulation of
content is made clear in another order stipulated in the above notice. This
order decreed that letters from government o≈cials to private individuals
should not include a distribution list, but ‘‘if it is specifically desirable to bring
the fact of such distribution to the notice of the addressee an appropriate
addition should be made to the text.’’≤∑ Like the date format regulation
discussed above, this order is concerned with producing uniformity, but it
does something else as well. By dictating style, the regulation also served to
control content. It seems directly concerned with minimizing the quixotic
e√ects of civil servants on the content of government papers. It would not be
possible to categorically forbid notice of distribution, as such notice was
occasionally desired. At the same time, to permit the use of distribution lists
would increase the likelihood that a careless clerk might provide accidental,
potentially embarrassing information. Through this precise, somewhat picky
regulation, an e√ort appears to have been made to forestall human error.
This regulation and others like it were immediately concerned with the
boundary between government and the public and attentive to the unin-
tended e√ects that documents might produce in their readers.≤∏ Other as-
pects of style management were focused more specifically on the internal life
of the civil service, a life that, to be sure, always had permeable boundaries.
The files of Palestine government correspondence, for instance, were orga-
nized to permit conversation among civil servants. They generally share the
same basic format: letters, drafts, and legislation form the body, or folios, of
the file, which opens with the minutes, a running commentary by various
interested o≈cials on the papers in the file.≤π The folios of a file represent the
formal discussion of policy, and expressions of disagreement tend to be
polite. The minutes, on the other hand, were much more casual and fre-
quently appear o√ the cu√ and most decidedly o√ the (public) record. Here
o≈cials allowed cynicism, prejudice, and frustration to show through. In the
minutes one finds comments such as, ‘‘I regard the whole thing [a draft bill]
as so bad that I think they ought to start all over again. The drafting is Mr.
Bentwich in his worst style, and resembles a sort of incoherent chattering’’
and further, ‘‘Clause 3 occupies nearly two pages of drivel, in order to provide
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what could be provided in a few lines.’’≤∫ The minutes appear to be a sanc-
tioned arena for such expression.≤Ω
The form of administrative files o√ers insight into both relations among
administrators and private individuals and the governmental milieu within
which civil servants worked. The audiences for any comment or letter were
generally multiple and were likely to exceed the named addressees. The
distinction between the two styles of administrative conversation discussed
above has a great deal to do with the presumed level of privacy of the
correspondence. Minutes were designed to be internal commentary, whereas
formal letters might reach the public’s attention. By providing a private space
for written communication among government o≈cials, minutes appear to
have contributed to forming a civil service culture. Here, in the margins of
files, civil servants were a√orded opportunities to address each other and
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each other’s work in spontaneous and natural ways—a more informal style
permitted in these nonpublic parts of files. Infighting and jockeying for
position, while present in folios as well, are particularly evident in the min-
utes.≥≠ Even in the presence of an apparently clear line of distinction between
the spaces of a file, conversation was carried on across that divide.
The various registers provided by this filing form did not simply o√er civil
servants a comfortable space for communication, though this in itself is
significant. Rather, the form of administrative conversation was of consider-
able importance in shaping government policy and practice. The regulation
of style served to police the boundaries of bureaucratic discourse—there is a
‘‘content of the form’’≥∞—as only ideas that could be rendered as policy and
articulated within the framework of debate could be entertained.≥≤ The
following of proper procedure was as important as independent judgment in
guiding government action. As I trace the details of bureaucratic operations,
the ways in which administrative style was intricately bound up with admin-
istrative practice will become ever more clear.
egyptian style: advice for administrative writing
Preoccupation with the mechanics of administrative writing was no less
important during the Egyptian Administration than in the Mandate. In this
case the concerns were linked both to bureaucratic imperatives and to broader
transformations in styles of Arabic prose.≥≥ This interest was evident in the
journal of the Egyptian Civil Service Commission, Majallat al-Muwazzafin.≥∂
An article titled ‘‘The Literature of Memos’’ (Adab al-Mudhakkirat), pub-
lished in the magazine in 1956, described the best style of document writing,
teaching civil servants how to write the most e√ective memos. ‘‘Above all,’’ the
article argued, a memo was a ‘‘sign of the understanding of the author of its
subject matter. Secondly, it is a way of evaluating you and indicating your
competence.’’≥∑ Memos thus have a double address. If done correctly, they give
clear expression of their subject matter. And, whether well or poorly ex-
ecuted, they express the professional capabilities of the civil servants who
write them.
The advice given in the article stresses the demands made by the Arabic
language on memo writers. One need not become an Arabic expert, the
article assures its readers, but one must ‘‘be able to express what you want
with a ‘clear’ expression and with formulations that have ‘limited, precise
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meanings.’ ’’ One should be careful not to choose words that have more than
one meaning, as these can obscure one’s ideas. Arabic, the article stresses, can
be a simple language, and in writing memos one should not a√ect a literary
pose. Rather, one should focus on using correct syntax and grammar, mis-
takes in which can alter the meaning dramatically. The author of the article
compares grammar to cooking: ‘‘Cooking is vital to the flavor of that which
requires cooking. Can you eat qulqas [taro] without cooking it? . . . I don’t
want to mention what Sibawiya [a medieval Arab grammarian] said . . . I
want you to always remember what your teacher explained to you about
nominal sentences and verbal sentences, and the arrangement of each of
them. . . . This is the grammar that is needed in order to cook the meaning of
your memo until it is ready.’’ The need for such instruction points to the
di≈culties of writing in Arabic, even for native speakers. It also suggests that
nearly a century after the widespread use of print technology had provoked
‘‘the decline of a preference for rhyme in favor of straightforward prose, and
the rise of a taste for simplicity and avoidance of little-known words’’≥∏
further education in style uniformity was required. The article ends by
averring that good memo writing can be a means of advancement for civil
servants and suggests that each should ‘‘strive to make your memos a means
of achieving a good evaluation.’’≥π
While the suggestions in this article do not delineate as precisely as
British regulations the form of the document, they do express an interest in
standardization. If administrative writers followed its advice and steered
clear of ‘‘perverse and infrequent words’’ and complicated constructions, the
result would certainly be a minimization of stylistic diversity in o≈cial writ-
ing. By emphasizing the e√ect on civil servants’ careers of the form of their
documents, this article seeks to invest them in the project of standardization.
At the same time, this process enabled superiors and citizens to observe and
document the practices of the civil servants. The uniformity of documentary
style not only supported the authority of those documents, but also o√ered a
means for comparing and judging civil servants. Not coincidentally, it also
constituted a mechanism for shaping civil service personas (see chapter 3).
personal form: civil servants write about themselves
That a civil service culture did develop among government personnel and
that these civil servants (muwazzafin) did feel invested in the projects of
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regularity and standardization that defined civil service quality is evident in
the ways they talk about their careers and positions. Their writings reflect
their participation in these projects. When petitioning their superiors on
their own behalf, as in asking for promotion, complaining about work condi-
tions, evaluating their coworkers, they made use of a shared rhetorical style
which largely followed prescribed contours. The personnel files of retired
muwazzafin are filled with such missives and a√ord an excellent venue for
considering the regularities of civil service style.
Administration-era requests for promotion, to take one example, display
a high degree of continuity of style and content.≥∫ In these letters, civil
servants both express deference to their superiors and engage in self-promo-
tion. The employee generally lauds the Administration as the defender of
justice and refers to correct procedure as the best mechanism for fulfilling
this objective. The petitioner details his work history, calling attention to the
dedication with which he has served government and explaining the error or
violation that has resulted in his failure to be promoted and therefore in a
denial of justice.≥Ω The letters usually close with a plea to the addressee to
turn his attention to this case and to fulfill his obligation and desire to see
that right prevails.
In one such letter, Musbah Ahmed,∂≠ a tax collector, compares his cir-
cumstances to those of his colleagues:
Sir, I have worked as a government tax collector in the Finance Depart-
ment since 1943—meaning 18 years—and I am in Grade 3. The breadth of
my work and my qualifications are present in the government file. I have
been in service for a long time but have not yet received a promotion. All of
my colleagues who were appointed at the same date were promoted to
Grade 2 three years ago, and I am still in my old grade. My work carries a lot
of responsibility, and my region is a central and large one. . . . In light of all I
have presented to you, I ask that you respond to my request for promotion
to Grade 2. You, who still strives for justice and social equality.∂∞
According to this letter, the principle that has been violated here is that of
equality. The procedural mechanism that has been infracted is that of pro-
motion of employees with the same seniority to the same grades. According
to Musbah’s argument, the length of his service is su≈cient to warrant
promotion, but he is careful to also highlight its importance and note that
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these details are documented in his file, thereby suggesting that the violation
of procedure is markedly unjust in his case.
Another employee, ’Ali Taleb, in a letter that begins almost identically (he
began work in the Agricultural Administration in 1937), cites the end of the
British Mandate as the precipitating cause for his failure to be promoted:
Sir, I was nominated to be transferred to Grade 3 under the previous
Mandate government, as the opportunity for promotion and transfer was
in the terms of the position. A number of my colleagues from this time
were graded and reached Grade 2. However, before my turn arrived the
Mandate ended and the Arab Administration came to the Strip. Natu-
rally, I should not be deprived of my rights for transfer and promotion
because of a lack of meaningful understanding of the position I am doing
currently. Therefore, I petition you, Sir, to look into my transfer to
permanent Grade 3 after my long service.∂≤
In this petition, ’Ali Taleb chastises the Egyptian Administration for not
fulfilling its obligations to its employees and implicitly compares it unfavora-
bly to the British Mandate in this regard. Like Musbah in the previous letter,
’Ali situates his service in the context of that of his colleagues, noting that
they have been duly promoted, and emphasizes the length of his employ-
ment. The criticism of the Administration, while muted, is sharper than in
Musbah’s letter. ’Ali’s mode of critique is common in civil servants’ letters.
The Administration is never called unjust, but rather is simply called to
account for instances of failure to achieve its own principles and goals.
This rhetorical style was chosen for its perceived e√ectiveness. Certainly
not all requests for promotion were granted (in the case of the two letters
cited above Musbah was promoted and ’Ali was not), but appropriate ad-
dress seems to have been important for getting a hearing. Although ’Ali did
not get his transfer, he did win the support of his direct superior in his
e√orts. Even if not every letter was e√ective in achieving its aims, as a body
they were e√ective in contributing to a broader uniformity of civil service
style. The resemblance imperative was clearly at play, as civil service corre-
spondence echoed other such correspondence. Through the mechanism of
accumulation, a style that was highly self-conscious and no doubt sometimes
artificial could become also a real expression of civil servants.
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limits of content
Style management o√ered an important means of regulating file content, but
it was not the only such mechanism. Content was also governed by the
demands of bureaucratic procedure. Files were not simply repositories of
bureaucratic memory, but also actors in the bureaucratic field. Their content
was e√ective in shaping administrative action, and vice versa. As Egyptian-
era personnel files show, the particular document compilations that made up
a file were connected to the concrete requirements of administration. Much
of the content of the personnel files was dedicated to tracking the personal
status of their subjects. All employees had to update their information an-
nually, indicating their marital status and the number of their children (and
in the case of men the number of their wives). Additionally, if an employee’s
status changed in the middle of the year through marriage, birth, death, or
children reaching the age of majority, he was required to report the new
information immediately to his superior for inclusion in his file. There was
nothing abstract about this requirement; the monthly allowances that com-
plemented base salaries were calculated according to family size.∂≥
As much as bureaucratic imperatives mandated the inclusion of content,
they also, sometimes as an almost accidental e√ect, produced exclusions.
Because personal information was reported for the purpose of determining
allowances, those family members whose existence did not a√ect the al-
lowances were absent from the files. Thus, when children reached their
majority and were no longer considered dependents for allowance purposes,
they simply disappeared from the files.∂∂ Despite the wealth of information
about family life contained in personnel files, therefore, they do not o√er a
straightforward opportunity for data collection. Like all files, archives, and
documents, personnel files have interests which govern their content and
their form.
Di√erent sorts of files, of course, have di√erent interests. Unlike person-
nel files, police files appear to consider no information irrelevant, a principle
of content management that says include everything.∂∑ The imperative to
collect all this information was rooted in the security concerns that shaped
Egyptian rule in Gaza: the threat of Gazan action provoking an Israeli attack
on Egypt, of political parties challenging government policy, of despair and
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disillusionment driving Gazans, natives and refugees alike, toward destabiliz-
ing protest. In tracking the contours of public behavior and attitudes, the
Egyptian-era files of Idarat al-Mabahith al-‘Amma (General Investigations or
Criminal Investigations Department, part of the Interior and Public Security
Administration) seem to collect as much information as possible about indi-
viduals. The tremendous breadth of scope of these files does not indicate a
lack of purpose. While much of the information collected could not have
been of immediate practical value, it did function as a database that could
assist the administration in controlling the behavior and attitudes that the
files tracked.
These files include incident reports about specific events, daily and weekly
reports by police o≈cers to department inspectors, and monthly reports by
regional governors and inspectors to the head of the Interior and Public
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Security Administration. The reports focus on public matters like political
activity, public opinion, and organizational formations but treat private life as
well. All public meetings were attended by an o≈cer of the mabahith, and pri-
vate gatherings were noted and observed. Conflicts between and within fam-
ilies were detailed, and their mediation by mukhtars (village leaders) dis-
cussed. Individual behavior, especially if unusual or potentially political, was
included in the files. Mabahith reports were concerned as much with talk as
with action and thus reported on public opinion and on prevailing rumors.
For the most part, these files do not analyze or (in terms of rumors) distin-
guish between fact and fiction. The work of making meaning out of these files
takes place elsewhere; the files themselves focus on the work of compilation.
Accumulation works to give weight and significance to seemingly insig-
nificant moments. The mabahith files are filled with events of no apparent
import and people of no obvious significance.∂∏ These kinds of reports were
e√ective in their compilation, not in their individuality. Not one of them
contains complete information about an incident, but rather serves as data in
the building of a profile or picture of a situation or person. Many reports
give, in considerable detail, accountings of incidents that seem entirely trivial.
For example, according to one such report, several people drove cars to Khan
Yunis and stopped at a school for several hours before leaving the town.∂π
The cars and their passengers are described in detail. The times of their
movements are carefully noted. This is the sum of the report’s information,
except for a note that the teachers at the school were familiar with the people
involved and believed they were there to have a meeting, subject unspecified.
The import of such a report is necessarily relational. If any of the partici-
pants already had files, then their personal profiles could lend an interpreta-
tion to the event. Similarly, if something threatening were to happen in the
future, this report could be included in a dossier. Or if a previous report
indicated that something was likely to happen, this report could serve to
confirm it. Police reports created an archive of information which could be
drawn upon if need be. Their role was to police the possible, to inform about
what could happen as much as about what had happened. Such an orienta-
tion no doubt contributed to the authority of the files, raising the level of fear
among people as to what they might contain. The files operated through
accumulation: no moment was too mundane for inclusion in them, and thus
no moment was guaranteed to be free from surveillance.∂∫
48 • Chapter 2
compiling categories and accumulating authority
This compilation imperative is important not only for security files. Com-
pilation and accumulation are crucial to the production of filing authority. In
filing, compilation both gestures toward the future and expands the reach of
files horizontally across the social and political field. It is part of the way in
which documents are made into files and through which files are located
within a network populated by other files. This process of accretion makes
files e√ective as records of the past and indicators of the future. This feature
further makes filing e√ective in the formation of ruling subjectivities and
spaces, as the threshold of knowledge is lowered and individual lives are
accounted for in files.∂Ω Filing is not a practice that simply captures individ-
uals. Rather, it forms an arena for regulated self-expression, as in complaints,
petitions, and analyses, and self-fashioning.
In addition to the incidental accumulation of almost undi√erentiated
information evident in mabahith files, compilation in filing also worked to
distinguish and define categories of people and place. Gaza, not surprisingly,
does not have pride of place within the British Mandate filing network. A
provisional district and town, Gaza did not warrant the same kind of atten-
tion as, say, Jerusalem. In files that cover Palestine as a whole, Gaza occupies
the periphery, often no more than a sentence or two, sentences frequently
devoted to comment on the backwardness of the region.∑≠ The Municipality
and Local Government files o√er more extended examples of compilations
about and from Gaza.∑∞ The Gaza files included budget estimates, election
regulations, citizen complaints, and municipal ordinances. They contributed
to the consolidation of Gaza as an administrative category in at least two
ways. First, through the compilation of municipal policy and procedure for
central government approval, Gaza was located within a hierarchy of rule.
Second, by providing an arena within the files of central government for the
enactment of local conflict (particularly clear in complaints and petitions
addressed to government), the accumulation of Gaza files within the group
Municipalities and Local Government participated in distinguishing Gaza as
a locale. Files, then, not only document, but also help make a place.
Palestine’s government during the British Mandate was highly central-
ized, and almost all local decisions required approval from the central gov-
ernment. Gaza’s municipal ordinances, such as those which determined the
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rates of market fees (vendors to be charged a 5 percent tax on all fruits and
vegetables sold and purchasers 2∞⁄≤ percent) or prohibited pollution of the
public water supply (no bathing allowed), had to be forwarded to the chief
secretary for approval and confirmation.∑≤ Municipal budgets required simi-
lar approval. Thus, when several towns of the Gaza district wished to pool
their resources and hire a municipal engineer, the chief secretary’s permission
was required. The Gaza district commissioner wrote on the municipalities’
behalf (the towns in question were Gaza, Majdal, Khan Yunis, Beersheba,
and Faluja) and noted that ‘‘this appointment would supply a longfelt want,
and I wish to recommend it. I should be glad if advance sanction would be
given for the provision of his salary in the estimates of the Municipalities
concerned so as to enable him to start work as soon as possible.’’∑≥ These
kinds of requests and passings up for approval of local decisions are repeated
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throughout the local government files, thus marking the subordinate posi-
tion of municipalities (Gaza’s and others) in the structure of Palestine’s
government.
Even as Gaza was like other municipalities in its formal relations to
government, the local government files also mark its distinctive character. If
the first major subject in the files was the seeking of government approval for
local administration, the second was local complaint about local administra-
tion. In the files, central government came to provide a venue for, as well as
serve as an arbiter of, local conflict. These files also display another aspect of
Gaza’s hierarchies, as it was for the most part the elite who could make use of
this filing opportunity. For example, in 1930, a number of Gazan notables,
most of whom were members of the municipal council, wrote to the high
commissioner complaining about the town’s mayor, Fahmi Husseini. These
notables were particularly incensed that the mayor had been granted permis-
sion to maintain his private law practice while serving as mayor. According
to the complaint, ‘‘The Mayor of Gaza is kept occupied with his own private
business to an extent as to neglect the interests of the town which is more
needy of organisation and attention probably than any other town in this
country.’’∑∂
Because the mayor’s business kept him away from town so much, the
complaint argued that conditions in Gaza, rather than progressing under his
leadership, had in fact deteriorated. The complaint notes, among other prob-
lems, that ‘‘winter is well in season, the roads are in a deplorable state, while
the walls of many houses are falling to bits. The mud in the streets actually
makes it impossible to walk, while due to the hopeless lighting system it is an
actual danger to be outdoors at night.’’ The notables call government’s atten-
tion to the strength of public opinion against the mayor and close by remind-
ing the high commissioner that ‘‘the public demands that only he who pos-
sesses the best conduct and enjoys a good reputation and who has the faith of
all the people should be eligible for this position. This is a point which we
believe Great Britain respects more than any other nation, and we feel sure
that you have intimate knowledge of all the people in Palestine, including our
most undesirable and unpopular Mayor.’’
In this complaint and in the many similar ones which can be found in
these files, the category of the local—and particularly of the Gazan locale—
was invoked to frame and forward the petitioners’ arguments. The peti-








tioners even used the centralization of Palestine’s government to make an
argument for the importance of the local: ‘‘The fact that the Government
still grants some right of authority to the Palestinians in the form of Munici-
pal Council is a recognition by the Government of the necessity of the
existence of Municipalities. That high Government O≈cials are engaged in
formulating municipal laws re-enforces this argument.’’ Good local admin-
istrators were, that is, vital to Gaza’s progress. The specificities of Gaza were
highlighted in the conflict between particular parties for power in this local
arena, in this case between the mayor and opposing notables. In the ac-
cumulation of charges and countercharges found in these complaint files, the
category of the Gaza locality is continually consolidated. Even as Gazans ask
for help from government, the files further consolidate this conflict as local,
one in which government could intervene if it so chose, but vis-à-vis which it
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was always an outside party. The varieties of accumulation found in files
work not only to articulate relations between and among di√erent partici-
pants in government, but also to shape and manage those relations.
Access and Control
As concerned as bureaucracies are about the stylistics of writing, equal atten-
tion is paid to the pragmatics of managing file circulation and accessibility.
This attention includes regulations governing availability of files, procedures
guiding the circulation of files, and layouts organizing o≈ces to control
exposure of files. The practices of the Mandate and the Administration were
no exception to this general condition. Weber stresses the secrecy principle
of bureaucracy, arguing that it ‘‘always tends to exclude the public, to hide its
knowledge and action from criticism as well as it can.’’∑∑ It seems, though,
that this formulation does not entirely capture the relationship of bureau-
cracy to information, a relationship which is marked by a tension between
the principles of public access to information and the protection of govern-
ment secrecy.
While Weber may well be correct to suggest that ‘‘the concept of the
‘o≈cial secret’ is the specific invention of bureaucracy,’’∑∏ without a principle
of publicity, there would be no requirement for such a regulation of secrecy.
That is, if no government files were available to the public, there would be no
need to define some of them as secret. Certainly, concern with both contain-
ment of and access to information was evident in filing in Palestine. In these
practices of filing management, as in the writing process, regularization and
repetition formed crucial means of e√ecting information management. Fur-
thermore, as in the writing process, the regulation of circulation was con-
cerned with producing and safeguarding the authority of files.
regulations of secrecy
Mandate Secretariat regulations recognize three types of files: top secret,
secret, and open. Top secret files were not allowed to be sent out of the
Secretariat;∑π were ‘‘to be seen and handled by British o≈cers only’’; could
only be transferred by hand, not sent in dispatch boxes; and could be typed
in the top secret registries only. This regulation is reflective both of the broad
colonial character of Mandate rule, which limited access and opportunity for
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natives, and of the specificity of the Palestine Mandate, where conditions of
so-called national conflict demanded that Jewish and Arab civil servants be
kept away from certain materials. Access to secret files, as compared to that
of top secret files, was circumscribed not by nationality but by rank. The
regulations delineate which o≈cers were permitted to handle such files and
specify that ‘‘in no circumstances may a secret file be handled by a mes-
senger.’’∑∫ To guard against accidental exposure, regulations stipulated that
‘‘top-secret and secret files when not in actual use must be kept in a locked
steel box or steel cupboard. It is permissive, however, if an o≈cer leaves his
room for a short while to go to another room in the Secretariat, to leave a top
secret or secret file on his table provided he takes such steps, by locking doors
and windows, as will ensure that no person can enter the room in his
absence.’’ The regulations further state that ‘‘the fact that an o≈cer is autho-
rised to handle top-secret and secret files concerned with certain subjects
does not entitle him to see top-secret or secret papers dealt with on other
schedules.’’ These regulations are interesting for a number of reasons. First,
they further elucidate British interest in limiting the quixotic e√ects of indi-
vidual action upon files. Like those regulations which sought to minimize
individualizing style in the writing of documents, these orders anticipate and
attempt to forestall accidental exposure of confidential information by im-
posing a uniform management style. Second, the regulations highlight dy-
namics of the relation between publicity and secrecy.
A central aspect of this problematic is the question of access by the public
to government information, but this is only part of the matter. The secret
files regulations mark distinctions internal to the civil service as well and
serve as a reminder that the category civil service is by no means monolithic.
Distinctions were drawn by nationalities and ranks as well as by job descrip-
tion. Lurking around the edges of these regulations—not articulated but
present nonetheless—was a degree of uncertainty about government’s own
civil servants. The possibility had to be considered that, faced with issues of
nationalist significance, civil servants might have loyalties to something other
than government.
In Egyptian-era filing practices, the management of access to files was no
less central, though the worries underpinning such management were dis-
tinct. Orders governing file disclosure can be found throughout the record of
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the Administration. In one such order, the director of administrative a√airs
reminded o≈cials of the laws and commands governing the protection of
secret documents:∑Ω ‘‘1) No employee is permitted to receive any visitors
during o≈cial work hours or to show them any papers. 2) Each violation of
the above clause will expose the responsible employee and his direct superior
to severe and deterring action. 3) It is the responsibility of the heads of
departments and directors of administrations to see that this order is imple-
mented with precision.’’∏≠ Like British regulations, this order both marks a
line between members of the public and government employees and inter-
nally distinguishes the civil service. By making an employee’s direct superior
responsible for his misdeeds, this order solidifies the hierarchies of the orga-
nizational structure of the civil service. The order seems designed to result in
extremely close supervision of employees by their bosses, an e√ect that
should ripple up the chain of command. This order does not distinguish
among types of files but rather serves as a blanket prohibition of exposure.
Some government files were allowed to be seen by members of the public.
However, by categorically forbidding disclosure to visitors to government
o≈ces, the order mandates a regularity of procedure and minimizes the
possibility of error on the part of individual civil servants.∏∞
circulating files
As the regulations discussed above indicate, even the most secret of files
circulate, albeit under tight restrictions. The guidelines which governed the
circulation practices of files during the British Mandate and Egyptian Ad-
ministration indicate that the movement of open, nonsensitive files was also
carefully regulated. The circulation of files encompasses the multiple kinds
of movement that files undergo, as parts of files (documents) move from one
to another, as whole files circulate among government o≈ces and as informa-
tion in files is selectively disclosed to private citizens.
The Mandate Secretariat regulation of correspondence determined that
‘‘where copies of papers on one file are placed on another, the file should
always show clearly which is the copy and should indicate the number of the
file on which the original is to be found.’’∏≤ This order, which seeks to mark
all documents, seems to work to ensure that documents remain embedded in
the networks that generate their authority. A copy that is marked as such
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would not risk losing the meaning derived from its place in a network of
signification, but rather could accrue further meaning by becoming part of
yet another chain of relations. In this manner, a document could operate in
multiple locations and do so in an orderly, systematized fashion. This order
demands that documents not make accidental or unmarked appearances in
other files. Rather, when they come to rest, documents should signal their
multiplicity and call attention to their paths of movement. This material
attention (within the file itself ) to the trajectory of the document and its
network of relations could operate to make a compilation of a single paper.
The circulation of whole files among government o≈ces in the Mandate
appears to have been perceived as an unavoidable, but at the same time
undesirable, facet of administration. Each time a file was removed from its
home department, there was a risk of disorder and mismanagement. Proba-
bly for this reason, the unnecessary circulation of files was discouraged: ‘‘Far
too many files are being referred to Departments and it would be appreciated
if, except in certain unavoidable circumstances, letters could be written in-
stead of the file being sent out. The principle to be observed is that files
should only be sent out when the amount of typing necessary for a letter
(especially enclosures) is so great that this extra work far exceeds the incon-
venience of absence of the file from this o≈ce.’’∏≥ Administrative preference
was to keep the file within the o≈ce where possible, and where not possible
to carefully manage the conditions of its movement: ‘‘O≈cers minuting such
files are requested to indicate clearly on the margin a specific date by which
they wish the file to be returned to this o≈ce.’’∏∂ Once again, relations among
di√erently located civil servants were important for the proper functioning of
the circulation system. Another order in this series reminded o≈cers of the
importance of properly instructing messengers in circulation practices, not-
ing that they should ‘‘explain to their messengers the systems of the distribu-
tion number card and when necessary, notify them, at the time of the collec-
tion of the files, of the names of the o≈cers to whom they are to be taken and
the location of their rooms. In default of such explanation the files are likely
to be misdirected and to reach their intended destination only after some
delay.’’∏∑ These practices of file movement operate to maintain and regularize
the general system of information management.
Increasing standardization of movement was a concern during the Egyp-
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tian Administration as well. In one instance, a bureau was established pre-
cisely for the purpose of systematizing the flow of information from one
o≈ce to another. In 1960, the Gaza Executive Council mandated the forma-
tion of the Personal Investigation Bureau, as an o≈ce of the Interior and
Public Security Administration, to respond to requests for individual crimi-
nal records. By serving as a central storehouse for information, the bureau
could regularize the transfer of information, both in and out of the o≈ce. At
one end of the process, police and court o≈cers provided information to the
bureau. The courts, for example, were ordered to forward to the bureau ‘‘1)
judgments issued in capital cases, 2) judgments issued for imprisonment of
six months or more’’∏∏ as well as judgments for a specified list of other crimes.
After the papers arrived at the bureau, following detailed instructions, files of
individual criminal records were to be prepared. The first steps of the pro-
cedure required that ‘‘when a charge sheet for the accused is sent from the
police, the sheet is registered in the appropriate registry, and numbered in
sequence. After sheets have been registered and have been so marked, they
are sent to the head of the alphabetical filing department who will undertake
a search for criminal records of the accused in the alphabetical files.’’∏π In this
process of file transfer, new files were created, as court and police records
were used to constitute individual criminal files. The attention to detail at
each step in the process indicates the felt importance of regularizing this file
circulation.
This concern was also evident in procedures for making information
available to members of the public. Content from the Personal Investigation
Bureau files were intended to be made available ‘‘upon request of the con-
victed person or request by public authority [sulta ‘amma]’’∏∫ for certificates
of conduct. The regulations also specified what information was to be in-
cluded in the certificates. They would not list ‘‘1) judgments that were over-
turned on appeal; 2) judgments where the punishment did not exceed six
months in jail . . . and no other crimes were listed in the file in the Personal
Investigation Bureau.’’∏Ω These regulations appear concerned both with pro-
tecting individual privacy and with increasing the e≈cacy of the criminal
justice system. The centralization of criminal records ensured that they
could be more easily accessed when needed. The precise delineation of the
information to be kept in these records, as well as the conditions for their
release or expurgation, minimized the risk of accidental exposure or erasure.
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Since these files were of people, rather than, say, government policy, privacy
concerns played a central role in the regulation of their disclosure. The
exposure of other types of files was governed by concerns specific to those
files, but general to all files was an interest in having control over when and
how the public (whether as a whole or particular individuals) had access to
the files.
File Storage
The government emphasis on file accumulation was bound to raise pressing
problems of storage.π≠ By opening with a discussion of archives, in some ways
this chapter began with the end of the process. The destiny of files, after all,
is either the archives or the garbage (now perhaps the shredder).π∞ Practices
of record retention were internal to the filing process. Sometimes these
systems of retention were immediately connected to the constitution of
historical archives—the British especially were careful about building archiv-
ing into their filing system—but o≈ce archives were not always intended for
inclusion in a national archive. Choices about what documents to keep (and
how) and which to discard (and how) impact the regulation of information
as well as the practice of compilation in filing.
The Mandate chief secretary’s o≈ce provided guidelines to its employees
for determining the fate of files. These regulations indicate the multiple
levels of file retention. Active files were stored in the filing cabinets of the
central registry of the Secretariat, according to an internal indexing system.
In order to relieve overcrowding in the storage cabinets, it was necessary, on
occasion, to destroy or archive unused files. It is noteworthy, considering the
general attention to detail in these regulations, that the regulations provided
almost no specificity in terms of what kinds of files should be kept.π≤ Rather,
such decisions were left to the discretion of the employees, though they did
have to be approved by a number of o≈cers:
Clerks in charge of sections of the central registry will go through old files
year by year, starting with the earlier years, to ascertain which in their
opinion (a) can be safely destroyed and (b) should be placed in archives.
They should bear in mind the possibility of such files being required for
ready reference in the future. . . . lists should then be submitted to the
Assistant Secretary or Administrative Assistant in charge of the schedule
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for examination. Each file on these lists should be examined both by the
section clerk and by the senior o≈cer concerned before submission in
final form to a Principal Assistant Secretary for approval of the action
proposed.
The objective behind this process of file storage and destruction was to both
simplify the daily practices of o≈ce filing (by minimizing the number of files
that would have to be sorted through in the process) and to make easier any
future move of the Secretariat to a new o≈ce (by decreasing the amount of
paper that would have to be transferred).
In this process of the culling of files, the destroyed or archived files did not
entirely vanish from the active filing system, but rather left two distinct
traces. First, material components of the files were to be saved for reuse in
other files. The order specified that prior to destruction of files, ‘‘serviceable
material, e.g. file covers, tags, unused minute sheets, pins and clips, will first
be salvaged.’’ Second, ‘‘the lists of files destroyed and sent to archives will be
passed to the indexing section for recording on the appropriate card the date
[of action]. The lists will then be returned to the registry for filing.’’ That the
o≈ce-file storage practice continued to account for those files that were
absented from its workings ensured that the integrity of the system—which
included its mechanisms for referencing file location—would not be under-
mined by the removal of physical files. Even files that no longer had an
internal life (that is, their content was no longer important) continued to be
part of the sca√olding of filing.
When the British began to prepare for their departure from Palestine, the
question of file storage took on a new dimension. Questions arose as to
whether files should remain in Palestine, and if so, which ones, to become
part of the administrative apparatus of a possible successor government or
should be removed to Great Britain to enter the historical record of British
overseas rule. While there are obvious political and ideological interests
underpinning such questions, they were addressed almost entirely in practi-
cal terms. What were the administrative requirements for such files, and how
would they be most e≈caciously utilized?
For example, as the Mandate wound down and the need to prepare for
pension payment became increasingly urgent, the Civil Service Commission
issued a set of orders for how to manage personnel files. It was decided to set
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up an Accounts Clearance O≈ce of the Palestine Government in Cyprus to
handle any ongoing financial obligations of the government.π≥ To this o≈ce
were to be dispatched ‘‘all the personal files and history cards of all the non-
expatriate o≈cers belonging to . . . departments’’ as well as ‘‘all personal files
and history cards of non-British expatriate o≈cers held by the Civil Service
Commission.’’π∂ Not going to Cyprus were records of British expatriate
o≈cers—those held by the commission were to go directly to London and
those in the departments were to be either destroyed or given to the o≈cers
themselves—and the files of nonexpatriate o≈cers held by the Civil Service
Commission, which were to remain in Palestine to be handed over to the un
Palestine Commission.π∑
In its final weeks and days, Mandate administration largely fell apart. As
Henry Gurney, the last chief secretary, described the situation at the end of
April 1948, ‘‘The Courts have stopped, and so has the Post O≈ce, except for
urgent and o≈cial telegrams; nearly all our prisoners have escaped, and the
prisons are not functioning either.’’π∏ The chaos which accompanied the end
of the Mandate meant that the orderly plans for the files were not executed
(indeed the un commission did not assume any authority), but they do
highlight the sorting out of the Mandate whole into its parts that accom-
panied the end of the Palestine government. Di√erences between British
o≈cers and local-hire civil servants were evident throughout the Mandate, in
both regulation and practice, but the process of ending that Mandate also
ended any semblance of equivalence among these people. Thus, the final
moments of mandatory archiving, even where they did not succeed in creating
an archive, did form a record of civil service di√erentiation and stratification.
Unlike the British Mandate, the Egyptian Administration of Gaza did
not come to a planned end. It ended, of course, with the war of June 1967 and
the occupation of Gaza by Israel. There were, therefore, no preparations for
final storage, compilation, or culling. Of the many documents that survived
the Administration, it is nearly impossible to determine which might have
been intended to be saved, which would have been discarded entirely, and
which might have been subsumed into other files, leaving a trace of their
original production. Within the various o≈ces of the Administration, there
is some information about how files were stored. The head of the Personal
Investigation Bureau, for example, supplied a list of the guidelines for file
retention in his bureau. The guidelines indicate that during the Administra-
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tion file retention continued to apply principles similar to those that were
prevalent during the Mandate. These principles accorded primacy to the file
system as an operational unity, making the mechanisms for filing sometimes
more important than the files themselves.
According to the bureau’s regulations, registers of charge sheets and fin-
gerprints were to be kept permanently, whereas the registers of requests for
certificates of conduct as well as the registers of the certificates themselves
(which were the files produced from the above registers) were to be kept for
only two years.ππ The lines along which distinctions were made seems rela-
tively straightforward and logical. The primary data files, which served to
create other files, were kept permanently. There was no need for the second-
order files to be permanently saved, as they could be re-created if necessary
out of the first set of files. These specific practices of retention and regular
culling of files highlight the mobile processes of signification which are
always integral to filing.
Filing as a practice exceeds the significance of any individual file. Main-
taining the capacity to keep filing is more important than any particular
content. Limitations in the space available for storing files was a real and
pressing issue, and thus file culling was essential for continued filing. At the
same time, the regular replacement of certain files within the filing system
kept awareness of future filing at the center of this practice. Each file that was
discarded created space for another, structurally similar file. The process of
file replacement has an additional significance. In limiting the importance of
any particular file, and emphasizing practice over product, the significance of
the loss of particular files (something which happened a lot in Gaza) was
minimized. Filing envisions future filing and in its self-referential structure
renders the systemic location of files as crucial as their content. Practices of
file storage illuminate how filing operates as both a compilation of the past
and an anticipation of the future.
Conclusion
Filing, while a fundamental part of government, is also in some ways an odd
sort of practice. It is executed primarily by civil servants and forms a record
of information about both civil servants and private citizens. At the same
time, many of the defining features of this regime of practices operate to
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minimize the apparent agency of these persons. Filing is a fully ‘‘peopled’’
regime of practices, but one in which those people cannot appear as primary
(or prior) actors. Files cannot work without civil servants, but they exercise
an authority that often seems to refer only to other files. Filing is a domain
that often appears autonomous. Files seem to have their own principles,
unconnected to any single administration or regime. To a great degree this is
true—and this chapter has highlighted this general character—but files are
also embedded in the particular bureaucracies they make work and are
formed by those demands. They are both shaped by and shape people and
places. Files are part of a broader governing dynamic that relies equally on
the practices of civil servants. No single bureaucratic instrument can be fully
e√ective on its own. It was the interactions among these instruments that




on being a  civil  servant
The English, of course, know their duties. . . . I learned from them
how to treat people, how to treat someone who wants something. I
say to him that I am not his master. The government placed me to
serve you. I don’t want to say that I am his servant, but that I serve
his interests. If this person was good and polite, I had to help him
regardless of his being a Muslim, a Jew, or a Christian. I lived on this
basis.
salim rashid, retired civil servant, gaza city, 11 march 1999
Since I am a member of society, I have to demand of myself what I
demand of people. . . . I was appointed to serve the people. I was not
there to give orders ‘‘you come here’’ or ‘‘go there.’’ This is shameful,
because there is dignity. I should respect him, for he is a citizen as
much as I am. I’m there to help and serve him, not more, so good
treatment is required.
jamal yusef, retired civil servant, gaza city, 3 may 1999
Civil servants, as much as the files they write and organize,are at the center of the bureaucratic process. Their e√ec-
tive operations are essential to both the work and authority of government. At
the same time, these personnel, especially the rank-and-file ones who have
pride of place in this discussion, often occupy an uncomfortable position. On
the one hand, they are functionaries and representatives of a government or
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administration. On the other, they are also members of the community which
is being governed. They are served as much as they serve. They are both the
face of government to a disgruntled public and members of that public who
may be as dissatisfied as their clients. While such tensions can be found in
bureaucracies of all types, they were accentuated by the circumstances in
Gaza, where the relationship between government and the public was so
uncertain and where the parties were so often at odds. As local hires employed
by a foreign regime, and operating on a precarious fault line between public
servant and private citizen, the personas and practices of Gazan civil servants
were vital to the authorization and persistence of government.
The authority of personnel was articulated first and foremost at a small,
even intimate, scale—in terms of character and reputation, of comparison
with other civil servants, of relationships with the people being served. It was
not only who these civil servants were that was important, but how they
were—lest this personnel authority be mistaken for simply personal author-
ity. Gaza’s civil servants also explicitly distinguished their work and their
authority from the government in which they were employed. This separa-
tion made possible their own positive sense of their work and also kept this
authority distinct from legitimacy. Civil service authority partly entailed
carving out a space that distinguished its practice from other sorts of prac-
tice—personnel from personal, government from regime, authority from
legitimacy.
To explore this civil service experience, it is necessary to understand who
counted as a civil servant. This definition was, as we will see, a matter of some
contention during both the British Mandate and the Egyptian Administra-
tion. To be a civil servant in Gaza did not always mean conforming to a classic
image of a clerk sitting at a desk, surrounded by papers, receiving members of
the public.∞ Further, and increasingly over the time period considered here, it
did not indicate with surety a person’s class or social status. When I told
people in Gaza I wanted to meet retired civil servants, in addition to admin-
istrative employees, I was introduced to teachers, policemen, clerics, electri-
cians, and nurses—a diverse array that highlights the breadth of the category.≤
Being a civil servant in Gaza was primarily defined, it seems, not by the type of
one’s job, but rather by the ethic, style, and benefits of one’s work. The
di√erence that being a civil servant made for people was not limited to their
work, but extended into all aspects of their lives.
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Civil servants (muwazzafin) worked for government (and also for unrwa:
see below) and provided services to the public. They were institutionally
distinguished from other workers (‘ummal) employed by government by their
conditions of employment, namely, monthly pay, pension upon retirement,
membership in a civil servants’ association. As one retiree put it to me, ‘‘The
civil servant received his salary at the end of the month—meaning, for exam-
ple, that he could buy on credit from stores and pay his bill when he was paid.
Someone who wasn’t a civil servant couldn’t borrow money from others—if he
worked he could buy food and eat. The life of the civil servant was di√erent.’’≥
Civil servants were self-defined as being especially concerned with matters of
respectability and duty.
During the Mandate, when the civil service was relatively small, it was
largely the province of the upper-middle class. Palestinian society was highly
stratified, and civil service status was part of the larger social condition. Civil
servants were educated, wealthy, and cultured, and the job was a high-status
position. According to ‘Arif al-‘Arif, a Gaza district o≈cer during the Man-
date and local historian, in 1943 the entire civil service in Gaza consisted of
2,775 people (the bulk policemen), of whom 162 were English and the rest
Arabs.∂ These numbers reflected a dramatic growth in the civil service during
World War II. Over the course of the Egyptian Administration, as both
educational opportunities and the ranks of the civil service expanded, its
salaries diminished, as did the value attached to such employment. Civil
servants were necessarily confronted with a certain amount of tension about
how much they could, or should, be distinguished from the broader Gazan
population. At the same time, di√erences of class, of training, and of salary
distinguished the civil service not only from the public, but within itself. The
diversity of civil service ensured that there was also considerable tension
inside its ranks. All these tensions were part of the definition of civil service.
This chapter explores reflections upon and debates about this definition.
The question of what a civil servant should be was a subject of considerable
concern, both among muwazzafin themselves and in the broader public.
These processes, which I term reflective habit, were themselves part of the
formation and consolidation of bureaucratic authority. In the absence of a
secure foundation for such authority, the habitual character of civil service
played a particularly important role.∑ It is a feature of bureaucracy that those
parts of its work which appear the least creative, the least individual, and the
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least exemplary are the aspects that lend it the most authority. In this
instance it was also the focus on the work itself, rather than the regime that
required it, that provided a means through which government could be
disassociated from the nationality of the rulers.
Weber highlights the significance of habit in permitting bureaucracies to
persist in the face of major disruptions, such as a change in regime, and even
to survive the loss of the files. ‘‘However great the practical importance of
administration on the basis of the filed documents may be,’’ he suggests that
one cannot overlook ‘‘the settled orientation of man for keeping to the
habitual rule and regulations that continue to exist independently of the
documents.’’∏ These habits and routines were not static or undi√erentiated.
Di√erent locations, jobs, and times made a di√erence to people’s habits, to
how they understood the proper character of a civil servant.π Furthermore, as
important as habit seems to be for bureaucracy in general, and as it has
proven to be in the specific case of Gaza, it is not an indestructible force.
Weber describes bureaucracy as ‘‘practically unshatterable,’’∫ but it is not
entirely so. The ways in which doubt, the counterpart of habit, can enter into
the workings of civil service illuminates the possibility, if not the probability,
of noncompliance on the part of civil servants and civilians.Ω
Habit, as C. S. Peirce understands it, can be ‘‘either a habit of action or a
habit of thought.’’∞≠ Belief is a habit, one that both shapes and provokes
actions.∞∞ For civil servants in Gaza, belief in their work, commitment to
their understandings of their personas, was certainly a habit of thought. This
chapter focuses precisely on habits of belief, on ideas about good and bad
work. The next chapter turns more directly to habits in/of action, looking at
the ways in which habits are inculcated through the practice of civil service
work. As we will see, civil service habits, being at least partially inculcated
even before one was hired and lasting long beyond retirement, exceeded the
moments of a career. Civil servants’ discussions about the nature of this work
are also part of the process of producing and reinforcing these habits.
Reflective Habits and Memory Processes
With its emphasis on experience and practice, this chapter draws heavily on
conversations I had with retired civil servants. In addition to innumerable
casual conversations, I tape-recorded interviews with people who worked in,
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or had experiences with, both the British Mandate and the Egyptian Admin-
istration. These conversations are not easily classifiable. They straddle the
divide—to the extent that there is one—between the historical and the eth-
nographic. They are part oral history, recollections of people’s lives and work
in earlier moments,∞≤ and part evaluative reflections on what government
should be and how people understood themselves. These conversations,
then, both provide evidence about habit and are part of habit formation
itself.
This is what I mean when I refer to habits of belief as reflective habit.
Contrary to common conceptions of habit as a space of nonreflection (as in
fact relying on an absence of active thought), the civil service habits I trace
here are deeply embedded in contemplations on the nature of service and its
practice. The bodily practices of bureaucratic work—the act of filing, the
scripted interactions with the public—and its reflective practices—the de-
velopment of a sense of oneself as a public servant, the elaboration of notions
like good work, respectability, and duty—are profoundly interconnected.∞≥
Understanding the meaning and power of civil service requires attending to
this relation.
In style and in content, my conversations with retired civil servants were
clearly part of the practice of reflective habit. Respectfulness, pride, and duty,
important features of civil service experience and habit, loomed large in the
ways former civil servants interacted with me. In this twofold expression, the
continuities between thought and action were manifest, as were the connec-
tions between my probings and their own concerns. Before I started con-
ducting interviews, I was not certain how my queries would be received by
people. I did not expect hostility, but I thought that perhaps the intensity of
the national problem in people’s experience would make my project, which
did not focus on this struggle, seem irrelevant. What I found, to my pleasure,
was that even as people were interested in what a book on Gaza might do for
their cause, they were also deeply engaged (entirely apart from me) in their
own processes of reflecting on the workings of government, the significance
of its mundane routines, and the e√ects of its demands on people.
I talked with people in a variety of settings, including homes, o≈ces, and
the outdoors. Interviews conducted in people’s homes were most likely to
involve other participants, as family members gathered around to hear what
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they had to say. I had ongoing relationships with many of the people with
whom I had tape-recorded conversations; other people I met only for the
interview. Judging from those people whom I knew well, the concerns and
evaluations expressed in formal interviews extended into ordinary life.∞∂ I
also learned something about civil service experience from the locations of
my interviews. I spoke with one former unrwa teacher sitting between rows
of peas growing in the small plot of land he had purchased with the money he
received at retirement. I interviewed many people in the o≈ces of the Retired
Civil Servants’ Association and the Retired Arab unrwa Employees’ Asso-
ciation, places where retirees, now that they no longer had o≈ces to go to,
spent their days drinking co√ee, playing backgammon, and arguing about
politics. For a conversation with Khalil Rishad, a retired director of Diwan
al-Muwazzafin (Civil Service Commission), he and I were given the use of
the o≈ce of the Pension Administration’s director, a courtesy that reflected
Khalil’s status as a former high-ranking o≈cial. Each of these settings—and
the variety of homes where I met people, in refugee camps, in cities, and in
towns—a√orded its own insight into the working histories of these former
civil servants.
The narrative expressions, evaluations, and recollections articulated in
conversations I had with people in Gaza constitute an interpretative moment
within the memory process.∞∑ Conceiving of memory as a process reminds us
that there is no inherent object that is falsified over time, or by politics
(which is not to say that there cannot be false memories).∞∏ In the case of
Gaza, the intense politics of the place and the multiple ruling authorities
who have influenced the civil service complicate civil service memories.
When former civil servants spoke about their work during the Mandate or
the Administration, they frequently made explicit comparisons with the
Israeli occupation or the Palestinian Authority, and sometimes with Otto-
man practice. The various administrations were judged in relation to and in
terms of each other. The practice of narrative imbrication necessarily com-
plicates, but does not invalidate, the use of these interviews in an analytical
project that focuses on the first two administrations. That people have some-
thing to say about the present does not mean they don’t have anything to say
about the past.
At the same time, just because people are silent about something does not
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mean it is unimportant.∞π With the tape recorder rolling, for instance, people
were often reluctant to criticize the Palestinian Authority. Even though my
research was not about the Authority, people wanted to make sure that I
would not use their names (I am not) and that I was not a journalist who was
going to put their words in the newspaper the next day. This concern, while
pervasive, did not engender a complete narrative absence, but rather a narra-
tive thinness. In casual conversation criticism never ceased, and it did some-
times make its way into interviews. There is no doubt, however, that concern
about the Authority’s security forces influenced people’s talk.
Other narrative absences reflected more complicated social phenomena.
For example, when I raised the question of relations between native Gazans
and refugees, people tended to gloss over problems and discrimination. It
seemed clear to me that this reluctance stemmed from a concern that I not
think there was disunity or internal discord among Palestinians, who were
supposed to be united in struggle after all. Of course, it was only because
enough people told me about the complexity of the relations between Ghaz-
zazwa (native Gazans) and refugees that I was able to interpret this narrative
thinness in this way.∞∫ My own understandings of Gazans’ reflections on civil
service experience rely both on an accumulation of conversations and on the
multiplicity of perspectives on these reflections that I acquired throughout
my research (in archives, in newspapers, in local histories, and so forth).
That is, my account of the memories and evaluations of civil servants is also
part of the interpretive process.
The Sense of Service: Reflections on Practice and Character
In my conversations with civil servants, we talked a lot about what it meant
to be a good muwazzaf, and conversely what might constitute bad work. In
implicitly or explicitly comparing their work to that of other civil servants or
to civil service in other times, the retirees I knew in Gaza not only defined
themselves, but also o√ered clear arguments about what government should
be. At times, people suggested that the work they did in the Mandate was an
improvement over conditions during the preceding Ottoman regime. At
other times, they drew contrasts between Egyptian service and the humilia-
tions of Israeli occupation or the corruption of the Palestinian Authority.
Retired civil servants’ evaluations of rule also sometimes felt to me like
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suggestions for the future—how a Palestinian state might best be able to
serve its people. Gaza’s muwazzafin did not create their ideas about service
sui generis. They were schooled in Ottoman, British, and colonial traditions
of service that shaped the contours of their definitions. These broad notions
both helped people cope with the di≈cult conditions in Gaza and were
themselves inflected with Gaza’s particularities. Being respectable and re-
spected, doing one’s duty, working with e≈ciency and sympathy, distinguish-
ing oneself within the community, these were all features of the complicated
and sometimes contradictory definition of good civil service work.
in service to duty: doing good for
nation, family, and self
The widespread agreement among muwazzafin that service was a duty lent
their work importance, even if the details of their job seemed trivial. Sense of
duty was also connected to civil servants’ production of themselves as author-
itative subjects. It permeated civil servants’ idea of themselves, of their work,
and of their lives. At the same time, ideas about duty were remarkably
concrete and often instrumental. Some people linked this work with their
obligations to the community, but just as many highlighted their respon-
sibility to their families and their need to earn a living. This instrumentality
distinguishes duty from the much more general ideas about respectability
that were also crucial to civil service self-perception. One might choose to
take the job for a specific, even narrow purpose. But once a civil servant, one
had to embody that persona. Varying reasons for taking the job did not seem
to produce diverse senses of what civil service should mean.
Those who defined their duty entirely as service to community and nation
tended to be wealthy, people whose families did not depend on their monthly
salary. Most women who worked in service during the Mandate were from
this class, people for whom a job as a teacher (the most common option for
women) was a means of doing good, rather than a way of earning a living.∞Ω A
former teacher who now runs a charitable society for women described the
purpose of her work: ‘‘I never thought of money. I thought of how to serve
my people . . . to serve my people and to serve my women.’’≤≠ Another
teacher, Hanan, said almost the same thing: ‘‘I was concerned for the people,
I loved the people and I still love them now. . . . I liked my job, and it was a
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hobby more than an employment.’’≤∞ For these civil servants, duty to serve
the people was perceived as a form of charity, an obligation on the part of the
well-to-do to those less fortunate than themselves. To this extent, duty was
implicated in the distinctions that civil service produced in the community.
Given the extreme impoverishment most Gazans faced after 1948, it is not
surprising that most people who began their civil service careers during the
Egyptian Administration accorded as much importance to their duty to their
families as to their duty to community. Ahmed Ismail, who worked first as a
laborer and then as a clerk for unrwa, explained that even though he was
educated, he was willing to take any job to support his family: ‘‘I was the only
person who could take care of the family. What to do? I thought that the
best thing was to find a job, but from where?’’≤≤ He submitted more than
sixty applications to unrwa before finally receiving a summons from the
director, who told him that the only available position was a job as a laborer
in a rations distribution center, a position far below his qualifications: ‘‘He
said, ‘Do you know what I mean by laborer?’ I told him, ‘Yes, I know, I see
the laborers when I go to the distribution center [to get my monthly rations].
I told him, ‘I want to work.’ ’’ Convinced that Ahmed was willing, the
director gave him the job. Then, he recounted, ‘‘I worked as a laborer, but I
determined that I accept for now and would be a hard worker and obey my
bosses, and I could also help them in clerical work.’’ Ahmed’s hard work paid
o√, and he was appointed to a clerical position within a short time. He
received steady promotions throughout his career and retired as a field
distribution o≈cer. He stressed that his duty to his family was the impetus
behind his success: ‘‘My family situation required me to work hard and strive
to bring my family into safety and security.’’
Working in the civil service a√orded people a salary with which to feed
their families, but it seemed also to transform their experience of loss. By
enabling muwazzafin to be active in improving people’s living conditions,
rather than being passive recipients of relief, civil service mitigated the humil-
iation they might have felt about their desperate conditions. There is no
doubt that, especially after 1948, public services were vital to many people’s
survival. Da’ud Ahmed certainly understood his work as a clerk in the
Egyptian Administration in these terms. He described his feelings of humili-
ation in 1948 and explained that while he needed work to help his family—
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‘‘my family thought of me as a savior’’—once employed he focused on his
ability to e√ect change for other people: ‘‘We saw how people were living, and
we tried hard to ease these bad conditions. It was a responsibility to serve my
community through my job and to work honestly in this regard.’’≤≥ Reflect-
ing a di√erent attitude from those who saw civil service as charity, Da’ud
emphasized the equality of the service relation: ‘‘I was put in this job to serve
the people, not to control or humiliate them.’’ Whatever the disparities in
their attitudes toward the people, civil servants were in agreement that they
and their work deserved respect. Evidence suggests that this conception was
widely shared, that civil servants’ self-constitution as authoritative subjects
contributed to their authority. Respectability was one of the terms through
which civil service authority was translated into everyday interactions.
respectability and civil service etiquette
Everybody in Gaza told me that civil servants had to be respectable—respect-
ful in their dealings with people, worthy of receiving their respect, and well
mannered in their life. This was a habit that defined civil servants and
provided a grounds for judging them. Respectability both indexed and pro-
duced their authority. To be deemed respectable, the smallest details of one’s
interactions mattered. Ibrahim Mahmoud, who retired as a school principal,
explained his view of this etiquette. A civil servant, he said, ‘‘should have taste
and good morals. I come to you, for example, you should o√er me a cup of
co√ee. You can’t greet me without a kind word. So, I drink something better
than this cup of co√ee [this small gesture goes a long way].’’≤∂ Treating people
right, easing their encounter with government, was perceived as an essential
part of civil service respectability. Reflecting on his own experience in civil
service, Salim Rashid gave prominence to his style of dealing with people: ‘‘I
learned from them [the British] how to treat people. . . . I don’t want to say
that I am his servant, but I serve his interests. If this person was good and
polite, I have to help him, regardless of his being a Muslim, a Jew, or a
Christian.’’≤∑
While Salim did not suggest that only civil servants were respectable—
and civilian respectfulness was clearly important to him—he did intimate
that respectability was intrinsic to civil service in a way that was not true for
the general population. He did not imagine that all civil servants lived up to
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these standards, but he viewed such failures as having serious consequences:
‘‘If you behaved in your work in a good manner, straight, the people will
respect you. . . . It is up to you. You have to prove yourself in society as a civil
servant. There are civil servants who retired without anyone mentioning
them and there are others in high-ranking positions, but nobody says good
morning to them.’’≤∏ Being perceived as respectable could bring concrete
benefits to civil servants. That is, it was an e√ective habit, one that could
engender habits of respect in other people.≤π
At the same time, a lack of respectability could a√ect not only one’s
position in society, but also one’s ability to advance at work. Muhammad
Ghazi, a clerk in the Egyptian-era health department, attributed his success
to his distinction from other, less respectable employees: ‘‘Some employees
had bad habits. Some drank co√ee at their desks, some talked, some smoked
cigarettes, this was not me. I progressed a lot, even compared to the em-
ployees who had seniority over me.’’≤∫ Respectable behavior also made the
work itself go more smoothly. In his accounts of events at work, Salim
stressed that he accomplished his goals ‘‘through sweet speech and logic and
not through shouting or fighting. . . . When the employee shouts and raises
his voice, he gets a headache. . . . Through understanding everything works
out—it depends on the mentality of the muwazzaf.’’≤Ω Salim noted the e√ects
of behavior—the instrumental aspect of respectability—yet he also believed
respectability to be its own reward. As a civil servant, one should be respect-
able, not just because it will help achieve some immediate end, but because
that is what it means to be a civil servant. Respectability participated in the
consolidation of the authority of civil service personnel, creating grounds for
public respect and suggesting the contours of interactions.
distinction: benefits of and tensions in service
The distinctions that went along with civil service reflect some of its internal
contradictions. Along with respectability came high social status, a distinct
benefit of government work and evidence of the successful inculcation of its
habits. The status accorded civil servants in Palestine was an accumulation of
attitude over time. The Ottoman origins of the Palestinian civil service
created new forms of education and training that distinguished civil servants
within the broader society.≥≠ When British o≈cials considered employment
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in their version of this service, they looked to hire people with service histo-
ries in their families, thereby ensuring that a sense of civil service status
would extend beyond the confines of any one job. The expansion of civil
service during the Administration, which made these positions much less
rarified, risked undermining, though not eliminating, this special status.
Even as civil servants appreciated this benefit, these social distinctions
created a certain amount of tension within and around civil service, in part
because, in contrast to conditions of patronage, occupation, or corruption,
civil service interactions were supposed to take place among equals.≥∞ Many
former civil servants stressed precisely this equality in describing their rela-
tions with the public. As Bahat Hassan put it, ‘‘We had values, principles,
obligation, respect, and compliments. The employee was not a tyrant. Civil
servants are ordinary people who respect all people. His salary doesn’t make
him a high-class person.’’≥≤ In this view, service should be neither servitude
nor domination.
Many civil servants, though, enjoyed a sense of superiority. This superi-
ority was linked to class di√erences and was most often expressed by the
same people who viewed their work as a form of charity. Reflecting on her
work during the Mandate, the teacher Hanan commented that ‘‘the South-
ern District—the Gaza Strip and the south—was less civilized. . . . Education
in the rest of Palestine was more advanced.’’ Despite the fact that she herself
is from Gaza, Hanan, being the daughter of a powerful, well-known man and
highly educated, most definitely did not include herself in this evaluation.
Her sense of distinction from the people around her was even stronger when
she discussed the refugees who came to Gaza in 1948: ‘‘The refugees who
came to the Strip were from the most backward class in Palestine. . . . The
villages—and I am an urban person [madaniyya]—there was a big di√erence
between a village in the north and a village in the south.’’ In addition to a
north-south distinction, Hanan highlighted the di√erence between urban
and rural life—and firmly identified the former as superior.≥≥ Hanan insisted
that her superiority did not undermine her service work, but those on the
receiving end might have disagreed.
Distinction did sometimes create tensions with the broader public.
Rachelle Taqqu notes, in a dissertation about Arab workers during the
Mandate, that when local civil servants ‘‘adopted British manners, they some-
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times set themselves apart from the rest of the population.’’≥∂ Even as people
respected and accorded status to civil servants, there was some resentment
about ‘‘the ‘professional’ pose assumed by many government employees.’’≥∑
There was also resentment within the ranks of the civil service about internal
class distinctions. As one retiree, Abu Jamal, complained to me, ‘‘Junior
employees had low salaries, and the senior employees had high salaries and
were indi√erent to the plight of junior employees and unconcerned about
increasing their salaries.’’≥∏ These sorts of tensions never developed into out-
and-out conflict, but they were a persistent feature of civil service experience.
Still, even civil servants who were not from the upper class benefited from
service distinctions, and many remember their high social status fondly.
People recall that in the British Mandate, ‘‘We were the top.’’≥π A former
teacher described how association with teachers was enough to raise the
status of others: ‘‘Someone who wanted to be notable, during Ramadan he
invited the teachers to show that he has a connection. So, the people say,
‘Oh! Oh, the teachers are coming to the home of fulan [so-and-so].’ ’’≥∫
During the Egyptian Administration, one retiree (Abu Jamal) commented to
me, ‘‘the civil servant felt comfortable and everybody wanted his daughter or
sister to marry a civil servant because he earned a good and steady salary.
When a civil servant wanted to become engaged to somebody, her family
immediately agreed; they said that this employee will get a dunam [plot of
land] in the future and his salary is good.’’ In large part because of a devalua-
tion in civil service salaries, such high status is a thing of the past, and Abu
Jamal went on to lament that today ‘‘people hesitate when an employee wants
to marry their daughter, even if he has good morals and conduct, but when
an uneducated day-worker wants to marry, they agree immediately.’’≥Ω
Distinction both created and was a characteristic of tension in civil ser-
vice. Bureaucratic authority seemed to depend on the presence of both
‘‘equality’’ and ‘‘social di√erentiation’’ in civil service practice. There were,
that is, multiple sources of authority which were both interrelated and mutu-
ally dependent. That civil servants made claims about approaching their
clients as equals a√orded the civil service a certain amount of moral author-
ity. That they sometimes approached these clients from a position of higher
status gave them social authority. This was in addition, of course, to the legal
authority that their o≈ce gave them. The relations among these sorts of
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authority were complex, and they did not necessarily form a coherent whole.
Bureaucratic authority appeared to depend on keeping this variety of rela-
tions in constant play.
Bad Habits: The Other Side of Civil Service
One of the factors that had to be accounted for in this variety was the
possibility of poor work—‘‘bad habits’’—among civil servants. Even as civil
servants articulated their expectations of themselves and others in their
position, and even as they asserted that these expectations were not simply
ideals but rather the practiced habits of civil service, they were cognizant of
failures. People more often talked about the bad habits of other people, other
departments, or other regimes than about their own. That civil servants were
vehement in their objections to perceived misbehavior by colleagues could
serve to further underscore the importance of civil service virtues as well as
the commitment of most civil servants to maintaining them. These reflec-
tions on the boundaries of good behavior also served as a reminder that habit
was not stasis: it required work, reflection, and active participation.
While my conversations with retirees about failures to behave up to
standard took place long after the fact, archival records indicate that working
civil servants did make formal complaints about their colleagues when they
disapproved of their practices (and perhaps when they saw personal advan-
tage in slowing someone else’s career trajectory). In 1947, Mustafa Bseiso, the
shari‘a advocate of Gaza wrote to the attorney general, complaining about the
work habits of a colleague in the Gaza court. The attorney general forwarded
the complaint to the chief secretary, who asked the Supreme Muslim Coun-
cil to investigate.∂≠ The petition both presumed and described a whole order
of work, which Bseiso thought was being undermined by the irresponsibility
of one civil servant: ‘‘[He] inquires whether the regulations governing hours
of attendance in Government o≈ces do not apply to o≈cers of the Supreme
Muslim Council and the Sharia Courts who arrive late in the morning and
absent themselves whenever they like, while the public wait to pay their fees.
For instance, Sheikh Adel Shareef, Chief Clerk at the Sharia Court, Gaza,
often arrives late unheedful of the hours of attendance. On Saturday the 12th
July, 1947, he arrived after 11 a.m., while he often has a haircut and invites
guests to eat and drink with him during o≈ce hours in the o≈ce behind
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closed doors, while people are waiting outside to finish their business.’’∂∞
Bseiso identified timeliness, regularity, and equality of treatment as crucial to
o≈ce order. Petitions such as this one, even as they complained about poor
civil service performance, reinforced the importance of good habits. Making
its way from one government o≈ce to another, the petition became a cir-
culating sign of the pervasiveness of a civil service ethos, even as it addressed
a failure of this practice.∂≤
Bseiso’s complaint was about a habit of negligence, a disorderly practice.
Other bad habits appeared more proactive—sins of commission, as it were.
Abu Jamal, who worked in the Gaza Municipality water department, con-
trasted the work of his department with that of other civil service sites in
terms of routine.∂≥ Adapted into Arabic, routine indicates ine≈ciency, bu-
reaucratic red tape, and a use of procedural mechanisms to obstruct the
citizen’s e√orts to receive services, rather than suggesting something like an
organized work schedule or a regular following of procedure: ‘‘We as em-
ployees o√ered services to the citizens and were e≈cient in our dealings with
them so they would feel comfortable and not annoyed by routine. There were
departments which operated by routine—for example, they said to the citizen
to come tomorrow or after tomorrow, but we were serious in our job, and we
respected the public and the public was satisfied.’’∂∂ In Abu Jamal’s view,
relying on routine showed one to be neither serious nor respectful. While he
distinguished the work of his department from that of departments who did
not e√ectively serve the public, there was an evident risk to the entire appara-
tus of authority if the latter were perceived as representing the civil service
milieu.∂∑ This risk, which could also undermine the status of civil servants,
was one reason that identifying and denouncing bad work was so important.
Bad habits are no less complicated than good ones, and there were many
possible reasons that a civil servant might not appear serious in his work. In
one of the few conversations in which a civil servant reflected on his own
practices with the same critical eye generally directed at colleagues, Bahat
Hassan described some of the di≈culties involved in being a good civil
servant. Bahat, who worked during the Administration as a market inspector
charged with ensuring that merchants were pricing items according to gov-
ernment regulations described the negative e√ects of wasta (connections) on
his work habits. He highlighted the ways in which it interfered with his
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capacity to do his job fairly and e√ectively. Bahat’s comments also indicate
another side of social di√erentiation vis-à-vis civil service: those circum-
stances in which the civil servant approached a private citizen from a position
of lower, rather than higher, status. Wasta, in this context, operated as the
negative side of social authority, di√erentiating among civil servants on the
basis of family origins or personal connections.∂∏ Personnel authority did
not, and does not, always trump personal authority, a reminder of the com-
plex field within which authority is articulated.
In response to my question about what he did when he discovered some-
one was not in compliance with the o≈cial prices, Bahat responded, ‘‘I will
answer you frankly. What I did is what happens now. I am from a weak
family. If I found that he was from a weaker family than mine and he couldn’t
hurt me, I would punish him. If I found that he was from Hillis, Shawwa
[powerful families] . . . I couldn’t do anything to him, I could only notice.
Because, my back wasn’t covered. . . . I wanted to eat, to continue to eat.’’∂π
The amount of attention accorded to pricing violations in police records
from the Administration suggests that this sort of civil service failure was
very likely to have been noticed by the general public.∂∫ A report from 1962,
for example, indicates that merchants were raising prices on basic com-
modities and states that ‘‘people are asking the government to intervene
and stop merchants from exploiting them.’’∂Ω People I knew in Gaza remem-
bered the prevalence of corruption: ‘‘The needs of the people were achieved
by wasta. There began to be a style that we hadn’t seen before—bribes—a
merchant who wanted to import had to pay something. . . . Someone who
wanted to resolve a problem—even if he wasn’t in the right—could get a good
outcome.’’∑≠
Bahat’s failure to do his job was, as he certainly felt, a serious matter. He
was both frustrated by and resigned to this bad habit of Gazan life. His
comments describe more than his personal failures and frustrations though.
They reveal how the di√erent obligations and duties of service could come
into conflict. In his work as a market inspector, Bahat had to choose between
fulfilling his duty to himself and his family and pursuing his duty to the
community as a whole. That he was confident in his inability to actually
fulfill this latter duty when faced with a well-connected malefactor seems to
have made his choice easy, though no less troubling to him. Whatever the
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public might see in Bahat’s work, he saw himself as trapped in a circumstance
ruled by privilege and distinction.
Public Perspectives on Civil Service: Habits of Complaint and Comment
As the public outcry about overpricing confirms, muwazzafin were not alone
in viewing civil service as a duty. Public attitudes toward the civil service shed
light not just on how its practices played among the broader population, but
also on people’s ways of interacting with government and its servants. That
Palestinians were quick with their commentaries about civil service practice
suggests a view of government as potentially responsive to public needs. The
content of the commentaries implies that belief in the importance of respect-
ability was widely shared, as it was in these terms that complaints were often
forwarded. The terms and tone of complaints did not necessarily pose a
challenge to the authority of civil service or its habits. Like civil servants’ own
accounts of corruption and ine≈ciency, by calling attention to particular
failures as the problem, public complaints may sometimes have further con-
solidated bureaucratic authority. Some complaints, though, did point to the
possibility of systemic problems, suggesting that failure might not be only
individual.
During both the Mandate and the Administration the Palestinian press
evaluated civil service performance, critiquing muwazzafin’s professionalism,
e≈ciency, and e√ectiveness. In the newspapers of each period one can find
examples of both praise and complaint.∑∞ In May 1935, for example, al-Difa‘,∑≤
a paper published in Ja√a that was widely read in Gaza, complained about
the behavior of employees of the customs department: ‘‘It has come to our
attention that these employees come late for their shifts, which is causing
negligence and delays in their dealings with people.’’∑≥ In this case, the com-
plaint was not about merchants, but on their behalf. It was frequent practice
in the press to report and champion public complaints about government
practice. The choice of which complaints to highlight no doubt reflected the
paper’s readership, a readership limited by class and literacy. This particular
complaint illuminated the network of relations—between employees, their
superiors, and the public—which constituted the civil service. Reflecting on
the negligent behavior, the article asked, ‘‘Could this be true? And, if it is
true, who is responsible for these actions, we wonder?’’ The piece ended with
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this question, further underscoring the importance of a well-functioning
bureaucratic apparatus for the inculcation of proper civil service values in
individual employees.
Similar techniques were employed in press articles which praised civil
servants, sometimes defending them in the face of mistreatment by their
superiors or misunderstanding by the public. The press, after all, did not
simply reflect public views of the civil service, but participated in creating
those views. In the early days of the Egyptian Administration, a new Gazan
newspaper, Sawt al-‘Uruba, published a panegyric to the Gazan civil servant.
The commentary praised Gaza’s employees for doing their job well and for
defying expectations. The article recounted a story told by a Quaker vol-
unteer (the Quakers provided relief in Gaza before the establishment of
unrwa), ‘‘who expected Palestine to be like unknown Africa.’’ Comparing
Gaza’s civil servants to those in Jordan, the man explained that it had taken
him a long time in Jordan to complete his paperwork, but in Gaza ‘‘they
asked me to sit in a chair and they o√ered me cigarettes and co√ee. And, in
five minutes—without connections—they completed what had taken four
days in Jordan. God bless all the civil servants of this region because they
brighten the image of their country.’’∑∂ In doing their job well—being respect-
able and e≈cient, doing their duty, and showing sympathy—these civil ser-
vants were not only mediators between government and the public, they
were the face of their country to a skeptical foreigner. In praising this work,
the press contributed to the consolidation of their authority.
Petitions submitted to government by individuals further underscore how
widely shared ideas about civil service quality were. A complaint sent in 1945
to the director of the land registry about two of its employees in Gaza
mobilized general ideas about civil service character to respond to a particu-
lar circumstance of misbehavior. The petition alleged that the employees
were letting down both the public and the government, noting that ‘‘it is the
duty of a Government o≈cer to serve the public interests and to be faithful
to Government.’’∑∑ Pulling out all its rhetorical stops, the complaint com-
mented on the reputation of the civil servants in question among Gazans:
‘‘Last evening I was sitting in the ‘Al-Nuzha’ Café in Gaza where I over-heard
some of the people discussing the ill reputation of the Registrar of Lands
Gaza and that of the Chief Clerk Habib El-Sayegh and how those o≈cers
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are actually committing shameful acts in over-loading the poorer classes of
the public by imposing on them exorbitant fees because they do not give
them bribes and how, in return of bribes they receive, they subject Govern-
ment to heavy losses in fees.’’∑∏ Positioning himself as an unconnected by-
stander who merely happened to overhear this talk and was concerned for
the sake of good government, the complainant urged that the director come
to Gaza at once to investigate.∑π I can’t comment on the veracity of this
complaint (the registry did not believe it to be accurate), but it discloses the
widespread currency of the categories through which civil servants defined
themselves. Character and practice, reputation among and relations with the
public, duty to government and citizenry—all of these terms according to
which the land registry employees were criticized, were those through which
civil servants recognized themselves.
The same criteria were invoked in Administration-era complaints about
civil servants.∑∫ When, in 1958, a group of students complained to the direc-
tor of the Interior and Public Security about their teachers, they relied on
shared conceptions of appropriate civil practice in their claim that the teach-
ers’ behavior was outside its boundaries. In their letter, the students said,
‘‘We would like to inform you that some of our teachers evidence bad morals
and set bad examples. They break the fast of holy Ramadan by smoking and
eating in front of the students—in addition to other disgraceful acts.’’∑Ω A
police investigation determined that the charges were true—the evident ex-
planation for such behavior being that the teachers in question were Com-
munists. Such an ostentatious display of political a≈liation was definitely at
odds with the prevailing understanding of appropriate civil service behavior
(not to mention the general security climate in Gaza). Accordingly, the
security forces ordered the education director to take disciplinary action
against the teachers.
Regulating Civil Service: Politics and the Repose of Habit
The complaint about civil service practice involving Communist misbehavior
raises the curtain on politics, the arena that posed the most significant
potential challenges to civil service habit. The severe restrictions that the
governments of both the Mandate and the Administration placed on politi-
cal activity by civil servants indicate their awareness of the risks posed by
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such expression. Consequently, civil servants were prohibited from fully
participating in the public life of their communities. For these employees, at
least as far as politics was concerned, there was no available realm of private
conduct. The restrictions, as much as political participation itself, created
tension in service habits.
This challenge was not to the idea of service, but to its enactment, threat-
ening to destabilize the ability of civil servants to be comfortably ‘‘reposed’’ in
habit.∏≠ The political realm had the potential to create doubt, discomfort,
uncertainty, which could undermine the stability of civil service. Such doubt
could also be threatening to civil servants’ sense of self. As William Connolly
notes, ‘‘To become severely disa√ected from that which one is called upon to
do in work, family, and consumption is also to become disa√ected from the
self one has become. When the distance between what one is and what one
does is great, one is likely to hold oneself in contempt.’’∏∞ Given the expan-
siveness of the civil service persona, which was deeply connected to how civil
servants understand their persons, this threat was very real in Gaza.
It was in the political domain that questions of legitimacy might be
raised—despite a general practice that held them in abeyance—that in turn
might undermine authority. Habit is tenacious, though. The recollections of
civil servants about how they maneuvered through these challenges indicate
that the abeyance of legitimacy was not a policy simply imposed from above
(in fact it very often may have been at odds with policy initiatives), but a
practice that made things work, however tenuously, for all those who partici-
pated in the governing process. The second part of this book, which explores
the details of bureaucratic service, further illuminates this practice. There
were clear moments of rupture in civil service habit over the fifty years under
consideration here, instances in which abeyance seemed to fail. The first
Israeli occupation of Gaza in 1956 was one such instance—and many civil
servants seemed to have stayed at home for those four months.∏≤ More often,
though, politics produced a shudder of doubt which was then reabsorbed
into the habits of bureaucratic practice.
choosing work and prohibiting politics in the mandate
During the British Mandate, civil servants were categorically forbidden from
engaging in political activity of any kind. As unsurprising as this restriction
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was, given the importance of controlling the national conflict in Palestine, it
shows some of the inherent di≈culties involved in the Palestinian experience
of working for the Mandate government. Constantly negotiating the restric-
tions of one’s employment and the sentiments of one’s nation created tre-
mendous tensions for civil servants. Retirees described their work as having
been for the benefit of their people, and yet they felt frustrated by their
inability to publicly express their support for this cause. Qasim Jamal, a
former teacher, described the position of civil servants. Each one, he told me,
knew he had made a choice: ‘‘He had two options, either to do the work he
had accepted or, if he got involved in politics, they said, ‘Bye-bye. You chose
politics.’ Then, maybe he wouldn’t find any other work. Job opportunities
were limited, and most of them were government positions.’’∏≥ The two
kinds of duty—to nation and to family—through which muwazzafin invested
their work with import appeared to be in conflict.
How were civil servants able to cope with this conflict? How was doubt
put to rest? Civil servants appear to have utilized two primary mechanisms to
maneuver among their conflicting demands: subterfuge and disassociation.
Through subterfuge—and by taking some risks—some civil servants were
able to find ways to participate in political life.∏∂ Hanan, who could a√ord to
take greater risks than those dependent on the income their jobs provided,
managed to write secretly for the nationalist cause even as she worked as a
teacher: ‘‘I wrote and signed my articles in my sister’s name . . . Istiqlal
[Independence]—our names inspired what was inside us. Inside school I
didn’t do anything. . . . I obeyed them at work. They allowed me to broadcast
on the school public address system, but to speak only about cultural things,
not politics. . . . So, I falsely signed my writings.’’∏∑ Hanan seems to have
created two distinct realms in her life, and she was able to feel positive about
both, indeed, to believe in her work in both.
Even civil servants who could not a√ord to risk such subterfuge were able
to take some comfort in the disassociation such divisions allowed. Civil
servants distinguished between their work in government and government
itself, drawing a line between British policy and Mandate service delivery.
Yasmin, a retired teacher, expressed this sentiment: ‘‘We never felt we were
working for the government.’’∏∏ When she said this, I thought she meant that
work in education was di√erent. When I asked, she insisted, ‘‘[No,] work in
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the government does not mean that all civil servants are spies for the govern-
ment or collaborating with the government.’’ Qasim Jamal echoed these
sentiments and explained when and how civil servants might be thought of as
collaborators. A civil servant, he said, ‘‘felt that he provided services for the
citizens, whether he was an employee in health, education, or public security.
Except for public security—if he had to enter into matters which were con-
sidered against the nation. Then it would be said, ‘This man is political, he’s
from the mabahith [cid].’ And people talked against him. But, this didn’t
happen a lot.’’ Thus, even as civil servants chafed against the restrictions
imposed by the British on their political activity, they were largely able to
keep this frustration separate from their valuation of their work and service.
The kind of separation described by Yasmin and Qasim was enabled by
the very habits that political restrictions disturbed. These habits, which were
not grounded in a particular government or policy agenda, were identified as
more fundamental to the work of civil service than that agenda. It was when
one’s work was directly implicated in the pursuit of objectionable policies
that it became di≈cult to disassociate. Such disassociation did not entail
creating a division between practice and belief or between o≈cial and hidden
transcripts.∏π Even as all sorts of divisions were demanded of civil servants,
both by the conditions of their employment and by their e√orts to take part
in the life of their communities despite those conditions, such divisions do
not comprise a map of the ‘‘truth’’ or ‘‘falsity’’ of people’s positions.∏∫ In the
process of making themselves feel better about their work and defusing the
challenge politics posed to their own comfort, civil servants contributed to
the consolidation of governmental authority.
national sentiments and political convictions:
egypt, unrwa, and civil service practice
During the Egyptian Administration, control of civil service political activity
was a√ected by Egyptian concerns about politics ‘‘at home’’ and regionally
and by the sometimes uncomfortable relationship between the Administra-
tion and unrwa. The control of political activity in Gaza, which went
through several distinct stages in the course of the Administration, mirrored
what was happening in Egypt itself. The most important parties on the local
scene were the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communist Party. The Mus-
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lim Brotherhood was especially popular since Egyptian members of the
organization had fought for Palestine during the 1948 war. After the war,
however, the party was banned by the Egyptian government.∏Ω
In 1952, after the Free O≈cers’ revolt, which overthrew King Farouq and
ultimately gave Gamal Abdul Nasser the presidency, the Muslim Brother-
hood was legalized again. For the next two years it was extremely active and
drew much of its membership from the ranks of the civil service. Rema
Hammami notes that ‘‘the head of the movement until 1954 was the head of
the Gaza Municipality and also a shari‘a court judge. Other leaders were also
employees in the Gaza Municipality or school teachers.’’π≠ The attempt on
Nasser’s life by a Muslim Brother in 1954 transformed the government’s
relationship with the group from one of cooperation to one of repression.
This second banning of the movement, and the departure of much of its
leadership, reduced the organization’s strength considerably.π∞
If 1954 marked the low point for the Muslim Brotherhood, 1958–59 proved
to be that moment for the Communist Party. While Communist support for
the partition of Palestine had antagonized the Egyptian government, during
the mid-1950s there was a ‘‘thaw in communist-regime relations’’π≤ such that,
in Egypt proper at least, jailed party members were released and greater
activity was possible. The Iraqi revolution of July 14, 1958, and the increasing
rivalry between Nasser’s Egypt and the communist-supported regime of ’Abd
al-Karim Qasim ultimately led to a crackdown on communists in Egypt, Syria
(at the time part of the United Arab Republic), and Gaza.π≥
The Gazan membership of both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Com-
munist Party had included many civil servants, though after the crackdowns
most were afraid to be involved in politics. Still, according to Hassan Ra-
shad, some continued to be active: ‘‘The civil servant was afraid. . . . Other
than teachers, most civil servants did not participate in political activities, but
teachers did. They were active with either the Communist Party or Muslim
Brotherhood.’’π∂ Police reports from throughout the Administration support
Hassan’s contention, indicating that the Communist Party had quite strong
support.π∑ There was also continued mention of Muslim Brotherhood sup-
port among teachers as well as support for the Ba‘th party.π∏ All political
activity was closely monitored, and the threat not only of dismissal but of
prison hung over any civil servant who remained active.
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Ibrahim Mahmoud was imprisoned in 1959. He explained that the gov-
ernment arrested anyone who expressed a political opinion: ‘‘We had made a
group who defended the homeland and the land. We pressured the Egyptian
government to bring arms and recruit. . . . they accused us of being Commu-
nists even though none of us were. When we disturbed them, they accused
us of being Communists and put us in the military prison. . . . We remained
isolated in the prison without trial. I stayed there for twenty-one months.
[The group was made up of] teachers and others, but the majority were
teachers.’’ππ Despite this experience, Ibrahim continued to speak positively
about aspects of Egyptian rule, insisting that ‘‘not all the Egyptians were
bad.’’ Even more striking than Mandate civil servants who evaluated their
own work as being good while disparaging the Mandate, Ibrahim disassoci-
ated the service work of the Administration from its political repression: ‘‘In
the education field, we respected all the Egyptian teachers because promi-
nent scholars and professors were among them, so why should we express
our antagonism against them. They [the teachers] did not interfere in poli-
tics but only in education—they gave us lectures in literature and morals.
The educational apparatus was good. In the health field, there were good
Egyptian physicians. . . . Politics was something else.’’ In fact, despite the
repressive aspects of Administration rule, most Gazans described this time
as the golden age for Gaza.π∫ The uniformity of this judgment hints that
disassociation was an e√ective tool for mitigating frustration with political
repression.
The Administration did recognize the necessity of a√ording Gazans an
outlet for political and nationalist expression, however controlled. The legis-
lative council and the Arab National Union were intended to provide such
an outlet, but also to build further support for the Administration and the
Nasserist project. Even if the union did not really represent a space of
political freedom, it was still too political in the eyes of unrwa, and the
organization prohibited its employees from joining. This stance created a
conflict with the Administration, which sought to encourage widespread
participation. It also produced an alliance between the Administration and
Gazans who, despite its limitations, were eager for opportunities to organize.
In September 1959, the agency issued a sta√ circular that highlighted the
importance of political neutrality among its employees:
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In accordance with the established principles and practices of the United
Nations, sta√ members are required to maintain at all times—in both
their o≈cial and their private conduct—the independence and impar-
tiality which is implicit in their status as Agency sta√. . . . Although sta√
members are not expected to give up their national sentiments or their
political or religious convictions and are naturally free to exercise their
rights to vote in elections, they shall not make public speeches, or write
articles or speeches for publication or broadcasting, or otherwise actively
support a particular political party or group of candidates.πΩ
According to unrwa, to be a civil servant, or at least to be an international
civil servant, was to be independent and impartial. Such a view was some-
what at odds with the definition of service as duty—duty to family and to
community—that was so important to Gazans. Egyptian administrators
couched their objection to the restrictions in precisely such terms. They
expressed concern that literal interpretation of the impartiality clause ‘‘would
require dealing with Israel as a normal country, not an enemy one. The price
of working for unrwa . . . is not that one has to forget one’s nation or one’s
consideration that Israel is an unlawful country.’’∫≠ Despite the Administra-
tion’s e√orts and employee petitions to unrwa, the agency seems not to have
been swayed.∫∞ unrwa employees appear to have managed this conflict in
their work in a manner similar to that of Mandate employees, namely, by
expressing frustration with and criticism of the agency and its policies even as
they saw their own work as in the service of their people.∫≤
civil service associations and
the defense of employee rights
While restrictions on political activity posed at least potential problems for
civil servants’ comfort with their work, the e√orts of these employees to
organize collectively to confront government about work-related problems
had the perhaps ironic e√ect of shoring up the stability of such repose. Civil
service associations provided a mechanism for muwazzafin to distinguish
themselves from government while remaining inside it. Despite the appre-
hension with which both Mandate and Administration o≈cials viewed these
associations, which seemed perilously close to unions, they ultimately rein-
forced, rather than undermined, muwazzafin’s connection with government.
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They o√ered a means of expressing discontent without threatening the bases
of civil servants’ perceptions of their work or their selves.∫≥
Civil service associations were moderate in their politics and conservative
in their methods. Even as they appealed for better working conditions and
made complaints about government practice, they consolidated a shared
sense of civil service identity based precisely on their relationship with gov-
ernment. As Mary McGuire comments about civil service organizing in the
United States and Germany, ‘‘At every step of the way the vast majority of
organized postal civil servants organized within a perception of themselves as
civil servants—with all that meant in terms of their duty, responsibility, obli-
gation, honor and loyalty as servants of the state.’’∫∂ In Gaza, civil service
organizing ultimately confirmed the habits of service.
When civil servants during the Mandate sought to organize, they first had
to convince Mandate o≈cials that their organizing was qualitatively di√erent
from trade union activity, activity which the government ‘‘had found it neces-
sary to oppose.’’∫∑ Provisional o≈cers of the new association assured the chief
secretary that ‘‘the Association will have little or nothing in common with a
Trade Union, either in its aims or its methods. It is the chief aim to place
before Government the reasoned views of its members and to act only on
recognized constitutional lines. It is anticipated that it will render material
assistance to Government inasmuch as it will deal mainly with wide questions
of the general policy applicable to the Service.’’∫∏ With such reassurance, and
despite its misgivings, government eventually acquiesced, and an association
representing members of the senior civil service was formed, followed by a
second one representing members of the junior service.∫π There was some
continued tension over the political outlook of these associations—the 1944
annual report of the First Division Association complained that they were
still sometimes described by the government as ‘‘the Association of Bolshies’’∫∫
—but, for the most part, worries that organized activity by civil servants would
lead to a disruption of service work proved unfounded. The one notable
exception was a strike in 1946 by the Second Division Civil Service Associa-
tion, an action which produced substantial government concessions.∫Ω
In raising questions about the character of the civil service and the nature
of its relationship with government, widely held notions about the propriety
and respectability of civil servants were confirmed. In response to a First
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Division Association request, J. W. Shaw, the chief secretary, commented, ‘‘I
agree . . . that it is desirable to foster a spirit of greater cordiality and co-
operation between ‘Government’ (what are all these civil servants if they are
not ‘government’?) and the Civil Service (1st Division) Association and for
my part I am prepared to do my part to achieve this.’’Ω≠ Shaw further con-
firmed that civil servants had a ‘‘ ‘special’ relationship to the state’’Ω∞ when, in
response to another association request, he stated, ‘‘I was in favour of com-
plying with the request coming as it did from a responsible body of Govern-
ment’s own servants which was a di√erent thing from dealing with the
General Public.’’Ω≤ Civil servants themselves certainly concurred with the
idea that they were di√erent from the general public. To cite one instance of
an explicit statement of this di√erence, the First Division Association presi-
dent reported in 1945 on his e√orts to get better car insurance rates for
members. He suggested that special consideration was likely to be forthcom-
ing because ‘‘civil servants as a body are generally quiet and careful people and
not likely to go rushing all over the roads to the injury of innocent passers-
by.’’Ω≥ Even as civil servants confronted government, they reinforced their
distinction from the general population and their identification as govern-
ment employees.
The civil service associations during the Administration—here divided
not by level (first and second division), but by employer (government and
unrwa)—continued to be an outlet for personnel frustration that served to
buttress the repose of civil service habit. The two associations were not
identical in style, though. The unrwa employees’ association deployed a
somewhat more confrontational tone in addressing its employer, calling per-
sonnel policies it disagreed with unfair and unjust and at times even raising
the threat of political activity. In a letter to the agency director complaining
about the cost of living in Gaza, the association’s executive committee
warned of trouble if salaries were not increased: ‘‘You may consider that this
Committee shall not certainly be happy to see that this untolerable [sic] state
of a√airs should thrust sta√ members into such attempts aiming at express-
ing their unrest as it is felt that they can no longer endure any further
patience in this respect.’’Ω∂ The threat of unrest was not entirely idle, as on
several occasions unrwa o≈ces had been the object of the local population’s
wrath, but the association seems not to have ever resorted to such measures.
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The government association did not employ such threats, even for rhetor-
ical e√ect. The extent to which civil servants internalized the restrictions on
political activity and fit them into their sense of their own identities is
evident in the ways people remember their work in the association. Abu
Sami, a onetime head of the government civil service association insisted that
they ‘‘had nothing to do with politics, only civil rights.’’Ω∑ As he put it, the
association ‘‘did not interfere with the basic laws, but only in personal rights.’’
He described the association as responsive, not proactive, in its activities,
saying, ‘‘The association did not get involved in anything just for the sake of
proving its existence. It was just a means of defending the rights of the
employees when needed: demanding promotion, raises, etc.’’ The associa-
tion, he seemed to suggest, was always respectful in it interactions with
government and focused on doing its duty to its members. To be gentle, not
aggressive, was also to be respectable and a good civil servant.
Conclusion
That civil service habits were both flexible and reflective contributed to their
tenacity. Throughout their careers, and indeed throughout their lives, civil
servants made di√erent senses of their work as conditions changed. Even
within a given moment, di√erent positions could produce distinct under-
standings of civil service work and habit. These internal distinctions, ten-
sions, and di√erentiations worked—by making such habits adaptive—to pro-
mote the general significance of civil service habits. Habits illuminate how
bureaucratic authority could be engendered and also how it might fall apart.
It is a strength of bureaucracy that it can produce its own authority. It is also
a weakness that doubt among its personnel can also produce doubt among
the population—that it can undermine its own authority when repose in its
habits is disturbed. Doubt does not, though, flow automatically from strain
or inconsistency or even dissonance. Such contradictions and tensions could
be a source of strength for service habits. Doubt arises, rather, when the logic
itself seems faulty, when tensions become crises, when contradictions be-
come conflicts. Under acute conditions, doubt can become resistance or
rejection. For the most part, habit was an e√ective instrument for sustaining
the civil service apparatus and, with it, the broader authority of rule.
4
civil  service  competence and
the course of  a  career
The government of any country depends principally upon organised
thought and organised thought depends upon exact record and assem-
blage of all the material which is necessary before the thought can be
translated into e√ective action. We suggest that the clerical service of a
government is concerned principally in the mechanism of maintaining
and assembling the record upon which governmental action depends.
report on reorganization of clerical service, 31 july 1926
A clerk has more information than any other person in a directorate
because he sees everything that comes into the directorate, and every-
thing that goes out—and he should be trustworthy. . . . [The directors]
maybe didn’t have all the information about the subjects that came in.
I had a simple position, but I saw everything.
muhammad ghazi, on work in the administration, gaza city,
24 april 1999
Governing authority must be repeatedly produced, and itdoes not have a single form. The authority of files and of
personnel each contributes to a field of bureaucratic authority, but in distinct
and sometimes disparate ways. Furthermore, bureaucratic authority is itself
embedded in a broader social and political field, within which it must be both
general and specific, expansive across the social domain and distinguished
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from other possible forms of authority. The power of o≈cial documents is
distinct from that of other forms of writing, but not entirely separated from
them. Civil service a√ords status and privileges—distinguished from other
socially powerful positions, but not unconnected to them. The terrain of civil
service, that is, has to be clearly marked, even as it claims that government
values are general social values. In any government, people and papers work
together in the production of bureaucratic authority. In Gaza’s government,
where the foundations of this authority were exceedingly tenuous, these
relations were of particular importance in sustaining rule. The processes
through which civil servants were acclimated to their work, through which
they developed their personas, were central to sustaining the sometimes
awkward balance among the various parts of this authority.
Having considered the general features of repetitive filing and the artic-
ulations of bureaucratic habit, this chapter turns to the course of the civil
service career in order to examine how such habits were instilled and how
such repetitions were ensured. From hiring to retirement (or firing), these
moments shed light on working conditions, relations among colleagues and
with the public, and the active promotion of a civil service style. Habit was
operationalized as competence—a way of being was articulated as a way of
doing. As civil servants sought personal advantage throughout their careers
and strove to be competent in their work, they became ever more acclimated
to the service milieu. The moments of a career worked to define civil service
both by schooling personnel in its contours and characteristics and by identi-
fying its borders. The processes of including and excluding certain sorts of
people on the basis of things like character, gender, and class and certain sorts
of jobs from the civil service apparatus helped shaped the character of service
competence. Such competence not only helped shape the personas of civil
servants, but also participated in shaping the population as well. I will ex-
plore these intersections in greater detail later. This chapter focuses on how
civil service was inculcated in civil servants, how the general idea of good
work was concretized in specific notions of competence, making the signifi-
cance of reiterative authority for Gaza’s government even more clear.
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Ethics, Techniques, and Local Knowledge:
Defining Bureaucratic Competence
The development of competence highlights the ‘‘repertoires of authority’’∞
available to civil servants. These repertoires were often articulated as forms
of bureaucratic competence. In developing and declaring specific kinds of
competence, civil servants also declared themselves to be authoritative fig-
ures. In judging such civil servants to indeed be competent, the public ac-
cepted this claim to authority, though it was not an unconditional accep-
tance. The ways in which competence was defined in Gaza further signal the
contours of its government. The distinction between authority and legit-
imacy, and the emphasis on the former in Gaza’s government, is crucial for
understanding how bureaucratic competence was conceptualized and articu-
lated. Lacking a framework to confer legitimacy, bureaucratic authority de-
pended especially closely on the authoritative personas of its personnel.
Further, conditions in Gaza helped define bureaucratic competence in this
context, producing notions of competence that both are recognizable as part
of a broader practice of modern government and reflect local distinctions.
Gaza’s civil service required a technical competence that was not exactly
expertise, a social competence whose goal was not disinterested interactions
but di√erentiated service, and an ethical competence that did not guarantee
(or even necessarily promote) a moral outcome.≤ These forms of competence
were instruments in intertwined, yet distinct, repertoires of civil service
authority. The reliance on not entirely expert technical knowledge was di-
rectly connected to the practice of tactical government. The articulation of
this kind of work as competent bureaucratic work lent authority to the
broader governing dynamic. The linking of competence with local knowledge
that enabled civil servants to appropriately distinguish among the population
further reveals the ways in which civil servants’ authority sometimes blurred
the distinction between personal and personnel authority. The centrality of
ethical considerations in judgments of competence calls attention to the
relation between the authority of individual civil servants and the broader
authority accrued to government through their work. Each of these aspects of
bureaucratic competence o√ered an opportunity to claim authority and also
proved to be a mechanism through which such authority could be challenged.
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While most governmental histories describe a tension between the roles
of ‘‘generalists’’ and ‘‘experts’’ in civil service,≥ it is widely agreed that the
advent of the expert—‘‘a protean image of authority and rational knowledge’’∂
—marks the emergence of modern government. Expertise might not define
all governmental practice, but it seems to occupy an increasingly crucial place
as governments become more modern.∑ Looking at government from Gaza,
however, necessitates a reconsideration of this picture. Gaza’s government
during the British Mandate and Egyptian Administration was indisputably
modern—it was concerned with the welfare of the population, it developed
techniques of knowledge accumulation and population management that
enhanced its e≈ciency, and it was focused on progress and increased ration-
ality—even as expertise was not a centerpiece of its practice.∏
Making government work, even with the limited money, infrastructure,
and planning that were available in Gaza, required a technical competence
that emphasized not mastery of elaborated models but coping skills. The
colonial roots of Gaza’s civil service explain in part its emphasis on general-
ists, as this kind of organization was typical of colonial civil service, which
required personnel who could be transferred among the di√erent colonial
administrations and be qualified for each.π As Robert Heussler notes about
the colonial civil servant, ‘‘An unusual combination of qualities was needed—
courage with adaptability; firmness with sympathy; enterprise with reli-
ability; obedience with authority. In lonely stations, far from the restraints of
European public opinion and supported by lavish remuneration, the o≈cer
must remain dignified and incorruptible.’’∫
Conditions in Gaza o√er further insight into the form of its technical
competence. The possibilities of government itself, the kinds of interven-
tions that were feasible, the sorts of undertakings in which civil servants
engaged were so severely constrained in Gaza (by both circumstance and
policy) that expertise was rarely brought to bear. Timothy Mitchell, explor-
ing the work of rule in twentieth-century Egypt, describes the importance of
the ‘‘reorganization and concentration’’ of knowledge in marking the thresh-
old of a particular sort of expertise.Ω As the interests and reach of govern-
ment shifted and its projects became more immense, the variety of localized
knowledges and capabilities (which constituted their own form of expertise)
that made agriculture, say, work in Egypt had to be replaced with a broader
and more controlled capacity to manage such production. In Gaza, such
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large-scale government was neither possible nor often sought. Rather, gov-
ernment coped, made do, was tactical rather than strategic in its interven-
tions. In this practice it was the skills of the bricoleur, not the expert, that
were required.
Technical competence was only one part of the skill set required to be a
good civil servant. The execution of technical skills defined by Gaza’s condi-
tions required a social competence based in local knowledge. It was through
understanding the people with whom one interacted (colleagues, superiors,
and clients) that it was possible to produce satisfaction from an encounter
with government, even if that encounter did not produce the desired results.
As Muhammad Ghazi, a retired health department employee, put it, ‘‘As a
civil servant, you have to meet the people in a good way. At the least you have
to make him feel content when he comes to you. We have a proverb that says,
Take him to the sea and leave him thirsty. That is, if you serve him a cup of
tea, he will be content, even if he came to complain. A good meeting of the
people helps.’’ This emphasis on attitude rather than outcome was itself
connected to the self-referential quality of bureaucratic authority, where
what might define an encounter as good might have less to do with achieving
a specific end than with feeling that the process was right.
According to common conceptions of civil service, the encounter between
bureaucrat and client should be disinterested, but in Gaza’s civil service this
was decidedly not the case. Rather, muwazzafin described their ability to
make distinctions among the population, that is, to know how to treat
people appropriately according to their social position, as crucial to their
work. One had to be sensitive to how someone coming to a government
o≈ce might feel, know how to put her at ease, and, as well, how to create a
balance between the person and the result she achieved. Social competence
was expressed as a matter of style, of etiquette, as much as anything else.
Salim Rashid highlighted this point:
Someone comes to me to make an application [for a travel permit]. I tell
him ‘‘good morning, what is the problem?’’ I know this man, he is not a
merchant—he stands on the sidewalk, laying out a blanket with some
goods and things on it. However, if someone comes to me and wants to
import TVs from England with a cost of one million dollars, I do not treat
him in the same manner as I treat the previous one. I give the importer a
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travel permit for one month and to the other a week. Some people tell the
latter, ‘Go and make a problem and shout at him in order to give you more
than a week.’ He comes to me to complain about the permit. I ask him if
he drank co√ee with his wife. I ask the messenger to bring co√ee to
him. . . . After he drinks the co√ee he apologizes and tells me to give him
the time I want.
Given the awkward place of civil servants as mediators between the often
clashing demands of government and of the diverse parts of the public, it
took considerable skill to create satisfaction in the bureaucratic encounter.
Simply being a local did not guarantee that a muwazzaf would have the social
competence to manage these interactions. Neither was it only a matter of
accumulating knowledge; one had to be deft in the management of informa-
tion. The respectability that was so important to muwazzafin was connected
to the development of a competent persona—a civil service presence that
suggested authority.
This civil service persona also required, as Thomas Osborne has shown in
the case of India, attention to the cultivation of ethical practice among
employees.∞≠ Ethics and bureaucracy often appear to be opposed domains,
and Gaza’s bureaucracies do not seem especially likely to have been driven by
ethical considerations.∞∞ A bureaucratic practice that distinguished people by
class and context, that often sought to deflect people from the attainment of
their goals, that could not promise a better future does not on the face of it
seem defined by ethics. How can this circumstance be squared with what we
have already seen were civil servants’ concerns with duty and respectability,
with good work and honorable practice? This contradiction can be addressed
not by opposing ethical claims to immoral outcomes, but rather by exploring
the ways in which ethical self-cultivation, in the sense described by Foucault,
shaped bureaucratic sensibilities.∞≤
That colonialism frequently sought to justify itself in moral terms has
been much written about.∞≥ What Osborne traces in India and what I am
interested in for the case of Gaza is something slightly di√erent. Here I
consider not only how rule was justified to others, but how civil servants
came to feel themselves competent to occupy their positions. Osborne sug-
gests that bureaucratic ethics were first and foremost expressed in the culti-
vation of an ethical persona among civil servants—that the care of self made
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possible concern for others.∞∂ This seems to have been the case in Gaza as
well. Saba Mahmood notes that Foucault considered this cultivation to
involve technical practices, ‘‘corporeal and body techniques, spiritual ex-
ercises, and ways of conducting oneself—all of which are positive in the sense
that they are manifest in, and immanent to, everyday life. Notably, the
importance of these practices does not reside in the meanings they signify to
their practitioners, but in the work they do in constituting the individual.’’∞∑
In Gaza’s government, this practice also involved perceptions of bureau-
cratic action, though the claims that were made about ethical practice had a
high degree of circularity. Civil service was defined in terms of good work,
which then became tautologically defined as the work of government. Such
self-referential ethics, not unexpected in conditions in which authority was
also to such a large degree self-referential, can appear to be ungrounded in
anything other than its own conceptions. This sort of circularity produces a
potentially ‘‘dangerous ethics,’’ in which almost anything can appear justified
in its self-reflective terms. Yet even in the absence of a clear ground for ethical
practice, it was not in fact entirely self-contained. Bureaucratic ethics were a
domain of contestation, as members of the public, civil servants, and high
government o≈cials sought to shape the field. Even as, in the absence of a
governing framework that could solidly ground a bureaucratic ethics, it was
only through developing and preserving their own capacities that civil ser-
vants could lay claim to ethical competence, self-cultivation was embedded in
these contestations.
This self-cultivation was clear in the conversations cited in the last chap-
ter, in which civil servants repeated to me, and to themselves, their sense of
themselves as honorable and respectable, of their work as good and as pro-
viding a service. Self-cultivation was also evident in the moments of a career
as civil servants sought jobs and promotions, as they went about their days
and planned for their retirement. How they interacted with their colleagues
and with the public shaped their sense of themselves as ethical subjects and
therefore as ‘‘authoritative subjects with the authorization to subject others
to authority.’’∞∏ Self-cultivation took place throughout the civil service career
and even beyond. Such attention to the self was both a service to oneself, as it
made possible a more successful career, and crucial to one’s development as
an authoritative persona, thus making possible a more successful bureau-
cracy. Just as files were formed in part through repetition, civil service per-
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sonas also required repeated articulation and reinforcement. The develop-
ment of competence throughout one’s career was a mechanism for such
articulations. The moments in a civil service career divulge the production,
deployment, and contestation of repertoires of authority
Acclimated Applicants and Civil Service Hiring
Muwazzafin acquired bureaucratic competence over the course of their ca-
reer, as they became habituated to civil service. If one sought a job in the civil
service, though, it helped to be already possessed of at least some of the
habits of service, to be already somewhat competent in its execution. The
hiring policies of the Mandate government explicitly sought out those peo-
ple, mostly men, who were likely to have such competence. Recruitment
policy sought out ‘‘sons or relatives of old government servants, who have
traditions or experience behind them.’’∞π It was not only technical compe-
tence that was sought in this preference; government hoped as well to har-
ness the social authority of these families for the authority of government.
That some of this prestige had been acquired precisely in government service
is a reminder of the multidirectional flows of authority. Even when govern-
ment looked beyond this narrow group for its employees, it worked to
develop competence and habits through schooling. As in the Ottoman Em-
pire, education during the Mandate was often intended to produce civil
servants for government.∞∫ When applicants emerged from the Palestinian
educational system, they had been trained, if not for service specifically, than
at least with British values in mind.
The potential problems in hiring the wrong people were made evident
even before the formal start of the Mandate. In a letter of June 1921 to
Secretary of State Winston Churchill, Herbert Samuel, the first high com-
missioner for Palestine, acknowledged that he had created some di≈culties
for himself: ‘‘When the Civil Administration was started in July last year and
I was selecting o≈cials for the various posts, I found that in order to retain
the services of the o≈cers of the Administration it was necessary to o√er
them some security of tenure. . . . After one year’s experience in Palestine, I
find that some of the o≈cials selected, whose services were retained by me, in
the above circumstances are not suitable for the posts they occupy. . . . I shall
be grateful, therefore, if you will inform me whether, although a particular
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o≈cial has been o√ered permanent engagement, I can now inform him that
his services are no longer required.’’∞Ω The minutes of this file indicate a
considerable degree of frustration among British o≈cials that such prema-
ture o√ers were made at all. It seemed clear that, at the very least, this
decision would have negative financial implications for government. As
Churchill noted in his reply, ‘‘In some cases it may be possible to state
definitely that the o≈cer in question is not fit to occupy the post which he at
present holds, but to dispense with an o≈cer’s services on grounds of ine≈-
ciency is a strong step which can only be taken in clear cases, and these are no
doubt rare. In the remaining cases it is clear that the Government cannot
treat as non-existent the very definite and precise o√ers of permanent em-
ployment which have been made and some compensation will certainly have
to be granted for loss of employment.’’≤≠ These mistakes at the outset further
underscored the importance of hiring the right sort of person, but what
constituted the right sort of person was a matter for further consideration.
Di√erent circumstances could produce di√erent understanding of good civil
service material.
Reflecting on a group of employees who now seemed unsuitable for
promotion, a British o≈cial noted a few years later that ‘‘most of these
o≈cers were engaged during the Military Administration to act as Advisors
and Translators to Military Governors who had little knowledge of Arabic,
and that in most cases they were selected for their linguistic attainments
rather than for any special administrative aptitude.’’≤∞ With governing needs
turning more to the daily work of administration and technical competence
becoming increasingly important, these personnel no longer seemed well
suited for government service, prompting the suggestion that ‘‘it would ap-
pear desirable, before o√ers of pensionable employment are made, that care-
ful reports be made on all Palestinian O≈cers, with a view to terminating the
services of those who are unsuitable and making room for better qualified
candidates, capable of being trained for eventual promotion to higher posts
in the service.’’≤≤
Over the course of the Mandate, personal character came to occupy a
central place in hiring decisions, a centrality shown in an e√ort in 1946 to fill a
vacancy in Gaza’s district administration. Commenting upon the quality of
the applicants, the district commissioner rejected one applicant partly on the
100 • Chapter 4
grounds that ‘‘he is very pleased with himself and his manners are deplor-
able.’’≤≥ Recommending others for further consideration, the district commis-
sioner praised one candidate’s ‘‘character and drive, which, with proper train-
ing, might enable him to develop into a useful public servant’’ and commented
on another that he was ‘‘genuinely interested in works of social amelioration
and is intelligent enough to see the great needs of his own people at the present
time.’’ Of one candidate who was over the age limit for the position and did
not possess the requisite university education, the district commissioner
argued he should nonetheless be considered because ‘‘he is sensible and
presentable and well acquainted with Government routine.’’ Wherever an
applicant acquired his sense of style and form, it was awareness of and comfort
with service habits rather than any specific skills or expert knowledge that
appeared a prerequisite for getting and doing the job. The di≈cult political
conditions in Palestine, combined with the broader colonial concern for
‘‘quality people,’’ shaped the character of the Mandate civil service.
In the switch from the Mandate to the Egyptian Administration, ap-
pointment procedures became even more fraught, a change directly related
to the tremendously di≈cult conditions facing the population after the
nakba. Dislocated and dispossessed, people were in desperate need of em-
ployment. In the first years of the Administration, when government jobs
were scarce and other jobs practically nonexistent, applicants stressed civil
service continuity and previous government employment. In the immediate
aftermath of the 1948 war, the best way to secure a job in the new administra-
tion in Gaza was to have been employed as a civil servant during the British
Mandate.≤∂ To the extent that financial restrictions made possible, the Ad-
ministration tried to rehire these former civil servants. In later years, as
financial and political conditions improved somewhat, applications con-
tained a new appeal to the sympathy of the Administration and figured civil
service jobs as a form of welfare. In both forms of appeal, applicants high-
lighted their familiarity with the contours of service work, presenting them-
selves as already competent in the ways of being which defined civil servants.
In August 1949, a group of civil servants originally from Beersheba com-
plained that they, unlike the bulk of their fellow employees, had not been
given positions in the new administration. Their complaint suggested it was
an ethical imperative that they be given the jobs they deserved: ‘‘We went to
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work for the Egyptian forces in Hebron and Bethlehem by order of the
Governor General. After the Egyptian forces left Hebron and Bethlehem, we
came to Gaza on May 1, 1949, following the Egyptian army. We wanted to
continue our work as in Beersheba, Hebron, and Bethlehem. . . . We are in
desperate need. . . . 90% of the employees of Beersheba are working now as
they did in the past and receive their salaries; to keep 10% of the Beersheba
employees in such di≈cult circumstances is not just. We consider the Egyp-
tian government good and just. Please help us.’’≤∑ The ethical claims implicit
in this petition rest on the importance of technical competence, of doing the
job. These former Mandate civil servants ‘‘went to work’’ as per the ‘‘order’’ of
the new Egyptian governor. Having done their job, they wanted simply to
‘‘continue our work.’’ The Administration, though, rejected the position of
these muwazzafin. The deputy governor-general explained, ‘‘When we left
Hebron and Bethlehem to the Jordanians, we asked the employees to stay
there, because the administration in Gaza could not handle any new em-
ployees being added to the employees already working in it—after the with-
drawal from Beersheba, Majdal, Faluja, and their surrounding villages, and
the inclusion of the employees and teachers from these areas in the admin-
istration. Despite this, a large number of these employees came to Gaza with
the Egyptian Army on their own responsibility, and all of them have asked
for work. They were refused because they came without request or need, and
there is no money in the budget to pay for additional salaries.’’≤∏ The Admin-
istration response to the petition stressed the importance of acting like a civil
servant if one hoped to continue to be one. In flatly disobeying orders, these
employees had shown themselves to be outside boundaries of service. Hav-
ing chosen to leave their posts in Hebron and Bethlehem, the Administra-
tion implied, they were no longer civil servants and therefore not beneficia-
ries of the principle of continuity. Their employment was now ‘‘their own
responsibility,’’ not government’s.≤π In addition to consolidating the contours
of civil service, this argument had the added benefit of removing a potential
financial obligation on a government ill-placed to take it on.
In the second half of the Administration (after the Israeli occupation in
1956) the financial circumstances of both the Administration and the Gaza
Strip in general were much improved. Government became more willing and
able to view the general problem of unemployment as a governmental re-
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sponsibility. In this period, the number of positions increased dramatically,
part of the emergence of civil service as a form of welfare. This transforma-
tion impacted both the style of application—as applicants began to add
personal su√ering to their list of qualifications—and working habits—as an
overabundance of employees diminished the work required in any individual
position. Thus, what one had to know to get a job and what one had to know
to do a job shifted in this period.
When Hussam Abdullah, a refugee from Nazareth, sought to get a posi-
tion that opened up in 1958 at the main Khan Yunis mosque, he did not
simply apply for the job. In keeping with the new welfare discourse, he sent
letters to the Khan Yunis qadi [judge], the head of the Islamic appeals court,
and the administrative governor of the Khan Yunis district. In each letter he
detailed his qualifications and his su√ering in the years following the nakba.
He put himself at the mercy of the addressee and left it up to him to
determine the right course of action. Hussam appears to have been a skilled
strategist, crafting his application to appeal to its various recipients, but not
relying on any one party to get him the job he was after. In his letter to the
Khan Yunis governor, for example, after explaining that he had graduated
from al-Azhar, Hussam stated, ‘‘I am separated from my family because they
have not sought refuge in any Arab country, but have stayed in our village
until now. . . . I did not find any refuge except in this beloved Strip. I petition
you to find me work, whether as a [Qur’an] reciter at government parties or
any work that you think is appropriate that will give me an honorable life.’’≤∫
The governor forwarded this letter to the awqaf director for his consider-
ation, as did the other recipients of the appeal. With support for Hussam
coming from all directions, the awqaf director soon replied to the admin-
istrative governor, informing him that the appointment had been approved
by the Supreme Muslim Council.≤Ω This process revealed Hussam to be
adept at managing the new application climate, to be, as it were, habituated
to the new demands of civil service hiring. Not everyone could have managed
this dynamic so e√ectively.
The emergence of civil service as a welfare provider in Gaza paralleled a
similar trend in Egypt itself. In both places this transformation meant that
many more people were employed as civil servants than were actually needed
to execute the work.≥≠ As one former department head told me, ‘‘They
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brought me twenty persons, what could I do for them, I had a complete sta√?
I gave every three or four a desk to sit at, gave them newspapers to read, and I
sat with them to pass time.’’≥∞ Further, because Egypt promoted and funded
widespread education, the number of university graduates needing jobs ex-
ploded. One former principal recalled, ‘‘The school that needed twenty
teachers, they gave it forty teachers. . . . There were many graduates and they
[the Egyptians] wanted to employ them. I, for example, needed twenty
teachers and I made the timetable for twenty teachers. Then, another group
would come because there was pressure on the government, so they hired
four or five more teachers. So, I would change the timetable. Each time there
was pressure on them they sent teachers.’’≥≤ The practice of overfilling the
ranks of the civil service had contradictory e√ects. As the boundaries of civil
service broadened, the domain became a presence in an ever-greater number
of people’s lives, perhaps making it easier to claim authority. Indeed, many
people told me how, over the course of the fifty years considered here, the
public had increasing occasion to deal with government and were ever more
likely to do so directly rather than through the intermediary of such persons
as mukhtars. That ever-greater numbers of people were likely to have a civil
servant in the family certainly contributed to this transformation. At the
same time, this expansion of the service also worked to devalue the jobs
themselves, as the work became more makeshift, thereby undermining some
of the dignity and respectability associated with government employment.≥≥
Improving Civil Service Character: Education and Training
Whatever the working conditions, considerable e√ort was directed toward
training civil servants in the habits of government service. Civil servants
certainly identified such education as important. As a report from 1946 by
the Second Division Civil Service Association put it, ‘‘Training should be
carried out systematically and so planned as to provide the new entrant with
practical instruction in actual duties, accompanied by individual supervision
and proper guidance in general routine, coupled with study by the trainee of
the text book, ordinances, regulations etc. relating to the branch of work in
which he is engaged.’’≥∂ Debates about how and whether to deliver such
training reveal uncertainty about the extent to which competence could in
fact be taught and the extent to which it was an inherent quality.
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One Mandate o≈cial stood squarely on the side of nature against nurture
when he criticized a proposed training course for clerical o≈cers designed to
treat ‘‘the absence of powers of supervision [which] is a common and serious
defect experienced generally with regard to senior clerks throughout the
departments of Government.’’≥∑ Rejecting the idea that further training
could help, the education director argued,
It is of course obvious that ‘‘absence of powers of supervision,’’ being a trait
of character, is probably congenital and irremediable. If, however, the
phrase is intended to mean ‘‘imperfect acquaintance with o≈ce organisa-
tion,’’ a judicious admixture of theory and practice might improve the
present low standard of clerical work in this Government. I incline how-
ever to the belief that the root of the evil is the recruitment of persons
with inferior natural and educational endowments, the lack of incentive or
compulsion to improve acquirements, inadequate salaries on first ap-
pointment and poor prospects of advancement.≥∏
This argument for a focus on better hiring rather than on more training
implies a conviction that the boundaries of civil service were best policed at
the outset of a possible career. Personal authority, in this view, could be
converted into personnel authority, but the latter could not be produced
from nothing. In practice, though, training was both necessary, as there was a
limited pool of competent persons, and e√ective, at least in inculcating peo-
ple in the demands of the service.
In the Mandate, such training was intended not simply to promote general
civil service character and practice, but to develop sensibilities suited to a
particular place within the civil service. For example, a course for messengers
‘‘which will fit them to improve their status,’’ was explicitly limited in its aims:
‘‘Training should not aim primarily at creating aspirants to the Clerical Ser-
vice. . . . Nevertheless, exceptionally intelligent and reliable messenger boys
are always eligible from promotion to clerical or other classified posts.’’≥π A
balance was sought between essential capacities, such as those exhibited by
‘‘exceptionally intelligent’’ boys, and those which could be taught. In addition
to the vocational curriculum, which included bookkeeping, arithmetic, and
English, the organization of the course was intended to teach service habits
like duty and respectability. Training o√ered practical exposure not just to the
work of service, but to the character it required.
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That the Egyptian Administration also o√ered on-the-job training to its
civil servants is evident in the personnel files of those employees, which
include frequent references to training furloughs.≥∫ The available archives do
not o√er many details about such training, but the recollections of civil
servants suggest that continued learning throughout one’s career was vital.
Muhammad Ghazi, for instance, told me that he advanced in his career by
keeping the importance of training (including self-training) at the forefront
of his awareness: ‘‘Someone who knows how to read the alphabet and is
open-minded can be a writer; someone who can count from one to ten can be
an accountant. Then he will acquire experience and open his mind for the
job—he can know everything. . . . I worked in many positions. It was like I
was born in all jobs, to the extent that I was a dictionary for everything. No
one ever came and asked me about a certain subject that I didn’t know about
it—I had information about everything. I joined the health school and got a
high school diploma through my experience [emphasis added].’’≥Ω Like the
Mandate education director, Muhammad assigned character a prominent
place in the building of civil service competence. Unlike the director, how-
ever, he believed that such character could be developed. As a general rule,
engagement, not expertise, marked the competent employee. Anyone who
had a few basic skills and a willingness to work could be a civil servant in the
service environment of the Administration.
Getting to Work: Spaces of Service
The space of service was as important as training and education, rules and
regulations in the habituation of civil servants.∂≠ Whereas a training course
came to an end, one went to one’s o≈ce everyday. One walked the streets,
guarded the classrooms, managed the clinics throughout one’s career. The
space of service both expressed ideas of service—articulating notions about
how service should be rendered and what the nature of the relationship
among the providers and the public should be—and acclimated civil servants
and the public to the practices of such service, thereby mandating certain
behaviors and styles. Furthermore, the ability of civil servants to display
competence was connected not only to an individual employee’s abilities, but
to the setting as well. If the space of service complicated interactions with the
public, it was that much more di≈cult for a civil servant to appear competent.
O≈ce architecture had an obvious e√ect on the character and quality of
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service. In discussions about o≈ce layout, a tension emerged between the
needs of one party, the civil service, for control of its space and productivity
in its work and the needs of the other party, the public, for access to informa-
tion and for e≈ciency in obtaining responses to its requests. These practices
and regulations served in part to define these two categories, both in them-
selves and in relation to each other. The practices of o≈ce management
contributed to creating a circumstance such that, when people in Gaza
confronted one another, they did so through their locations as members (and
in some ways representatives) of a group. The basic concerns about organiz-
ing space for good service seem to have been consistent from the British
Mandate to the Egyptian Administration, but the stylistics di√ered. If in a
Mandate o≈ce, service was best expressed through e≈ciency, in an Admin-
istration o≈ce it appears to have been expressed through personability, for
example, in the cup of co√ee, the kind word, the space of sociality.
The Mandate records of inspection of the Gaza land registry o≈ce high-
light the attention paid to the details of o≈ce organization. They also dis-
close something about the robustness of the real estate market in Gaza and
indicate that it was not only locals who were doing the buying. In 1934, for
example, the inspecting o≈cer recommended that the registry o≈ce be sup-
plied with an iron safe to ‘‘enable the clerk in charge of cash to comply with
article 58 sub para 3 of the Financial Regulations which authorise him to
keep in his safe amounts not exceeding LP 50.’’ Such a safe would not only
bring the o≈ce into compliance with the law, but also improve the e≈ciency
of the o≈ce, as the recommendation went on to note: ‘‘This is needed
because with the increase of land-purchases in the Gaza Sub-District some
people come with the train from the North which reaches Gaza between
12.30 and 1 p.m., and by the time they reach the Land Registry O≈ce they
find that the cash is closed and they get into di≈culty about payment of
fees.’’∂∞ The immediate interest behind this suggestion was to improve the
level of service o√ered by the registry to members of the public. In addition,
it would create another setting for interaction between clerk and private
citizen, providing a reminder that o≈ce space helped habituate the public as
much as civil servants. Rather than confronting a closed door and an ab-
stracted notion of ine≈cient bureaucracy, people who came to the Gaza land
o≈ce after it had a safe would deal with a clerk both authorized and able to
provide services.
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While the safe is an example of an easily solved problem, management of
documents and files created greater di≈culty. Here, where privacy was a
central worry, the ability to protect papers from accidental exposure to the
public came into direct conflict with the needs of people to have access to the
o≈ce and its services. Soon after the land registry moved into Gaza’s new
government building in 1941, the director expressed his concern about prob-
lems with the o≈ce layout: ‘‘Room No. 2, the archives rooms, is completely
filled, as will be seen from the plan, and cupboards containing valuable and
irreplaceable documents, the property of private individuals, are scattered all
over the o≈ce. An additional archives room is essential, as in any case it is
impossible to place any more cupboards in the general o≈ce. . . . It is equally
unsatisfactory to perpetuate the practice of placing such archives in the
corridor and in the hall in which the public collect. . . . In addition the
surveyors’ stores have to be placed in a passage and are thus open to inter-
ference by members of the public.’’∂≤ As the director’s comments make clear,
the comportment of civil servants and the public was in part dependent on
the proper arrangement of o≈ce space and of papers. These arrangements
helped make it possible to distinguish appropriately between members of the
public, in this case to give people access to only their own papers, and to
manage the boundaries between civil service and that public. The placing of
personnel papers in a public space created a concrete risk of interference; it
also divulged the broader challenges of inculcating appropriate attitudes in
all the participants in government.
The milling about of the public that so troubled government o≈cials
during the Mandate appears to have been par for the course during the
Egyptian Administration. Less information is available about Egyptian-era
o≈ce organization, but by comparing descriptions of o≈ce life in Egypt at
this time with current practice in Gaza, it is possible to imagine what they
might have been like. What I saw in o≈ces in Gaza in the late 1990s nearly
replicates a description of an Egyptian o≈ce written by an American sociolo-
gist in 1957: ‘‘As a visitor enters, indeed, he usually finds many others there
before him, most of them whispering to each other quietly, yet not in a
conspiratorial air; this is simply the way things are done, for in Egyptian
government o≈ces the really private audience is almost unknown. The o≈-
cial simultaneously handles three or four items of business and converses
with three or four visitors or colleagues who stand or sit around his desk.
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The number of such persons milling around an o≈ce gets to be consider-
able.’’∂≥ Today, private conversation is certainly not an attribute of people’s
interactions with government o≈cials. When I was reading files in one civil
servant’s o≈ce, he would frequently turn to me in the middle of dealing with
someone’s case and tell me their whole story. This made me very uncomfort-
able, but it did not appear to bother anyone else involved. Service in Gaza, at
least in the 1990s, did not require privacy.
This di√erence in organization reflects as well a di√erence in the display
of competence. In the Mandate o≈ce, a civil servant’s competence could be
judged in part by his ability to guard information from public view. In the
Administration it appears that competence was displayed through a public
performance of knowledge. The openness of Administration o≈ces likely
had other practical e√ects as well. Perhaps the presence of other civilians in
the o≈ces of civil servants o√ered allies in dealings with government. To use
my experience in Gaza’s government o≈ces as guide once again, not only did
civil servants tell me people’s stories, but people themselves often involved me
in their interactions with o≈cials, looking for agreement on the merits of
their case or sympathy for the di≈culty of their situation. As is clear from
both Mandate and Administration attentions to the organization of space
for service, the obligation to provide service was about more than the out-
come of an encounter between a civil servant and a civilian. It was, in
addition, about the quality of that encounter.
This encounter, though, sometimes required that a civil servant take an
adversarial position vis-à-vis a member of the public; it also sometimes took
personnel out of the confines of their o≈ces. Civil servants had to know
when to be forceful, and they relied on the authority engendered by their
position and their person to make such confrontations e√ective. At the same
time, such actions also worked to further solidify their authority. A seem-
ingly minor story told to me by a former head of the Gaza municipality
electricity department, Khaled ’Emad, manifests the import of this practice.
Going into the field to respond to complaints or to inspect the quality of
work was a regular part of his job, Khaled told me, and if he found problems,
his force would be directed against the negligent employee. One day he was
sent to investigate a complaint made by a citizen about garbage collection at
his house.When Khaled and the complainant left the municipality o≈ces,
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however, the citizen seemed to lose interest in the investigation: ‘‘The man
invited me to smoke argile [waterpipe] with him at a café, and not to go to his
house. I returned to the mayor and told him that the guy wanted me to
smoke argile with him at the café instead of checking the worker’s work. The
mayor told me to leave the garbage at the man’s house for a week as a fine.’’∂∂
Whether the complaint was fabricated or the man simply thought his
long-term service prospects would be better with Khaled as an ally is not
clear. What is clear is that this infraction demanded a response. Further, and
equally important to Khaled, the punishment had to be appropriate. As he
told me, ‘‘I had contacts with the people and through my contacts I knew
everyone—the good and the bad, the educated and the uneducated—and
understood that you have to cope with them all. It is illogical to beat some-
one who asked you to smoke ‘‘argile with him at a café.’’ So, being a good civil
servant and treating the public with respect meant not only producing a
pleasant encounter with government, but also exercising a carefully cali-
brated forcefulness meant to contribute to engendering respect among the
population.
Career Advancement: Resemblance and Recognition,
Opportunism and Equality
Having gotten a job, a civil servant’s thoughts quickly turned to compensa-
tion and promotion.∂∑ Personnel files were filled with civil servants’ com-
plaints about their inadequate salaries, descriptions of their arduous duties,
and self-reviews of their excellent performances. In their writing, civil ser-
vants participated in and produced a regulated civil service style that empha-
sized equivalence among civil servants even as it (sometimes contradictorily)
sought to make a place for individual recognition. Equivalence suggested that
competence was a general civil service attribute, while individual recognition
identified the skills of particular civil servants. Just as the distinctions that
civil service produced between and among the population created tensions,
so too did the emphasis on resemblance among muwazzafin. The promotion
process, fraught as it often was for personnel seeking raises, was a crucial
mechanism in their continuing inculcation in the service milieu. The terms
in which they pressed their cases and the grounds on which their appeals
were accepted or denied were part of the terrain of habituation.
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The British formed numerous commissions, issued multiple reports, and
produced considerable regulation on the problem of managing promotions.
In 1926, noting that the existing promotion system in the clerical service had
‘‘been formed under a system of opportunism’’ and that ‘‘inequalities and
injustices are inherent in its constitution,’’ an o≈cial committee proposed a
new system of cadres, grades, and grounds for promotion.∂∏ The report
recognized that many clerical o≈cers might never want the added burden of
administrative responsibility, preferring ‘‘the routine of their function be-
cause it involves them in little anxiety.’’ Therefore, the proposed system was
to include regular promotions within the clerical service that would ‘‘a√ord
opportunity for a normal, if undistinguished, career.’’ The cases of those
exceptional civil servants who sought advancement to the highest grades
would be considered by a promotion committee which ‘‘should have before it
the complete history of each o≈cer recommended by the Chief Secretary for
consideration and the recommendation should be by way of vote of the
majority. We can think of no more impartial way in which to decide the
public values of individual o≈cers.’’∂π Even in recognizing exceptional indi-
vidual qualities, the system was supposed to operate according to a principle
of equivalence.
The stated aim of the reorganization was to produce a fair system, one
that created genuine equivalences among members of the service, o√ered
guarantees for the future, and allowed distinguished individuals to be identi-
fied and rewarded. In order for these goals to be achieved it was necessary to
produce su≈cient knowledge about both individual civil servants and the
general needs of the service and the public. Thus, this reorganization not
only mandated a habitual resemblance among civil servants but promoted
the proliferation of instruments of knowledge production, including more
complete personnel files, assessment of public needs, etc. Information had to
accumulate. For civil servants, it helped shape both the contours of and the
conditions for acquiring a proper persona. The values of resemblance and
recognition also defined the quality employee, one who was like other em-
ployees but who stood out as exemplary in his/her achievement of these
common values.
The dynamics of equivalency and recognition remained similar during the
Egyptian Administration.∂∫ Given the enormous financial constraints facing
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the Administration, though, opportunities for promotion were more limited
than during the Mandate. Perhaps for this reason, Khalil Rishad, former
director of Diwan al-Muwazzafin, described complaints about promotion as
the most persistent di≈culty in his job: ‘‘Most people’s protests were about
employees’ promotions. Promotions created confusion, in that each em-
ployee felt that he had right to be promoted, which is natural. In order to
make the employee accept that someone else deserved it more than him, I
had to sit with him and make him understand. The problem is that the
employee thinks that you are the one who is standing against his promo-
tion.’’∂Ω As head of the department charged with employee a√airs, Khalil had
a personal investment in viewing the promotions process as fair and e√ective,
yet he recognized that no system could be perfect (‘‘Let me tell you some-
thing, there is no 100 percent justice’’). In case of injustice, however, each
employee had the right to have their complaints investigated. Khalil stressed,
‘‘If someone was wrongly or unfairly treated, we could know it, why?, be-
cause we were limited in number and we knew each other.’’ His comments
point to his interest in achieving a balance between correct procedure and
situational flexibility.
While Khalil clearly had an investment in remembering the system as
being largely fair, other retired employees had mixed memories. One retired
police o≈cer recalled that ‘‘the government was poor during the Egyptian
period. It was selling the promotion process for money. The government had
no money.’’∑≠ Memories of corruption were by no means limited to the
Egyptian period; one person described wasta as part of every government:
‘‘Everything depends on relations and knowledge of people. If I know you,
my issue is solved in no time. If I don’t know anyone, I have to wait for a long
time. And so on. This is the way it was in the days of the Egyptians, the Jews,
whenever. . . . Today [under the pna] if you want a job, you pay a thousand
dollars to be hired.’’∑∞ And yet, a former railroad employee insisted that
‘‘when someone was going to be promoted we used to examine his file—and
sometimes we did find some negative issues. Still, it was very rare to find
someone who was taking bribes, who looked at women, who did not do his
job as required. . . . If [the employee’s record] was inadequate, then we
stopped promoting him.’’∑≤ The promotions process no doubt included a bit
of each. Civil servants needed to be able not only to handle members of the
112 • Chapter 4
public, but also to maneuver among the complex relations of class and
connection which could hinder or guarantee their own advancement.
Punishment
My focus thus far has been on civil servants’ claims to competence and on
the administrative techniques for producing and judging such qualities. Of
course, not all civil servants were competent—or judged so by their superiors.
Punishment for incompetence or willful disobedience was in part about
weeding out bad civil servants, those who had been neither excluded during
the hiring process nor corrected through training. Additionally, by identify-
ing the boundaries of appropriate civil service behavior, punishment further
taught good employees how to be better. The ways the civil service apparatus
responded to mistakes, misbehavior, and insubordination by civil servants, as
well as the ways these employees reacted to punishment, helped define the
bureaucratic field.
Punishment again raised the question of whether competence was rooted
in practice or in character. In cases where the harshest punishments, such as
dismissal, were meted out, failures of both tended to be identified: ‘‘I have
observed this man at his duties on numerous occasions and found that in
addition to being grossly incapable and ine≈cient, he possesses an inflated
ego which will always prevent him from stooping to absorb knowledge.’’∑≥
Displays of incompetence of both character and practice were highlighted to
support arguments that rehabilitation or improvement was impossible.
These sorts of charges refer directly to the ethos of o≈ce, to the ethical
dispositions which were supposed to be part of civil service personas. In
judging the character of these employees, their superiors, colleagues, and
even the public called them ethically deficient. Not surprisingly, fired civil
servants often rejected these charges.
In one such case, a former station clerk at the Gaza railway station (Khalil
Hammanieh) wrote to the chief secretary complaining about his dismissal.∑∂
He recounted the events leading up to his punishment, starting with his
arrest for rape, including his suspension from duty, ultimate acquittal, and
finally dismissal after the resolution of the case. In his complaint, Ham-
manieh noted that he was fired before his acquittal and that the acquittal
removed any grounds for firing him: ‘‘The gross misconduct which, as the
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G.M. says, was the immediate cause of my being dispensed with, is non-
existent, otherwise I would not have been acquitted by the Court of Justice.
. . . without the false charge against me there would not have been any cause
for my discharge and in view of my clear acquittal my being dispensed with is
rendered illegal.’’
The administrative response to this complaint indicated that while Ham-
manieh had legal justification for claiming that a dismissal in response to the
rape charge would have been improper, his acquittal was not entirely ‘‘clear’’
nor was the charge used as the ‘‘immediate cause’’ (though it seems pretty
obvious it was the underlying cause).∑∑ The general manager noted that
Hammanieh was acquitted despite the fact that the girl in question had
accused him of assaulting her and that medical examination had indicated that
she had been raped: ‘‘The fact that he married the girl before the case was
heard, thereby rendering her evidence inadmissible, had, I believe, a bearing
on the finding.’’∑∏ The general manager stated that he was fired not because of
the rape charge but because of other charges associated with the event—that
he had aided her in traveling without a ticket and that he had taken her into
the railway rest room in Gaza—as well as his past conduct, which included
two fines, two warnings, and eighteen cautions in his service file.
The general manager closed his letter by stating, ‘‘It being apparent that
Hammanieh was not of a type who should be retained in Railway service, his
services were terminated with e√ect from the date of his interdiction. . . . His
discharge from the service was decided upon independently from the charge
of rape preferred against him by the Police [emphasis added].’’ Despite the
distinction made between the rape charge and the dismissal (necessary for
legal purposes no doubt) it seems obvious that this charge was instrumental
in making it ‘‘apparent’’ that Hammanieh was not of an appropriate ‘‘type’’ to
be a civil servant. He was fired for failures of both practice and character.
The ethical violations at issue here were not limited to an ethics of o≈ce, but
charges of this sort were central to the case against him. Having so thor-
oughly failed to acquire good civil service habits and to develop a proper
persona, Hammanieh proved himself to be irretrievably outside the limits of
the service domain.
As during the Mandate, punishment during the Egyptian Administration
expressed an interest in both practice and character, that is, doing the job
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well and being the right kind of person to do it. During the Administration,
however, there seems to have been a bit more reluctance to conclude that
someone was not civil servant material. Perhaps in part because of the impor-
tance of civil service work as social welfare, administrators might have been
hesitant to deny someone the opportunity to receive a salary. In the nearly
one hundred Egyptian-era personnel files I read, I found no cases of em-
ployees being dismissed (though there were instances of employees of the
Egyptian Administration being fired during the Israeli occupation).∑π
Dismissal was always the extreme end of a range of possible responses to
civil service misbehavior. Most such misbehavior was relatively minor, and
the punishments were accordingly limited. The personnel files of Gaza’s civil
servants are filled with instances of people being warned about their be-
havior, fined a few days’ salary, or given similar sanction. Even in these lesser
punishments what was at issue was more than the infractions of certain
regulations. What made punishment an imperative was what the infractions
evidenced in the way of failures of service habituation: not being respectful,
not doing one’s duty, dishonoring the service. The ethos of o≈ce that sta-
bilized civil service practice could be disrupted by such misbehavior by
individual civil servants. In these cases, it was precisely the disposition of a
civil servant qua civil servant that was at issue. Given the importance of
authoritative personnel to the broader authority of government, its protec-
tion demanded attention even to apparently minor threats to its stability.
Mariam Samira, a nurse at Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis, was sanc-
tioned four times over the not quite four years of her employment in the
Administration (she was hired in November 1963).∑∫ The causes for the
sanctions were inventory deficits, in which cases she was fined the cost of the
missing object, and fighting with her colleagues. In the most serious of these
instances, the director of the Health Administration recommended that she
be fined two weeks’ salary. Such a large fine required the approval of the
governor-general,∑Ω who decided to dock Mariam’s pay only one week—still a
substantial penalty. The cause of this severe penalty was that Mariam had hit
another nurse at the hospital, as the health director explained to the civil
a√airs director, who oversaw the civil service commission: ‘‘I am sending you
a copy of the investigation papers that were sent to me by the director of
Nasser Hospital . . . in the matter of nurse [Mariam Samira] hitting the
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nurse [Rana Zeinab] inside the hospital on June 14, 1964. The above-men-
tioned nurse hit her colleague and cursed her in front of the patients. This
behavior does not conform to the honor of the nursing profession, is consid-
ered to be a violation of her colleague’s rights, and harms the reputation of
the hospital. Therefore, I have decided to deduct two weeks (fourteen days)
from her salary and to give her a final warning that she will be fired if she does
something like this again.’’∏≠ The infraction was viewed as especially serious,
touching as it did on the honor of both the nursing profession in general and
the reputation of the hospital in particular. Not only was this action in and of
itself dishonorable, but it took place in front of patients, thereby impacting
the public perception of the civil service.
Concern not only about a particular infraction, but its possible ramifica-
tions is evident in many punishments levied against civil servants. In one
case, a department director requested that an employee be transferred out
because of his ‘‘lack of cooperation and laziness in his work [and] his re-
calcitrance in implementing the directives and commands that come to him
from us.’’ The director argued that ‘‘if an employee like this were to remain in
the directorate it would spread the spirit of recalcitrance and slowness among
the other employees.’’∏∞ Whereas in the case of Mariam’s sanction, the con-
cern was about the possible e√ect of such misbehavior on the public, here the
concern was about e√ects on other civil servants.
In a dispute between an employee and his direct superior, the principal
issue was that of respect. The employee, Da’ud Khaled, was four hours late
to work one day and refused to answer his superior’s questions about his
absence. In response to this infraction, the director of civil a√airs informed
the governor-general that he intended to dock his pay two days (double the
sanction his boss had recommended) because ‘‘this action is a severe dis-
respect.’’∏≤ In Da’ud’s statement about his behavior, he claimed he refused to
answer questions because his boss had insulted him in front of other em-
ployees, saying, ‘‘You are always late. You are a himar [donkey], and you don’t
fulfill your responsibilities.’’∏≥ His boss denied this accusation, a denial that
was supported by other witnesses. It doesn’t matter very much who actually
said what; what is interesting for my purposes is the general agreement about
the nature of the problem. To treat someone with disrespect, to cause him to
lose face in front of his colleagues, was a serious violation of workplace
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standards. Such disrespect not only reflected on the character of the o√ender,
but could impact the entire workplace and therefore the whole civil service
domain.
Retirement Benefits and Struggles Over Civil Service
The promise of a pension on retirement was one of the clearest personal
benefits of a civil service career, a benefit which, like the monthly salary of a
working civil servant, distinguished these employees from the larger popula-
tion, which had no such social security. The British are praised by Gazans
for continuing to pay pensions to Mandate civil servants long after the
government for which they worked had ceased to exist.∏∂ Conflicts that arose
during both the Mandate and the Administration over who was eligible for
pensions suggest that the definition of a career in service was often deter-
mined in the character of its closure. Not surprisingly, it was in relation to
potential government expenditures that it became crucial to define with
precision who was a civil servant. Whether one received a pension and what
sort of pension one might get determined the conditions of life in the after-
math of a career and also cast light back on how the career itself was evalu-
ated, by both employers and personnel.
During the Mandate, two major pension conflicts formed around catego-
ries of gender and religion. Specifically, should married women civil servants
(whose husbands were presumed to support them) be allowed to receive
pensions? And should personnel of the shari‘a courts be considered civil
servants like any others and therefore eligible for pension benefits? The
issues were somewhat di√erent in each case, but they both exhibit the stakes
of service definition. There was a long tradition of treating female civil
servants di√erently from their male counterparts by paying them lower sal-
aries and restricting the positions open to them. The problem posed by
allowing these women to receive pensions was ‘‘the possibility of husband
and wife, both civil servants, drawing two full pensions at the same time.’’∏∑
This problem was ultimately resolved by forcing women who married to
resign their positions and therefore remove themselves from the pensionable
ranks but permitting them to be rehired on a ‘‘temporary’’ basis, thus meeting
government needs for their work.∏∏
This resolution addressed the financial concerns posed by married wom-
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en’s presence in the civil service, but it did not solve some of the other
associated problems, such as ‘‘the embarrassment caused to other members
of the sta√ and to members of the public by their presence in a certain
condition.’’∏π That pregnant women were thought to pose a disruption to the
proper functioning of the o≈ce is a further reminder that the contours of
civil service required not simply the positive development of civil service
habits, but the exclusion of discomforting presences.∏∫ We saw in the last
chapter how gender di√erences impacted civil servants’ self-conceptions; we
see here how much anxiety those di√erences could produce in civil service
space. Concern about issues of propriety continued, leading to a recommen-
dation, in 1936, that married women no longer be rehired in the clerical
service since ‘‘it is now possible to obtain competent shorthand typists with-
out di≈culty and in my opinion the only grounds for the retention of
married women o≈cers is the impossibility of replacing them within a rea-
sonable period of time by competent shorthand typists.’’∏Ω The problem of
pensions brought to the fore a much broader set of concerns about women’s
employment and its stakes for the civil service.π≠
In the matter of the shari‘a court employees, the principal problem was
their working conditions, particularly that they operated under the authority
of the Supreme Muslim Council, not the high commissioner.π∞ This di√er-
ence of authority was enough, according to the colonial secretary, to render
them ineligible for civil service pensions. It was, he said ‘‘clearly undesirable
that there should be created in Palestine a special class of pensionable o≈cers
who could not be retired for ine≈ciency or compulsorily retired on grounds
of age; and, indeed, whom the High Commissioner would have no power to
dismiss in the case of misconduct or misbehavior even when of a criminal
nature.’’π≤ The concern here was clearly about authority, both the articula-
tion of regulated authority within the civil service and the potential challenge
that other forms of authority might pose for the former. The Palestinian
Civil Service Association tried to minimize those concerns, highlighting how
firmly inside civil service shari‘a judges were. In its petition to government on
their behalf, the association stressed that this position was the oldest govern-
ment post (going back thirteen hundred years) and that it had always been
pensionable before. Furthermore, the association noted, ‘‘Members of the
Shari‘a Courts are subject to Government Regulations. Their whole time is
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at the disposal of Government. Their salaries are paid wholly from Govern-
ment funds.’’π≥ In the crucial areas, the association argued, these employees
were like other civil servants.π∂
In the letters that went back and forth for several years among govern-
ment o≈cials, the civil servants’ association,π∑ the Supreme Muslim Council,
and shari‘a court o≈cers, these points continued to be debated, with each
party indicating another reason these o≈cials either should or should not be
considered civil servants.π∏ Not long after this exchange, for reasons and
under circumstances that are not clear from the archival record, government
decided to grant the pensions, but under a special ordinance. In this way, the
immediate problem was solved, but the underlying question about the defini-
tion of civil service was not entirely resolved.ππ In the case of ‘‘religious
a√airs’’ employees, the resolution was always uncertain—these employees
ultimately were civil servants in the Mandate, and this categorization was also
always a problem.
In the Administration, religious services did not pose the same problems
that they did during the Mandate. These employees continued to operate
under somewhat di√erent conditions than other civil servants—their person-
nel files were (and are) kept in the awqaf administration, which had direct
authority other them—but they received pensions without apparent prob-
lem.π∫ Even where there was no debate about whether employees were civil
servants, what kind of civil servant they were could make a tremendous
di√erence for their retirement. I refer here to the di√erence between the
government and unrwa as civil service employers. In regards to pensions,
the di√erence is this: government provides a monthly pension from retire-
ment until death, whereas unrwa pays a lump sum to its retiring employees,
with which they can do what they like. Many people I spoke with told me
they had not realized the importance of this di√erence until they retired.
One person said that through the course of his career with unrwa he had
never considered working for government because the unrwa salary was
much better, but that ‘‘now that I am retired I regret not working for the
government because unrwa is not fair with employees in terms of retire-
ment. . . . The government gives the employee a life pension, which guaran-
tees that he would not have to ask people for money. Now I am facing this
problem. I have spent the money I received on the education of my son.
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Thank God, my son is employed now, but what if he wasn’t?’’πΩ Remember-
ing that the persona of the civil servant, and even the inculcation of that
persona, continued throughout people’s lives, these pension disparities could
also make a di√erence in people’s dispositions. Both benefits o√ered an
opportunity for financial security, but one continued the same sort of se-
curity as the career, that is, a guaranteed, although relatively low, monthly
salary. The second a√orded the opportunity to begin a new venture—in the
last chapter I mentioned a retired unrwa employee who had purchased and
cultivated land with his retirement money—but also entailed a risk of outliv-
ing the benefit.
It might seem that retired civil servants would no longer be concerned
about the authoritativeness of their personas, about how well they embodied
the various sorts of bureaucratic competence. Yet, as they worried about
their futures in retirement, they also revealed a desire that they continue to
be perceived in this same light. As one retiree explained his pleasure at
having worked for the government rather than unrwa, ‘‘When you retire
from unrwa, it gives you your money. Maybe the retiree is less powerful in
the house, maybe his sons asked him to build a house, or they wanted to
marry, so the money goes easily. But I go and receive my salary at the first of
the month. I don’t need my son or my daughter to give me money. So I keep
my dignity until the last day of my life.’’∫≠ Retirees’ authority might no longer
directly matter to government, but it clearly continued to matter to them.
Conclusion
Across the breadth of their careers, civil servants both acquired and exhibited
competence and authority. The di√erent aspects of competence, the distinct
repertoires of authority, highlight both the expansiveness of bureaucratic
authority and the persistent challenges it faced. Debates about who could be
a civil servant—what sort of job, what kind of person—and then what made a
competent civil servant—what kinds of practice, comportment, attitudes—
were often the ground for working out formations of authority. While civil
servants were often as worried, or even more so, about their own positions as
the stability of government, to the extent that they developed authoritative
personas in the quest for personal advancement, they also helped produce
governmental authority. To the extent that government sought to harness
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social and personal authority for its own purposes, it contributed to the
strength of such forms. Each deployment of authority, furthermore, pro-
vided an opportunity for challenges. The processes of defining, elaborating,
and challenging bureaucratic competence and authority were always in-
flected by the particular governing conditions in Gaza—its demands and its
limitations.
part two
Tactical Practice and Government Work

5
service  in  crisis
In the Turkish period [during World War I], there was starvation.
People were quarreling over an orange. . . . We were starving during
the period of the Turks and blessed during the period of the British.
. . . Though they were occupying us, we led a life of ease and comfort.
abu said, refugee from hammama, gaza city, 23 february 1999
When we first left our villages [in 1948] there was starvation and
hunger. . . . We remained about four or five months with no food or
supplies or anything. . . . After four months, an agency came—the
Quakers—and started to distribute flour, supplies, blankets and
things like this. . . . They opened supply centers . . . and the people
went to these centers every fifteen days or every month and received
flour, sugar, and supplies.
abu nadim, refugee from yibna, gaza city, 22 february 1999
If the domains of filing and personnel illuminate formationsof authority that relied on repetition, reiteration, and reg-
ularity, the particular services these instruments worked to provide highlight
practices of tactical government that often appeared singular, limited, and
even irregular. The work of service provision in Gaza further elucidates
distinctions between authority and legitimacy and clarifies the ways in which
Mandate and Administration government produced the former without the
latter. Services occupied a curious position in Gaza’s governing dynamic. In
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many ways, they lay at the heart of government’s relation with the popu-
lation. At the same time, both governments evinced considerable anxiety
about getting too involved in service provision (though what counted as
being ‘‘too involved’’ changed over time). Services were, then, both the center
and the periphery of a governing relationship. They were both the most
ubiquitous site of encounter between civil servants and the public and an
obligation to be avoided when possible. In a dynamic of tactical government,
the apparent paradoxes of this condition were, while not resolved, produc-
tive for the work of rule.
This chapter focuses on what I call crisis services, those services—such as
food and shelter—which were understood to be temporary, brought on by
extraordinary need, and destined to be removed from the service domain at
some future time (even if that time has never yet come). Crisis services
highlight the process of defining both need and service, as well as movements
between these categories. Everyone needs to eat, but what counts as adequate
and appropriate food requires elaboration. When needs come to be thought
of as services, it is a result of a further process whereby responsibility for
their fulfillment shifts, from personal to public, from family to society, from
community to government. In the case of crisis services, this movement was
not conceived as permanent. Precisely because these services were defined as
exceptional, as beyond the ‘‘proper’’ service domain, they produced acute
anxieties in governments that were always anxious about extending the do-
mains of their obligation.
They produced anxiety for other reasons as well; the very crises that made
these services necessary indicated that the population was unsettled, in a
dangerous condition, constituting a possible threat. During both periods,
there was a great deal of discussion about such threat, and not only on the
part of government o≈cials. It was security concerns as much as governing
compassions that made the Mandate and the Administration venture into
the realm of providing food and shelter to the Gazan population. To a
certain extent, then, one source of anxiety trumped another, as security
considerations kept governments involved in a broadening array of services.
If crisis services were marked by both security and compassion, they were
also distinguished by their location on the cusp of formal government. These
practices consistently traversed the boundary—and called into question the
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extent to which such a boundary was clear—between the state and society.∞
They were connected to community relations as much as to government
procedures and regulations.
These crisis-driven interventions into the service domain must also be
understood in relation to the dynamic of abeyance. With their tactical focus
on averting threat, the claims of these services were limited. In part because
of the apparently exceptional quality of this service provision, even as it
produced anxieties, its stakes were not always clear. In conditions where
service recipients felt at risk, their attention was often (though importantly
not always) focused on the immediate fulfillment of basic needs and less on
the significance of their participation in a broader governing regime. The
ways distraction and deferral entered into the details of service provision are
made clear in these crisis services.
Crisis servicing also highlights the practice of an ethic of care that gov-
erned relations among people and between people and government. The
phrase ‘‘ethic of care’’ was famously used by Carol Gilligan to describe an
image of a network of relations, a ‘‘nonhierarchical vision of human connec-
tion,’’ as opposed to a hierarchically imagined one, ‘‘an order of inequality’’ in
which relationships ‘‘appear inherently unstable and morally problematic.’’≤ I
mean it here, however, more in the sense of what Foucault describes as the
Greek problematic of ‘‘the care of the self.’’ Such care was, Foucault argues,
‘‘ethical in itself; but it implies complex relationships with others insofar as
this ethos of freedom is also a way of caring for others. . . . it is also the art of
governing.’’≥ As such, this ethic was ‘‘a way of being and of behavior. It was a
mode of being for the subject, along with a certain way of acting, a way visible
to others.’’∂ And, importantly, this practice of care was hierarchical.
Gaza, of course, was not ancient Greece, and the demands which under-
pinned its similar ethic of care were not identical. In Gaza, this ethic was
linked to shifting definitions of obligation and relation in the transformation
of services. In the deployment of, and transformations in, practices of care,
we can see how tactics shaped the practice of both persons and government.
The practice of care, whether delivered as a service or imagined as a social
practice, was of considerable importance in subject formation. When gov-
ernments responded to crises through service provision they, like the popula-
tion, benefited from increased stability, from strengthened bonds, and from
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an enhanced (though still limited) capacity to a√ect the social, political, and
economic environment. The transformations in the practice of care that
were part of the trajectory of crisis services in the Mandate and the Admin-
istration did not make this practice less hierarchical. On the contrary, as the
pathways of service became more clearly marked, more bureaucratically cod-
ified, certain networks of hierarchical relations became even more elaborate,
revealing just one of the ways in which crisis services always did more than
respond to immediate need.
The Contours of Crisis
Probably the single most wrenching event in Palestinian history was the
nakba, but this was by no means Palestine’s only upheaval. When British rule
in Palestine began in 1917, much of the country—and certainly Gaza—was in
very poor shape. It took three major battles for British forces to defeat the
Turks in Gaza, in the course of which the city was decimated and ‘‘many
[Gazans] were forced to leave by the Turks, who feared the population
would get in the way of the troops.’’∑ The Gaza Municipality records this
expulsion as ‘‘the Gaza Emigration,’’ saying ‘‘this disastrous event has been
engraved in the minds and souls of the Gazans.’’∏
The years of the Mandate were marked by one crisis after another—
political, economic, security—often brought on by the intensifying conflict
between Zionist settlers and Palestinian Arabs. There were riots in 1921,
1929, and 1933 and full-scale revolt in 1936–39 (by Arabs) and 1946 (by Jews).
The 1929 riots, sparked by rumors that Jews were planning to take over the
Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, provoked a serious reconsideration of British
policy in Palestine, as did the 1936 revolt. Each time political unrest erupted
into violence, British administrators sent commissions to the country to
probe the underlying causes, whether peasant poverty and landlessness, dis-
placement by Zionist settlement, frustration over British support for the
Zionist project.π The discussions surrounding these commissions show that
Mandate o≈cials were acutely aware that poor living conditions could pro-
duce unrest and could lead to security threats. The solution most often
imagined for such problems, though, was the prospect of development, con-
ceived as a private, market process, not a government project.
Palestine’s crises did provoke occasional, and exceptional, relief e√orts;
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during the 1936–39 rebellion, for instance, assistance ‘‘was given at first to
families where the breadwinner was detained under Emergency Regulations
and was later extended to families which su√ered indirectly from the prevail-
ing conditions—the unemployed and the chronic poor.’’∫ In the later years of
the Mandate, concern for such chronic conditions and a broader empirewide
interest in development and welfare led to a consideration of government-
sponsored development. As the report of a committee convened to study the
question stated, though, the crisis conditions of the country severely con-
strained the possibilities for such a government project.
The report noted that any major development program would require an
expansion of existing government departments, ‘‘the normal departmental
organization forming the nucleus from which such expansion would take
place.’’Ω In Palestine, however, there were many departments that lacked such
a stable nucleus: ‘‘Owing to the disturbances and on financial grounds, the
departments in question have been reduced in strength to such an extent that,
far from being in a position to expand, they are unable to discharge, with that
degree of e≈ciency which might reasonably be expected of them, even those
day to day duties which now fall to their lot.’’ Before the question of develop-
ment could be really tackled in Palestine, that is, the crises which made
ordinary government so di≈cult needed to be resolved. As the report put it,
‘‘The service rendered by the various departments of Government fall short of
the reasonable requirements of the country.’’ The authors of the report were
convinced that not only could Palestine not a√ord what it called ‘‘luxury
services,’’ but under existing circumstances ‘‘a far longer list of activities, of
practically equal importance and in many cases vital to the development of the
country, must be abandoned as beyond the power of Government to under-
take.’’ While in the first part of the Mandate the government hoped to be able
to control and conclude crises in the country, by its end this hope seemed vain.
Indeed, the British government relinquished the Mandate not because it had
successfully completed its tasks but out of frustration.
Under the Egyptian Administration, exceptional conditions were the
norm throughout, and crisis services had to expand accordingly. In this
post-1948 service expansion, defining and categorizing the population posed
an acute set of problems, as Gaza’s native population was dwarfed by the
influx of refugees. On the one hand, distinctions between the two groups
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were obvious and codified by the United Nations. The unrwa definition of
a Palestinian refugee, finalized in 1952, was a person ‘‘whose normal residence
was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the outbreak of the
conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of this conflict, has lost both his home
and means of livelihood.’’∞≠ On the other hand, this categorical distinction
between people who had lost their homes and those who had not was not an
accurate accounting of need. Much of the native Gazan population, many of
whom had lost not home, but land and their means of livelihood, was as
destitute as the refugees. But, lacking the label refugee, they were not eligible
for most unrwa services.∞∞
The crisis facing the Gazan population was immediately seen as being
about more than basic needs. It was also about a potential decay in morals
and possible emerging security threats. In the first years of the Administra-
tion, Egyptians and international observers alike o√ered sobering evaluations
of the decline in values and social capacity among Gaza’s population. The
Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram described the refugees as ‘‘living in a society
with no religion, no morals, and no community life.’’∞≤ Such an evaluation
may seem extreme and indeed does not entirely correspond to other reports
about refugee sociality.∞≥ This kind of response to the presence of large
numbers of ‘‘people out of place’’∞∂—displacement provoking not only com-
passion, but fear and even revulsion—is in fact a common response to refugee
crises.∞∑ In Gaza this concern was neither abstract nor only social. Egyptians
worried that, wittingly or not, an uncontrolled population might put the
Egyptian government at risk. Border crossings to retrieve food and posses-
sions might provoke an Israeli attack. Political and or military organizing to
reverse the dispossession of 1948 could be even more threatening. Having
su√ered a bad defeat, the Egyptian government had no interest in a con-
frontation with Israel; Palestinians did not necessarily share that reluctance.
Whatever its political and security concerns, the Egyptian Administra-
tion described its interest as humanitarian. The Department of Refugee
Supervision, Government Assistance, and Social A√airs (henceforth Refu-
gee A√airs) explained its work as follows: ‘‘Our mission for these people is
humanitarian in the first degree. . . . We need to be close to the attitudinal
currents that are moving among the people. And we have to expend great
e√ort in spreading reassurance and hope among them in order to stop the
decline into depravity or the rot of Satan or the fall into destruction which
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has already aΔicted some of them because of the [di≈cult conditions] in
which they live.’’∞∏ unrwa, in its annual reports, also expressed concern
about ‘‘the psychologically debilitating e√ect of giving relief over time’’ and
about the ‘‘development of a professional refugee mentality.’’ It reported
some of the (mis)behaviors that accompanied the refugee condition: ‘‘To
increase or prevent decreases in their ration issue, they eagerly report births,
sometimes by passing a new-born baby from family to family, and reluctantly
report deaths, resorting often to surreptitious burial to avoid giving up a
ration card.’’∞π
unrwa worried further about the long-term negative e√ects of unem-
ployment and poverty: ‘‘A refugee who has lost, or has never acquired, the
habit of self-reliance and self-supporting work will be a useless burden on the
community, whether he is later to be repatriated or resettled.’’∞∫ By the later
years of the Administration, the immediate threat of starvation or exposure
was much diminished, but the threat of idleness remained: ‘‘One of the tragic
aspects of the life of a refugee is that he often has nothing to do. This is . . .
particularly true in the Gaza strip, where 300,000 people are concentrated in
a small area of largely unproductive desert land. . . . Although a man may not
be aware of it, the debilitating e√ects of ten years without regular work is
considerable.’’∞Ω Gazans themselves, especially natives, expressed similar con-
cerns about the corrosive e√ects of relief. As Salim Rashid said to me, ‘‘From
my point of view, and I say it to everybody, it was better if there was no
agency [wikala]. Prophet Mohammed said ‘the high hand is better than the
low hand.’ What does this mean? It means that the one who gives is better
than the one who takes.’’≤≠ Another person contrasted the dignity of Pales-
tinians before 1948 with their conditions after receiving unrwa aid: ‘‘After
unrwa started to distribute rations, the Palestinian started to take. He
started begging—and morals were destroyed.’’≤∞
While unrwa and Administration descriptions of the deleterious psy-
chological and moral impact of poverty were constrained by their measured
bureaucratic language, judgments by native Gazans were sometimes much
harsher. This harshness reveals deep-seated tensions within this population.
While few people spoke in great detail about problems between native
Gazans and refugees, one elderly woman I talked with, Hanan, did not
hesitate to express her opinions. Hanan saw clear connections between ‘‘bad
habits’’ and impoverished living conditions:
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The refugees were really in a catastrophic condition. When they first
came to Gaza, they occupied schools and took refuge everywhere. Noth-
ing was prepared for them. Then camps were made for them; the camps,
of course, o√ered very humiliating conditions. . . . In addition, there was
the matter of begging—for provisions. Can you imagine, a mother, father,
and son going to ask for food? The child carried the basket and begged.
This, of course, was reflected in the psychology of the child, how they
taught him to beg. It was a terrible thing. . . . There was an unimaginable
decline in values. . . . This in fact had a very negative impact. I always say
that our country has gone, but we can regain it in a fierce battle—but the
morals of the people cannot be restored in one, two, or three days as the
structure was corrupted. . . . Actually we are in bad need of awareness and
I always call for going to houses and educating women there.≤≤
Hanan also described the ‘‘class rancor’’ (haqd al-tabaqi) between refugee and
native Gazans. She suggested that the e√ects of this rancor remain very much
alive today: ‘‘Even when the boys of the camps were throwing stones, they
said that the boys of the city [that is, nonrefugees] cover the stone with tissue
before they throw it at the Israelis. This is strange. Really we dealt with them
as human beings regardless of anything else and they were in bad need of
care. They, however, remain wretched.’’≤≥ Given Hanan’s disparaging com-
ments about refugees, her surprise at expressions of hostility toward native
Gazans seems, if not disingenuous, then at least naive. Even if Hanan’s
comments were more harsh than most—and they were—they reflected wide-
spread sentiments among native Gazans about the impoverished character as
well as the material conditions of refugees. Such comments also reflected the
anxiety on the part of the natives about their new position in a population
defined by poverty. That the nakba had produced a social crisis was not only
an evaluation by outsiders, but was a concern among the population as well.
Providing for Oneself and Caring for Neighbors:
Getting Food in the British Mandate
The British Mandate began and ended in crisis, but at least so far as food was
concerned its middle was relatively stable. The beginning of the Mandate
followed the devastation of World War I, which decimated Gaza City. In the
final years of Ottoman rule, Gaza had been a peaceful, relatively prosperous
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town, though such serenity defined only one moment amid a history marked
by conflicts. The life of this ‘‘modest stone-and-mud-built town’’≤∂ was shat-
tered by the war, in which Gaza became a frontline zone in the struggle for
control of the Middle East. Caught in the war and in a broader regional
famine, the population faced starvation.≤∑ Musa, an elderly man who was a
child during the war, described these hardships: ‘‘The Turks used to take our
fathers to the army. My mother remained alone. She had three hens that laid
eggs. She used to sell the eggs in the market for 1 piaster, or 2∞⁄≤ piasters, and
with the money buy turmus, jummaiz [dried sycamore], and five handfuls of
flour. We would mix it all in a bowl with a pitcher of water and devour it. We
were very hungry, thirsty, and imprisoned. There was no work.’’≤∏ Saying that
he would not wish this su√ering on his worst enemy, Musa commented
further, ‘‘An orange rind lying on the ground covered in sand, I would pick it
up and wipe it o√ on my clothes and eat it, I was so hungry. Hunger is cruel
and life was terrible.’’ Under conditions of acute hunger, orange rinds and
flour mixed with dried sycamore become substitutes for the ‘‘figs, sabr
[prickly pear], grapes, and everything’’≤π that Gazans remember as their
normal diet during the Mandate.
How exactly the transition from the cruelty of hunger to a life of relative
stability was managed is not well documented. Certainly there was some
limited food servicing when the British entered Palestine. This government
intervention was trumpeted in British propaganda e√orts. Jaridat Filastin,
the o≈cial paper of British military forces, commented in 1918 on British
e√orts to aid the needy in Palestine: ‘‘[The military administration] has spent
a lot of money to assist the unfortunate and the industrial sector, giving out
seeds and food to those in need, and establishing camps to aid the poor and
unfortunate in all parts of the country.’’≤∫ Despite this early activism, Man-
date o≈cials appear to have relied primarily on market forces, which nor-
malized after the war, and the promise of development to resolve the crisis.≤Ω
That land in the Gaza area was, as a British o≈cial noted, ‘‘highly fertile,’’≥≠
made this a more realistic proposition.≥∞
Gazan refugees from villages in the surrounding area often remember life
during ayyam al-balad (village days) as being ‘‘like gold.’’ They emphasize
communal assistance and self-su≈ciency—the ethic of care, for oneself and
for others—as the primary mechanisms for ensuring that people had enough
food. These memories are certainly at least partly nostalgic longings, colored
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by the dislocation and loss of home which occurred in 1948, and they cannot
be assumed to be entirely accurate depictions of life in a Palestinian village
prior to the nakba.≥≤ On the contrary, as I have noted, the problems of peasant
poverty, indebtedness, and growing landlessness were concerns throughout
the Mandate and repeatedly noted in government-commissioned reports.
While some peasants lived well, such as a farmer described in American
Friends Service Committee (afsc) records who ‘‘owned a bit of fruit trees too
and on his earnings they lived in relative comfort in the little village before
fright scattered them and their neighbors,’’≥≥ others experienced conditions of,
as the Hope-Simpson report put it, ‘‘extreme poverty.’’≥∂
Life for much of the Palestinian peasantry during the Mandate was pat-
ently di≈cult. For the most part, however, it was better than the famine that
had come before or the total dislocation and the attendant threat of starva-
tion that came after. People’s memories cannot be dismissed as mere fan-
tasies, and they reflect dramatic changes in self-su≈ciency, abundance, and
the practice of care.≥∑ They also reflect changing definitions of need and
luxury, as people’s ordinary diets were transformed over time. The ethic of
care as social practice worked during the Mandate in part because of what
Gazans described as their ‘‘simple life.’’ As Abu Hassan, a retired unrwa
teacher from a village near Majdal, explained, ‘‘One lived a simple, blessed
life. Today when I go to buy things for the house I buy big sacks of sugar,
flour, and rice, etc. In ayyam al-balad I only used to buy one or two kilos total,
a pound of rice or sugar, half sack of flour. I didn’t have to buy tea or co√ee,
which I buy in kilos now, because it was only drunk and o√ered to guests at
the mukhtar’s place. Guests were o√ered fruit when they came at home.’’≥∏
This comment underscores the social aspect of the definition of needs. What
counts as abundance or as a minimum requirement changes over time and
varies according to perspective.≥π While today one is invariably served both
co√ee and tea when visiting a Palestinian home—and both are certainly felt
to be basic necessities—during the Mandate they were luxury items.
Within the Palestinian population, there were material disparities in peo-
ple’s abilities to be self-su≈cient. While there were many small peasant
holdings in the Gaza area, as in the rest of Palestine, large landowners
provided employment to many peasants who either had no land or who
could no longer live o√ its income and produce. Amal, who was from such a
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wealthy family, compared life in the Mandate to current dependency: ‘‘Now-
adays if you have money you eat. If you don’t have money you can’t eat. . . .
We had all the lands in the world. Everyone had land—not only a dunam
[approximately one-quarter of an acre] but a lot of land. . . . We lived in well-
being, eating from the produce of the land, working the land, planting,
reaping and eating. . . . We worked in our lands . . . and we had also workers
who harvested the land with us. We hired peasants for harvesting because we
had a lot of land.’’≥∫ Even as Amal o√ered this as a picture of universal
prosperity, her description divulges a key feature of the ethic of care—its
hierarchies. In marked distinction to Gilligan’s claim that care is about inter-
connection rather than inequality, the practice of care in Gaza was both
interconnected and unequal. Even as Amal’s family may have had ‘‘all the
lands in the world,’’ not ‘‘everyone had land.’’ Some people were workers who
harvested other people’s land. The conditions of hierarchy and inequality, far
from undermining the ethic of care, were integral to it.
As part of a broader milieu in which zakat (charity) was valued, those who
had land shared its bounty with those who did not. Abu Hassan described
how the landless took what they needed from their neighbors’ crops: ‘‘I
remember when we were living in our village and had land that we used to
plant. All the neighbors used to take vegetables for free. They used to take it
themselves and we were happy; because we considered it as zakat. People
were close to each other as one family.’’≥Ω Of course, as Abu Hassan’s descrip-
tion reminds us, relations of inequality do not imply a simple distribution of
power. The landless that he mentioned were not given this food; they ‘‘used
to take it themselves.’’ Abu Hassan and his kind might have been ‘‘happy’’
about it, but they seem not to have been entirely in charge of it. Still, the
ethic of care in the Mandate appeared largely successful in managing the
provision of food to the people of Gaza.
While the government tried to stay away from food services, there were
times when involvement was necessary. Sometimes local events demanded a
degree of intervention, for example, the aid provided during the 1936–39
revolt noted above and the distribution of water during a 1947 drought.∂≠
The crisis which most forcefully brought food into the domain of govern-
ment service during the Mandate was, however, not a local crisis of hunger,
but rather the much larger extraordinary circumstances created by World
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War II. During the war British o≈cials regulated food production and
supply in Palestine and all over the Middle East.∂∞ Even with this increased
intervention, British rationing policy mandated maintaining ‘‘normal chan-
nels of trade’’ to the extent permitted by the requirements of control.∂≤ In the
e√orts to maintain this balance, some of the tensions inherent in the tactical
government of the Mandate came into play. To the extent that government
did involve itself in food distribution and in the practice of care, it did so as a
‘‘singular’’ intervention, one motivated by crisis and intended to end as soon
as possible. As it happens, this intervention facilitated the much larger proj-
ect of food aid undertaken by the afsc in the immediate aftermath of 1948.
The Quakers relied on the village population records developed to manage
this wartime rationing to help determine the number of refugees.
Government, market, and municipality all had a role to play in the Man-
date food distribution network, and these roles were sometimes at odds.
Some municipalities appealed to government to be allowed to assume greater
control over the sale of goods within their jurisdictions. In Majdal, for
example, the municipality was granted permission to monopolize the sale of
flour, an enterprise funded by local merchants.∂≥ It then sought to expand the
range of commodities under its control. The Gaza district commissioner
supported this request and forwarded it for approval to the chief secretary,
but the latter was wary about the e√ects on private business of such munici-
pal expansion.∂∂ The district commissioner’s arguments in favor of permit-
ting municipal control of sales illuminate a transition that was under way in
the practice of the ethic of care, wherein this practice was, at least momen-
tarily, transferred to the site of government. In the case of Majdal, the district
commissioner argued that the ‘‘public benefit’’ of municipal control far out-
weighed the potential ‘‘private’’ harm caused therein. Further, he suggested
that those most likely to object to the proposal were ‘‘profiteers’’ and there-
fore not worthy of consideration. He clinched his argument by reminding
the chief secretary that the benefits of municipal control would accrue to the
entire town: ‘‘The profits are spent on improving the streets and schools for
which revenue is urgently needed. There may be complaints from one or two
who will be unable to profiteer but the majority of shopkeepers are quite
content as they sell other articles.’’∂∑
Such an argument both suggests and reinforces a tactical hierarchy of capa-
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bility in which private persons were necessarily compromised in the practice
of care precisely because of their private interests. According to this argument,
in this context it was government (here in the body of the municipality) that
was most capable of providing justly for the needs of all.∂∏ While this case
represents a wholesale removal of private responsibility, food servicing more
commonly traversed domains, and the ethic of care appeared both private and
public, both communal and governmental. When the practice of care was
transferred to government during the Mandate it was self-consciously per-
ceived as temporary, a requirement of wartime management. The exceptional
nature of Mandate interventions contributed to the broader dynamic of
abeyance. With the focus on emergency, little attention was paid by either
government o≈cials or the population which was the recipient of these
policies to the potential stakes and significance of such interventions.
Coping with Catastrophe: Food Services after 1948
The period of the Egyptian Administration witnessed a larger and longer-
lasting transformation in the ethic of care and the character of crisis services.
Under such conditions it was less distraction and more disassociation that
promoted abeyance. Both the community’s practice of care and government’s
capacity to provide were strained by the massive dispossession of Palestin-
ians in 1948. The sheer numbers of people who required assistance in getting
adequate food overwhelmed the available coping mechanisms. The nakba
tripled the population of Gaza and threw almost everyone, native Gazans
and refugees alike, into poverty. The practice of care was both strained and
reinforced by this crisis. The normal ways of distributing food were no
longer available—most of the land from which people got their food was now
beyond their grasp. The ordinary hierarchies in care were also disrupted in
that people who had been giving landowners during the Mandate were now
forced to scrounge for food wherever they could find it. Ultimately, this crisis
resulted in the enormous expansion of government food services—a nearly
wholesale transformation of need to service—and a reconfiguration of peo-
ple’s sense of obligation to themselves and each other.
To explore how this transfer occurred, I turn first to the conditions of
dispossession which mandated it. People’s departures from their homes were
chaotic and hurried; they often took little with them because they planned to
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return when the fighting was over. As Basma Haifa described, ‘‘The planes
were firing on Majdal, and people were afraid because of the air raids, so they
left their homes and furniture.’’∂π Sami Ibrahim remembered watching peo-
ple heading toward Gaza: ‘‘We were young, and we were going to watch them
along the shore. Women, men, one carrying her baby, some carrying things
on their heads, some pulling an old man slowly, everybody was walking along
the shore.’’∂∫ Once refugees arrived in Gaza, conditions were extremely di≈-
cult. Im ‘Amir, a refugee from Yibna, described the early days: ‘‘We had no
bread or food to cook. Our living was di≈cult. . . . We were fighting over the
distribution of supplies and every day two people were injured. . . . The
[Egyptian] army was throwing onions and soap while it passed by. . . . We
had neither food nor drink. We ate dried dates and guavas, but it was not
enough.’’∂Ω
As the experiences of everyone I knew in Gaza made clear, the confusion
and trauma of the hijra (exile) threw basic needs into conflict. Shelter and
health, safety and sustenance, personal survival and family and social well-
being, all these important life needs were in conflict with each other during
this period. While the first months of dispossession were the most di≈cult—
with people uprooted from their lives and not yet having formed new pat-
terns of living—the trauma caused by this experience has yet to be resolved.
The immediate crisis of dispossession and starvation severely constrained
peoples’ abilities to care for themselves and for others. Im ‘Amir’s comments
were echoed by other refugees, who described similar scenes of ruthlessness
in the struggle over food: ‘‘One could not feed his children. People were
stealing bread from those who went to the baker. People were starving.’’∑≠
The crisis of the nakba and the widespread hunger which accompanied it
overrode, at least in the short term, the ethic of mutual care which motivated
communal food provisioning.
In the immediate aftermath of 1948 it was not clear how a communally
sited practice of care could fulfill people’s needs for food. The knowledges
and capabilities that had been developed to this end were, in the new Gaza
Strip, no longer applicable. People were forced to develop new ways of
coping, ways that relied neither on their neighbors’ ‘‘happiness’’ to give them
food, nor on the products of their own land. Im ‘Amir’s description of her
early e√orts to feed herself and her family appears as a distorted version of
prior practices:
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Where could we go and how could we find food? I started going to the
forest and bringing wood to sell to bakers for a [small sum]. We sold
wood in order to eat. Then I told him [her husband] that I was fed up
with selling wood, and so we started selling radish, onions, carrots, and
vegetables. I was going to [Gazans’] fields and uprooting carrots, washing,
cleaning, and selling carrots for one or two pennies and buying a loaf of
bread with the money. The Gazans started to put sand in the loaves of
bread and selling the bread to us for one or two pennies.
This description of refugees taking (essentially stealing) whatever they could
find in an e√ort to survive and of Gazans putting filler in the bread to be able
to make more money highlights the extent to which care of the self and care
for others, both integral parts of the practice of care, often appeared incom-
patible during this di≈cult period.
Both natives and refugees were in need, many natives having lost much or
all of their income and land. Lacking any means to change the situation or
even, in the first days and months of the crisis, to find food, people often
resorted to taking from each other.∑∞ Even during these most trying days
people tried to o√er assistance when they could, but that they sometimes
harmed rather than helped each other must also be recognized. These tacti-
cal practices on the part of both Gazans and refugees certainly reflect a
making-do that ‘‘seize[s] on the wing the possibilities that o√er themselves in
any given moment,’’∑≤ though they were tactics directed not at power but at
others like themselves. In this context, personal tactics did not always express
themselves as resistance, but often as force. When organized e√orts to pro-
vide relief began, first by the Quakers and later by unrwa, with cooperation
from the Administration, these service providers were cognizant of the pos-
sibility that this force could also be turned against them.
If the crisis of the nakba undermined people’s abilities to care for each
other, it also threatened their sense of personal dignity and continuity. Peo-
ple who were used to caring for themselves found themselves dependent on
charity, an experience that was destabilizing and degrading. Da’ud Ahmed, a
retired civil servant who was a boy at the time of the nakba, recalled to me the
consternation he felt when he first received food aid: ‘‘Someone put a piece of
cheese in my pocket and sweets in the other pocket. . . . At that time, I felt
myself as a strange beggar. I was twelve years old and I was crying. . . . The
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people there brought food to us like beggars.’’∑≥ Even when international aid
groups began to organize the delivery of food aid and the relationship of
distribution was transformed from a personal to a procedural one, the expe-
rience was still humiliating.∑∂ As Da’ud said, ‘‘Can you imagine how a man
who lived in a great city such as Ya√a and then came to live in a tent and had
nothing would feel? . . . It was humiliation and misery of the most horrible
kind. . . . We lost everything, and we had never imagined we would experi-
ence such conditions.’’
Ultimately, this sense of humiliation was managed, and the practice of
care reconfigured, through a discourse and practice of international obliga-
tion. Obligation had always been part of the ethic of care. Having abandoned
the Palestinians, as Gazans saw it, the international community now bore
responsibility for caring for them. They saw the work of, first, the afsc and
then unrwa as a recognition of this obligation. Providing this aid did not, as
Gazans saw it, absolve the international community of its political obliga-
tions to the Palestinian people—most particularly their obligation to enforce
their right to return to their homes. Furthermore, acceptance of food aid
should not be construed as a recognition of the legitimacy of either the
organizations which supplied it or the conditions which made it necessary.
This disjuncture left many Gazans bitter about unrwa’s role. As Abu Ayub,
a refugee living in Shati camp, told me,
In the days of the Quakers and the un the Palestinian people had only
food and drink. I mean, it is like someone who stops someone else and
keeps beating and beating him and at last he brings him food. The world
countries were doing the same with us. They brought us food, blankets,
cheese, dry dates and everything. There was more food than you can
imagine. But what is the benefit?∑∑
This comment reflects a commitment to the idea that such services were
limited and inadequate responses to the Palestinian problem. From this
perspective, food services could always only be tactical—no matter how ra-
tionalized they became in their delivery—because a strategic response de-
manded a reversal of dispossession.
Even as the Egyptian Administration was not painted with exactly the
same brush as unrwa, the discourse of obligation came also to shape its
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food service practice. Although unrwa’s jurisdiction was limited to refugees,
Egypt had an obligation to the entire population of Gaza. One of the early
mechanisms the Administration employed to distribute food and other sup-
plies to Gazans was the organization of what it called mercy trains (qitarat al-
rahma), which traveled between Cairo and Gaza to deliver goods donated by
Egyptians for the Palestinians. This new practice of food provisioning was
part of a humanitarian style of governing that characterized the Administra-
tion in its early years—and thus was coded as relief rather than service. This
humanitarian style was connected to the initial ambivalence and discomfort
in Egyptian rule. By projecting its service in Gaza as a humanitarian e√ort,
rather than as part of a rationalized bureaucratic structure, the Administra-
tion was able to proceed without fully inhabiting the role of government. It
was not, though, possible to maintain this stance for very long.∑∏
While the mercy trains played an important public relations and psycho-
logical role, the provisioning of food to so many hungry people required a
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more regimented and ultimately bureaucratic system. As the practice of relief
began to be codified as head counts were taken and eligibility determined,
local village leaders [mukhtars] acquired a new responsibility and therefore
new power. These people were called upon to identify members of their
villages and were sometimes given responsibility for distributing donated
goods to refugees.∑π These new powers created opportunities for corruption,
and the afsc for one was very frustrated by the extent of such malfeasance
among mukhtars.∑∫ The continued, reconfigured importance of mukhtars
further reveals ways in which transformations in the service of care could
work to further elaborate social hierarchies.
There was never enough money to provide as much food as was re-
quired,∑Ω the capacity to perfectly regulate the rolls, or the mandate to aid
everyone who needed help.∏≠ These problems contributed to the develop-
ment of a focus on rationalization, management, and continuity in food
delivery as a tactical means to maximize limited resources. At the same time,
this shift indicated a change in the Administration’s style of rule in Gaza
from humanitarian to bureaucratic. In this regard, the first and second parts
of the Administration (before and after the four-month Israeli occupation in
1956) were quite distinct. Even as the pressures of work moved government
in this direction early on, the second half of Egyptian rule was marked by a
much more expansive understanding of its role in the Strip. While never
fully at ease with this rule and certainly never settled, the Administration
gradually acquired a more de jure acceptance of its obligations toward Gaza
and Gazans and thereby was increasingly bound to the population and place
of governance. Conditions in Gaza meant that this move toward regularity of
servicing could never be entirely stable—nor could the future of the ruling
body be assured.
The emphasis on rationalization was evident in a report by the Refugee
A√airs Department on the operations of the flour distribution bureau. The
sta√ of the bureau included ten civil servants and fourteen workers. The
report praised the employees and noted that
because of the experience of the o≈cers and civil servants . . . they have
been able to implement a new distribution system whereby each recipient
knows exactly which week, which day, and which time he receives his
rations. Previously all of this was unknown to them, which caused a lot of
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figure  6. Rations distribution. source: afsc archives.
exhaustion among both the recipients and the civil servants who did the
distributing. The new system allows the number of work hours to be cut
with an increase in production. It used to take until 3pm to get through
400 ration cards, now we get through 600 before 12pm, without causing
the civil servants and workers any di≈culties.∏∞
Developing a more rational system of distribution made the jobs of civil
servants easier and, no doubt, eased the population’s anxieties. If one knew
exactly when, where, and how one could get food, it might be possible to not
be fearful at every moment that one might go hungry.
This increased rationalization in and improvement of food service provi-
sion was threatened by ongoing instabilities in government. The procedures
of flour distribution were undermined by an unpredictable supply of flour
from Egypt, caused in part by financial constraints. The report stressed the
importance of keeping the distribution regular, saying, ‘‘We have to continue
to distribute to the poor at their regular appointments in order to protect the
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governmental machinery.’’∏≤ Embedded within this statement is clear anxiety
about possible tactical action on the part of the population. The tactical force
that people turned against each other earlier could just as easily be turned
against government.∏≥ Just as providing some security of distribution could
ease personal anxiety and therefore, presumably, make people less likely to
act out against government, disruptions in that security might provoke anx-
ious disorder among the population.
The imbrication of social concern and governmental practice highlights
both the transformation in the ethic of care as it was reconfigured as service
and the ongoing tension between continuity and singularity, between ratio-
nalization and exception, that characterized tactical government. The cen-
trality of obligation in people’s understandings of food servicing could poten-
tially bring them perilously close to a consideration of legitimacy. Such an
outcome was in part averted by the dynamic of disassociation that enabled
people both to claim un relief as a right, as afsc workers noted they did,∏∂
and to argue that the purpose behind unrwa was to make ‘‘the Palestinian
forget his homeland since he takes the flour sack,’’∏∑ as one Gazan put it to
me. Just as civil servants distinguished their work in government from their
evaluation of it, so too Gazans sometimes separated their acceptance of
services from their judgment of the government or agency providing that
service.∏∏
Service Anxieties, Living Conditions:
Planning Towns and Houses in the Mandate
To an even greater extent than food servicing, the field of housing o√ers an
instance of governmental anxiety and of tactical government utilized as an
instrument of response. It also sheds light on important di√erences between
the Mandate and the Administration. The meeting of anxiety and service
highlights the paradox at the heart of tactical government. Both governments
wanted, on the one hand, not to be overinvolved with the place or the
people—not to extend or expend too much—because of fears of overcommit-
ting and of overspending. At the same time, each government needed to be
involved because of fears of the population getting out of control, of moral
disintegration, and of political challenge. Tactical government is the means
through which these contradictory impulses were managed in Gaza.
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In addressing housing problems, each government had first to decide
whether housing should be considered a service at all, and, whether yes or
no, either answer had troubling implications. Although shelter is an immedi-
ate and apparently straightforward need, fulfillment of it creates a broad
array of social, legal, and political entanglements. Building houses raises
questions of town planning, construction regulations, landownership, and
social dynamics. These issues made Mandate o≈cials, especially, reluctant to
define housing as a service. Still, these same concerns also indicate ways in
which such a service could be productive for government. When government
was forced to fully take on housing as a service—as was the Egyptian Admin-
istration, due to the extreme crisis caused by the nakba—that service was also
able to participate in social policy.
World War I wrought enormous devastation in Gaza, including the phys-
ical destruction of much of Gaza City. As Herbert Samuel, the first high
commissioner of Palestine, described it,
The town of Gaza su√ered probably more from Military action during
the war than any other town in this theatre of operations. Almost all its
buildings have been destroyed, and its present appearance is comparable
only to that of the devastated areas in France and Belgium. . . . Gaza was,
before the war, in respect of population (40,000), the third largest town
in Palestine. . . . It was of considerable commercial importance, being the
natural emporium of the rich grain districts lying south and east of it. The
original population has now dwindled to something like one third of its
number, and in the present ruinous condition of the town there is little to
attract the remainder of its inhabitants to return or a fresh population to
settle there.∏π
Samuel made a plea for government intervention, arguing that aid would
serve a humanitarian purpose and could also be of strategic benefit to the
newly established British Administration in Palestine: ‘‘Not only would the
population of Gaza be deeply grateful, but the political e√ect throughout
Palestine would contribute greatly to the popularity of British rule.’’∏∫ There
is more than a glimmer of interest in legitimacy in this plea—an important
reminder that its relative absence from the governing dynamic was not be-
cause the governments of the Mandate, or later the Administration, did not
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care about legitimacy, but because it did not work for government. The
immediate demands of governing crises deflected attention from strategies to
develop legitimacy toward tactics to manage problems. This was certainly
the case in this instance, in which, despite Samuel’s e√orts, no significant
funds were put toward the rebuilding of Gaza.
British o≈cials worried about the financial drain on already limited gov-
ernment resources, about setting a precedent that would impose future obli-
gations on government which it might wish to avoid, and about the possibility
that the relationship between municipalities and the central government
would be disrupted by government intervention in what was felt to be a
municipal (or possibly private) arena.∏Ω One Mandate o≈cial commented
that he didn’t understand why landlords had not made the repairs themselves:
‘‘There is no lack of credit in the country for building provided that it is an
economic proposition. If it is not an economic proposition at Gaza, public
funds should not be invested in it any more than private funds.’’π≠ The tactical
response to these concerns resulted in a limited government project of home
building and a much more significant transformation of the regulatory land-
scape within which housing stock could be built. Thus, one could say that the
Mandate solved the problem posed by regulatory entanglement vis-à-vis
housing by making an answer out of the problem itself.
To get to this tactical solution, housing policy in Gaza went through
numerous twists and turns over the course of the Mandate. This confusing
array of decisions made it di≈cult for people on the ground, whether Gazans
or government o≈cials, to discern their e√ects. The Gaza Development
Scheme, as the response to Gaza’s housing problems was called, was a com-
plex, not entirely workable, amalgam of poor relief, town planning, and
municipal development. It did not award direct grants to those whose homes
had been destroyed. Rather, it proposed to cede government land to the
municipality, which in turn would sell this land and use the proceeds to fund
a Gaza Building Society to make loans to homeowners whose houses were
destroyed during the war.π∞ By making the municipality the putative owner
of the land and thus the direct service provider, and by raising money from
among wealthy Gazans rather than from state co√ers, government hoped to
avoid the problem of overservicing Gaza. Even this limited scheme raised
suspicions. O≈cials doubted the capacity of the municipality to fulfill the
role proposed for it, and they especially worried about getting reimbursed for
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the value of the land. In addition, skepticism was expressed about the Gazan
population’s ability to live up to its commitments, that is, to pay o√ the loans
and to actually do any building.π≤ In the end, these judgments proved
too harsh.
Actual implementation of the scheme was delayed by numerous com-
plications, which meant that, despite government approval of the scheme in
principle as early as 1924, a final draft of the purchase agreement was not
approved until August 1933.π≥ Even then, the condition of the land slowed
both sales and building. Since this was a ‘‘new’’ area, there were no govern-
ment services, such as water provision, near the land, making it a less than
appealing site on which to build a home. The commissioner of the Southern
District reported to the chief secretary in 1932 that out of an anticipated two
thousand available plots, only seventy-seven had been sold, and of these, only
four people had begun actual construction. He commented,
I am informed that one reason why the inhabitants of Gaza have failed to
take advantage of the scheme is the lack of water in the area in question.
This naturally increases the di≈culty and the cost of building a house,
and the knowledge that the house, even when built will be without a water
supply is a further deterrent.
When the scheme for a new Water Supply at Gaza is put in hand it
will be possible for the Municipality to provide water to the development
area. This scheme is, however, temporarily in abeyance while the finances
of the Municipality are being examined with a view to enabling the Coun-
cil to contract a loan for the purpose.π∂
This comment about the lack of water services (see chapter 6) underscores
the interconnected, mutually supporting character of government services.
In the event, land sales did not begin in earnest until 1934, when 322 plots
were sold.π∑ This delay, as a 1941 report on the scheme by the Land Settle-
ment Department noted, ‘‘reduced the necessity for granting loans to the
would-be purchasers whose houses were destroyed or damaged during the
war, which was one of the main objects of the scheme.’’π∏ As this comment
indicates, one thing this plan had never been designed to do—a feature which
distinguishes it from later Egyptian housing interventions—was to remake
the socioeconomic landscape in Gaza. The people who were supposed to be
aided by the scheme were those who already owned property. Even in its
146 • Chapter 5
imagined form, it did not include mechanisms for expanding the owning
class in Gaza.
While much of damaged Gaza was eventually rebuilt, and the new Gaza
neighborhood of Rimal was established, this happened less through govern-
ment servicing than through government regulation. The plan, which had
been intended as a means of providing some housing service without involv-
ing government too much, had evolved into a government-regulated commer-
cial venture. There was no formal decision to abandon the service aspect of
the scheme, just as there had not been only one cause for the delay in its
implementation. As it was actualized, though, public funds seem to have
disappeared.ππ The regulatory mechanisms which governed the implementa-
tion of the Gaza Development Scheme got the better of any original intent
behind that plan. In this manner, it was folded into the general regulatory
environment, which was the primary means through which the Mandate
responded to the housing problem.π∫
Regulation did not bring an end to the confusion, however. In the chal-
lenging environment of the Mandate it was easier to propose a regulatory
framework then to enact it. Gaza was designated a town planning area as
early as 1923, but it was not until 1940 that the District Town Planning
Commission began meeting.πΩ Further, as late as 1945, the regional town
planning scheme still did not have the force of law. As the town planning
advisor commented, ‘‘In so far as the issue of permits and the collection of
fees are concerned, my O≈ce has been obliged to act as if it was in fact in
force.’’∫≠ The Town Planning Commission faced additional di≈culties in
getting home builders in Rimal to follow these rules. In a meeting in October
1940, the commission noted that ‘‘although the Municipality had instructed
owners to build in accordance with the Regulations, cases had arisen where
these instructions were ignored.’’∫∞
Faced with a public that was disregarding regulations and a municipal
body that was failing to enforce compliance, government was forced, con-
trary to its own intentions, to increase civil service involvement in the daily
life of Gaza. As a result, the commission ordered that the regional engineer
be dispatched to Gaza on a monthly basis to serve as an advisor to the local
planning commission.∫≤ The commission also regulated the activities of mu-
nicipal civil servants, ordering the municipality, for example, ‘‘to ensure that
one of its building inspectors visiting [sic] the site and explained to the
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applicant all the regulations or set backs, etc.’’∫≥ The layers of governing work
involved in managing regulation meant that, even as government was in-
creasingly involved in microlevel municipal a√airs, the public still confronted
the municipality as agent. So, while the Mandate government may not have
been successful in minimizing housing service in Gaza, it did manage (with-
out any plan to this end) to distract attention from the significance of such
involvement.
It was not until 1947 that the Planning Commission felt prepared to claim
success at enforcing regulations. According to the minutes of a meeting from
June of that year, ‘‘After a slow start and a lot of uphill work . . . real progress
was at last being made. . . . having cleared up a considerable number of
infringements which had been allowed in the past the Committee was con-
centrating on the future.’’∫∂ The procedures put in place, the personnel
dispatched, and the products being constructed should, the commission
averred, ‘‘put an end to the state of chao[s] which had been allowed in the
past.’’ It was, therefore, not until almost the end of the Mandate that the
regulatory environment had been brought under enough control to begin
‘‘concentrating on the future’’—a future that, as it turned out, would not be
realized.
Responsibility for ensuring that building regulations were followed had
been removed from the municipality, which now served as an agent of the
Planning Commission in this regard. Thus, while government had initially
been reluctant to undertake housing services partly because of an unwilling-
ness to take on municipal responsibility, in the transition from service to
regulation, this is precisely what occurred. Over the course of the Mandate
housing went from need to service to regulatory domain. The outcome of
this process was an involvement of government at a level of detail that had
not been anticipated, a general incapacity to do more than react to problems
in implementation, and the emergence of a complicated field of government
service that rendered the stakes of its work opaque.
Housing Service as Social Service
Most of the improvements of the Mandate years were made irrelevant by the
1948 war over Palestine and the subsequent creation of the Gaza Strip. With
three times the population and much less land, housing became a crisis, not a
development problem. Indeed, the severity of the situation which faced the
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refugees coming into Gaza did not a√ord the Egyptian Administration or
unrwa the luxury of debating—as did Mandate o≈cials—whether or not it
was appropriate to service housing. It was evident to all that housing was a
pressing and immediate need. The very severity of the need meant that the
implications of this service work for the nature of government, and for the
relationship between the (transformed) local population and that govern-
ment, could not be the focus of anyone’s attention. This condition-produced
distraction later shared space with a practice of deferral that was equally
connected to conditions in Gaza.
The housing crisis highlighted an important distinction between refugees
and native Gazans. Since it was precisely in terms of losing one’s home that a
refugee was defined, housing both was a marker of distance between the two
groups and was productive of that distance. At the same time, the housing
crisis in Gaza also brought these people, newly defined as two groups, into
intimate relations with each other. Jamil Nizar, a refugee from Asdud who
was a child in 1948, described the close quarters in the house where his family
rented space from native Gazans: ‘‘In the house where we stayed, we lived in
one room, and the owner’s family lived in the other room. If I were my father,
I would not have been able to survive.’’∫∑ Not surprisingly, these kind of
conditions created tensions between Gaza’s native inhabitants and the refu-
gees. As Hassan Muhammad, a refugee from Hammama, explained, ‘‘We
had no relatives, but I knew a man from Jabalya. . . . We lived with him for
some days, but his house was small, and his father was always nervous, I
thought maybe it was because of us, so I said goodbye. He is still my
friend.’’∫∏ Sometimes refugees with no money squatted on private land, but,
as Im ‘Amir recalled about her family’s squatting experience, ‘‘The people of
Gaza did not tolerate us and kicked us out.’’∫π
Even as housing created tensions between natives and refugees, many
refugees also recall the e√orts by Gazans to help them when they first
arrived.∫∫ Certainly, Gazans remember: ‘‘We used to go to the sea—a big ship
would come carrying girls and women from Ja√a. A man would go into the
sea carrying a rope, and would swim and swim until he reached the ship.
Then he would tie the rope to the ship and two hundred or three hundred
people would pull and pull until they dragged the ship in, carrying the
women and children.’’∫Ω The refugees then took up residence wherever they
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found space, in fields, schools, and mosques.Ω≠ As relief agencies, and even-
tually unrwa, came to Gaza, refugee camps were established which even-
tually moved people out of mosques and into tents, later replaced by concrete
and asbestos houses.
From the start, Egyptian administrators understood the dimensions of
the housing crisis to extend beyond the need for shelter. From their perspec-
tive, the crisis was a social one as well, with improper living conditions
leaving society in general at risk for a ‘‘decline into depravity.’’Ω∞ Social rela-
tions and mores were normally imbedded in spatial arrangements of housing
and neighborhoods that helped sustain ‘‘proper’’ interactions between men
and women, as well as within and among di√erent families. All of these
relations were put at risk by the conditions in which refugees in Gaza had to
live in the first years after 1948. Egyptian administrators saw these conditions
as dangerous to the moral welfare of the society. According to a report by the
Refugee A√airs department, conditions in camps were not much more satis-
factory than those in mosques: ‘‘Where there was a family living in their
nation in a spacious independent house, they have come to a life where they
live in one narrow room, or a small tent. The family needs to tend to all of its
needs in this small space—sleeping, cooking, washing, showering, meeting
guests, etc. There is no doubt that this situation cannot be sustained.’’ Even
worse, the report went on to comment, ‘‘there are many circumstances of two
families who have no connection having to live in one tent or room,’’Ω≤
thereby forcing unrelated men and women into the same intimate space.
Calling the situation abominable, the report stressed both the importance
and the di≈culty of alleviating these conditions.
It was not only ‘‘nation,’’ but potentially ‘‘society’’ that was lost in the
disaster of 1948. While the former loss could not be quickly rectified, it was
possible to do something about the latter. Hence, in the response to the first-
order need for shelter, housing service during the Administration quickly
developed a second-order interest in social policy. Even as it remained de-
fined as a response to crisis, housing became a mechanism for regularizing
and regulating the lives of refugees and native Gazans. It participated in
reshaping the social landscape, as new towns and neighborhoods were
formed and new neighbors emerged, reconfiguring the moral climate, as
people lost and gained privacy, and redefining the boundaries of government,
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figure  7. Khan Younis refugee camp, 1954. credit: m. chaumeny. source: unrwa photo
archive.
as unrwa and the administration determined the contours of their shared
responsibility.
unrwa also saw the need to improve conditions in the camps and was
eager to replace tents with solid housesΩ≥ as quickly as possible, a goal that
was achieved in Gaza before any other area of unrwa operation.Ω∂ In other
places, most notably Syria and Lebanon, refugees actively resisted any proj-
ects that they thought ‘‘might mean permanent resettlement.’’Ω∑ Accordingly,
‘‘experimental houses, erected by the Agency, have been torn down; and for
many months, in Syria and Lebanon, there was widespread refusal to work
on agency road-building and a√orestation schemes.’’Ω∏ unrwa reports do
not indicate why Gaza projects did not encounter such resistance, though
unrwa’s firm and stated conviction that ‘‘the reintegration of refugees on the
Gaza strip is impossible, since it can hardly support its previous inhabitants’’
may have eased refugees’ possible concerns about the implications of housing
improvements. When there were clear e√orts to engage in resettlement
projects, such as a proposal to move refugees to the Sinai, resistance was
indeed strong.
With new houses in place, the unrwa Annual Report for 1954 noted that
‘‘many refugee camps are thus increasingly taking on the appearance of
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villages and towns, with school buildings, small workshops and communal
facilities such as bath houses and recreational centres, as well as small shops
opened by enterprising refugees.’’Ωπ Of course, this almost rosy picture of
emerging small-town life does not capture the overwhelmingly makeshift
and destitute character of the landscape of these camps. Even after the tents
were replaced with houses, these camps were temporary in design and dilapi-
dated in execution.
Another way in which refugee camps were unlike normal towns was that
none of the inhabitants owned their homes or the land on which they sat.
Rather, the land, at least nominally, retained its original ownership, and the
homes were owned by unrwa itself. The public ownership of camps in-
creased unrwa’s regulatory oversight of the use of the houses. Any con-
struction within the camps required permission from the o≈cer in charge of
the camp, and such construction would itself become unrwa property.Ω∫
The camp regulations also stipulated how camp residents could make use of
their dwellings. Residents were responsible for keeping their homes and
yards clean, were not allowed to o√er shelter to others, and were prohibited
from installing water taps in their homes or using land for cultivation.ΩΩ The
land on which refugee camps sat was for the most part state land, and these
regulations were developed and enforced with cooperation between Egyptian
authorities and unrwa.∞≠≠
The joint management of refugee camps—in which unrwa provided
services and the Egyptian Administration was responsible for security—
further complicated the governmental field. That their respective authorities
were entangled seemed clear to the population—a complexity which was
reflected in the multiple directions of complaint and critique. Petitions about
unrwa practice were sent to the Administration; protests about Admin-
istration policy were staged outside unrwa o≈ces. These complicated rela-
tions certainly contributed to a lack of clarity about the meaning of particular
policies for judgments of government, though it did not in any way limit
critique of those policies themselves. Refugees were acutely aware of both
their need for housing assistance and the potentially negative implications of
such assistance for the resolution of their condition. The establishment of
refugee camps was a response to the incapacity of the population to care for
its own housing needs (owing to the crisis of dispossession), but it also
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ensured that this capacity for self-su≈ciency would be continually deferred
and risked making a return to their homes less likely.
The housing services provided by refugee camps were limited not only in
their capacity to fulfill the broader social needs the Administration saw as
crucial, but also in their very capacity to house refugees—only about half of
the refugee population ever lived in camps.∞≠∞ In these conditions of per-
petual deferral, Egyptian administrators eventually had to develop addi-
tional, more permanent housing policies. Mirroring a practice used in Egypt,
the Administration sold public land to civil servants as a perquisite of their
service to government. Through a lottery system, plots of state land were
made available at ‘‘symbolic’’ (that is, very low) prices to employees—first to
those with more than ten years’ experience and later to those with less.∞≠≤
These sales highlight the paradoxical place of deferral in Gaza’s government.
One the one hand, they were a sign of the continued deferral of refugees’
return to their homes. On the other, they were an instrument through which
the Egyptian Administration shored up its authority, authority based partly
on the deferred promise of independence.∞≠≥
This distribution of land, taking place as it did in the new circumstances
in which Gaza was inhabited by both natives and refugees, had a significant
e√ect on the social landscape. As civil servants, refugees had the opportunity
to acquire land in Gaza. Property ownership did not diminish people’s de-
sires to return to their homes or lessen their claims to lands left behind, but it
did bind them to their new place of residence. It also muted some of the
di√erences between refugees and natives inhabitants. While clear distinc-
tions between the groups remain even today, the fact of living in the same
neighborhoods and sharing the same everyday space did blunt the edges of
the di√erences. In the elaboration of housing services in the Administration,
it is clear how even a crisis service, deployed in a practice of tactical govern-
ment, could participate in e√ecting social policy and shaping social life. Even
with all the profound limitations, both chosen and imposed, on government
in Gaza, it still had a fundamental impact on transforming this place and its
population.
The land sales met with an enormously positive response. Judgments by
Gazans about the Egyptian Administration vary considerably, but nearly all
speak with glowing praise about two aspects of Egyptian rule: the provision
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of free university education to vast numbers of Gazans and the low-cost sale
of land to government employees.∞≠∂ That Gazans were so enthusiastic about
this service further highlights the complexities of tactical government. The
coexistence of the promise of independence with the delivery of services that
might be contrary to such a promise was made possible by the particular
scale of tactical practice. Their limited breadth of vision and scope meant
that they did not easily cohere into a totality. Both promise and service were
necessary for the persistence of rule. In tactical government, not only did the
contradictions between them not require resolution, but they were produc-
tive for rule.
At stake in the details of Egyptian housing service, as in the details of
Mandate services, was nothing less than the persistence of government.
These practices, which kept people participating in a dynamic to which they
could not assign legitimacy, also formed material through which both com-
munity and place were shaped. When frustration over perpetual deferral
seemed likely to produce a crisis, the distraction a√orded by improved ser-
vices could avert it. Alternately, when political demands rendered distraction
insu≈cient, future promise could counsel patience. The way these things
worked together was not necessarily planned, but it was productive. At the
same time, this mode of practice both represented and was produced out of
genuine limitations of governmental capacity. When government worked in
Gaza, when it participated in the shaping of place and people, as it clearly
did, it did so in ways that neither policy makers nor practitioners could
entirely control or even understand.
Conclusion
The location of crisis services on the edge of government—persistent but not
permanent; provided by both state institutions and community practice—
illuminates the contradictions at the heart of tactical government. Crisis
services were motivated by concern both for people’s well-being and for the
potential threat they posed. Food and housing services expanded the reach of
government into new domains, even as they proclaimed these domains to be
beyond the proper sphere of the state. In the Mandate, the government
sought to limit its service interventions, thereby developing a housing project
that was quickly overtaken by market forces and by regulation, and to limit
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the implications of those services it did provide, defining its food rationing as
an exceptional instance that was not characteristic of government respon-
sibility. In the Administration, government explained the expansion of ser-
vices by reference to a language of international obligation and humanitarian
relief—such that food rations could be universal, but not precedent setting—
and took advantage of being compelled to broaden services to turn crisis
services to a social policy end—as housing services attempted to create better
social and moral conditions among the population.
These contradictions were very real but also productive for the persis-
tence of rule. Crisis services, with their presumed exceptionality and imper-
manence, reveal the ways in which the practice of tactical government, as
opposed to any particular policy, served to keep questions of legitimacy in
abeyance. In their e√orts to contain the scope of their servicing, the Mandate
and the Administration also worked to obscure its significance. The way
these services were embedded in a broader social dynamic of care further
worked to distract attention from their relation to the governing regime. At
the same time, even as they might have averted attention from their own
significance, these exceptional services had important and lasting e√ects on
the place and people of Gaza. As ways of coping with di≈culty and patterns
of living shifted across domains, relations among people also shifted. How-




[Ayyam al-Balad] was an easy life, not hard like today’s. There was no
electricity. Water was free. Farmers used to give people vegetables and
fruits.
abu said, refugee from hammama, rafah, 12 june 1999
We used to bring water from [wells]. We filled water in jars and put
them on our heads. Every three women went together, or a woman
alone. Water was di√erent from now where you can use the tap, or
light the lamp, it was di√erent in the past.
im ‘amir, refugee from yibna khan yunis, 15 june 1999
In 1943, two histories of Gaza were published, both writtenby civil servants. The first was by ‘Arif al-‘Arif, a Jerusalem-
born Mandate o≈cial who was a district o≈cer in a number of locales,
including Gaza. Tarikh Ghazza (The History of Gaza), was one of his many
publications. The second history, Tarikh Ghazza: Naqd wa-Tahlil (The
History of Gaza: Critique and Analysis), was written as a rebuttal to parts of
al-‘Arif’s book. The author, Hilmi Abu Sha‘ban, was certainly known in
Gaza, but he was not a historical figure like al-‘Arif. Rather, Abu Sha‘ban,
who was a Gaza native and from a prominent local family, was a municipal
clerk and a regular contributor to Palestine’s newspapers.∞ Abu Sha‘ban took
issue with many parts of al-‘Arif’s account, seeming to suggest that al-‘Arif’s
outsider perspective on Gaza hindered his ability to accurately represent it.
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He prefaced his book by explaining why he felt compelled to write his
critique:
Since this book is about the city in which I was born and under whose
skies I grew up, and, desirous of the commitment that its greatest citizens
have shown for preserving its history, I embarked on writing my notes
about this book and criticizing some of the information in it—about
which the author did not succeed in obtaining the truth. His excuse for
this is clear, as he could not collect everything about the history of Gaza.≤
Indicating that al-‘Arif’s e√orts to ‘‘collect’’ the truths of Gaza’s history were
‘‘irreproachable,’’ even if his conclusions were not, Abu Sha‘ban o√ered what
he hoped was a ‘‘positive and constructive’’ criticism.
Abu Sha‘ban criticized al-‘Arif for relying too much on ‘‘what he heard
from people’’ and for letting his biases influence his history. Even as Abu
Sha‘ban criticized al-‘Arif for producing a located and partial history, in
contrast to the objective and accurate account that he sought to o√er, it
seems clear that the problem with al-‘Arif’s version was not that he was
located, but where he was located. Because he was not Gazan and interacted
with the Gazans only as a government o≈cial, al-‘Arif misinterpreted ‘‘Gazan
character,’’ which he described as ‘‘nervous and quick to anger.’’ Abu Sha‘ban
suggested that the source of this misinterpretation was al-‘Arif’s limited con-
tact with the people of Gaza: ‘‘He did not mingle with all the people of Gaza,
rather by reason of his position he knew a portion of them—those who had
injustices to present to the authority, rights to demand, problems to solve, or
needs to have met. What applies to someone in need, as it is said, does not
apply to the rest of the Gazans.’’≥ Abu Sha‘ban, a Gaza native who worked in
local, not national, government, suggested throughout his commentary that
he knew Gaza in a way that al-‘Arif never could.
The significance Abu Sha‘ban attached to the di√erence of locality—both
of person and position—highlights the importance of perspective in the
formation of governing relations. Perspective both provides an analytic hook
for making claims to and about government—demanding better services,
contesting restrictions—and gives rise to particular senses of place. As
Donna Haraway reminds us, all knowledge is situated, coming from ‘‘some-
where in particular.’’∂ By attending to these locations and to the ‘‘embodied
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objectivities’’ they represent, it becomes possible to see how contestations
among a multiplicity of partial visions help give shape to a shared experience
of place. People’s perspectives are obviously derived in part through their
social, political, and economic locations, and they are made robust by the
details of everyday life.
Intimate connections with people and place are forged in significant part
through regular practices of living, such as the gathering of water, the travel-
ing through the landscape, the communicating across its space. It is these
practices and the services which aided them that are my interest here. My
focus is on the quotidian formations of place that emerge out of the everyday
practices of government services.∑ If crisis services were distinguished by
their exceptionality, everyday services were marked precisely by their mun-
dane quality. It was in the repeated enactment of these mundane services
that place took shape. Services such as utilities, roads, and transportation
helped shape the pathways of people’s lives, influencing daily routines, deter-
mining trajectories of movement. The similar, but not identical, use of such
services by many people underscores both networks of connection and rec-
ognition that are forged in part in service use and the spaces for creativity and
contestation that exist in these unremarkable experiences.∏
Jurisdiction, Locality, and Everyday Services
For government, one expression of these contests over location was the
persistent debates over jurisdiction. Questions about which branch of gov-
ernment should provide which services are part of any government. In Gaza
these questions were complicated by the di≈cult conditions pertaining in the
place and the lack of stability that characterized governmental practice. In
the British Mandate, these struggles often took place between central gov-
ernment, municipalities, and the local public. In the Egyptian Administra-
tion, with the presence of international aid organizations and the United
Nations, the jurisdictional questions became even more complicated. While
e√orts to avoid responsibility were often couched in terms of economy, and
e√orts to claim authority over service were often described as procedural
imperatives, it is clear that the stakes of jurisdiction were tremendous.
Contests over jurisdiction also further illuminate the layers of government
that Gazans experienced. During both the Mandate and the Administration,
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government was highly centralized, and yet local bodies and personnel—
municipalities, village councils, mukhtars—were the sites of government with
which many Gazans had the most contact. In the Mandate, as an early report
on British administration in Palestine put it, local councils were to ‘‘serve as
the collective mouthpiece of the people towards the District Governors, and
as the means for carrying out the general requirements of the Administra-
tion.’’π To balance these two roles, Mandate o≈cials attempted to remain
aloof from the details of municipal conflict, while at the same time exercising
control over the output of municipal councils. The central government re-
served for itself the right to oversee all decisions of local bodies as well as the
prerogative not to intervene.
Gazans frequently petitioned government with complaints about munici-
palities, generally to no avail. For example, in 1946 several Khan Yunis families
appealed to the chief secretary, asking for more representation on the local
elections committee: ‘‘We have one representative out of seven on the com-
mittee and he is ill. We are at a loss as to whom we should address our griev-
ance. Should we address ourselves to the Secretary of State or to His Majesty
the King or to God alone? We pray that an enquiry may be instituted to ensure
free and unbiased elections.’’∫ These families charged the mayor and the
district o≈cer with conspiring against them and obstructing their ability to
contest elections. The government’s response, in which it declined to inter-
vene in the domain of municipal authority, was typical during the Mandate. In
the files I examined, I found no instance in which government intervened on
behalf of petitioning locals against a local council.Ω
During the Administration, government was, if anything, even more cen-
tralized. Local councils and their employees were fully integrated into the
strip-wide governing structure. Being located more firmly within this struc-
ture, municipalities became a site for conflict, not only between government
and local communities or within those communities, but also within govern-
ment itself. Such conflict was evident in a 1960 complaint sent by the qa’ima-
qam (administrative o≈cer) to the governor-general about the Deir Belah
administrative governor. In this complaint, the qa’imaqam, Said Abu Sharkh,
reminded the governor-general that ‘‘the councils are under your supervision’’
and that ‘‘the purpose of these administrative organizations was to have each
area work according to its jurisdiction to benefit the public good in terms of
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figure  8. Report of Deir Belah village council meeting. source: israel state archives.
quiet and order.’’ Abu Sharkh charged the Deir Belah governor with interfer-
ing in the council’s work and with forcing council members and employees to
spend the town’s money without going through proper procedure.∞≠ He
detailed several specific complaints and asked that the governor-general ‘‘en-
sure proper behavior and appropriate jurisdiction division.’’∞∞
If the space of municipal autonomy was somewhat decreased, though, the
presence of unrwa added another layer to the governing dynamic and
o√ered another space for contestation over government action. So too did
the legislative council that was established in the second half of Egyptian rule
in Gaza. The legislative council, initially headed by the governor-general and
later turned over to more fully Palestinian representation (Haidar Abdul
Shafi was its chair), was empowered to debate and propose legislation,
though the governor-general retained veto power.∞≤ unrwa, while making
no claim to govern Gaza, was as important an administrative actor as the
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Administration. The apparently fixed division of jurisdiction—unrwa re-
sponsible for services to refugees, the Administration to natives—was in fact
not without challenge on the ground. The Administration often sought
unrwa funding for public projects undertaken outside of refugee camps,
arguing that those projects would benefit refugees. A great deal of the corre-
spondence between the two parties is taken up with such questions: who
would pay for (or pay for what percentage of) what.∞≥
This multiplicity in the faces of government as well as the conflicts over
jurisdiction was part of a governing dynamic in which it was di≈cult to get
things done and often impossible to plan ahead. Even as these uncertainties
created numerous problems, they were also productive for a practice of
tactical government that depended on a dynamic of abeyance. Jurisdictional
tussles demanded that attention be paid, not to the issue of government’s
legitimacy, but to the question of which part of government should be pro-
viding which services. The way in which layered government worked in
Gaza, where the central government was both reluctant to be involved in
local matters and unwilling to devolve significant powers to these bodies,
meant that the location of authority was not always obvious to service recip-
ients. Even under these conditions, there were cracks in this abeyance, mo-
ments people connected problems with service provision precisely to funda-
mental questions about the character of government, its relation to the place
and population, and its legitimacy. These moments underscore the tenuous
nature of governing practices in Gaza. Even where they worked, it was never
assured that they would continue to do so.
Water Services and the Boundaries of Government
In the previous chapter I described services that were taken on by govern-
ment because of a crisis of need, reflecting an inability of the population to
care for themselves independently. Water, on the other hand, came to be a
service through the transformation of relations of people and government to
place. Whereas in crisis servicing the presumption was always that if the
crisis abated so would the services, everyday services were intended to be
permanent, even if in practice they rarely were. There was a shift in defini-
tions of place and its capacities such that water distribution came to be
perceived as necessarily lying within government’s jurisdiction. This trans-
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formation was also connected to changes in notions of government and
service themselves. As rationalization and standardization became increas-
ingly important to government, social mechanisms for collecting and dis-
tributing water appeared increasingly inadequate.
For much of the Mandate, rural areas lay beyond the reach of water and
other utility services. The practices that sustained life in a nonserviced en-
vironment were both a means of coping with di≈cult conditions and a
productive mechanism in shaping social life. Sitting in his cramped and
crowded living room in the Shati refugee camp, Abu Ayub described to me
what life was like in Yibna before 1948. In the absence of government ser-
vices, water gathering was women’s work:
There was no street cleaning, no water pipes, no services like this in the
balad [village]. . . . People used to go to the grove where there was a pump
for water. . . . A woman would put a crock on her head bring water in
it. . . . They’d go to fill it in the morning and in the afternoon they fill it
again. All of the water was brought on the head in the balad. There was
no water at home, except in cities. . . . The life in the balad was like this. It
was di√erent from now. Now there are people who clean the streets, there
is a water tap, and the water is checked.∞∂
This account of a rural life pursued mostly without government-provided ser-
vices demonstrates the di√erence of life in the villages both from city living
and from post-1948 conditions.∞∑ People who lived in larger towns recalled the
expansion of services into these areas over the course of the Mandate.
On a visit to the Jabalya refugee camp in the north of the Gaza Strip I spoke
with a woman about utilities in Majdal (now Ashkelon). She recalled, ‘‘Elec-
tricity entered the town a short time before we left al-Majdal. At first they [the
municipality] put in lampposts . . . which ran with kerosene. There was a man
who lit them every day at sunset. A short time before we left al-Majdal, they
brought electricity to the houses.’’ Then I asked about water services: ‘‘Were
there faucets in the houses?’’ ‘‘In our time,’’ she told me, ‘‘there were. At first
they brought water to the municipal wells, and then I remember that the
water reached the houses. They laid water pipes to the houses.’’∞∏ Service
expansion in steps seems to have been typical of Gaza-area towns.
In people’s recollections, this transformation to servicing does not appear
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as a simple account of progress. People were cognizant of the ways in which
services can produce new obligations and constraints even as they can make
life easier. These new relations contributed to shaping the ‘‘character’’ of the
place of Gaza both by reconfiguring understandings about the capacity of
that place (its natural resources and its population) and by transforming that
population’s relationship with those resources. Place and public were formed
in ‘‘minor’’ government practices such as water provision in several ways: in
part by cohering di√erently located people into a horizontal group of service
recipients; in part by concentrating resources in governmental hands, there-
by delimiting both present and future distribution; and in part by distin-
guishing as well as connecting national and local government, thereby linking
place not only to its public, but to its local government.∞π
provisional histories: need, demand, and development
The dueling local histories of Hilmi Abu Sha‘ban and ‘Arif al-‘Arif both
discuss Gaza’s water services. Their sometimes seemingly minor disagree-
ments about the facts of this service in Gaza City divulge an even more
fundamental disagreement about the stakes of government-provided water.
Both Abu Sha‘ban and al-‘Arif indicate that there had long since been a
municipal well that supplied water for some of the people of the city. Fur-
ther, they agreed that the Mandate was a period of considerable expansion in
government water service. They concur as well that this expansion was a
definitive sign of progress and service improvement. They disagree, however,
about the nature of the progress and about who the primary beneficiary of
this improvement was.
Al-‘Arif’s account begins from the perspective that water necessarily had
to be provided as a government service and, therefore, that the expansion of
the service network was evidence of better government. Abu Sha‘ban, on the
other hand, suggested that the private mechanisms of water procurement
had in the past been a perfectly adequate means of fulfilling people’s needs.
He too saw the expansion of the service network as vital, but its importance
lay in its contribution to the rationalization of government. The expansion
of municipal water services, according to Abu Sha‘ban, aided in the produc-
tion of more e≈cient government, increase of municipal revenue, and greater
control over health conditions in the city. Rather than highlighting the role
of service expansion in increasing the capacity of place, Abu Sha‘ban focused
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on how it enhanced the capacity of government. Water services, from this
perspective, produced government as much as they fulfilled needs.
These services also transformed people’s relationship with place. Al-‘Arif
described how ‘‘Gazans brought up water [from the municipal well] in buck-
ets and carried it away in leather waterskins,’’∞∫ until 1926, when the munici-
pality put in a motor, after which point the water was drawn into a municipal
reservoir. If waterskins were a symbol of the social life of water gathering, the
municipal reservoir was a symbol of its bureaucratization.∞Ω Over the course
of the Mandate, additional wells were dug. Al-‘Arif suggested that even these
were not enough, and he described ‘‘the strong thirst’’≤≠ which had faced the
city in recent years. Abu Sha‘ban disputed this characterization, saying that
in Gaza ‘‘any small child could dig a well in the sand on the beach and drink
sweet water from it.’’ Abu Sha‘ban further commented, ‘‘It appears to me
that the author is ignorant of the history of water in Gaza and the reasons for
digging the wells which he mentions.’’≤∞
According to his view, the expansion of water services was not primarily
about meeting the ‘‘basic needs’’ of Gazans, but rather about increasing the
capacity and e≈ciency of government. For this reason, Abu Sha‘ban’s correc-
tion of al-‘Arif’s account focused on the bureaucratization of water services—
a bureaucratization which he saw as all to the good. Whereas at the begin-
ning of the Mandate there was only ‘‘a basic network of water pipes’’ and the
subscribers to the municipal water supply numbered only in the hundreds,
after the ‘‘elected Municipal council’’ decided, in 1928, to compel participa-
tion by forcing all Gazans to pay water fees whether they used public water
or not, the water network was able to expand dramatically. Abu Sha‘ban said
of this endeavor,
This step was necessary to make people participate, to protect public
health, and to gather the drinking water in a reservoir that is under the
supervision of the council and the oversight of the department of health.
The people became interested in subscribing to the water and the over-
whelming majority now consume their water through municipal pipes.
Waterskins and the like have disappeared. The Municipal council has
fulfilled its role and has expanded the pipe network and safeguarded their
presence in the city streets. Revenue from water has increased from hun-
dreds to thousands of pounds.≤≤
164 • Chapter 6
According to Abu Sha‘ban, it was the greater participation in water services
that created the need for new government wells.
In addition, new building in Gaza created new service needs. The Gaza
development scheme, which created the new neighborhood of Rimal, re-
quired new wells to service the area. As noted in chapter 5, as of 1932 water
was still lacking, awaiting approval of a new water supply scheme: ‘‘This
scheme is, however, temporarily in abeyance while the finances of the Munic-
ipality are being examined with a view to enabling the Council to contract a
loan for the purpose.’’≤≥ Given the Mandate government’s concerns about
taking on municipal financial obligations, the reason for such careful exam-
ination seems clear. The project was no doubt caught up in the variety of
tensions and conflicts between central government and the municipality.
Given also that the stability of municipal finances depended, in part, on the
capacity and willingness of the population to pay its bills in a timely manner
and on the capacity and willingness of the municipality to enforce regu-
lations, government’s concerns about each of these parties may have also
slowed down the project. The water scheme was approved in December 1932,
when Barclay’s Bank—‘‘without a Government guarantee’’—agreed to make a
loan to the municipality.≤∂ Even when government services expanded, then,
private means were not entirely left behind.
Neither Abu Sha‘ban nor al-‘Arif addressed any of these issues. Their
‘‘debate’’ about the water project focused on the quality of water produced by
the well dug in 1933 with money from the loan.≤∑ Al-‘Arif described the well
as ‘‘salty and not good for drinking,’’≤∏ an assertion to which Abu Sha‘ban
strongly objected. He argued that, as district o≈cer, al-‘Arif had to know that
the Health Department had tested the water and found it acceptable for
drinking. Rather than describing the water as salty, Abu Sha‘ban suggested,
it should be said that it was ‘‘less sweet’’ than another well.≤π In fact, a
government report from 1936 did describe the water as ‘‘at present adequate
and good in quality, slightly saline, but containing some fine sand.’’≤∫ In these
two accounts the complicated politics and economics of water expansion in
Gaza seem reduced to a ‘‘technical’’ problem of water quality. So, ironically
perhaps, even as both Abu Sha‘ban and al-‘Arif sought to write a complete
history of Gaza, each produced a ‘‘developmentally’’ inflected account that
obscured some of the tactical operations of Gaza’s water provisioning.≤Ω
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The expansion of municipal authority and scope through the compulsory
participation in public water services was part of a more general process of
binding people and government. This binding created bidirectional obliga-
tion, responsibility, and demand. Whereas in the past most people had
obtained water—no doubt often for free—from their own or their neighbors’
wells, they were now obligated to pay for the privilege of using municipal
water. At the same time, the municipality was now obligated to supply the
piping that would enable water distribution and to ensure that its wells had
enough water to meet the needs of the whole Gazan population. The expan-
sion of service and obligation created new opportunities for challenge to
government and new sites of interaction between the public and the govern-
ment. At the same time, the expansion of water services reduced certain
kinds of social interactions, as the walk to a nearby well disappeared from
daily pathways, and the water well ceased to be a gathering spot for women.
These reconfigurations were not simply the inevitable result of development
but were produced in the tactical operations of government.
politics of service: providing water
and protecting the local
The tactical conditions of Gaza’s water services were brought to the surface
by conflicts engendered by the 1936 general strike, which was supposed to
include a cessation of local government services. This strike highlighted the
mutual obligation and dependence of Gazans, the municipality, and the
Mandate government, and the problems sometimes engendered therein. Al-
though the transfer of water provision to public responsibility, a transfer
which provoked both obligation and entitlement, seems to have been largely
complete by this point, tension and conflict over the contours of this respon-
sibility had not ceased, nor would they. Debates in the Gaza City Council
over its participation in the strike evidence these tensions. While the munici-
pality had provisionally halted all service provision at the start of the strike,
as recorded in the Registers of Council Decisions, the council was divided
about whether this was an appropriate course of action. The mayor ex-
pressed concern about both the harm to the public and the danger from
government that continued participation in these strike activities might
cause. He argued that ongoing municipal stoppage of ‘‘cleaning, lighting, and
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water provision for city residents will lead to sickness as a result.’’ In the
mayor’s view, ceding governmental responsibility for these services would
create numerous problems.
‘‘There will be a danger,’’ he suggested, ‘‘of residents leaving their cities or
of the government—per its authority according to the Municipalities Law—
taking over the administration of the municipalities.’’≥≠ The threat was that
the central government might be provoked out of its usual oversight ap-
proach to municipal management and into an active position as surrogate
local authority. For the mayor, this threat was itself su≈cient reason to ease
the strike.≥∞ His concern about government interference reflected more than
an ordinary interest in local autonomy; it suggested a conviction that this
government was incapable, above all during such stressful times, of properly
providing for local needs, both practical and political. Municipal autonomy
was always extremely limited during the Mandate, but the political conflicts
between foreign policy and local demands, heightened during periods of
outright rebellion as in 1936–39, made preservation of even that limited
autonomy appear highly important.
At the same time, the tension between government and municipality was
not the only form of national-local conflict. There was also an inherent
conflict between national(ist) political demands and the local needs which
the mayor articulated. In the council debates, other members argued on
behalf of nationalism that the council had to promote national unity and
support the cause and therefore the strike. Ultimately, the mayor’s position
prevailed, and the council decided that because ‘‘the people of Gaza are dying
of thirst and are su√ering from illnesses,’’≥≤ the municipality was obliged to
resume its provision of basic services. This instance not only showcases an
instance of the disassociation that civil servants often used to make sense of
their work, but also highlights the work involved in arriving at such compart-
mentalization. While the Gaza City Council, and civil servants generally,
may indeed have felt that their work in governing was di√erent from work for
government, it took an active e√ort to manage the contradictory positions in
which they often found themselves.
This service question was also a potential crisis for government. It was
precisely at those moments when the stakes of service had to be confronted
head-on that the dynamic of abeyance was most fragile. Where people were
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forced to consider what it would mean—for themselves, for the nation, for
the future—to either participate or not in the daily work of government, they
had to contend also with the legitimacy of government. In this case, the
potential crisis of legitimacy was averted by a politics of location. In its own
e√orts to resolve its awkward position between competing national de-
mands, the council invoked and measured the needs and demands of the
local public against these competing obligations. The municipality presented
itself as the bulwark between Gaza and the threat of government interven-
tion. At the same time, even as the decision was presented as a form of
resistance to government, it also had the e√ect of contributing to the per-
sistence of government—by keeping services working—and of averting the
potential crisis of abeyance—by separating the daily work of governing from
questions about the legitimacy of the governing regime.
ordinary incapacities, service obligations
Even after the end of the rebellion and the return of water services to more
ordinary terrain, struggle over the style of service provision continued to
shape the relationship of government and local public. Government re-
mained a participant in this local dynamic, but a relatively aloof one. When
local conflicts did not threaten the stability of the governmental process, it
proceeded as observer of these a√airs. In the triadic relations among govern-
ment, municipality, and Gazans, circuits of complaint and redress were cen-
tral. In one instance in 1941 of Gazan complaint to government about munic-
ipal practice, a group of almost sixty residents of Rimal, the ‘‘new Gaza’’
neighborhood for whom, in part, the well had been dug in 1933, submitted a
petition to the chief secretary objecting to a municipal plan to install water
meters in their quarter of the city—a petition preserved in the ‘‘municipal
government’’ files of the chief secretariat.≥≥ This conflict, relatively late in the
Mandate-era transformation of water services, illuminates the significance of
this transformation. Not simply compelled to participate in municipal water,
as Abu Sha‘ban described, the residents of Rimal were dependent upon it.
Their new homes were built with water faucets and, presumably, without
private wells. If disconnected from the municipal system, there was no pri-
vate network upon which people could depend. The new municipal plan
entailed this very threat; the municipality had announced its intention to
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discontinue water service to anyone who did not agree to install a meter.≥∂
The installation of meters marked a significant change from the previous
system for assessing water fees, one whereby people were charged flat fees
depending on the type and value of their buildings. Under the meter system,
people would pay for their usage, regardless of their rent or whether their
building was their home or business. The petitioners complained that their
quarter was being unfairly singled out for meters (the other quarters of the
city did not have them) and argued that the new system was unfair to the
poor, who would now be charged at the same rate as the wealthy. Given this
injustice, the petitioners asked government to step in and reverse the munici-
pal action. In keeping with the general practice of staying out of municipal
governance if it did not threaten national government, central authorities
declined to intervene.
This petition, and the seemingly inevitable response, open a window on
the transformations in the place of Gaza over the course of the Mandate.
The concentration of the mechanisms of water collection and distribution in
the hands of government meant that the resources of Gaza could be accessed
only through the o≈ces of government. Water use was no longer a private
a√air, or an act of beneficence by the wealthy to the poor (as one woman I
spoke with remembered her father’s provision of water to others in the
village), but rather was a public responsibility.≥∑ Provision of services like
water binds government (local and national, institution and process) and
place (both land and population) in new ways, both delimiting action and
creating new spaces and styles of interaction and challenge.
Expansion of government service is not simply a means through which
government gains greater control over the lives of individuals. If Abu Sha‘ban
was correct that water service expansion was a means of increasing govern-
mental capacity, its e√ects were just as much to increase governmental obliga-
tion and responsibility, and therefore to uncover and produce new inca-
pacities. Servicing is a complex process that increases both opportunity and
obligation for all the parties—government, public, nation, locality—that are
formed in its practice. Both the social and the physical landscapes of Gaza
were transformed in the shift to water services, as social gathering around a
well was displaced in the change to faucets and as piping and motors appeared
on the scene in Gaza.
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These seemingly clear transformations from one kind of place to another
and from one kind of present to another were made possible by the relative
stability in water servicing. Unlike the crisis services discussed in the pre-
vious chapter, water services were defined as permanent, presumably not to
be withdrawn as circumstances changed. Despite this apparent stability,
however, water services and the transformations they engendered could be as
easily threatened as any other governmental domain by the dramas of Gaza’s
history.
Service Boundaries in the New Gaza Strip
The tenuous ordinariness of everyday servicing was made even more pre-
carious by the transformations of 1948. While during the Mandate everyday
servicing was punctured at intervals by the explicit demands of politics, and
tactical government was made evident only occasionally, during the Admin-
istration the domains in which tactics were not dominant and in which
politics were not pressing were much more circumscribed. The compression
of territory and the vast influx of refugees created enormous burdens for
government, for servicing, and for place. It dramatically altered the physical
and social landscape of Gaza. The capacities of the land to provide were
stretched by the demands of its new population. The capacities of govern-
ment were, if anything, more overextended.
Servicing under Egyptian rule was always a cooperative and often con-
flictual a√air, with responsibility shared or divided between the Administra-
tion and unrwa. The transformation of water services that began under the
Mandate continued during the Administration, but the disruptions of 1948
ensured that it was not a simply linear development. While service in munic-
ipalities proper were not disrupted, the enormous refugee population
strained their capacities.≥∏ The pressures of service provision are particularly
evident in the camps. This division by place—where the services provided to
municipalities and villages were much greater than those available in camps—
was distinct from other jurisdictional divisions we have seen that were made
according to type (native or refugee) within the client population. Whereas
in food services native Gazans su√ered from their lack of refugee status, in
water servicing it was refugee spaces that were more deprived.
In the camps, at least in the first years after 1948, everyday utilities were
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figure  9. Water pump in Shati refugee camp, 1956. credit: moshe pridan. source: israeli
national photo collection.
barely existent. Not only were there no pipes and power lines connecting
these supposedly temporary places to existing networks, but there was politi-
cal resistance to their incorporation, which, it was felt, might signal an
acceptance of permanent displacement. The 1953 Report by the Department
of Refugee Supervision, Government Assistance, and Social A√airs indi-
cated that there was one faucet for every three hundred people in the camps
and that the water was turned on at intervals.≥π And camp regulations issued
by the same department in 1961 included the provision that the ‘‘installation
of water taps (privately for the shelters)’’ was strictly prohibited.≥∫ One
retired teacher recalled the problems that sometimes arose because of the
limited water distribution in the camps: ‘‘unrwa was in charge of the water
problem in coordination with the government. Sometimes disputes or quar-
rels occurred between women who were going to bring water. Water time
was limited, not the whole day. It was one hour a day, and this caused
problems among women.’’≥Ω Procuring water was still women’s work, it
seems, but more di≈cult, more divisive work than before.
The question of jurisdiction—what agencies should provide what services
to whom—was particularly challenging in relation to refugee camps. While
service provision during both the Mandate and the Administration was
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pursued without an explicit claim to sovereignty over the territories serviced,
such services did indeed entrench government. When it came to servicing
refugee camps, there was an added layer of concern. Not only did the Egyp-
tian Administration not want to claim sovereignty over Gaza, it did not want
to seem to suggest or accept the idea that refugees were permanently Gazan
or that the Gaza Strip itself was not temporary. Providing everyday services
to refugee camps posed the risk of doing exactly that.
After 1967, the politics of servicing produced a clash between Gaza City’s
mayor and the Israeli occupying forces, leading to the former’s dismissal.
According to reports at the time, ‘‘The Israelis said the order was intended to
integrate Gaza refugees into the town and make them tax-paying citizens.
Four other refugee camps have been annexed to other Gaza Strip towns.’’∂≠
Ann Mosely Lesch comments, ‘‘Refugees feared that integrating the camp
into the town would cause them to lose their special legal status as refugees
and undermine their right to return to their homes inside Israel. Thus
Shawwa’s (the mayor’s) refusal to obey the Israeli command received popular
support.’’∂∞ That the order came from an occupying army made the political
importance of such a refusal evident.
The status of camp services during the Egyptian Administration is a little
less clear. Some retired municipal employees I spoke with in Gaza recalled
that there were municipal services in camps in the latter years of the Admin-
istration. Abu Jamal recalled that, in 1960, the Gaza municipality extended
services to Shati camp:
At first, the issue was political, and they did not extend the services to the
refugee camps, and they [the refugees] depended on drinking water from
pumps inside the camp. Then [in 1960] the municipality extended the
water network to them. . . . and then [later] the services of sewage, road
paving, and electricity were provided for the camps so that they could live
in dignity, and to stop the spread of diseases among them.∂≤
When I asked about unrwa’s connection to this refugee servicing, Abu Jamal
indicated that ‘‘there was cooperation. unrwa helped the municipality pay
for the oil for the motors that pumped water in return for extending the water
network to the refugees.’’ Khaled ‘Emad, who started work in the electricity
department in 1960, insisted that the municipality provided services to Shati
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‘‘from the very beginning’’∂≥ of his career. He remembered the two spaces as
completely tied together in servicing: ‘‘There were not water wells for the
refugees and wells for the Gazans. unrwa contributed in health and cleaning,
but the municipality presented electricity and water as well as health.’’
The only archival document I have found on this issue seems to indicate
that there were not—or at least not many—such services in the camp. This
document, a police report on an open meeting (nadwa) held in June 1966 in
Shati camp and attended by the governor-general, the mayor of Gaza, and a
large number of camp residents, records refugee requests precisely for such
services. At the meeting, the residents asked the Administration, among
other things, to provide street lighting and drinking water for the camp, pave
the camp roads, dispense rations to camp residents because unrwa rations
were not su≈cient, and increase the police presence in the camps.∂∂ In
response, the governor-general promised to meet ‘‘some of these requests,’’
and he ‘‘explained the di≈culty in fulfilling others.’’ Which requests were
met, the report does not specify. Matters are made no more clear by the
mayor’s comments. He told the people of Shati camp to conserve their
resources because ‘‘the municipality had cut o√ all the assistance it had
provided.’’ He further stated that he had asked unrwa authorities two
months prior to provide drinking water and electricity to the camp, but that
he had still not received a response. Since the report does not specify what
assistance the municipality was no longer providing or what the politics of
this cessation were, one cannot say with certainty what the camp’s service
status was. Whatever the actual facts of the matter, the question of service
jurisdiction highlighted the limits of the Egyptian Administration’s capacity
to fulfill its promise to liberate Palestine, creating potential problems for the
e√ectiveness of deferral as a mode of abeyance.
‘‘we were serious in our job’’: the water department
and municipal service practice
It was the edges of service jurisdictions that created the most obvious ten-
sions in government. Inside service, this work could acquire an ordinariness,
tenuous to be sure, that was important not only for getting work done, but
also for contributing to formations of place. Abu Jamal, now an activist on
behalf of retired civil servants, used to work in the Gaza City water depart-
ment.∂∑ He was very proud of both his career and his postretirement ac-
Servicing Everyday Life • 173
tivities, and he talked to me at length about them in conversations at the
o≈ces of the Retired Civil Servants Association.∂∏ His first job, which he got
in 1957, was as a water meter reader, though he was quickly promoted to a
clerk’s position. His account of municipal water services during the Admin-
istration highlights both the particular role of the municipality as a service
provider and the significance of everyday services in shaping the relation
between Gazans and government and between population and place. It was
during the Administration, Abu Jamal told me, that ‘‘the municipality suc-
ceeded in connecting water to every house. Water was available to everyone.’’
Water service provision—and everyday services in general—comprised a
venue for an intimate connection between people and government. And
water services contributed to constituting a place in very concrete ways.
Water services tied the place of Gaza together, both literally, as the net-
work of pipes connected each home and building to each other one, and
figuratively, as patterns of water usage were replicated across town. When-
ever a Gazan turned on the water faucet in her home she reinforced these
literal and figurative ties. At the same time, these services also connected the
places in Gaza to the municipality in an equivalent fashion.∂π Each home was
charged for water according to the same system; each pipe was laid with the
same technique. Abu Jamal described the procedure as follows:
People who wanted to build a house and wanted water used to come to
me and submit an application. The application is transferred to the orga-
nizational department, whose employees go to measure the building and
ask the people to pay the fees for building the house. After the fees are
paid, the application is transferred to the engineers in the water depart-
ment to determine the diameter of the tube for the house and the place-
ment of the waterline that would be connected to the house. The owner
of the house pays the fees, and we give him a water meter, and then the
technicians of the water department go and connect the water to his
house, and the same thing happens with the department of electricity. . . .
We determined the fees according to the engineer’s measurements, the
greater the distance [of the house to the main waterline], the higher the
fee, the shorter the line, the lower the fee.
The ordinary regularity of this procedure may appear remarkable in a place
where no aspect of life was untouched by the crises of Palestinian experience,
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where government was always uncertain and anxious about how to proceed.
That even under such conditions everyday practices can sometimes be regu-
lar is important to keep in mind. How people work with these procedures,
how they interact with civil servants and with the services they provide, can
be seen, as Michel de Certeau and Luce Giard suggest about ordinary prac-
tices, as a ‘‘practical science of the singular.’’∂∫
Not only the use of services, but the work itself constituted such a practi-
cal science. Abu Jamal described his typical workday, from the 8 am start of
the day to its close at 2 pm.∂Ω His description illuminates both regular
practice and moments of tension, an ordinary flow and mechanisms that
permitted a release of pressure. This is indeed a picture of a ‘‘subtle combina-
tory set, of types of operations and registers, that stages and activates a
making-do’’:∑≠
We came to work at 8 in the morning and arranged the citizens’ transac-
tions according to date or turn—we put the new transactions in a category
and the transactions that were scheduled we arranged according to their
date. Of course, every citizen knew his turn—when water would reach his
house. . . . At noon, we prayed the noon prayers in a mosque for the
employees in the same department. There was also a breakfast break from
9 to 9:30. One ate a sandwich and drank a cup of tea. We spent the time
working and receiving the demands of the citizens. Because water is in
demand and its problems are so many, we were under pressure. There
were water problems especially in summer, for example, water was cut o√
at someone’s house or the amount of water decreased or he had salty
water, etc. We conveyed the citizens’ complaints to the authorities and
asked them to respond. This work took all our time, unless there was a
holiday for the employee, so he can let his body have some rest the same as
any other employee in any state. This was basically our daily work.
The breaks in the day and the periodic breaks from work itself were crucial
to managing the tensions of even an ordinary service. A petition or com-
plaint might provide such a break for a citizen, but civil servants required the
built-in getaways that their schedules allowed. The di√erent ways of making-
do that come together in any service encounter may be clashing. Abu Jamal,
for instance, felt confident that water services were well provided and that
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complaints were dealt with e≈ciently; members of the public may not have
agreed. What felt like a moment of relief for a civil servant may have been
perceived as shirking of responsibility by a citizen. What felt like a reason-
able request by a citizen may have been seen as an aggressive overreaching by
a civil servant. The negotiations and conflicts that are an inevitable part of
any service provision gave shape to its pluralized experience.
‘‘unrwa is responsible for water’’:
fighting the water-pipe project in nuseirat
As much tension as might arise within service, such tension was even sharper
at its boundaries. We have seen how questions of whether and how to
provide everyday services troubled the Administration; they concerned
unrwa as well. An instance of suggested service expansion in the Nuseirat
refugee camp and of local opposition to this expansion sheds further light on
the complications of service provision. In camps not adjacent to munici-
palities, such as Nuseirat and the other ‘‘mid-camps,’’ there was no question
that unrwa, at di√ering levels of concert with the Administration, would
remain principally in charge of water provision.∑∞ Thus, the conflict over the
proposed expansion involved unrwa directly, and to the extent that political
concerns were raised, they centered around the politics of international
service obligation. No less than municipal expansion, this proposed service
change may have been perceived as a threat to refugee status and to refugees’
convictions that their life in the camps was temporary. In making the place
more comfortable, more like a home, such service expansion may have
threatened to undermine the delicate balance between coping with reality
and hoping for more that sustained refugee lives.
Embedded in a larger file of mabahith (cid) investigation papers, a series
of documents from April 1967 report on a proposed plan to pipe water
directly into refugee homes in Nuseirat camp and detail the crisis this plan
engendered.∑≤ The immediate question under investigation was whether a
local unrwa employee named ‘Ali Harb had destroyed water pumps in
Block c of the camp in an e√ort to force people living there to accept the
project, which he had designed. The mabahith director contended, on the
basis of the report of a police o≈cer stationed in the camp, that people had
refused the project because they could not a√ord to pay the ten-pound fee
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Harb was collecting; and furthermore that he had therefore destroyed the
pumps, leaving ‘‘one pump for all of the residents—more than 1,000 souls—
while the other three are broken.’’∑≥ Statements on Harb’s actions were taken
from the residents of Block c. Most people questioned professed no knowl-
edge of Harb destroying pumps, but some did raise strong objections to the
piped water project.∑∂ It is these objections which most interest me here.
The varied responses to this project highlight the extent to which people
had, by 1967, become accustomed to their conditions in the camp as well as
their continuing conviction that these conditions were unjust. Refugees, who
had been uprooted from their previous communities, habits, and practices,
reshaped these formations in their new conditions and through new services.
Expectations of life in the camp did not include piped water, and they did not
include paying for the water services that were provided, in this case public
water pumps. The refugees were willing to challenge those who threatened
this fragile service arrangement. This service practice both helped shape the
place of the refugee camp—as the diverse population that made up the camp
was bound together in similar living conditions and in a similar structural
relationship vis-à-vis unrwa and the Administration—and confirmed its
status as temporary. To suggest that there was a shared experience of place
and a bond among its residents is not to deny internal division and conflict.
On the contrary, the water crisis in Nuseirat evidences both the existence of a
community of service recipients and divisiveness within that community
about the practice and future of such provision.
One of the mabahith charges against ‘Ali Harb was that he tried to alter
conditions on the ground and thereby force people to ‘‘adapt’’ to a new
circumstance under which they would pay for piped water. The mabahith
director viewed this project as part of an unrwa plan to bring the ‘‘Palestine
problem’’ to an end. The camp residents’ objections were framed in more
local terms. One of the principal objections to ‘Ali Harb’s water project was
that people were going to be forced to pay for something that unrwa was
supposed to provide. As the policeman put it in his report, ‘‘He wants to sell
water pipes to the people, even though this is unrwa’s responsibility.’’∑∑ The
diversity of response among the camp residents suggests that some people
were willing to transform their relationship with unrwa if it meant better
living conditions, but that most were reluctant to make any change. At a
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meeting with the governor-general, the majority of camp residents rejected
the idea.
In investigating the crisis, mabahith personnel took statements from four
camp residents. They were divided on the wisdom of the project, and each
for di√erent reasons: one person agreed to pay if the majority would; another
refused because he thought that pumps were su≈cient and that in any case
his house was too far for the pipes to reach; a third had never heard of the
project, but was willing to pay because water from pipes was better than
pump water; and the fourth also had not heard about the project, but he
rejected the idea on the grounds that unrwa supplied water for the camp.∑∏
The person who was willing to pay if a majority had agreed argued that the
opposition came from people’s inability to pay the fees and that ‘‘everyone
would agree if it was at unrwa’s expense.’’∑π The principle of unrwa re-
sponsibility seemed as important to people as immediate financial concerns,
as this relationship was reiterated in several of the statements. The relation-
ship also functioned as a community bond, bringing all the camp residents
together in a common service relationship. To both implement the project
and have unrwa pay for it might have been a compromise position. It would
have a≈rmed international obligation for refugee services (and therefore
their unique status) while at the same time providing greater comforts in
refugee lives, thereby settling their conditions somewhat.
In the end, a compromise was ordered, but a di√erent one. Because of the
many complaints, the Deir Belah administrative governor finally instructed
that piped water be brought in, but that those residents who could not pay
for it should be permitted to continue to use the pumps.∑∫ In distinction
from the Mandate, when the compelling of all municipal residents to partici-
pate in the water network played a part in the formation of community, in
Nuseirat in 1967 the residents won their freedom from such obligation at the
expense of their horizontal connection. The decision to exempt people from
accepting piped water would no doubt divide the camp along lines of who
was able to pay, thereby creating a new marker of wealth in the water faucet.
This decision might also have created divisions among camp residents be-
tween those who rejected the new service as a ‘‘settlement’’ of their condition
and those who either saw no threat in this creature comfort or who simply
felt their immediate needs outweighed a possible future implication. In the
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event, the occupation of Gaza by Israel in June 1967 transformed the entire
social and political dynamic of the Strip, limiting the e√ects of this crisis.
Service Connections: Getting Around and Keeping in Touch
Water services transformed daily habits of living and shaped the relations of
people and government by bringing di√erent provisioning practices into the
places where people live. Transportation and communications services pro-
duced similar e√ects by enabling and promoting people’s connections beyond
their local places of residence. These services are no less ‘‘everyday services’’
than water provisioning, but they attend to di√erent aspects of this everyday
life. Whether public works projects like road building and paving, services
like trains and buses, or communication mechanisms like mail and tele-
phones, connection services both shape community and transform defini-
tions of locality and place. While water services are immediately connected
to the natural resources and physical layout of a place, connection services
transform the relationships of places to each other.
As in almost every aspect of life, variations in profession, in class, and in
gender had considerable influence on the use people made of roads and
transportation services. In Gaza during the Mandate private cars were an
uncommon luxury. One person told me that ‘‘there were five or six cars in all
of Gaza—in comparison with the situation now, where there are one or two
cars in every house. People used primitive means of transportation—carts
and such.’’∑Ω For travel between towns, most people relied on the private
companies that o√ered car or bus service. And, it should be remembered,
most people did not leave their villages frequently. This was especially the
case for women. As Im Tariq recalled, ‘‘I stayed in al-Majdal, and we did not
go out unless there was an urgent need for doing so. Sometimes, for example,
one wanted to visit a patient in a hospital in Gaza.’’∏≠ For those who did have
more regular cause to travel, what they tend to remember now is the lack of
boundaries between the areas in Palestine. As Hamdi Qasim, who grew up
in Majdal, recalled, ‘‘We used to go to Ja√a, Haifa, Jerusalem, etc. I used to go
for a change of air. If I did not like Ja√a, I could go to Haifa, Tel-Aviv, or
Jerusalem. If I did not like Jerusalem, I could go to Nazareth or Safad. I used
to go wherever I wanted. It was allowed.’’∏∞ The basic capacity to move—such
a marked contrast with people’s lives now—gave people’s memories of Man-
date travel a distinctly rosy glow.
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At the time, however, road conditions were a subject of considerable
contention. Both government files and the Palestinian press were filled with
complaints about the state of Gaza-area roads. Reflecting the constituency
for these services, these complaints came mostly from car companies, cham-
bers of commerce, and local elites. These were the people who needed the
roads most immediately, though a shutdown in commercial tra≈c would
obviously have broad e√ects. A letter to the high commissioner from repre-
sentatives of some of Gaza’s wealthiest families championed the ‘‘fellah’’
(peasant) as the true beneficiary of the Gaza-Ja√a road (an obvious rhetorical
ploy, but not wholly without merit): ‘‘The policy of Your Excellency has
always been the revival of the fellah and the improvement of agriculture in
the country. . . . the greatest help that you may render to the inhabitants of
Gaza District, who are wholly peasants, is through the construction of this
road.’’∏≤ The fact that these roads connected places to each other meant that
they were never simply local. Gaza’s merchants might have a local interest in
having good roads into town, but the clientele for these roads was always
multiple.
The fact that a variety of persons—Arabs, Jews, government, the army—
made use of the roads made them subject to further tussles over jurisdiction.
Who, for instance, should be responsible for repairing a road heavily traf-
ficked by army trucks, but about which ‘‘no definite proofs could be pro-
duced to hold the Army responsible for exceptional damage to the roads?’’∏≥
Should a road running through Majdal be considered an ‘‘arterial road,’’ that
is, one ‘‘which carries ‘through tra≈c’ through a municipal area as distinct
from local tra≈c, and therefore be partially supported by the central govern-
ment, as the Gaza district commissioner argued, or was it more properly
considered a ‘‘feeder road’’ and a municipal responsibility, as the Public
Works Department decided? ∏∂ The fact that the roads were not entirely
local directed people’s attention to perceived inequalities in treatment, mak-
ing it harder to keep people’s attention from concomitantly considering the
meaning of such inequalities. ‘‘Had Gaza been Jewish,’’ wrote the newspaper
Filastin about the bad state of its roads, ‘‘His Majesty’s government would
[not] dare to delay the correction of such a problem.’’∏∑ Distraction in the
service of abeyance had a somewhat more di≈cult time in this domain.
Contestations over construction on the Gaza-Beersheba road in 1936–37
highlight the stakes of such public works projects. Large stretches of the
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Gaza-Beersheba road were not asphalted, with the result that in poor
weather it frequently had to be closed. Letters and telegrams to the high
commissioner from Beersheba’s transportation companies and notables de-
cry the hardships caused by these closures, which
isolate Beersheba from big towns such as Ja√a and Gaza which are very
frequently visited by the inhabitants of this District. . . . Your excellency,
no doubt, cares very much for the welfare and happiness of the popula-
tions and we are confident that you will order those concerned to arrange
as early as possible for the road in question to be metalled so that this
District would not, during your time, be deprived of the facilities accorded
to other towns in the country.∏∏
In their pleas for action, the transport companies described themselves as
nearly bankrupt. The state of these roads aroused interest beyond the imme-
diate locality; the Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem specifically
linked the road to the government’s interest in economic development,
arguing.
For centuries, Gaza has kept commercial and various other relations with
Khan Yunes and Beersheba but while this part of the country is being
developed by the plantation of citrus trees and while this relation is being
continually increased through the transport from one place to another of
cereals and other crops, we see that Government has overlooked the
question of the road between these towns and failed to assist in the
further development of this area. . . . It has been the practice of the
Government when small Jewish settlements are established in the country
to embark on the construction of roads for the purpose of connecting
these settlements together and for that reason it is the duty of Govern-
ment to pay special attention to such a large area which includes Gaza,
Khan Yunes and Beersheba.∏π
While government’s initial responses to these petitions were to regret the
financial stringencies which rendered major work impossible, eventually, and
owing to the di≈cult economic and political conditions in the country,
repairs to the road were authorized as a ‘‘relief measure,’’ a reminder that the
boundary between everyday and crisis services was not always clear. Regard-
ing this work as relief meant that it need not commit government to future
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expenditures. Indeed, only a year later it was once again saying that ‘‘having
regard to the present financial circumstances of the Government, it appears
improbable that it will be practicable to allocate in the near future a sum of
this magnitude for the permanent improvement of the road.’’∏∫
In addition to the barrage of petitions, the Palestinian press kept up a
steady drumbeat of complaint about road conditions. Alongside complaints
about land sales to Jews, this was one of the most frequent topics about Gaza
in the press. In the pages of al-Difa‘ both local and national governments
were criticized for insu≈cient provision of connection services. Local au-
thorities were generally charged with negligence or personal corruption,∏Ω
while government was charged with bias and duplicity. Government, the
articles implicitly argued, was using an appearance of incapacity as a tactic in
its e√orts to support the Jewish community at the expense of the Arab. For
example, in January 1935, the paper complained that the government only
paved roads used by Jews. Noting that the Gaza-Ja√a road was paved only as
far as the last Jewish settlement, after which point it was merely covered with
stones, the article asked bitterly, ‘‘Will we only get a road when we give all our
land to the Jews? This is very shameful in the history of your government,
that it cooperates with the Jews to pave the roads, but we don’t get anything
but stones.’’π≠
Again and again, articles in the paper began by exclaiming, ‘‘Oh, public
works department,’’ and then proceeding to detail how the department was
callously neglecting its service obligations to Arabs. An article in May 1935
reflected on the frequency of complaint:
It could be said that all the residents of Palestine have heard the com-
plaints of the residents of Gaza, and the owners of cars and buses, about
the bad road. The local newspapers have published their demands that
the road, which connects a number of Arab villages with Gaza and Ja√a,
be paved quickly. Does the reader know what was the result? Government
responded to the people’s demand, but when?
After tens of cars and trucks were ruined. . . . We thanked government
for this work, even though it was late in coming. Then later, we learned
that this work is going to be ‘‘only a small payment’’ to make people be
quiet . . . [it will extend only] a small distance past the existing asphalt—
which goes as far as the last Jewish settlement. As for the holes which
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damage cars and trucks on their way to Majdal, these will remain. Not
much time was allotted to us before we had to return to complaining and
asking the government to pave the road.π∞
The paper was compelled to make this complaint, the article seems to sug-
gest, because of its role as the mouthpiece of the people of Palestine. Still, the
press, produced and largely consumed by an educated class, no doubt dispro-
portionately addressed the concerns of this class as well.π≤ At the same time,
the press, playing the role of muckrakers, could be the vanguard of aware-
ness, not only reflecting, but also shaping concerns and complaints. News-
paper discussions of transport-related services are an instance as much of the
constitution of concern about these services as expressions of it. If ‘‘all the
residents of Palestine have heard the complaints of the residents of Gaza’’
this was because the press had served as a venue for the voicing of this
complaint. In this manner, the press not only o√ered comment about ser-
vices, but participated in producing habits of complaint and resistance in
regard to these services.
In all the complaints about road conditions, whether in petitions or in the
press, there was a clear understanding that places were defined in part
through their relationship with other places. To deny connection, to isolate a
place, was also to diminish it. Services too were often understood in rela-
tional terms—compared to other times, places, and classes. For Palestinians,
the obvious comparison was to the services provided to Jewish settlers.
Government was consistently chastised not simply for not providing these
services to Palestinians, but for not providing them equally with the services
that were provided Jewish communities. From the Palestinian perspective
governmental incapacity to provide everyday services was a result of will as
much as of circumstance. The tactical government which limited govern-
ment intervention had, from this perspective, a strategic purpose. Incapacity
was not simply a condition of Gaza, it was a tactic used to shape Gaza. This
attention to the politics of government services is a reminder that the conflict
in Palestine was of such significance that it could not always be dissipated
through distraction.π≥
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transportation and communication:
connecting with a new border
As in all other realms of service, the nakba forced profound changes in the area
of connection services. The abrupt formation of a border between the Gaza
Strip and the rest of pre-1948 Palestine bisected roads, severed telephone
communications, and cut o√ the railroad. As an Egyptian o≈cer noted in a
July 1949 memo, ‘‘The absence of civilian telephone and telegraph lines in the
Gaza-Rafah area causes considerable exhaustion among the people because all
business transactions for this area . . . require travel to Egypt or El-Arish in
order to send a telegram or make a telephone call. Further, going to El-Arish
requires getting a permit to enter the Egyptian train and an exit permit [from
Gaza].’’π∂ As the o≈cer further noted, the lack of such service was a political
rather than a technical problem: ‘‘The telephone and telegraph lines exist, and
so do the civil servants needed to operate them.’’
Not only was Gaza, in 1949, still a military area, but the broader system of
which Gaza’s telecommunications had been a part—the Palestinian system—
had been disrupted. Gaza needed to be reconstituted within an Egyptian
service network in order for these connection services to operate.π∑ This
reconstitution took time, but it did happen, and travel and communications
among Gazans and between Gaza and Egypt were restored. This section
explores conflicts over this (re)connection of Gaza and Egypt, illuminating
how the provision of connection services among newly defined points of
service participated in shaping these places of service. In this process, Gaza as
a place was both re-placed (within a new regional context that rendered
Cairo more present than Jerusalem) and re-figured (as a place of crowding,
di≈culty, and inconvenience).
In 1959, in an e√ort to win support for increasing transportation between
Gaza and Egypt, the governor-general sent the Egyptian defense minister a
copy of an article that had appeared in al-Tahrir, a local Gaza newspaper.
This article, by Zuheir Rayyis, described the di≈cult transportation condi-
tions and asked that something be done to improve them.π∏ As Rayyis noted,
the only existing means of transportation between Gaza and Cairo was a
train, which he dubbed ‘‘the train of troubles’’ (qitar al-mata‘ib) because of its
unpleasant conditions: it was hot, dusty, shaky, and extremely slow. The time
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had come, he argued, that bus transport should be considered ‘‘not a tourist
necessity only, but a national and public service necessity.’’
The importance of having good transportation services to Egypt was
directly linked to the transformations in Gaza’s spatial relations. The cutting
o√ of Gaza in 1948 not only required a reconstitution of connection services
as a practical matter, but also generated new habits of connection with other
spaces. Gaza as a local place became part of a di√erent regional place, de-
manding a new set of spatial relations and new patterns of movement and
connection. In these circumstances, even ‘‘the train of troubles’’ was an ‘‘ar-
tery of life’’—as Rayyis said the train was also known—that ‘‘connects Gaza
with the beating heart of Arabism and brings to us everyday our brothers and
honored visitors.’’ No longer could Jerusalem serve as a center for Gaza; now
Cairo had to be the ‘‘heart of Arabism’’ for Gazans.
Rayyis noted that the governor-general had expended considerable e√orts
trying to get bus service going; al-Tahrir had itself reported on his numerous
communications with various Egyptian ministries. To assist the governor-
general, Rayyis addressed the Transportation Ministry directly, saying, ‘‘A bus
line is the easiest, fastest, most comfortable means of connection, which will
not cost anything other than opposing some of the deadly and boring rules of
routine.’’ One of the issues surrounding the establishment of such a bus line
was who would get the concession. The governor-general supported granting
a Gazan company the special permission that was required for a non-Egyptian
company to work the route to Cairo. The Egyptian transportation minister
rejected this suggestion, simply saying, ‘‘We don’t see a point to establishing a
new company to have permission to go inside the borders of Egypt.’’ππ The
Gazan company that wanted the concession, not surprisingly, saw a great deal
of point to this arrangement and argued that, because of the di≈culties
associated with the route and the limited income potential, no Egyptian
company wanted the concession. It reminded the authorities that an Egyptian
company had briefly worked on the route and had ceased operations when it
found itself with a deficit of thirty thousand Egyptian pounds.π∫
This incident calls attention to the ways in which Gaza remained a place
apart during the Egyptian Administration. While it was often governed in a
manner similar to Egypt, with certain evident parallels in policy, it was never
governed as if it was Egypt. Evidence of whether this newspaper article
helped the governor-general’s case is not included in the file. What is cer-
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tainly clear from the exchange is that incapacity in this instance was not
simply a result of conditions in Gaza, but was directly linked to political and
economic considerations. Egyptian authorities were reluctant to grant for-
eign operators permission to work in Egypt, even if those foreigners were the
Gazans they were supposed to be helping. They may also have been worried
about financial repercussions if the company was not profitable, as it would
have been Egypt, through the o≈ce of the Administration, that would have
had to carry the burden if the company was unable to pay its fees. The train
may have created troubles for Gazans, but from the Egyptian government’s
perspective, a bus line seemed potentially even more troublesome.
If travel to Egypt was troublesome, though, transportation problems were
exacerbated within the Gaza Strip, where travel among its locales was a daily
necessity. During the Mandate many people did not travel much, and ‘‘every-
one was in his own balad and busy with his own work.’’πΩ During the Admin-
istration, fewer people had the luxury of staying at home and tending to their
own a√airs. Without land to work, people who lived in camps and small
towns needed to leave their places of residence and travel to work (if they
could find it) in Gaza City. That there was deep frustration with inadequate
transportation within the strip is reflected in many mabahith reports. A 1963
report from Jabalya camp in the northern part of the Strip stated,
Recently there has been a transportation crisis. People who wanted to
travel to Gaza were held up at the taxi-stand because the bus company
didn’t send enough vehicles to Jabalya camp. In the past it used to send
four buses for the Gaza-Jabalya line, whereas now it only sends one or two
buses. This is not enough to transport all the passengers and is creating a
transportation crisis. When a bus arrives you see the people running and
pushing each other, and around 100 people end up on the bus. There is
not a single tra≈c cop at the taxi-stand to order the movement of cars—
especially in the morning. People complain to government and to the
company about these actions and the failure of the company to transport
the passengers. Further, the company only sends the old and dirty cars for
the Jabalya line, which wouldn’t be used on any other line. There is no
system for sending cars for the Jabalya line.∫≠
Implicit within this report of transportation crisis was anxiety about the
threat of disorder the crisis was provoking. Policing and servicing had to
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work together to ensure that public order was maintained. (See chapter 7 for
a discussion of how political concerns and control entered the community
service domain.) This incident also suggests the importance of regulating
movement within, not merely beyond, the borders of Gaza. This crisis of
government servicing was, in the first instance, a problem of private business
conduct. But it seems clear that actual provision of this service by a private
company did not undermine anyone’s sense that transportation servicing was
government’s responsibility. The ability of government to fulfill this obliga-
tion was sorely strained by the new character of the Gaza Strip.
One reason it was so di≈cult to provide adequate transportation for
people traveling between Jabalya and Gaza was that there were simply too
many people. The space of Gaza had been vastly overcrowded by the nakba,
and conditions only became more crowded over the years. As a refugee camp,
Jabalya was incapable of supporting or sustaining its population, conditions
which forced a large percentage to travel to Gaza City on a daily basis. At the
same time, this inadequate transportation was not an accident. Despite its
need, Jabalya appears to have been unable to make a claim on the company,
which sent ‘‘the old and dirty vehicles’’ to this overcrowded, dirty place. The
bus company seemed to make use of Jabalya’s incapacities to create its own
service incapacities. It is not di≈cult to imagine the decision making that
would have led the company to reserve its better vehicles for better-o√ places
and to be more concerned that there was enough transportation for people
who were better placed to complain if it was inadequate. Still, even if their
complaints did not have the same weight as those of citizens in Gaza, the
refugees of Jabalya continued to press their claims. If the refugees in Nuseirat
were reluctant to accept a water-service expansion in part because of con-
cerns about becoming too settled, the Jabalya incident indicates that refugees
were willing to challenge discomforts that appeared to be gratuitous. If the
private company could not be counted on to provide clean, adequate trans-
port, as apparently it could not, government intervention was required.
The claim of Administration responsibility was explicitly made in a peti-
tion sent to the governor-general a few years later, also coming from Jabalya.
In 1966, a group of about fifty civil servants living in and around Jabalya
petitioned the governor-general, asking that the local car company be re-
placed, since it had ‘‘failed in its mission’’ to transport passengers.∫∞ The
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mabahith report about this problem and the petition itself noted that ‘‘this
company has not fulfilled its duties toward civil servants in the proper man-
ner.’’ With adequate transportation, Jabalya could be easily tied to Gaza,
whereas without such services it seemed immeasurably farther away. Barring
replacement of the company, the petition suggested that ‘‘a special bus, or
more, be designated to transport civil servants from Jabalya camp to their
places of work in Gaza—for a monthly fee.’’ In this case, civil servants ap-
pealed to their particular needs as government employees—and to govern-
ment’s particular needs for them: ‘‘The scarcity of transportation is causing
them [civil servants] not to fulfill their work obligations in the proper man-
ner, because it is causing them to be late to work.’’ The petition evoked,
therefore, the possibility of a cycle of ine≈ciency whereby inadequate trans-
portation would cause civil servants to fail in their duties, thereby ensuring
that Gazans would be improperly serviced. This complaint linked everyday
transportation services to larger service questions of duty, obligation, and
responsibility and explicitly located the responsibility for fulfillment of these
service demands with government.∫≤
These particular service crises highlight some of the ways in which every-
day servicing was distinct from the crisis services discussed in the previous
chapter. In everyday services the sense of service was su≈ciently expansive to
incorporate even seemingly private commercial activity within its domain.
The entire episode occurred within service—a marked distinction from the
practices in relation to food or even water. Here service was transformed
from an intermittent response to crisis to a general condition of being in the
Gaza Strip. And if service was expansive here, it was also productive. Rela-
tions among the various parts of Gaza, and the character of these places
themselves, were produced in part in the details of service delivery.
Conclusion
The singular work of everyday servicing—provision and receipt, debate and
delivery, complaint and correction—was fundamental to the pluralized pro-
duction of place. In the repetition of daily acts of servicing—turning on a
faucet, getting on a bus—the dense network of relations that constitute a
place was produced and reproduced. These everyday services, minute though
their apparent focus might be, were also far-reaching. Their significance lay
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not only in their e√ect on Gazans, but also in their impact on government.
The diversity of perspectives on, and locations in relation to, everyday ser-
vices was crucial to this formation. As people expressed their views, staked
their individual claims, articulated their own understandings, they gave
shape to the networks that formed Gaza and its government.
Government services helped produce government authority, though the
multiplicity of governing bodies, practices, and participants often rendered
the nature of that authorization opaque. Municipalities may have seen them-
selves as staking a claim for local authority in the face of a potentially hostile
national government, but their e√ective operations also promoted the sta-
bility of central administration. Individuals might have objected to specific
service conditions, but the form of their objections often worked to consoli-
date governing practices. The tenacity of government never meant that gov-
ernment entirely controlled or directed these dynamic relations. Gaza may
have been formed in and by government, but this form was often unexpected
and frequently reconfigured. Given the loss that is at the heart of the Gazan
(and Palestinian) experience of place, it is di≈cult to imagine how this might
have been otherwise.
7
community services  and formations
of civic  life
The average Municipality of Palestine is an authority which plans
roads, provides water and conservancy, erects slaughter-houses and
regulates markets; but it is not yet a corporate body expressing in its
services the social sense of the community. . . . There is evidently little
sense of municipal responsibility for public welfare in the sense in
which this would be understood in Europe. . . . The participation of
the local government authorities in education, as is the English prac-
tice, is one way of enlisting civic interest and civic pride in a campaign
of general cultural improvement.
palestine royal commission [peel commission]  report , 1937
Purpose of the club: to raise the social and cultural level among the
Arab unrwa employees—to have games and matches, hold lectures,
show films. The club has sports activities to strengthen bodies and
spirits. The club does not enter into political matters or sectarian
matters. The club operates according to the law in Gaza.
bylaws of arab unrwa employees association, 1961
While most of the governmental practice of the BritishMandate and the Egyptian Administration was char-
acterized by its constraints—limited in financial resources, tentative in rela-
tions with the territory being governed, anxious about overextending its
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reach—there were domains and moments that called for a more expansive
mode of governing. The need for control, for managing political threat and
security concerns, sometimes produced an intensity of regulation and a close
involvement with place and population. Government concerns did lead to a
proliferation of security services, but they were also addressed by community
services which elaborated civic ideals and defined public mores.∞ In these
services, the expression of government control was forceful without (often)
employing the actual use of force.
In community services such as education and religious a√airs it became
ever more di≈cult to disentangle state from society, even as these services
often relied on the apparent solidity of such a distinction to do their work.
The space in which these services operated was the space of the civic, a
domain that was, not surprisingly, highly contested. While at the broadest
level there was agreement that civic life entailed individual, community, and
government participation in the promotion of an active citizenry, an engaged
public, how such goals might be accomplished and what such an engaged
public might look like were sources of deep disagreement. That this public
did not simply exist but had to be continually formed was certainly some-
thing of which government was aware. The necessary involvement of govern-
ment in such production further complicated any imagined separation of the
civic from the governmental, of society from the state.
We can think of the civic, as Pierre Mayol in volume 2 of The Practice of
Everyday Life suggests in regard to the neighborhood, as entailing both
obligation and recognition. One was obligated to participate and to conform
to the demands of ‘‘propriety.’’ Propriety, as Mayol defines it, ‘‘represses what
is ‘not proper,’ ‘what one does not do’; it maintains at a distance, by filtering
and exposing them, the signs of behavior that are illegible in the neighbor-
hood, intolerable for it, destructive, for example, of the dweller’s personal
reputation.’’≤ Propriety does not function only negatively, but also articulates
obligations of what is proper, what are the best ways of living and being in a
community. Fulfilling these obligations could also lead one to expect ac-
knowledgment of one’s compliance, one’s civic skills, through a ‘‘lexicon of
‘benefits’ expected from the progressive mastery’’ of propriety.≥
While the neighborhood is a more intimate space than the civic appears
to be, arguments about civic virtues, as the services explored here make clear,
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often played out at precisely this scale. Education and religious services,
while broad in their mission and scope, were enacted at a small scale: in a
school, a village square, indeed, a neighborhood. The mutual obligations
brought forth by these services were not simply between government and the
public, but within the Gazan community itself. Civic associations, which
were regulated and subject to surveillance by government, o√ered a space for
the management of the ‘‘conduct of conduct’’∂ of Gazans by Gazans. The
activities of such associations, the details of schooling, the work of religious
scholars and service providers were all part of a process of policing propriety.
One aspect of the locality of these community services was the bounded
nature of the community they served. While community services were dis-
tinguished from crisis and everyday services by having a collective client,
their clientele was also in some ways more narrow than that of those individ-
ually oriented, singular services. The ‘‘community’’ of community servicing
was never the entire population, but rather was distinguished by religion, by
nationality, by refugee status. And yet, these services often sought to exercise
influence beyond the seemingly clear boundaries of their jurisdiction. Educa-
tion, for example, had long been divided in Palestine according to religious
community (millet), each millet providing its own schools. In the Mandate,
this religious community distinction was transformed into a national com-
munity division, with two school systems, one for Jews and one for Arabs,
operating. During the Egyptian Administration the line of distinction was
once again transformed, and refugee and native children attended separate
schools. Religious services were by definition limited to members of a par-
ticular religious community, but, as in the case of missionary activity, some-
times they attempted to expand the boundaries of that community.
The focus of community servicing on civic life further illuminates the
dynamic of abeyance that was so important to the maintenance of rule in
Gaza and in Palestine more broadly. While the language of propriety o√ered
a mechanism of control, it also displaced the site of that control to the
seemingly distinct realm of society. The demands of propriety, that is, could
appear to be social rather than governmental demands, distracting attention
from the very regimes which were imposing it. Abeyance, though, as has
already been made evident, was never a perfect technique, and there were
many cracks in its distractions and deferrals. E√orts by community members
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to bring the government in as an ally in their projects for policing society
highlight the impossibility of keeping these realms entirely separate and of
fully distracting people from the government’s involvement in controlling
propriety. Political struggles over the nature of civic life in Palestine, over the
future of the community, the nation, and the state, suggest limits to the
e√ectiveness of deferral as a means of avoiding political threat. Not surpris-
ingly, the e√ects of government policies often outdistanced their intentions.
In the e√ort to exercise control over the shape of Palestinian civic life,
community services opened up new venues for challenging government.
Community services were concerned not only with defining and protect-
ing propriety for the current moment, but also with shaping the future of
civic life. Crisis and everyday services were principally focused on the near-
at-hand and the current moment. Community services, on the other hand,
projected their vision forward, imagining a better society, a brighter future.
In conditions of tactical government like those in Gaza, this future orienta-
tion posed a problem. I have already noted that tactical government has a
shortened vision of action, and we have seen some of the consequences of
this makeshift character for governmental practice. Because community ser-
vices articulated themselves in relation to a future they could not glimpse,
they operated with an additional layer of uncertainty. This uncertainty
shaped the delivery of community services in both the Mandate and the
Administration.
‘‘Commanding What is Good’’: Religious Services as Civic Services
Religious services, which in the case of Islamic services included work in
mosques, shari‘a courts, religious education and scholarship, and charitable
societies, were somewhat uncomfortably located within the larger bureau-
cratic structure.∑ The question of whether shari‘a court employees should be
eligible for pensions (see chapter 4) highlighted some of that discomfort, a
discomfort that was not so much about whether religion should have a place
in public life, but what that place should be. How autonomous could re-
ligious services be? What kind of claims could religious expression make on a
society that was broader than its own community? The process of defining a
religious sphere within public life began not with the British, but with the
Ottomans. In the nineteenth century, Ottoman authorities distinguished
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religious and secular governmental functions, limiting the jurisdiction of
religious courts, for example, to personal status issues and referring all other
matters to a secular court system.∏ During the Mandate and the Administra-
tion, the fact of religious servicing raised sometimes uncomfortable questions
about the relationship among government and population, government in-
stitutions and civic associations, and private citizens and public o≈cials.π
The dominant idiom of religious servicing was that of moral improve-
ment.∫ Moral improvement was, though, not simply the betterment of the
individual or the improvement of personal character, but was also tied to the
community as a whole, to its civic life. It was, therefore, also connected to the
political terrain on which civic life was enacted; hence the problem with these
services. Nationalism and civic duty were articulated as internal to religious
practices, potentially solidifying a means of challenging government. Con-
necting their mission to this question of the civic, religious service providers
also often tried to exert influence beyond the limits of their client population.
The first problem for the provision of religious services in the British
Mandate was the form of that mandate itself. The replacement of Muslim
Ottoman authority with (Christian) British authority in Palestine raised
immediate questions about the organization of religious services within the
framework of the state. Under the Ottoman Empire, shari‘a courts, waqf
administration, and mosque management were all part of the state infra-
structure, authorized, like all government services and activities, by the sul-
tan. When the British entered Palestine, they took over all of the adminis-
trative functions of the former Ottoman regime, including these religious
services, but under, first, military and then international (through the League
of Nations) authority. These authorizing sources, being secular at best and
Christian at worst, were a weak foundation on which to build the provision
of Muslim services.
In order to cope with this problem and to equalize the various religions
within the new ecumenical authority, a governing body, the Supreme Muslim
Council (smc), was established to authorize Islamic services in Mandate
Palestine.Ω The smc, like all government o≈ces during the Mandate, was
headquartered in Jerusalem, although, again like all government o≈ces, it
had employees working in the districts as well. Gaza City was the site of an
smc-authorized waqf committee, shari‘a court, and library.∞≠ Despite its
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many similarities with other government o≈ces, the smc was not an entirely
regular governmental body. By creating this autonomous religious body,
Mandate o≈cials hoped to both contain religious expression and defuse
religious politics. From the beginning of the Mandate, Herbert Samuel tried
to impress on the smc the ‘‘undesirability of using places of devotion for the
purposes of political propaganda.’’∞∞ In its 1936 report to the League of
Nations, the Palestine government commented, ‘‘Whilst discussing the rep-
resentative character of the Supreme Moslem Council, it will be borne in
mind that it is not a political body, but an administrative body dealing with
Moslem religious a√airs. In so far as it is representative, it is representative of
the Moslems of Palestine in their religious aspect.’’∞≤
Despite the British insistence on controlling the limits of the smc’s repre-
sentativeness, neither the council nor the variety of Islamic personnel saw
their services as so limited. The moral and political futures of the Palestinian
community were entirely bound together in the eyes of these service pro-
viders, and their practices indicate an unwillingness to divide them. Religious
services were civic services in Mandate Gaza, and they also formed a field of
tension about the delimitation of both religious and civic life. The similarity
of these services to other civil services in terms of administrative structures,
styles of operation, and budgetary strictures imbued them with governmen-
tal authority. At the same time, the similarity constrained them, as it obli-
gated them to operate according to the same standards of civility that sought
to excise (or at least contain) politics from the civil service field.
In other chapters I have discussed personnel who operated under the
direct authority of the smc, including shari‘a court judges, mosque sta√, waqf
o≈cials, and religious teachers. Here I turn to another sort of provider and
another site of such servicing: the community leader and the religious asso-
ciation.∞≥ During the Mandate, societies were established throughout Pal-
estine with the express purpose of ‘‘spread[ing] Islamic morals and ideals’’
among the population.∞∂ Many of these societies operated under the um-
brella of the smc. Unlike some other religious services, though, these so-
cieties had no legal authority. Their ability to command was based, rather, on
moral authority. Their self-defined responsibility was for the moral climate
among the Muslim-Palestinian community and the promotion of virtue in
its members. They, like government, acted tactically in their pursuit of a
better society.
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There were several Islamic societies in Gaza during the period of the
Mandate, the most significant of which was the Society for Amr bi-l -Ma‘ruf
wa-l -Nahy ‘an al-Munkar (lit. Society for Commanding Right and Forbid-
ding Wrong, a name which the society rendered in English as the ‘‘Society for
the Preservation of Public Morals’’).∞∑ This society, Gaza’s branch of a na-
tional network of such societies, was established after a call from the first
national ‘ulama’ conference (convened by the smc) for concerted work on
Palestine’s moral terrain. According to Abdul Latif Abu Hashim, the Gaza
society was established on June 3, 1935, at a meeting held in the awqaf
administration o≈ces.∞∏
In organizing its civic struggle in the terms of amr bi-l ma‘ruf, these
Palestinian societies were joining a much longer and broader Islamic tradition
of exhortation to better behavior. Michael Cook, in a comprehensive study of
the history of amr bi-l ma‘ruf in Islamic thought and practice, identifies a wide
variety of wrongs to be forbidden and of means of forbidding them.∞π The
obligation of amr bi-l ma‘ruf crisscrosses the terrain of state and society.
Describing this practice as it occurs in Saudi Arabia, Talal Asad notes that the
government has taken on the responsibility, as part of its obligation to ensure
that people do not flout God’s authority, of establishing ‘‘a supervisory organiza-
tion whose members devote their energies ‘to commanding what is good and
forbidding what is evil (al-amr bi-l -ma‘ruf wa n’nahy ‘an al-munkar).’ ’’∞∫ In her
study of the women’s mosque movement in Egypt, Saba Mahmood emphasizes
its personal enactment, tying women’s involvement in such exhortation to
Rashid Rida’s argument that it is a fard al-‘ain (individual obligation).∞Ω
In Palestine, the Society for the Preservation of Public Morals lay some-
where in between. It was not governmental, though it operated under the
umbrella of the smc and sought government support for its campaigns. Its
membership was somewhat circumscribed—it was open to the following:
participants in the conference, ‘ulama’, or ‘‘men of religion,’’ and ‘‘every Muslim
who follows the righteous path and laudable morals [al-akhlaq al-hamida]’’≤≠
—though the specific issues around which it organized demanded the per-
sonal involvement of the entire Palestinian community. The major threats to
Muslim community and morality in Palestine identified by the society were
the sale of land to Zionists, Christian missionary activity, and improper dress
and behavior by Muslims.≤∞ While all of these threats were to the entire
community, they could be rebu√ed only by proper behavior on the part of
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individuals. In defining the issues which were most pressing for the Muslim
community, the society also linked them to the needs of the entire Palestin-
ian Arab society.≤≤
It was on the terrain of these preoccupations that the society struggled for
its vision of civic life. Thus, while the services of the society, namely, its
preaching and teaching, were limited to Muslims, its lessons were meant to
be general. The concerns of the society also indicate the anxiety about the
future that conditions in the Mandate engendered. The political character of
some of these moral issues is evident and posed a challenge to government’s
idea that religious expression could be contained as social. In the society’s
work these ideas may not for the most part have been expressed against
government, but in its charting of a political terrain they created a possibility
for opposition.
Uri Kupferschmidt, in his study of the smc, comments that the Central
Society ‘‘rarely showed signs of life.’’≤≥ This may have been true of the
Jerusalem branch, but it was demonstrably not the case in Gaza’s society.
According to the records of this society, which include reports on activities
and correspondence, its members were active on a number of fronts, includ-
ing preaching in villages, challenging government on its biases, complaining
to government about its permitting immoral behaviors, and providing char-
ity to the poor.≤∂ The obligation to act morally may have been incumbent on
everyone, but the inculcation of such behavior required ethically authorita-
tive personnel. The society’s sense of its authority is evident in its 1936
request to the smc to be permitted to oversee village preachers and to
‘‘supervise them in an o≈cial manner.’’ The society complained that there
were many preachers ‘‘who are only interested in receiving their salary and
who are lazy and negligent about undertaking this holy o≈ce [wazifa muqad-
dasa] correctly.’’≤∑ Since it was through the o≈ces of this wazifa muqaddasa
that the bulk of Muslims in Gaza could be induced to ‘‘preserve the interests
of their religion and their world,’’ their supervision by such morally qualified
individuals as the members of the society was of paramount importance.≤∏
The society ended its request by tying together the various forms of
community and obligation. It wanted to supervise the preachers, the letter
a≈rmed, in order to ‘‘work with them in the public interest and for the
salvation of the nation [umma] from the dangers which are facing their
religion, their world, and their holy nation [watan], preservation of which will
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preserve their being [kiyanahum] and their nationality [qawmiyatahum].’’
There are several senses of nation embedded in these words—the Muslim
community, the Palestinian nation, and the broader Arab nation—though, as
Weldon Matthews notes, the distinctions between these terms that character-
ized later nationalist discourse had not yet fully crystallized.≤π Even if the
meanings of these locutions overlapped, the society’s use of them all suggests it
saw itself as equipped to provide ethical guidance across these domains. That
religious thought expressed itself in a nationalist idiom in Palestine is perhaps
not surprising, but it should not be seen as self-evident (nor has such expres-
sion been employed at every moment).≤∫ That it did so during the Mandate
points to the expansiveness and the publicness of this thought at the time.
This expansive attitude is confirmed by the range of the society’s activities.
The society sent preachers to the mosques of the city and to surrounding
villages to speak about its agenda and to attempt to elicit people’s agreement
to improve their behavior.≤Ω The mechanisms the society employed to con-
trol conduct were varied, including social pressure and government force.
One preacher, Said Muhammad Allah, described his success in transforming
conduct in the village of Simsim. He went to the village on February 10, 1936,
arriving before the afternoon prayer. He was escorted by a teacher in the
government school, implying that he was not content to rely on his own
moral authority but wished as well to ‘‘borrow’’ some of the social authority
of teachers. After the prayer he commenced his preaching, focusing on the
prohibition against drinking alcohol. He spoke until the evening prayer, after
which time
I asked them to ask for pardon, to repent, and to cease practicing abom-
inations. I took from them an agreement for that. The mukhtars of the
village swore on the Qur’an that if someone practiced these things, they
would hurry and inform on him to you [the society president] or to the
police. This happened in front of everyone in the mosque. The school-
teacher gathers the boys nightly in the school and works on their reading
and writing and tries to dissuade them from all abomination, and he
deserves thanks for this. And so I thanked him in front of them. I am
confident that they will not return to this behavior.≥≠
The publicness of both the message and its acceptance appeared to be of
central importance: ‘‘this happened in front of everyone’’ and ‘‘I thanked him
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in front of them.’’ Another crucial aspect was the communal and universal
nature of the experience: everyone was there to hear Said preach, he stressed,
and everyone agreed to accept the message. Even as people accepted the
demands laid out by Said, their behavior would be henceforth policed by
their local leaders, the mukhtars, who might involve the outside authority of
the society or the police.≥∞
Although Said invoked the authority of the police over moral conduct, it
was by no means guaranteed that the police were actually interested in
patrolling this domain. An e√ort to get legal backing for the society’s cam-
paign against alcohol, for instance, largely failed. The society petitioned
government to revoke the liquor licenses of a number of bars and stores on the
grounds that they violated the law by being located too close to mosques or in
solely Muslim neighborhoods.≥≤ The government did not seem to find these
claims compelling. In the matter of an objection to the renewal of Fahmi
Hakura’s permit to sell alcohol in his store, for instance, the high commis-
sioner decided not to overturn the decision of the local permits committee,
being convinced, among other things, that ‘‘the store is on a main street in
Gaza where a lot of non-Muslims live and a number of the neighboring shops
are owned and frequented by non-Muslims’’ and that many of the nearby
mosques ‘‘were built after the store.’’≥≥ There was more at stake in this decision
for the society and for government than the narrow legal issues. But regula-
tory questions which made it possible for the society to request governmental
involvement, also made it possible for government to refuse to intervene.
Christian missionary activity, especially missionary schools, worried the
society and Gazans more generally.≥∂ Like alcohol consumption, missionary
activity threatened to undermine both the virtue and the unity of the Muslim
community. The threat of the schools seems to have been less that pupils
would actually convert to Christianity than that they would learn attitudes
and morals that would make then bad Muslims. As in its campaign against
alcohol, the society moved in several directions at once to confront the threat.
A 1936 monthly report blamed the government for not providing adequate
schooling and described the society’s e√orts to address this problem:
In the last monthly report, we mentioned that there is a missionary school
in Gaza which is teaching children to hate the Islamic religion. They learn
this false ideology because there are no [public] kindergartens. We wrote
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to the mayor of Gaza asking him to open a kindergarten in the municipal
school, and we asked the director of education to open a children’s school
in the government elementary school. We have learned that the munici-
pality opened this class. As for the government, the education director
responded that he received our request and he will look into the matter
and maybe the request will be fulfilled. I hope that requests like this will
be made by all the associations in Palestine, and then maybe the govern-
ment will respond positively.≥∑
In addition to petitioning government, the society decided to address the
parents of the students directly, both in the public forum of the Friday
sermon and through personal visits to their homes in order to ‘‘clarify to
them the harmfulness of the missionary schools . . . and ask them not to send
their children to the school.’’≥∏ The society serviced the community by in-
volving each of the parties in the governing dynamic—government, munici-
pality, population—in the project of creating a more virtuous civic life.
In the campaign against land sales to Zionists, the society focused its
attention on individual members of society, seeking to remind them of their
obligations to seek the good of all. In distinction to practices of public
shaming of land sellers and simsars (brokers) that were often employed by
the press, the society’s e√orts were frequently private interventions. Society
members did preach against the sales in general, for example, in cases in
which a particular sale was threatened or a specific seller identified, but the
society tended to approach the party individually. Among the records of the
society, there are a number of letters written by individual members to
persons they knew to be selling land as well as mentions of delegations being
sent to talk to them in an attempt to dissuade them.≥π Such individual
address hints at another aspect of the control the society desired to exert.
Using ‘‘sweet speech and logic,’’≥∫ the society aimed to compel individuals to
recognize their obligation to community and society.
As a community service provider, the society searched out multiple mech-
anisms for controlling conduct and for improving the quality of civic life.
The di≈culties in acquiring the government support it sought further high-
light the complications that religious servicing posed in the Mandate. Dis-
tinctions had been made between these and other kinds of services, partly in
deference to community feeling (that it was inappropriate for a non-Muslim
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body to direct Muslim services), but this distinction in turn restricted the
capacity of those services to lay claim to the full weight of government power.
In their practice, religious service providers made use of a variety of sources
of authority, including ethical and social, governmental and national, even as
these domains were held to be distinct.
stated religion: the egyptian administration
and the provision of religious services
Under the Egyptian Administration, the boundaries between the various
domains of service receipt, provision, and authorization were much less
sharply drawn. Whereas during the Mandate the smc was established pre-
cisely to create a distinct authorizing body for religious services, during the
Administration the smc was integrated into government, and at its head was
the governor-general.≥Ω Ultimately this lack of distinction led to its dissolu-
tion. Since its original purpose had been lost, this ‘‘old’’ body was no longer
suited to the needs of service provision. As Michael Dumper puts it, ‘‘The
position of a higher echelon of the Supreme Muslim Council in the Gaza
Strip controlling the local waqf committee [became] increasingly redun-
dant.’’∂≠ Accordingly, in 1957 the responsibilities of the smc were devolved to
the governor-general, the Administration, the shari‘a appeals court, and the
local waqf administration.∂∞ The dispersing of religious services across gov-
ernment departments suggests how unproblematically within service these
practices were during the Administration. At the same time, the control
exerted by the Administration over the services indicates the extent to which
this provision was connected to political concerns.
Before the smc could be absorbed and then dissolved, the Administration
had to reconstitute it. As we have seen in every arena of service provision, the
1948 nakba destroyed the financial and organizational basis of religious ser-
vicing. The loss of waqf land, which provided revenue for mosques and
religious schools, and of the resources of the smc in Jerusalem had an imme-
diate deleterious e√ect on the provision of religious services. As a stopgap
measure, in 1949, the new governor-general of Gaza asked the Egyptian
Awqaf Ministry to help support Gaza’s religious institutions:
In the areas of Palestine under the purview of the Egyptian Administra-
tion, there are a number of mosques which are now without furnishings.
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Not one of them is maintained by Islamic A√airs in Jerusalem, as they
used to be. . . . The need now is for the Awqaf Ministry to provide new
furnishings and also to provide financial assistance to these places of
worship. The salaries of the preachers and muezzins have been stopped.
The Egyptian Administration is obliged to organize these places of wor-
ship and to arrange for assistance to them. The Awqaf Ministry is respon-
sible for religious and charitable matters, so we ask that the ministry
provide whatever assistance it can in paying the salaries of these em-
ployees.∂≤
The ministry agreed to send carpets to the Gaza mosques and to contribute
190 pounds to their budget.∂≥ The Egyptian Social A√airs Ministry also
appropriated funds (upon request) to support the operations of Islamic
schools in Gaza, which had previously been supported by the smc.∂∂ In the
long term, as I noted, the smc was reestablished by the Administration and
then absorbed into other departments. With religious services distributed
across government, Administration-era files record numerous instances of
municipalities and other government bodies funding these services—the
Deir Belah Council contributed to the construction of a religious school; the
Rafah Municipality was ordered by the Administration to pay for the repara-
tion of a local mosque wall.∂∑
While this absorption occurred in large part for administrative reasons, it
reveals the government’s desire to control the domain of religious services.∂∏
The Mandate government was similarly apprehensive about the possibility
that religious bodies would act politically, but it was more constrained than
the Administration in its possible responses to such worries. The Admin-
istration, as a Muslim government, was able to more directly control re-
ligious expression by its employees and the public. Rema Hammami, echo-
ing this point, suggests that ‘‘the Egyptian State’s consolidation of its control
over the institutional mechanisms of religious production in Gaza was inti-
mately connected to its suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood [Ikhwan Al-
Muslimiin] as a counter-hegemonic political force.’’∂π Still, just as the Man-
date was never entirely successful in controlling these politics, neither was
the Administration. In concert with its centralization of control over re-
ligious expression, the Egyptian Administration was much less willing than
the Mandate to give independent religious societies room to maneuver.
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Police files from the Administration include numerous accounts of sur-
veillance of religious activities and refusals of permission for the formation of
religious societies. In 1953, a group of people in Khan Yunis desired to
establish a Society of the Followers of Sunna in Khan Yunis, whose stated
purpose was to spread knowledge of the Qur’an and Sunna through ‘‘public
lectures on exalted morals and social etiquette,’’ to develop a collection of
religious books and magazines, and to ‘‘aid the poor and unfortunate to the
extent the Society’s finances allow.’’∂∫ Police investigation of the founding
members found them all to be supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, but
also found them all to possess ‘‘good morals and clean records.’’∂Ω Despite the
lack of apparent danger such a society would pose and the nonobjection of
the policeto its founding, the governor of Khan Yunis recommended against
approval, commenting, ‘‘In my opinion there is no cause to have this society,
given that its numbers are very small, and in fact do not exceed the founders
themselves—also there is no cause to have a society like this given that most
of these founders were previously members of the Muslim Brotherhood.’’∑≠
Even if religious services during the Administration were not usually
provided by the kinds of religious societies that were so important during the
Mandate, their provision was nevertheless not limited to religious a√airs
muwazzafin. The administrative dispersal of religious services across the
governing infrastructure also produced an expansion of religious servicing.
One of its most important sites became the educational apparatus (see below
for a lengthier discussion of education). According to Rema Hammami,
‘‘The administration invested itself with the role of elaborating religion. . . .
[and] the main terrain through which the regime promoted its reading of
Islam was the school system.’’∑∞
Hammami argues further that this reading was part of the government’s
project of ‘‘creating modern subjects/citizens’’ and made clear that ‘‘Islam was
to be considered a code for personal behavior and social morality as opposed
to a political will that it was the responsibility of Muslims to fulfill. Islam was
relevant to shaping modern life inasmuch as it provided codes of ethics and
behavior in everyday life.’’∑≤ Gregory Starrett makes much the same argu-
ment for religious education in Egypt, writing that ‘‘religious study in Nas-
ser’s primary schools altered the previous emphasis on manners like humility,
time management, and good behavior, focusing instead on social values nec-
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essary to a popular reconstruction of society by the masses: sincerity, fulfill-
ing obligations, forbearance, and the rights of the nation.’’∑≥ Compared to the
Mandate, the Administration made religious servicing, if anything, more
public, more imbricated in the civic life of Gaza, but it was also more
controlled for political expression. Islamic education under Egypt sought to
promote a kind of civic morality that would not threaten government power
and could participate in its project of promoting a well-ordered public life.∑∂
The civic quality of religious services and the obligations entailed therein
were highlighted in the crisis atmosphere that preceded the 1967 war (and, as
it turned out, the end of Egyptian rule in Gaza). At the end of May 1967, just
two weeks before the war in June, the awqaf commissioner issued an order to
mosque sta√ in which he listed the topics for sermons to be delivered in the
mosques during the month of Safar 1387 ah, that is, May/June 1967. In light
of the brewing political crisis, the sermons were to stress the importance of
cooperation and understanding among the citizenry as well as support for
and cooperation with the forces working to liberate their nation. Further, the
sermons were to urge people not to hoard food and supplies because it is ‘‘the
government [that] is responsible for organizing, storing, and distributing the
needed supplies to the people, and it is undertaking this task.’’ People should
be reminded that hoarding food ‘‘will harm the public without benefitting
the hoarder, whether he be a merchant or a consumer. . . . The Prophet, sala
‘alehi wa-salem, said: ‘One who hoards the food of a nation [qawm] is not
of them.’ ’’∑∑
In this high stakes moment of preparation for war, the practices of polic-
ing propriety and encouraging ethical comportment were especially impor-
tant in the delivery of religious services. The mutual, overlapping obligations
inherent in civic life continued to shape its expression. Religious and na-
tional duty were inextricably linked in this call for responsible citizenship.
The government could meet its obligations to both regulate and provide only
with the participation of the entire society. To choose not to participate was
to choose not to be of the society. To cooperate with government and with
one’s fellow Gazans, on the other hand, was to express the highest ideals of
Gaza’s civic life. As it turned out, of course, this carefully calibrated array of
obligations was disrupted by the defeat of Egyptian forces and the Israeli
occupation of the Gaza Strip.
204 • Chapter 7
Civics and Citizenry: Educational Services in Gaza
Education in Gaza during the first half of the twentieth century, which was
partly colonial, influenced by nationalism, and indebted to enlightenment
traditions and Ottoman practices, was necessarily connected to the contours
of civic life that were emerging and being struggled over during this period.∑∏
Given the intensity of the demand for control and the ongoing uncertainty
about rule, the civic life promoted through education unsurprisingly was one
which excluded, or at least restricted, political expression. The contours of
educational servicing were also formed by uncertainty about the future shape
of the polity of which students were being educated to be a part. This
uncertain civic life was expressed in education through the sometimes con-
flicting figures of the ‘‘national’’ and the ‘‘citizen.’’
In their most common senses, nationality and citizenship appear to be
integrally connected. James Holston and Arjun Appadurai, for example,
describe a general modern project of ‘‘national citizenship’’ that relies upon
an idea of ‘‘the nation as a community of shared purposes and commensur-
able citizens.’’∑π In the Gaza of the Mandate and the Administration, how-
ever, nationality and citizenship were to a degree uncoupled, and each be-
came a site of struggle. Given the intensity of national conflict between Jews
and Arabs in Palestine during the Mandate, British o≈cials promoted a
vision of citizenship that could transcend national distinction and o√er a
social, as opposed to a political, sense of citizen rights. Since the Administra-
tion, on the other hand, was unable to actualize the achievement of formal
citizenship (in an independent Palestine) that it promised to Gazans, it
promoted the nation as the dominant space of subject positioning. During
both periods, Gazans, above all the teachers who were most explicitly called
on to impart these visions, challenged the government’s terms and its e√orts
to control the limits of proper behavior.
If civil servants occupy an uncomfortable space in a ruling dynamic, the
work of teachers epitomizes this discomfort. Gazan teachers, who were
highly politicized during both the British and the Egyptian periods, were in
the position of always having to teach two conflicting curricula at once. On
the one hand, they taught the government curriculum with its particular
emphases and with its important skills and knowledge. On the other hand,
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they also articulated and taught a contesting vision of community and civic
life. They suggested, in the Mandate, that the national community was
paramount, even as they reproduced the o≈cial curriculum’s lessons on
world history and universal civics. They suggested during the Administra-
tion that the rights of citizenship, rights that included political contestation
and organization, were as important as the demands of nation as defined by
the Administration. Teachers continually negotiated a terrain of contradic-
tion and conflict.
Early in the Mandate, o≈cials identified education as a mechanism for
inculcating a broad conception of Palestinian community, one which would
encompass all religions and nationalities and which would be distinctly so-
cial, rather than political. Being a good citizen was uncoupled from one’s
obligations to country and was figured instead as a general attribute of a
proper person. Such a project would be greatly simplified, o≈cials argued, by
the establishment of a uniform, national school system. Ylana Miller de-
scribes the attitude of the Colonial O≈ce: ‘‘The avowed British aim in
Palestine was ‘to get Jew and Moslem to work together and develop a com-
mon Palestinian consciousness.’ The more schools were left to religious
communities and local authorities, the more di≈cult it would be ‘to get the
schools to play their part in the development of such a policy.’ ’’∑∫ Given the
depth of the conflict in Palestine and the doubts and debates that were
always present under British rule, one has to wonder, as Miller does, how
much British o≈cials really imagined they might succeed in producing a
common citizenry and community in Palestine. Certainly the fact that
schooling was separated into two systems, the Jewish community operating
its own schools, seemed to guarantee that the e√ort would fail even before it
began.∑Ω However unrealistic the aim, schooling for Arabs in the government
system was always engaged in this project of producing non-nationalist,
apolitical citizens, a project that was complicated by the uncertain future of
Palestine.
A further complication in educational initiatives was that, although
schooling was supposed to be compulsory, there was a sizable gap between
theory and practice, with large numbers of students shut out of schools every
year for lack of space. Education during the Mandate may have been defined
in universalizing terms, but it was nowhere near universal.∏≠ The limits in
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educational services represent another instance of services with a limited
clientele whose e√ects were meant to pervade society. Those families which
had no direct exposure to school might acquire some familiarity with its
general lessons through the social personas of teachers. Civil servants gener-
ally, and teachers particularly, had high social status during the Mandate.
Given the limited availability of education, it was inevitable that this service
field would contribute to the reproduction and reinforcement of class distinc-
tions among the population. The same conditions which mandated the stag-
nation of much of the population were those which guaranteed the educator
and the educated status and respect. Education was widely recognized as a
path to personal advancement. As Qasim Jamal, a former teacher, recalled
people’s desires to educate their children, ‘‘The desire was that they would
finish school and become respectable, could find a position, get work.’’∏∞
Teachers were both the embodiment of this educational ideal and gate-
keepers for its realization. Sami Ibrahim, a teacher in Majdal, pointed out
that there were very practical reasons to cultivate good relations with teach-
ers, as they determined which of the students would take one the few seats
available at the next grade level: ‘‘It wasn’t like what they did during the
Egyptian Administration when there was a general examination that was
corrected in Egypt or was corrected by a committee. . . . No, we made the
examination and the grades—and I reported the grades. There was no one to
supervise me in the question of grades.’’∏≤ The delegated authority enjoyed by
teachers contributed to their social status, as did their relatively high salaries
and their education.
The social authority of teachers was evident in the context of religious
services—as when a preacher smoothed his entrance into a village by coming
with a teacher (see above). In relation to the program of civic education
promoted by the Mandate, teachers’ influence was much more complicated.
Since, for the most part, Palestinian teachers did not support the govern-
ment’s policies, their social practices often worked at cross-purposes to its
program. Recall the discussion in chapter 3 of one teacher’s (Hanan) extracur-
ricular political activity. Even as Hanan obeyed Mandate commands ‘‘at
work,’’ in her personal life she wrote political articles under a pseudonym.∏≥
Even those teachers who did not directly engage in political activity (no doubt
the majority) had an influence on people’s conceptions of what Palestinian
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community, society, and civic life could be.∏∂ That people still talk about the
significant e√ects of Mandate education, even as they complain about its
restrictions, suggests that classroom work had a broad social impact.
Decisions and debates about school curricula highlight the tension be-
tween social citizenship and national identification. The students who were
lucky enough to be admitted to schools were taught di√erent subjects de-
pending on whether they were in town or village schools. The village curricu-
lum was limited in its academic subjects and was weighted toward agricul-
tural techniques.∏∑ This curriculum was intended, in the words of one
educational o≈cial, to deliver ‘‘an education that will at once enlighten the
peasant, make him a contented citizen, and keep him on the land.’’∏∏ The
town school curriculum included history, Arabic, English, mathematics, reli-
gion (Islam or Christianity, as appropriate), hygiene, drawing, and sports. It
was designed to ensure that upon graduation students would ‘‘know in a
systematic way (a) the circumstances of the development of human society
and present systems of government; (b) the problems that face human so-
ciety at present, and (c) the duties of the citizen to his country.’’∏π Each of
these knowledges was general, connected to universal history and values. The
duties of the citizen that students were to learn through this curriculum were
not, therefore, the particular duties of an Arab Palestinian living in the
conditions of the Mandate, but the general duties that any citizen anywhere
would have to his country.
The politics of curricular depoliticization did not go unnoticed among
Palestinian nationalists. The emphasis in the curriculum on world history
was understood as a direct attack on the development of Palestinian na-
tionalist consciousness in students. A. L. Tibawi, the education inspector for
the Southern district, recorded the following complaints in his history of
Mandate education: ‘‘While it contained features of the geography and his-
tory of Arab countries, [nationalists] never ceased to point out, it insisted in
its content and tone on the international rather than the national character
of Palestine. The Arab boy or girl was taught far less about the history of his
nation and the geography of the Arab countries, the argument went, than the
average Iraqi or for that matter the Palestinian Jewish child studying under a
national but an independent system of education.’’∏∫ Despite their political
objections to this curriculum, Palestinian teachers recognized what they
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identified as its pedagogical importance. It was a good education, if not
always the right one. Almost every former Mandate teacher with whom I
spoke echoed this view. Hanan summed up her view of British education as
follows: ‘‘The level of education was high, sixth or seventh class during the
British period was better than the level of the general secondary students
today—truly, without exaggeration. This is true, and one cannot say anything
but the truth. However, we still dislike them.’’∏Ω
Visible in this attitude of educators is how the development of citizenship
was complicated not only by the practices of tactical government, which en-
sured that no one, clear policy could ever be pursued with consistency, but also
by the sometimes oppositional practices of the teachers who had to imple-
ment any policy. There is no small irony in the fact that the arena that was
supposed to produce apolitical citizens was occupied by the most political of
civil servants. While teachers remember their political activity during this
period as being severely curtailed, as constrained as that of any other civil ser-
vant—‘‘They didn’t allow any discussion of politics, not by us or the students,’’π≠
one teacher told me—politics plainly did seep through the restrictions.
Government was certainly aware that students were learning nationalism,
however indirectly, from those who were supposed to teach citizenship. In an
attempt to deal with this problem, the Education Ordinance of 1933 provided
for the firing of any teacher who was proven ‘‘to have imparted teaching of a
seditious, disloyal, immoral, or otherwise harmful character’’ and the closing
of any school ‘‘being conducted in a manner contrary to good order and
morals.’’π∞ Through its use of a general language of ‘‘order’’ and ‘‘morals’’ the
education ordinance presented itself as a nonpolitical document, a represen-
tation of the social public sphere that Mandate practice sought to promote.
At the same time, of course, these broad categories were designed to permit
the firing of any teacher deemed to be a nationalist.
That this e√ort to foreclose nationalism enjoyed only limited success is
evident in Palestinians’ memories of this period and was recognized at the
time by Mandate o≈cials. The Peel Commission Report of 1937 summed up
the state of the problem when it identified education as a key factor in the
growth of Palestinian nationalism:
The whole of the Arab educational system, unlike the Jewish, is main-
tained by the government . . . it is at least as purely Arab in its character as
Formations of Civic Life • 209
the Jewish system is Jewish. . . . A school-system thus purely Arab may be
better for Arab children than a ‘‘mixed’’ system with a British element in its
sta√ and its field of instruction; it is the right way, it is said, to make them
‘‘good Arabs.’’ Whether that is so or not, it certainly makes them good Arab
patriots. The general tendency of schoolmasters to be politically-minded is
nowhere more marked than in the Middle East: and it is not to be expected
that Arab schoolmasters in Palestine, Government servants though they
are, should be able to repress entirely their sympathy with the nationalist
cause.π≤
The narrowness of a school system that was ‘‘purely Arab’’ apparently made
it di≈cult to create Arabs who were broadly civic. Politically minded teach-
ers, left to their own devices, produced politically minded students. Despite
the fact that education was a service domain in which government endeav-
ored to plan strategically and from which it made an explicit e√ort to remove
politics, it was, as we have seen, one of the more political of service areas.
When political leaders called strikes in the country, students and, some-
times, teachers obeyed. In one of his memoirs, Ibrahim Skeik, a former
teacher and local historian, recalled such a strike. On November 2, he re-
membered from his elementary school days, he and the other young boys
would run into older students on their way to school who would tell them,
‘‘Today is Balfour Declaration Day—it’s a strike. So we retraced our steps,
and no one was scolded or punished.’’π≥ Tibawi noted this same phenome-
non in his report on education during the latter years of the Mandate:
There is hardly any place for politics in a report of this nature but a few
passing remarks are needed to touch on the subject of strikes in schools.
This subject was almost negligible from 1940 to 1944, but with the re-
sumption of political activity in Palestine . . . strikes were declared. . . .
Government schools like all other branches of the Government service
were bound to be a√ected, and attendance of pupils on the days of the
strike became either scarce or nil. . . . From the range of my experience as a
pupil, teacher and inspector from 1920–45 I know of no e√ective remedy
to stop completely strikes in schools when there is a political strike. . . .
Penalties of suspension, expulsion or payment of fines proved of no avail
in dealing with pupils. Warnings and withholding of increment of salary
was likewise useless in dealing with teachers.π∂
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Both the complaints made about the school curriculum and the prevalence of
political activity within and around schools highlight the extent to which the
stakes of this service were evident to providers and recipients. Distraction
and deferral gave way to direct political challenge. Education (not always, but
at times) was a case in which abeyance failed. There was almost no service
area that did not on occasion witness such a failure, but, along with policing,
education proved to be the most di≈cult to manage. As political challenges
heated up after World War II, abeyance, which o√ered no real solution to
the problems of governing Palestine but simply was a way to manage such
government in the short run, was no longer a su≈cient technique. Having no
capacity to govern in any other way, the British ultimately gave up on their
civic project and on the Mandate as a whole.
schooling and surveillance: educational
opportunities in the egyptian administration
Educational services during the Egyptian Administration did not, as they did
during the Mandate, strive to exclude nationalism from the curriculum or
from the minds of students and teachers. On the contrary, during this period
a carefully circumscribed version of nationalism was promoted and encour-
aged, and the concept of the citizen assumed a more restricted place in
education. The tensions that teachers felt as participants in the practice of
education were similarly reconfigured. Teachers’ oppositional practices dur-
ing the Administration tended to inject political citizenship, including the
right of opposition and the right to organize, into students’ consciousness.
Another distinguishing feature of this period was the addition of unrwa as
a negotiating party that shaped the contours of educational practice. If the
Administration and Gazan teachers struggled most immediately over the
shape of the current civic life, unrwa and the Administration struggled over
its future. In this struggle as well, the Administration privileged nationalism
as the idea that would give shape to this future, while unrwa promoted a
more prosaic notion of utility in education.
As in other service areas, Egyptian security concerns had considerable
impact on educational practice. Despite, or maybe because of, these con-
cerns, education was the site of the most expansive governmental project of
the Egyptian Administration. As distinguished from crisis and everyday
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services, in community services like education and religious servicing the
Administration hoped to do more than contain security threats. It hoped to
actively transform the political positions and dispositions that could produce
such threats. We have seen how religious education sought to contribute to a
project of producing social subjectivities, a project that extended across the
curriculum. Muslim Brotherhood and Communist Party a≈liations would,
it was hoped, be substituted by support for Nasserism. The prevalence of
independent political attitudes among teachers made this a challenging prop-
osition in certain ways, though the evidence suggests that Nasserism was
indeed broadly popular among the Gazan population.π∑ To the extent that
Palestinian nationalism was encouraged, and it was, this was to be a depen-
dent nationalism—subordinate to Egyptian political demands and not to be
acted upon on solely Palestinian initiative. The simultaneous expansion of
education and control of politics were pursued through increased surveil-
lance of schools and their occupants.
Egyptian authorities transformed the social landscape in Gaza by making
universal primary and secondary education a reality and by providing free
university education for large numbers of Gazans. This massive educational
expansion mirrored the policy in Egypt, and here too university graduates
were granted government employment. The importance of Egyptian educa-
tional initiatives is universally recognized and applauded by Gazans today.
Gazans who refer to Egyptian rule as a ‘‘golden age for the Palestinian
people’’ explicitly connect this evaluation to the expansion of education.π∏ As
a retired government clerk put it to me, ‘‘We are completely tied with the
Egyptians. No one can deny that. They were here to serve us. People used to
study without paying fees. . . . Education was free. That is why if you pay a
visit to a [refugee] camp you will find tens of teachers, doctors, pharmacists,
and engineers who were educated at Egyptian universities.’’ππ
The massive educational transformation took time, of course. In the
immediate aftermath of 1948, there were not enough schools, teachers, or
materials, nor were there the funds to provide them. Gazans recalled to me
the very di≈cult conditions in which education was initially pursued: ‘‘Pupils
had no wooden board to write on. They wrote on the asphalt. They solved
algebra questions while they were walking.’’π∫ Mahdi Ayub, a former teacher,
recalled how he began his career teaching refugee children: ‘‘In the beginning
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figure  10. Teaching in a refugee camp. source: afsc archives.
of 1949, after five months, we, the youth, gathered and discussed the situa-
tion and decided to be volunteers and teach the children. We started to teach
the children in streets. The Quakers and the Egyptian Administration no-
ticed us and helped us.’’πΩ
Eventually, Mahdi recounted, schools were built to house these students.
He insisted that, even without school buildings, refugees’ desire for knowl-
edge was such that his students’ grades were better than those of native
Gazans studying in preexisting schools.∫≠ Today, the high educational levels
attained by refugees are often pointed to as proof that they have ‘‘assimilated’’
into Gazan society—that they have overcome their initial lower-class posi-
tion.∫∞ In fact, class and other distinctions between these groups have not
entirely disappeared.∫≤
Getting enough books for all the students was a problem, as was the sorts
of books that were available. Coming out of the frustrations of Mandate
education, Gazans initially hoped to have a more Palestinian curriculum.
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figure  11. Tent school in Shati refugee camp, 1950s. source: unrwa photo archive.
When a delegation from the Arab League visited Gaza in 1952, the mayor
took the opportunity to insist that students in Gaza needed to be educated in
the history and geography of Palestine and that they needed textbooks that
could o√er this education.∫≥ Providing such resources proved di≈cult. A
committee sent from Egypt in 1959 to examine the state of education in Gaza
noted that some classes still lacked books altogether. Those that did have
them relied almost entirely on Egyptian texts.∫∂ The committee agreed that
this was a problem because ‘‘some of the things in Egyptian schoolbooks will
be strange to Gazan students,’’ but designing wholly local texts would have
been di≈cult given that, as the committee also recognized, ‘‘the current
situation in Gaza is a provisional one, subject to many changes.’’ One e√ect
of the textbook situation, and of the educational practice more generally, was
that Gaza’s students received a somewhat deflected education. They were
schooled in the manner of Egyptian citizens, and yet they were not schooled
to be such citizens. Keeping Palestinian national feeling alive and controlled
was an Egyptian priority, but the mechanisms for providing this national
education (tarbiyya wataniyya wa-qawmiyya) were not necessarily Palestinian.
The Administration and unrwa certainly struggled over curricular is-
sues, and their conflicts were often about short-term practical benefits versus
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long-term national strategies. A conflict in 1959/60 between the two bodies
over responsibility and funding for an agricultural training school in Beit
Hanoun illustrates this tension. Having operated the school for a number of
years, unrwa decided to terminate its support on the grounds that, because
agricultural lands were very limited in Gaza and no local work was available
for graduates of the school, it did not conform to the agency’s policy of
funding ‘‘useful’’ projects.∫∑ unrwa’s apparently prosaic focus on training
refugees in useful skills was interpreted in political terms by the Administra-
tion. In responding to the decision to stop funding the school, the Admin-
istration countered that unrwa’s responsibility was to improve the edu-
cational standards of refugees to prepare them for a future not in their
temporary refuges, but in their homes: ‘‘The intent in this improvement is
not to settle [tawtin] them in the places where they are living, but the goal is
that they should be good citizens [muwatinin salahin] when they return to
their country.’’∫∏ In the Administration’s view, citizenship was defined in
reference to the deferred future in Palestine, and education in the present
should produce Gazans who were Palestinian ‘‘nationals.’’ Students were to
be prepared for citizenship in a country which did not (yet) exist, and whose
relation to their current conditions was not defined.
While the Administration championed future civic life in this conflict with
unrwa, its own position was not and could not be stable. Even as Admin-
istration o≈cials were accusing unrwa of attempting to settle the Palestine
problem by focusing on practical education, in another setting o≈cials were
championing exactly this kind of need-focused education. The 1959 ‘‘Report
on Education in Gaza’’ implied that unrwa had responded too much to
refugees’ desires for higher education and had lost sight of the need for the
creation of work opportunities. The report indicated that the school curricula
of the government and unrwa alike—contained far too little vocational
training: ‘‘The result of the current education system is that many young men
graduate from their theoretical studies and the Strip is not able to find room
for them.’’∫π In the absence of any industry in Gaza, even vocational education
was less than wholly practical. As the report stated, ‘‘Establishing industrial
schools in the Strip before industry is set up there will transform the study to
theoretical study.’’ These considerations seem the same as those which made
unrwa hesitant to keep funding the agricultural school. Whatever the Ad-
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ministration’s commitment to a future Palestine (a commitment that was
generally more rhetorical than practical), the immediate economic demands
and political threats of Gaza’s di≈cult conditions made it impossible to banish
immediate concerns from educational services.∫∫
The emphasis on national education by Egyptians was both policy and
practical consideration. Unable to o√er Gazans immediate improvement,
administrators resorted to o√ering them hope for the future. Teachers’ de-
scriptions of their work during this period emphasize the importance of
developing this sense of nation among their students. Ibrahim Mahmoud, a
native inhabitant of Gaza who was both a teacher and a principal in unrwa
schools, described his responsibilities as the head of the ‘‘cultural committee’’
in his first school.∫Ω This committee, he said, focused on ‘‘making the people
aware culturally, principally concentrating on morals and values as well as the
love for the people and doing good deeds.’’Ω≠ He noted that one of the
achievements of the committee was implanting a sense of patriotism among
the students. When I asked him how this patriotism was taught, he said,
‘‘Loving homeland and morals do not come by instruction but through
practices. Practices—that means you tell stories, run school tours where
cooperation among people and the respect for others prevail, where the
importance of not harming others and forgiving people will be clearly mani-
fest—through practices. Also through writings, for example, in a small news-
paper. . . . These things encourage the students to search in the library about
the moral values, which they then wrote about and showed to their teacher.’’
The duties of the nationalist as described in schools were not immediately
political ones, but cultural and moral ones, including care for others, cooper-
ation, and respect. Ibrahim argued that being a patriot was a moral duty and
a requirement for the betterment of society as a whole: ‘‘They must love the
people so that the whole society can live in happiness and well-being.’’Ω∞
The happiness of the whole society, from the Administration’s perspective
at least, depended not just on patriotism among its people, but also on the
control of unauthorized political expression. It is in the struggle over the
control of political activity in and around schools that the extent to which
educational patriotism was pursued at the expense of certain aspects of
citizenship is especially manifest. Ibrahim, who spoke so proudly of his
achievements in inculcating patriotism in his students and who praised
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Egyptian authorities for their support of education, is the same Ibrahim
whom these authorities imprisoned for nearly two years (see chapter 3).
Politics was a perpetual threat, and teachers, who were always more political
than the general population, were the objects of continual surveillance and
regulation. In the Administration police files there are numerous reports of
principals being instructed to watch their teachers (and themselves) to en-
sure that there were no political activities in schools.Ω≤
A file on the Bureij Middle School for Refugees demonstrates the extent
of the surveillance of education in the Administration as well as the preva-
lence of politics within the schools.Ω≥ On the morning of October 12, 1959,
the janitor of the Bureij school found a leaflet posted on the door of the
school. As he began to remove it, some students ripped the leaflet apart,
perhaps to forestall an investigation. He was able to put the pieces together,
and he then turned the leaflet over to the school principal, who sent it to the
Deir Belah administrative governor, who in turn sent a contingent of police
o≈cers to investigate. The o≈cers questioned the students who had ripped
down the leaflet as well as its author and some teachers. The text of the
leaflet seemed to comport with the messages being promoted by the Admin-
istration—it declared ‘‘Palestine is our country’’ and ‘‘Long Live Gamal Abdul
Nasser’’—so the disturbance produced by its posting was obviously about
something other than content. This independent action on the part of a
student raised the possibility of a loss of control over the school and the civic
environments. The sentiments might have been proper, but their expression
had not been authorized.
The investigation into the posting revealed that the school was an arena of
rampant factionalism and party politics. The police identified teachers a≈li-
ated with the Communist Party, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Ba‘th
party, the supporters of each organization accusing the others of creating
trouble and ‘‘chaos.’’Ω∂ In an incident which exemplified just how di≈cult
educators could be to control, an informant reported on a quarrel that broke
out among the teachers. They were calling each other garbage, and the
principal, who was a Ba‘thist, threatened to ‘‘wring the neck’’ of a Nasserist
teacher. The principal announced to the group, ‘‘I am a Ba‘thist, and I am not
afraid of anyone, not even Gamal Abdul Nasser.’’Ω∑
Even as the Administration sought to promote a nonpolitical national
subject, teachers injected a sense of political citizenship into the discourse
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about civic life. It was teachers and students who were at the forefront of
demonstrations in 1955 against a proposed plan to resettle refugees in the
Sinai.Ω∏ It was teachers who were most active in the political parties the
administration hoped to control.Ωπ Even the imprisonment in 1959 of a large
number of teachers for their political activity—the incident is mentioned by
Mahmoud and described in detail by Mu’in Basisu, a teacher, poet, and
Communist Party activist, in Descent into the Water—failed to entirely con-
tain such expression.Ω∫
During the Administration, political threats and the perception thereof
ebbed and flowed. There were moments of genuine crisis, many of which
involved teachers directly, but the dynamic of Egyptian government was
never completely undermined. Through one tactic or another, and some-
times by changing a governing practice, these crises were contained, though
never really solved, and abeyance continued to work. Changes in the govern-
ing structure in Gaza in the latter years of the Administration do suggest
that there may have been a limit to deferral’s e√ectiveness as a governing
tactic. The Palestine Liberation Organization (plo) was created in 1964;
shortly thereafter the National Union was dissolved and replaced by the plo
as Gaza’s only recognized party.ΩΩ The plo then established the Palestine
Liberation Army (pla), with Gaza as its primary base. Yezid Sayigh indi-
cates that Egyptian authorities initially objected to this establishment, but
that Nasser ultimately was compelled to support it in order to deflect chal-
lenges to his leadership in the Arab world.∞≠≠ Sayigh further argues that the
actual establishment of the pla in Gaza was hampered by Egyptian policies.
However tempered the support may have been, in March 1965 the governor-
general and Legislative Council approved a law mandating compulsory con-
scription.∞≠∞ This move toward the creation of Palestinian institutions, how-
ever limited their authority (and it was quite limited), does allude to the
impossibility of deferring Palestinian national aspirations indefinitely. Since
Israel’s occupation of Gaza cut the Administration short, what exactly might
have been the limits of deferral and of abeyance will never be known.
Conclusion
Government control, political struggles, and the proprieties of civic life were
intertwined in the provision of community services. In these services, con-
testations over civic life centered around government’s attempts to control
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political expression, Gazan e√orts to expand political consciousness, debates
about the role of religion in public life, and challenges to the highly vexed
categories of ‘‘national’’ and ‘‘citizen.’’ Ideas about civic life were always ex-
pressed in multiple tenses—struggling with past loss, striving for the future,
uncertain about the present. The concern for control, for propriety, was
perhaps the most di≈cult feature of tactical government. It was compelled by
anxiety and incapacity. At the same time it required a putting aside of this
anxiety and a surpassing of these incapacities. Control demanded precisely
the kind of over-involvement that government in Gaza generally struggled to
avoid. There was also a persistent paradox in these controlling services, as it
was precisely in the domains where government was expansive that the most
sustained resistance emerged.
This awkward relation among the aspects of tactical government was
itself, of course, tactical. Tactical government was by its nature self-contra-
dictory, relying now on one instrument, now on another. Government coped
with the di≈cult conditions of Gaza by deploying a tactical mobility that
allowed it to respond rapidly to changing demands, just as Gazans coped
with these same conditions through a multiplicity of practices that included
care and contestation, scuΔes and support. The confrontations among these
forces sometimes produced crises in abeyance—such a crisis led the British to
retreat from the Mandate and perhaps could have undermined Egyptian rule
had it continued—but also often worked to sustain rule. Within this dy-
namic, the parties to government in Gaza each sought, even within the
constrained horizons of its temporality, to imagine a future that could pro-
vide more security, greater stability, a better life.
8 Conclusion
gaza and an anthropology of government
This exploration of government in Gaza has illuminated adiverse and sometimes contradictory array of governing
practices. The ways in which these practices worked together—even as they
did not always fit together—gave shape to a mode of government, and also to
the place and people of Gaza. The relationship among government, popula-
tion, and place was not one simply of cause and e√ect, but rather operated in
multiple directions, sometimes at the same time. In addition to the national,
regional, and international forces that influenced the style of rule in Gaza, the
demands of this particular space, as a provincial market center or overcrowded
refugee destination, shaped the details of this practice. At the same time, rule
was shaped not only by the constraints of place, but also by the demands of its
participants (the governors and the governed). These demands for freedom,
for independence, for security, for order, for stability, for nation were formed
in rule and were formative of it, shifting over time and circumstance. The
e√orts to manage the complexities of governing Gaza demanded a multiplicity
of sometimes contradictory instruments and techniques.
The two major styles of rule I have explored here—the deployment of
reiterative authority and the use of tactical government—seem, and in fact
are, at odds in many ways. These practices worked together in part by not
claiming to cohere into any totality. If one of the problematics of liberal
governmentality is how to govern ‘‘spatially and constitutionally ‘at a dis-
tance’ ’’∞ —a technique that was often developed in the colonies≤—in Gaza
this problematic was inflected as how to govern without quite identifying
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what that distance was, without clarifying the relation between government
and place, government and people. In the absence of a precise framework in
which to place and through which to interpret these di√erent practices, the
significance of such contradictions often remained opaque. With govern-
ments that did not work through sovereignty or legitimacy, there was no
whole against which the parts of government were judged. This is not to say
that these governments were not judged, for they often were, but they were
not judged on the basis of their incoherence. Contradictions were generally
not a problem for government, and indeed they were often productive for it.
If one ruling style was ine√ective at a particular moment, another might help
hold things together. We saw, for instance, how civil servants disassociated
the work of government from its politics in order to continue to feel good
about their own work. Given the di≈cult conditions in Palestine and Gaza
and the fundamental incapacity of either the British Mandate or the Egyp-
tian Administration to actually resolve those conditions, it is hard to imagine
how rule could have worked otherwise.
Reiterative authority relies on regularity and on an expansive view of the
bureaucratic domain. Files and civil servants accrued and deployed authority
in part through a process that seemed to o√er no alternative, no other place
to go. It is in this respect that Gaza’s bureaucracy came closest to the picture
o√ered by Weber of the ‘‘iron cage’’ that o√ers no way out. Bureaucratic
practice can appear as a hall of mirrors, each instance of such practice being
judged in relation to other such practices, and which in fact may simply be
the same practice duplicated endlessly. We saw this in the absolute impor-
tance accorded to documentary similarity—with even the smallest deviations
controlled for. We saw it as well in the often circular character of civil
servants’ claims about their work. Public service was good work because it
was work for the people, it was for the people because it was public service.
While this circularity did not obviate the possibility of critique—of individ-
ual civil servants, particular practices—it did make it more di≈cult to con-
ceive of an alternative structure of governance.
Bureaucracy and bureaucracy’s reiterative authority shaped, constrained,
and helped define possibility for all its actors. The expansion of bureaucratic
apparatuses bound people and government in new ways and made demands
of both. People found themselves obliged to follow government regulations,
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to use proper procedures, to petition in appropriate language. The govern-
ment, at the same time, acquired new obligations to provide services, to
respond to people’s complaints, to manage social relations. Responsibility,
authority, and opportunity were distributed very unevenly across the bureau-
cratic terrain, but this multiplicity is nonetheless significant. When Gazans
wrote to the Mandate high commissioner to complain about the city’s mayor,
they had learned particular lessons about how best to get a hearing for their
complaints. When civil servants petitioned the Administration for jobs or
promotions owed them, they too displayed skills acquired through bureau-
cratic familiarity. That in many of these cases the complainants did not get
the result they desired is a further reminder that these governments had an
array of techniques at their disposal to deflect, redirect, or refuse these
demands. These struggles were in part defined by the terms of bureaucracy
itself and by the dynamic of reiterative authority that helped stabilize it. In
these conditions there appeared to be no perspective outside service, and
therefore the idea of such an outside was itself less imaginable.
Tactical government, on the other hand, depended on always keeping the
possibility of spaces beyond service alive. Rather than regularity, it was ex-
ceptionality that most characterized tactical practice. Uncertain of their rela-
tionship with the place of rule, anxious about the future, constrained in their
finances, and concerned about security, Gaza’s governments relied on prac-
tices that were both impermanent and restricted in their claims. Service,
while at the center of the governing relation, was not necessarily meant to
declare anything about the character of that relation. We have seen how crisis
services were a priori defined as exceptional, even when their enactment was
both broad and long. In contrast, everyday services, while in theory perma-
nent, in practice almost never were. The shifts in and contestations over
these ordinary services indicate the importance of necessarily located and
partial perspectives in shaping a governmental experience. The most self-
consciously expansive form of service, community services, was also the
domain that produced the most tension in government, a reminder that
tactics were by no means an instrument available only to government. In each
of these sites and forms of service, the uncertainty of government, that is, its
potentially short life and limited capacity, was highlighted.
The tactical approach to governing, while helping to mitigate these di≈-
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culties, was not a technique of limitless possibility. It could not and did not
work always or indefinitely. That governments did not have a monopoly on
tactical practice—we have seen clear evidence of its use among the Gazan
population, directed sometimes at government and sometimes at others like
themselves—indicates one source of constraint. During both the Mandate
and the Administration there were instances of clear challenge to the govern-
ing regimes, instances in which neither distraction nor deferral was quite
su≈cient. That the British eventually gave up on their e√orts to govern
Palestine serves as a further reminder of the limits of tactical government. It
can help manage the moment but leaves the future very uncertain. If reitera-
tive authority seemed to o√er no outside perspective on rule, tactical govern-
ment o√ered no horizon.
The coming together of contradictory practices—the nontotalizing gov-
ernmental field—was practice rather than policy. That intentions do not
always or even often match outcome is, by this point, a truism about govern-
ment. By focusing on the practice of rule, my aim is not to highlight this
disjuncture, but to understand better the e√ects of practice itself. The picture
I have traced here, while not unrecognizable to the policy makers of the
Mandate and the Administration, would also not necessarily have been
identical to how they articulated their visions of government in this territory.
This has been very much a description of government at work, not as
imagined. Gaza is a good location from which to consider this practice of
government. Provincial as it was, it was never the center of government
decision making. Even during the Administration, when it was a distinct
administrative area, Cairo remained the power center. It was, at the risk of
overstating matters, a place where government was enacted, not planned.
And yet, as this exploration has made clear, such enactment was a highly
creative process. The work of government was never a simple application of
policy, regulation, and procedure.
Looking at government in this way makes it possible to see something
new about Gaza, to better understand how the place took shape (and what
shape it took) over the course of the fifty years examined here. We have seen
something of the ‘‘social life’’ of bureaucratic authority, how it worked to help
sustain government and also to shape relations among people, to structure
political arrangements, and to define spaces. At the same time, government is
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always a process of interaction between ruling ambitions and existing condi-
tions. It does not simply impose itself on a place, but rather places also help
shape government. This general process is perhaps particularly clear in Gaza,
with its crisis conditions and (especially in the Administration) overcrowded
space, untenable economy, and unsustainable population.
By exploring the in many ways extraordinary operations of government in
Gaza, it actually becomes possible to see Gaza as a more ordinary place.
Many locales su√er from a burden of presumptions that can get in the way of
actually comprehending them. Gaza’s regular appearance in the news as a site
of violence has certainly tended to work against more complex understand-
ings of the place. Investigation of the daily work of rule, in contrast, has
divulged a multiplicity of facets, some of which in fact appear fairly ordinary.
This book has depicted transformations in social relations as civil service
employment accrued and lost both status and economic importance; as
people’s financial conditions were upended by the dislocation of 1948; as new
population categories followed from this event; and as schools sought to
produce di√erent sorts of subjects. It has emphasized the formation of place
in the expansion and occasional contraction of government services as people
got water from wells, pipes, or central pumps; as roads and railroads were
built, destroyed, and rerouted; and as opportunities for landownership were
reconfigured. It has also described changing mechanisms for civic expression:
as formal structures of local and national government were reconfigured; as
paths for petitioning were redrawn; and as political circumstances and move-
ments shifted. As this array of practices has shown, for all of its truly remark-
able history, Gaza is not wholly exceptional.
Indeed, because of its provincial location and uncertain state form, Gaza
has a√orded an opportunity to understand government in a somewhat new
light. In the lack of any definite model that could be turned to in order to
explain this government, it has required a focus on the details of its practice.
The governing techniques I have explored here can, in fact, be identified and
understood only through the lens of practice. They could not be distinctly
seen simply in ideology, prescriptive discourse, or policy. An understanding
of their operations has to be teased out of the daily work of governing. This
investigation illuminates a much broader governing dynamic, one that is
relevant far beyond Gaza.
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Government beyond Gaza
Approaching government through its practice provides a di√erent perspec-
tive on both the historicity and coherence of governing arrangements. It is
widely recognized by now that considering new actors, questions, and con-
cerns in historical research does not simply add to our understanding of
historical periods, but can generate a rethinking of these periodizations
themselves.≥ In this case, looking at quotidian ruling practices underlines
rhythms of transformation that do not always correspond to the periodiza-
tions of political history. Sometimes there were continuities across dramatic
breakpoints, such as the retaining of personnel across regimes. Sometimes
significant changes occurred in otherwise unremarkable moments, such as
the transfer of government land to people in Gaza. It is in apparently mun-
dane processes, expressed, for example, in a minor change in bureaucratic
procedure, in a gradual accommodation to a new regulation, in a new style of
social interaction, that both government and the formation of people and
place are often most clearly grasped. While Gaza has had more distinct
‘‘periods’’ than many places, this shift in perspective can be helpful for explor-
ing numerous circumstances. Further, it is precisely the focus on practice
that makes it possible to understand that diverse and often contradictory
techniques could work together in government, and how important having
this array of instruments available was for enabling the persistence of always
tenuous governments.
While in some ways Gaza represents an extreme case of governmental
uncertainty, studies conducted in numerous settings have highlighted how
uncertain even apparently stable governments and seemingly strong states
can be. Colonial states, for example, have been shown to be frequently
insecure in both their knowledge of the colonized and their capacity to
manage relations between ruler and ruled; such insecurity shaped the prac-
tice of governance in important ways.∂ Postcolonial states have proven to be
dependent on ‘‘mystifying complex[es] of practices and beliefs,’’∑ on produc-
tions of ‘‘illegibility,’’∏ and on varieties of both amnesia and memoryπ as means
of distracting attention from often fundamental instabilities. Conditions of
globalization have only underscored the uncertainty of even powerful state
forms such as the nation-state.
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Indeed, in a world that seems increasingly unstable, the potential impor-
tance of both reiterative authority and tactical government in a variety of
settings seems evident. The number of governments across the globe that can
be described as tenuous is enormous, and it is not just the classic sorts of
‘‘failed states’’ that fit this description. The case of the U.S. occupation of
Iraq, for instance, underscores how perilous it can be for governing regimes
to forget the importance of ordinary bureaucracy.∫ In its initial zeal for de-
Ba‘thification, the purging of the new Iraqi government of anyone tainted by
the old order, the Coalition Provisional Authority (cpa) outlawed the party,
dissolved the army, and fired thousands of former Ba‘thists from government
o≈ces. Combined with the military’s failure to intervene to stop the looting
and destruction of government o≈ces, this mass purging seems to directly
contradict Weber’s reflections on bureaucracy: ‘‘A rationally ordered o≈cial-
dom continues to function smoothly after the enemy has occupied the terri-
tory; he merely needs to change the top o≈cials. It continues to operate
because it is in the vital interest of everyone concerned, including above all
the enemy.’’Ω The smooth functioning of Iraqi government would certainly
have been in the interest of U.S. occupying forces and of the Iraqi population
as well. In the event, it was not long before the problems with this approach
were realized. In following years increasing numbers of former Ba‘thists have
been returned to government positions, but the stability of the bureaucracy
had already been disrupted.
If, on the one hand, the U.S. approach to governing Iraq seemed to
disregard the importance of bureaucratic continuity and reiterative authority,
thereby underutilizing some crucial governing techniques, it seems to have
overreached in other areas, refusing to be satisfied with the limited claims of
tactical government. In the circumstances I have explored in Gaza, govern-
ments were acutely aware of the uncertainty of their relation to the place of
governance and of the tenuousness of their authority. The United States
displayed no such concern when it went into Iraq. Convinced that American
troops would be greeted as liberators, that the United States would automat-
ically be granted authority, o≈cials appear to have paid little attention to how
governing authority might be produced. Further, in claiming to be the savior
of Iraq—promising liberation, freedom, democracy (despite a lack of plan-
ning for how to make that happen)—the United States put the legitimacy of
226 • Chapter 8
both its occupation and the regime it helped install front and center. As a
consequence, abeyance, however useful it might have been, was not entirely
available as a technique. While other aspects of tactical government, such as
the focus on the near-at-hand, a lack of strategic planning, and extremely
limited service resources, quickly became important, it appears to be tactical
government without its advantages. As this brief excursus on Iraq suggests,
the analytic developed in this book provides useful tools for investigating the
work of government beyond Gaza.
Israeli Occupation
I have emphasized throughout this book that the rhythms of government
and bureaucracy are not identical to the rhythms of political history. We
have seen how sometimes the ruptures of this latter domain—and the abrupt
changes in regime that have characterized Gaza’s history—have marked rup-
tures in governing practice, but how they have sometimes been absorbed by
the continuities of bureaucracy. A question for many readers, then, may be,
What relation does this form of government practice have to the Israeli
occupation that came after the Egyptian Administration?∞≠ How many of
these techniques continued (and continue) to be deployed? While there were
certain, significant, continuities, the occupation marked a more fundamental
break. Certain techniques of tactical government were employed, but ul-
timately, since Israel hoped to achieve greater control over this territory and
possibly sovereignty over it, a di√erent mode of operation dominated. Sim-
ilarly, legitimacy could not be held in abeyance in the same manner as during
the Mandate and the Administration, though certain governing practices
seemed intended to encourage it.
In contrast to policies surrounding the more recent example of Iraq,
Israeli policy at the outset of its occupation suggested a familiarity with
Weber’s insights about the importance of keeping bureaucracies intact after
changes of regime. At the beginning of the occupation, Israel sought to
pursue a policy which it termed ‘‘government but not administration.’’∞∞
Existing structures of local government would be maintained and admin-
istrative tasks would continue to be executed by Palestinian civil servants.
The situation envisioned by this policy was that a Gazan might ‘‘be born in a
hospital, receive his birth certificate, grow up and be educated, get married
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and raise his children and grandchildren—all without having to resort to an
Israeli civil servant, or having to see one at all.’’∞≤ This kind of separation
seems designed to encourage the sort of disassociation that was one of the
mechanisms through which continued participation in government was
made possible during the Mandate and the Administration.
Indeed, many Gazans who had been civil servants during the Egyptian
Administration continued in their jobs under Israeli occupation. This deci-
sion was a pragmatic one, as one Gazan told me: ‘‘When the Jews came in
1967, they asked us to come and work for the police. The policemen asked:
‘How do you want us to work in the police while you occupy us?’ The Jews
said to them: ‘You are not going to fight for us, no, you will only work for
your country.’ An o≈cer told me: ‘Don’t think that we will go so easily as in
1956. He who can find a job and feed his children will be the one to win.’ So, I
worked.’’∞≥
Even as the policy of ‘‘government but not administration’’ was declared,
the military government did interfere in administration in an e√ort to con-
trol resistance to the occupation, thereby underscoring the crucial impor-
tance of the latter to the operations of the former. In the immediate after-
math of the war, the Israeli o≈cer in charge of Gaza City threatened to
dismiss the municipal council and cut o√ water and electricity services to the
city if the council was unable to force Palestinians to turn in their weapons.∞∂
While that threat was deemed excessive and was revoked by the military
governor of the Strip,∞∑ continued Palestinian resistance (both military and
otherwise) to Israeli occupation made repeated interference inevitable. Re-
sistance took the form of both armed struggle and civil disobedience. As part
of the latter ‘‘students demonstrated in the school yards and streets, adults
boycotted Israeli goods, and lawyers refused to practice in the Israeli military
courts.’’∞∏ Organized armed struggle against the occupation peaked between
1969 and 1971, when it was largely crushed by the Israeli military under the
command of Ariel Sharon.∞π
Resistance to the occupation in Gaza from its inception suggests that the
policy of occupation at a distance was not wholly e√ective. Yet the many
years of relative quiet that followed the initial period of confrontation mean
that it was not entirely without success. Israeli e√orts to eliminate armed
resistance in Gaza had a direct impact on service provision of the sort
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explored in this book. One of the most well-known instances of administra-
tive interference around service provision was the dismissal, in 1972, of Gaza
City’s mayor because of his refusal to provide municipal services to the Shati
refugee camp. Palestinians understood the Israeli demand for incorporation
to be part of a project to dissolve refugee-specific spaces in Gaza.∞∫ Housing
was another site of struggle. Sharon took charge of a project to create wide
streets through refugee camps, whose narrow, winding pathways a√orded
ample ways for resisters to evade detection by the army, and in the process
bulldozed large numbers of refugee dwellings. Sara Roy states that ‘‘Israel
built nearly 200 miles of security roads and destroyed thousands of refugee
dwellings as part of the widening process.’’∞Ω
Infrastructure projects which built roads and created new housing outside
of camps for refugees were part of a reconfiguration of space that had more
than military value.≤≠ These projects, whether early attempts to move parts
of the refugee population out of Gaza altogether to nearby al-Arish in the
Sinai or the later neighborhood building projects, were read by the popula-
tion as strategic e√orts by the Israeli government to dissolve the category of
refugee and thereby to defuse the demand for return. From the perspective of
the Palestinians living under its rule, that is, Israeli occupation did not seem
restricted to the tactical domain.≤∞
While there were some connections, then, between the period I have
considered and the subsequent Israeli occupation, the modes of rule also
di√ered in important ways. Along with a separation of government and
administration, over the course of its occupation of both the West Bank and
Gaza, Israel has sought to separate population from place. The ‘‘government
but not administration’’ policy reflected the occupation’s attitude toward the
people of the territories. Toward the land, however, Israel enacted, even if it
did not formally state, a claim to sovereignty over the territory. In the
projects that have been pursued on the ground in Gaza and the West Bank
over the course of the forty-year occupation the di√erence between this
government and the tactical government that characterized the Mandate and
the Administration becomes abundantly clear. The projects of settlement
building, road construction, and land and water appropriation that have
gone on throughout the occupation—and that have increased dramatically in
recent years—exhibit none of the restricted scope, scale, and imagination that
is a key part of tactical government.≤≤
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However little Israel may have wanted to claim Palestinians, it has cer-
tainly laid claim to Palestine. This has had important consequences for the
sorts of governmental work that were undertaken in the territory and also for
the government’s response to resistance to that rule when it has become
vociferous and organized. While for much of the first twenty years of the
occupation the Israeli government claimed to be managing an ‘‘enlightened
occupation,’’≤≥ the intifada (1987–93) put an end to the imagined Palestinian
acquiescence. It became increasingly di≈cult to distract the population and
civil servants from the illegitimacy of occupation, and resistance became
nearly impossible to contain. In recognition of the significance of participat-
ing in government, during this period many civil servants, especially police,
resigned from their positions in the Civil Administration. Unlike the British
Mandate, however, which gave up on governing Palestine as soon as abey-
ance seemed to completely fail, the fact that Israel has had much more
certainty about its relationship to the place (a certainty that has been in-
creasingly shaken) meant that resistance led not to the end of Israeli rule but
to its increased brutality.
The establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (pna) as a result
of the Oslo Accords of 1993 marked an important shift in the dynamics of
occupation, but it did not mean its end. In some ways this governing arrange-
ment seemed the successful implementation of Israel’s first occupation strat-
egy, which minimized the number of Israeli soldiers and o≈cials that Pales-
tinians would need to encounter in the course of their daily lives. The
creation of the pna did, though, enable Palestinian civil servants and the
population to feel that the government could be legitimate. The possibility of
legitimacy, in part embodied in the elections for the presidency of the pna
and the Legislative Council, remained connected to the hope for an indepen-
dent Palestine. The prevalence of corruption in pna operations in the ensu-
ing years and people’s disappointment in its progress toward independence
have meant that this legitimacy was always contested.
Given how unstable post-Oslo ruling forms have been, a focus on govern-
ment practice is vital for understanding this recent history. Not only did the
pna not exercise sovereign authority over the small part of Palestinian terri-
tory it controlled, the bureaucratic operations of government continued to
be shared in crucial ways.≤∂ Border crossings, identification documents, and
permits of many kinds required Israeli approval, though Palestinian civilians
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dealt with Palestinian o≈ces. One e√ect of the Oslo Accords was the further
expansion of an Israeli closure policy (enacted for the first time during the
Gulf War in 1991) that dramatically curtailed opportunities for people to
work inside Israel. With fewer work options available, civil service employ-
ment began to return to its earlier place of prominence in Palestinian econ-
omy and society. The export of Palestinian products from the territories and
between Gaza and the West Bank was controlled by Israel. When I was
doing my fieldwork, Gaza’s insu≈cient electricity supply still largely came
from Israel, and there were frequent blackouts.≤∑ Palestinians were certainly
acutely aware of the limits of the pna as a government and, after the initial
excitement over the establishment of Palestinian governing institutions died
down, were extremely critical of the Oslo Accords which had created it.
The tenuous authority of this government was made starkly manifest in
the Israeli response to the second intifada, which began in September 2000,
and the pna has been increasingly stripped of any semblance of substantive
power. In the course of the second intifada the level of violence of both
resistance and repression increased enormously. Even with their focus
turned largely toward methods of counterinsurgency that seek to extermi-
nate the leadership of militant Palestinian groups and to restrict the move-
ment of the entire Palestinian population, Israeli forces did not entirely
forget the potential of other methods of disrupting political and social life. In
April 2002 Israeli forces reentered a number of Palestinian towns, the first
large-scale military occupation of Palestinian population centers since the
withdrawals under the Oslo Accords. While the stated purpose of this
invasion was to crack down on militant activity, Israeli attention extended
beyond people and buildings. Rather, the army also attacked the administra-
tive infrastructure of both public and private institutions.
According to a report from Ramallah, in the Ministry of Education ‘‘all
school test records since 1960’’ were taken.≤∏ In the Finance Ministry ‘‘all
payroll data for the Palestinian Authority seemed to be gone.’’ The Minis-
tries of Agriculture, Health, Civil A√airs, Statistics, the Land Registry, and
the Ramallah Municipality all reported similar losses. Both paper files and
computer hard drives were taken. The Palestinian minister of information
called it an ‘‘administrative massacre’’ and said it would ‘‘lead to chaos.’’
International o≈cials who surveyed the damage noted that the army ‘‘seemed
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not to have made a distinction between the political leadership and the civil
service.’’ Asked why the army would undertake such actions, one o≈cer
commented that they were searching for security information. ‘‘A lot of these
places turn up unexpected things by accident,’’ he said; ‘‘documents have a
very important value.’’ Indeed they do, although, as this book has explored,
this value does not only or always lie in the specific information they contain.
In this case, the seizing of the documents worked to disrupt bureaucratic
operations and undermine the capacity for governmental continuity, a ‘‘value’’
no doubt more significant than any ‘‘sensitive’’ information likely to be found
in thirty-year-old school records.
One result of the intifada and of Israeli e√orts to quash it was thus to pose
a greater challenge to the existence of anything that looked like a stable
structure and to bring about a further fragmentation of authority. Hamas
(the Islamic Resistance Movement), since the first intifada a serious chal-
lenger to Fatah, the long dominant plo faction, and the plo for popularity
among Palestinians, continued its rise to prominence. People supported
Hamas because of its apparent lack of corruption, its political positions, and
its extensive networks of social services, services that augmented the always
insu≈cient government (and unrwa) resources. After the death of Yasser
Arafat in November 2004, further cracks in governing authority emerged.
Reports from Gaza suggest that family ties and militia groups have come to
play an increasingly important role as the pna largely collapsed.≤π
As the second intifada began to die down, a number of events transpired
that had tremendous significance for Palestinians in Gaza and the West
Bank, and that further highlight the continued relevance of the analytic
approach developed here. In August 2005 the Israeli army, after removing its
eight-thousand-person settler population, evacuated Gaza. This pullback
created new opportunities for contiguity of Palestinian government and new
concerns about the boundaries of a future Palestinian state. Part of the
discursive and ideological work done around this removal was precisely to
reconceptualize Israel’s relationship with this territory. Palestinians ex-
pressed concern that this change in Gaza may come at the expense of an even
greater entrenchment of Israeli attachment to portions of the West Bank.
In January 2006 Hamas won a majority of seats in elections for the
Palestinian Legislative Council. The Hamas takeover of the pna was a major
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blow to Fatah, and it opened a new chapter in the history of government in
Gaza. While the pna had already been weakened by Israeli incursions into
Palestinian territory and the concomitant destruction of institutional appa-
ratuses over the course of the second intifada, the international and Israeli
response to the Hamas victory was to, essentially, launch an all-out bureau-
cratic assault on this government. International donors withheld funds, and
Israel refused to transfer the tax revenues it had collected from Palestinians,
in the process essentially bankrupting the government. As a result, the au-
thority could not pay the salaries of civil servants, salaries on which large
portions of the population depend for survival. The crisis produced by the
failure to pay salaries further underscores how important civil service em-
ployment has once again become. In the wake of the Palestinian capture of
an Israeli soldier in June 2006, this financial strangulation was augmented by
a direct attack on government o≈cials, as the Israeli military began arresting
Hamas government ministers. In the wake of these events and as the pna
seemed increasingly less authoritative, some Palestinians, including Prime
Minister Ismail Haniyeh, questioned whether it could or should continue to
exist at all. In June 2007, after months of Palestinian struggle over authority,
Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip and Fatah then sought to consoli-
date its power in the West Bank. This circumstance rendered the future of
Gaza and its governing condition even more uncertain.
Anthropology of Government
At the current moment, uncertainty about the future seems a global condi-
tion. While many state structures appear increasingly unstable, this circum-
stance further accentuates how important an anthropology of government
can be. The analytics of government developed here can be useful for under-
standing rule in circumstances quite distinct from Gaza. For one thing, the
particular techniques of reiterative authority and tactical government de-
scribed here can be found in other places, but in addition an approach to
analyzing government that takes as its starting point government’s everyday
practices has broad utility. The landscape of possibilities for governing the
modern world is diverse, but not entirely disconnected. In o√ering a descrip-
tion of government at work in particular circumstances, I hope to provide
further analytic tools for exploring both this diversity and these connections.
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To understand this array of techniques, one needs neither a unitary theory of
‘‘modern government’’ nor a vision of an entirely disparate array of alternative
possibilities, but rather a perspective that considers these techniques as part
of a broad, interconnected terrain of modern government.≤∫
Government in the era of neoliberalism—a subject of so much recent
academic attention—can look di√erent when deployed in the development of
what James Ferguson calls ‘‘nongovernmental states’’ in Africa, in the ‘‘gradu-
ated sovereignty’’ that Aihwa Ong elucidates in an Asian context, in the
entrepreneurial subject that Nikolas Rose identifies as crucial to the ‘‘ad-
vanced liberalism’’ of Europe and the United States, or even in the ‘‘unitary
executive’’ theory currently popular among certain circles in the United
States.≤Ω And yet, as these authors note, these forms share important connec-
tions. Neoliberalism is often discussed as a retreat of the state as part of an
ideology of privatization. While some people have suggested that this restric-
tion of services might be better described as a reconfiguration of government
—one in which security functions may expand even as services decline—the
question of how to rule with limited resources which was so important in
governing Gaza clearly has continued relevance.≥≠ The Gazan case also un-
derscores that such questions are not entirely new.
After many years of hesitancy to take on the state, anthropologists have
increasingly turned their ethnographic attention in this direction, producing
innovative and vital accounts of state operations, imaginaries, and e√ects.
Michel-Rolph Trouillot has urged anthropologists interested in such ‘‘state
e√ects’’ to ‘‘look for these processes and e√ects in sites less obvious than those
of institutionalized politics and established bureaucracies’’ and to turn in-
stead to ‘‘the seemingly timeless banality of everyday life.’’ My exploration of
government in Gaza suggests, though, that bureaucracy is not as ‘‘imme-
diately transparent’’ in its operations as people may presume and that it is a
crucial site for exploring the fundamentals of ‘‘everyday life.’’≥∞ Indeed, in key
ways, bureaucratic life is everyday life. Approaching the study of government
through the lens of bureaucratic practice makes it possible to see these
connections.
In placing such ‘‘regimes of practice’’ at the center of analysis, they become
both the subject and the site of research, thereby enabling a productive
reframing of research questions. In this approach, practices cannot be seen
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simply as instruments in the hands of particular actors or tools for domina-
tion and/or resistance, though they are certainly sometimes that. Practices
appear, rather, as techniques—for living, for governing, for shaping social
space—that cannot be reduced to singular causes or e√ects. Research in this
vein may be ‘‘multi-sited,’’≥≤ following the deployments of particular practices
across di√erent locations. It certainly requires a multiplicity of perspectives,
hence my reliance on both archival and ethnographic methods. To define
practice as one’s research site does not mean saying less about places and
peoples, the focus of most anthropological inquiry. On the contrary, as I
hope this study has shown, this approach can shed new light on formations
of subjects and locales.
As I have suggested, the self-referential reiterative authority that charac-
terized government in Gaza seems to be a general feature of the bureaucratic
form, but one that is often masked by other claims about the sources of
government authority. One of the loudest such claimants in the modern
world has been the nation-state. Nation-states claim to be and to provide
everything that was absent from rule in Gaza: a stable framework for govern-
ment, a clear connection between rulers and ruled, a permanent relation,
and, most important, legitimacy. That such stability and legitimacy are often
illusory and seem to be increasingly under threat has been much discussed
and has often been taken as evidence of the decline of the nation-state, a
diagnosis that has itself been increasingly challenged.≥≥
In considering bureaucratic operations in Gaza I have been less focused
on diagnosing the state of the state in this place that is fairly demonstrably in
crisis than on trying to understand the dynamics of governing authority and
persistence. Nonetheless, this investigation does propose some central tenets
about how we should approach investigation of such ruling forms. If ruling
authority even in nation-states has depended greatly on the self-referential
mechanisms of bureaucracy, then a rethinking of where the power of that
form lies may be in order. Certainly, a faltering in nation-state ideologies
should not be presumed to lead automatically to their demise. Saskia Sassen
has written about how even with the rise of globalization and the concomi-
tant shifts in nation-state operations, techniques and institutions developed
to govern that particular arrangement have continued life, being deployed by
new actors toward new ends.≥∂ My exploration of government in Gaza sug-
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gests, in addition, that important techniques of rule—of producing authority,
of managing continuity—are not always derived from the form of its state.
Even where a nation-state seems stable, therefore, an examination of govern-
ment should take very seriously the practices of its bureaucracy.
As my exploration of tactical government has indicated, to put bureau-
cratic practice at the center of analysis does not require presuming that
bureaucracy is an entirely autonomous domain. As Gaza’s experience makes
clear, this practice is entirely entangled in the histories, economies, and
politics of the places where it operates, even as it is not always directed by
them. In Gaza during the Mandate and the Administration, the interrela-
tions between bureaucracy’s general ‘‘regularities, logic, strategy, self-evi-
dence, and ‘reason’ ’’≥∑ and the conditions in which this bureaucracy was
enacted gave rise to tactical government as a dominant mode of rule. In other
circumstances, other conditions, di√erent styles may be foregrounded. What
I o√er here is not a universal (or other) model of rule but an analytics of
government. An anthropology of such regimes of practice—an anthropology
of government—makes it possible to understand how the general and the
specific, the regular and the exceptional, work together (and at odds) to
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75. Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contempo-
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Magical State, 116).
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Frederick Cooper, ‘‘Colonizing Time: Work Rhythms and Labor Conflict in Colo-
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of Palestine A√airs Administration to Governor General, March 7, 1960.
83. According to the Peel Commission Report, ‘‘Municipal organization of a sort existed
in Turkish times, though in practice the Ottoman Governors exercised unlimited
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84. Omar al-Barghouthi argued that mandate rule represented a serious setback for
municipal autonomy: ‘‘The position of the municipality under the Turkish Govern-
ment was one of dignity and independence. Government interference was very slight,
consisting mainly of the appointment of the mayor from among the elected members.
When the British came, however, this local self-government was seriously jeopar-
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Forms of the Social Environment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Mit-
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them more amenable to government, to enable them to better meet the needs of the
population—has been an articulated part of government practice, at the same time
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In The Magical State, Coronil discusses the problems of how ‘‘nature is taken for
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which govern the place are an amalgam of amendments enacted by British, Egyptian,
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104. I am aware of the risk that, in not giving the same attention to the personnel dynamic
of British and Egyptian civil servants, ‘‘the Mandate’’ and ‘‘the Administration’’ may
at times appear overly unitary and unified as categories. To undercut this appearance,
while at the same time maintaining the focus that is important for my inquiry, I try
throughout to gesture to this field of complication among ‘‘foreign’’ personnel.
2. Ruling Files
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istrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517–1798 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1962); Carter Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman
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Margins of the State, ed. Veena Das and Deborah Poole, 225–52 (Santa Fe: sar Press,
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Practices in the Modern World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
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ries, to determine averages, to fix norms’’ (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 190).
4. For example, Findley describes the new system of managing personnel records, under
regulations issued in 1879 and: ‘‘The instructions also specified the form of the
questionnaire that was to be the basic document in each file. This questionnaire was
a large sheet of paper divided into boxes. The column on the right contained the
printed questions which the respondent was to answer in the wider boxes running
down the middle of the sheet. To the left was another column of boxes intended for
‘observations’ by the individual’s superiors. . . . [After listing of family background
and qualifications] there was to be a chronological account of the respondent’s o≈cial
service. This was to include dated entries for changes in salary or other forms of
compensation as well as for changes of position’’ (Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman
Empire, 272).
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5. Ibid.
6. For an account of the importance of paper and its forms in producing ‘‘textual
domination,’’ see Brinkley Messick, The Calligraphic State.
7. Discipline and Punish, 190.
8. Archives have become a subject of considerable interest to anthropologists in recent
years, as the possibilities inherent in pursuing ‘‘ethnography ‘of ’ and ‘in’ ’’ the archive
have been increasingly elaborated (Ann Stoler, ‘‘Colonial Archives and the Arts of
Governance,’’ Archival Science 2, 1–2 [2002]: 87–109). See also Penelope Papailias,
Genres of Recollection: Archival Poetics and Modern Greece (New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2005). Historians too have turned new attention to the form and function of
archives as institutions and processes, not simply as repositories of information.
These attentions have been well described by Ann Stoler and others, and I will not
repeat the history of the ‘‘archival turn’’ here. See, for example, Roberto Echevarría,
Myth and Archive: A Theory of Latin American Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990); Nicholas Dirks, ‘‘Colonial Histories and Native Informants:
Biography of an Archive,’’ in Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives
on South Asia, ed. Carol Brekenridge and Peter van der Veer, 279–313 (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993); Richard Thomas, Imperial Archive: Knowl-
edge and Fantasy of Empire (London: Verso, 1993).
9. As Derrida says of the archive, ‘‘As much and more than a thing of the past, before
such a thing, the archive should call into question the coming of the future’’ (Archive
Fever: A Freudian Impression, trans. Eric Prenowitz [Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1995], 33–34).
10. By discussing personnel files, police files, and administrative files within a single
frame, I do not mean to suggest that they are all the same. I do, however, want to
show how these kinds of files participate in filing practice.
11. Interview, Gaza City, 26 March 1998.
12. Ann Stoler uses the term ‘‘extractive history’’ to oppose what she argues is the more
useful ethnographic history.
13. For example, the particular hierarchical relations evident in filing are frequently
refigured in archives. Typically, these relations are in some ways flattened, all docu-
ments being of equal potential value for a researcher. In other ways, they are remade,
such that a prolific filer might acquire a higher place in an archival hierarchy than
s/he occupied in an administrative one.
14. Critical historians have highlighted the political character of archival narratives and
the ways in which the forms of these archives operate to dictate particular kinds of
narratives (see De Certeau The Writing of History; Hayden White, The Content of the
Form [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987]; Dirks, ‘‘Colonial Histories
and Native Informants’’; and Stoler, ‘‘ ‘In Cold Blood’ ’’).
15. Brinkley Messick describes the importance of the Qur’an as the ‘‘authoritative origi-
nal’’ for Islamic texts. He notes that ‘‘the paradigmatic, Urtext qualities of the Quran
concern both content and textual form’’ (The Calligraphic State, 16).
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16. The violent character of the shifts in Gaza’s rulers has meant that the documents of
its history have followed highly troubled paths. While no system of archiving docu-
ments, however comprehensive in its regulations, is ever perfectly actualized, the
Gazan case has been especially di≈cult.
17. In addition to documents I gathered, my archive is constituted by those in whose
production I was involved. I refer to my interviews with former civil servants and
civilian Gazans, or, more precisely, to the transcripts of those interviews. By record-
ing and then translating and transcribing (with the help of a research assistant) my
interviews, I have transformed them into another type of document. Despite this
transformation, the originally oral character of the interviews is not entirely lost in
this process, as their rhythm and language remain distinct from a written form.
Unlike most of the documents of my research, these interviews are conducted after
the fact. Certainly the files I am using are at di√erent levels of remove from a
situation, ranging from in-the-moment, on-the-ground reporting to conclusions
reached after study and reflection, but virtually all of them were formed in the period
on which they report.
18. According to the isa catalogue, ‘‘The records of these former administrations were
not received in an orderly and organised fashion since neither the Turks nor the
British wished to pass on to their successors the machinery of government. Most of
the records salvaged at the end of the British Mandate were found in abandoned
buildings and then transferred to temporary depots till a successor department
eventually asked for the records. Therefore much of the archival material was lost by
negligence or destroyed purposely’’ (P. A. Alsberg, Guide to the Archives in Israel,
volume 1: The Israel State Archives [Jerusalem: Israel Archives Association, 1991], 13).
19. I deduce this from the files I was able to examine. I was not allowed to see files related
to security matters.
20. There is a certain danger that in calling attention to content and style as being
distinguished they will appear as distinct. I hope I succeed in highlighting the mutual
imbrication as well as the di√erentiation of these two aspects of writing files.
21. isa, rg 2, box 460, file u/333/43, Chief Secretary’s O≈ce, O≈ce Order No. 1, 6
September 1946.
22. Such lapses were noted at the top of many of the notices.
23. isa, rg 2, box 460, file u/333/43, Chief Secretary’s O≈ce: O≈ce Notice No. 35, 15
December 1947.
24. Messick describes the authorizing gestures in copying in both scribal and mechanical
reproduction. In the former, ‘‘as a ‘copy’ it is virtually the same thing as the original,
not because it ‘looks like’ the original in the photo-identity sense accomplished by
mechanical reproduction (cf. Benjamin 1968), but because it has passed through an
authoritative process of human reproduction and collation’’ (The Calligraphic State,
240).
25. Chief Secretary’s O≈ce: O≈ce Notice No. 35, 15 December 1947.
26. See, for example, isa, rg 2, box 473, file u/2586/47 on the form of personnel files;
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isa rg 2, file 8/217, on early orders governing drafting and sending of o≈cial
telegrams and correspondence; and isa, rg 22, box 3395, file 53/44, on land regis-
tries.
27. Regulations governing filing specified that full-size, rather than half-size, sheets had
to be used for minutes, indicating an interest that such minutes be neither lost nor
appear like other than important parts of the file. At the same time, the regulations
indicated that reference in minutes to other papers should indicate clearly whether
that paper was a folio or a minute, highlighting the structured di√erence between the
two types of writing in files (isa, rg 2, box 460, file u/333/43, O≈ce Orders No. 3
and 10).
28. co 733, file 77168, Comment in minutes, 11 December 1930.
29. The importance of informal correspondence was noted in the Secretariat regulations.
While the reason o√ered in the regulations for such informality was that ‘‘by this
means useful exchange of ideas can be made without formally committing Heads of
Departments or Government’’ (isa, rg 2, box 460, file u/333/43, O≈ce Order No.
35), the opportunity provided for o≈cials to blow o√ steam seems equally important.
30. Competition among o≈cers was often expressed through posturing about who
had a clearer understanding of the Palestinian population or the impact of a specific
policy on that population. This kind of posturing was evident in debates over
issues as diverse as funding the rebuilding of Gaza (co 733, file 12837), the drafting of
a press law (co 733, file 77168), and the reorganization of the police force (co 733, file
57397).
31. Hayden White, The Content of the Form (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1987).
32. See Michel Foucault, ‘‘The Discourse on Language,’’ appendix to Archeology of
Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), for a
related discussion about the necessity that statements fall ‘‘within the true’’ to even be
subject to judgments about veracity.
33. Juan Cole describes the importance of print technologies in producing such transfor-
mations. When scribes were the primary means of reproducing texts, authors often
relied on rhyming and repetition in order to protect their texts from corruption. As
Cole notes, though, ‘‘the need for rhymes, parallelism, and synonyms sent authors to
the dictionaries frequently, and caused them to resort to obscure terms inaccessible to
ordinary folk’’ (Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural
Origins of Egypt’s ‘Urabi Movement [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993],
117). The growth of print in the Middle East toward the end of the nineteenth
century had a dramatic e√ect on this writing style.
34. The journal was interested in the conditions of civil service in Egypt and does not
address Gaza. However, insofar as I am interested in the ethos of rule under Egypt,
this prescriptive discourse can tell us something about the milieu within which civil
servants in Gaza likely approached their task.
35. ‘‘The Literature of Memos,’’ Majallat al-Muwazzafin 1 (March 1956): 76–77.
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36. Juan Cole, ‘‘Printing and Urban Islam in the Mediterranean World, 1890–1920,’’ in
Modernity and Culture from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, 1890–1920, ed.
Leila Fawaz and C. A. Bayly, 344–64 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002),
350.
37. The use of civil service writing as a means of evaluating employees was certainly not
new, though the grounds for evaluation had changed. Cole describes how an Otto-
man civil servant was promoted ‘‘because the Sultan thought well of the rhetorical
excellence he displayed in an article on preventing fires in Istanbul’’ (Colonialism and
Revolution, 116).
38. The civil service in Gaza, like that in the United States, was organized by grades,
which determined salary (separate from the specific job). Promotions were usually
made according to seniority and less frequently for performance.
39. As is to be expected, the letters usually close with a plea to the addressee to turn his
attention to this case and to fulfill his obligation (and desire) to see that right prevails.
40. In order to protect individuals’ and their families’ privacy, I have changed the names
of the civil servants whose personnel files I examined as well as those I interviewed.
Since last names in Gaza locate people quite specifically as members of certain
families, I have not used last names at all, even as pseudonyms.
41. Pensions and Social Security Administration (pssa), Gaza City, Personnel File
#244.
42. pssa, Personnel File #242/434.
43. The personnel files of the Egyptian Administration include numerous examples of
civil servants being punished for delays in reporting changes in their family circum-
stances, indicating the seriousness with which this requirement was enforced (see, for
example, pssa, Personnel Files #665, 156/1959, and 1917).
44. The exact conditions which determined allowance eligibility changed over the course
of the Administration. Because of this, there are instances of children reappearing in
the files. For example, in 1963 the Executive Council ruled that unmarried female
children over the age of seventeen should receive allowances. After this decision,
many civil servants requested allowance increases and once again listed the names of
their female children on their personal status forms. In 1965, sons who had come of
age and who were still students were allowed to be counted for allowance purposes,
and so they reappeared in files.
45. There is no way these files could have ever actually included all available information
about behavior and attitudes in the Gaza Strip. As a practical matter that would be a
little like building a life-size map. Furthermore, people must have been successful, at
least on occasion, at keeping some of their thoughts and actions secret.
46. Well-known figures and important moments must have also been the subject of a
great deal of police reporting. Not having been granted access to sensitive materials in
the Israeli archives, I have not seen any such files. That they surely exist does not
detract from my argument about how this particular kind of everyday surveillance
operates. I explore this aspect of policing in greater detail in ‘‘Observing the Every-
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day: Policing and the Conditions of Possibility in Gaza (1948–67),’’ Interventions:
International Journal of Postcolonial Studies 9, 3 (2007): 415–34.
47. isa, rg 115, box 2024, file 3, report from o≈cer to mabahith inspector on ‘‘public
opinion and general conditions in Khan Yunis,’’ 1 April 1963.
48. This incidental accumulation, which was so e√ective in enhancing the authority of
these police files, also highlights some of the limitations of compilation in filing. By
gathering apparently everything (without discrimination about veracity) and com-
posing a potential narrative within these files (without too much evident concern
about actuality), these files also contained a built-in potential for failure. Because, of
course, the police did maintain an active interest in hunting out the truth, and
investigations might show rumors to be false and information inaccurate. These
moments of failure, which were inevitable, did not necessarily destabilize the scaf-
folding of filing. Rather, and this is the dual aspect of accumulation, the same
compilation e√ect which could lead to a false story in the files ensured that there
would always be enough material in those files to rewrite that story better.
49. Foucault describes this lowering of the threshold of knowledge as central to the
‘‘epistemological ‘thaw’ of the sciences of the individual’’ (Discipline and Punish, 191).
50. For example, in a 1922 discussion about the organization of districts in Palestine,
mention was made of a suggested appointment of an o≈cer to Gaza. In touting this
man’s abilities, Gaza was o√handedly mentioned and defined: ‘‘The somewhat back-
ward district over which it is proposed to place him will, I confidently believe, make
considerable progress under his guidance’’ (co 733, file 3879 ‘‘Civil Service,’’ letter of
January 14, 1992).
51. In addition to the files of the ‘‘Municipalities and Local Government’’ group of the
Chief Secretariat, the primary kinds of files where particular files were dedicated to
Gaza were town planning files (of the attorney general’s o≈ce) and land registry files
(of the Land Settlement Department).
52. isa, rg 2, box 209, file g/44/35, Gaza Municipal bylaws, 1935. Signed by the mayor
of Gaza and ‘‘confirmed. By His Excellency’s Command’’ by the chief secretary.
53. isa, rg 2, box 216, file g/8/41, letter from Gaza District Commissioner to Chief
Secretary, 22 January 1941.
54. isa, rg 2, box 206, file g/39/34 Municipal Elections—Gaza, petition to High Com-
missioner from Khalil Bseisso, Abdel Azim El Husseini, Husni Khayal, Adil
Shawwa, Mousa Sourani, Osman Tabbah, Shaheen Ghalayini, Said Ramadan,
Khader Tarazi, and Abdel Nour Ifranji, 9 January 1930.
55. Weber, Economy and Society, 992.
56. Ibid, 992.
57. ‘‘Except to the Attorney General in person’’ (isa, rg 2, box 460, file u/333/43 O≈ce
Order No. 1, 5 September 1946). All citations that follow regarding secrecy regula-
tions are from this file.
58. ‘‘O≈cers of the secret registry and o≈cers of or above the rank of Administrative
Assistant.’’
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59. The copy of the order which I have is hand-marked as going to the o≈ce of the Khan
Yunis administrative commissioner. Presumably the order was distributed at least to
all of the regional administrative o≈ces.
60. isa, rg 115, box 2023, file 19, Circular #m/49 issued by the Director of Administrative
A√airs of the Employee A√airs Administration, 1 March 1956.
61. Unlike British regulations, Egyptian filing practice did not appear to determine
access to files based upon nationality. That such regulation was not felt to be needed
is not surprising, given the di√erent political circumstances between the two periods.
During the Mandate, restricting certain files to British o≈cers would serve only to
protect them from entering into conflicts between Jews and Arabs and enable at least
certain parts of administration to remain above the fray. Facing no such local national
conflict, Egyptian administrators could su≈ciently protect files from local politics by
di√erentiation through rank and position.
62. Chief Secretary’s O≈ce: Order No. 35, 15 December 1947. Recall that this order was
a restatement of the previously issued code, so despite its late date it is not an end of
the Mandate order.
63. isa, rg 2, box 460, file u/333/43, Chief Secretary’s O≈ce: Order #44, 11 November
1947.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., O≈ce Order #3, n.d.
66. isa, rg 115, box 2114, file 17, Decision #6 of the Executive Council for 1960, 6
November 1960.
67. Ibid., memo from head of Personal Investigation Bureau on ‘‘Permanent Orders for
Movement of Files,’’ 17 March 1965.
68. Ibid., Decision #6 of the Executive Council for 1960.
69. Ibid.
70. Such a problem was indicated in the complaint by the director of the Gaza Land
Registry about the insu≈ciency of available archival space in the o≈ce (‘‘Accom-
modation of Land Registry Gaza in Tegart Building,’’ letter from Director of Land
Registry to Chief Secretary, 29 June 1942).
71. There is, though, a certain inaccuracy in defining archiving as the chronological
end of filing. Filing as a practice is not basically linear. Precisely since filing operates
as a system through accumulation the various moments of filing that are some-
times synchronic and, even when occurring diachronically, do not follow a single
trajectory.
72. The one specific requirement was that ‘‘particular care should be taken not to destroy
files and documents relating to Government claims to land’’ (isa, rg 2, box 460, file
u/333/43, ‘‘Destruction of Old Files,’’ 25 March 1947). All quotations in this para-
graph are from this order.
73. isa, rg 2, box 473, file u/2586/47, from Civil Service Commissioner, Sta√ Notice
#26, 9 April 1848.
74. Ibid.
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75. File u/2856/47, letter from Civil Service Commissioner to Dr. C. Stavropoulos of
the United Nations Palestine Commission, 8 April 1948.
76. Cited in A. J. Sherman, Mandate Days: British Lives in Palestine, 1918–1948 (New
York: Thames and Hudson, 1997), 236.
77. isa, rg 115, box 2114, file 17, Schedule of Bureau Documents, Issued by Head of
Personal Investigation Bureau, n.d. 1966.
3. On Being a Civil Servant
1. Morroe Berger describes the classic images of European and Egyptian civil service:
‘‘The ‘typical’ British civil servant, with bowler and tightly-rolled umbrella, is re-
served, aloof, and very correct. The ‘typical’ French fonctionnaire sits among his
papers, inaccessible, and never permits the public business to prevent him, every day
at the same time, from reaching into the bottom drawer of his desk for his lunch
wrapped in brown paper. The ‘typical’ Egyptian clerical muwazzaf, for the author, is a
man sitting at a desk in his overcoat, his tarbush (or fez) hanging on a nail on the wall
behind him, his newspaper spread out, one hand holding his demitasse of Turkish
co√ee and the other reaching for his buzzer to call in a messenger’’ (Berger, Bu-
reaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt: A Study of the Higher Civil Service [Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979], 12).
2. Akhil Gupta’s study of provincial government in India shows how sometimes even
clerical employees are found in places other than o≈ces (‘‘Blurred Boundaries’’).
3. Interview, Gaza City, 23 February 1999.
4. ‘Arif al-‘Arif, Tarikh Ghazza, 310. Al-‘Arif provides the following breakdown of Gazan
civil service: First Division, 31–19 British and 12 Arab; Second Division, 243-13
British and 230 Arab; police o≈cers, 2,193-130 British and 2,063 Arab; messengers/
janitors, 308—all Arab. The settled population of the Gaza subdistrict was estimated
to be 136,650 in 1944 (A Survey of Palestine, prepared in December 1945 and January
1946 for the information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (reprint. Wash-
ington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991, 1:152). Gaza City itself had a
population of around 36,000 (Mosely Lesch, ‘‘Gaza: History and Politics,’’ 225).
5. C. S. Peirce defines habit as ‘‘a rule, norm, or general pattern of what is appropriate
under the circumstances . . . that is acquired dispositions to act in a certain way rather
than in another’’ (quoted in Vincent Potter, Charles S. Peirce on Norms and Ideals
[Worcester: University of Massachusetts Press, 1967], 126–27). That habit is a
tendency, not a certainty, is crucial to Peirce’s conception. If it were a certainty ‘‘habit
would become wooden and ineradicable’’ (Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders
Peirce [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935], 6:148).
6. Weber, From Max Weber, 229.
7. As Peirce argues, the capacity for habit change is a crucial part of the vitality of such
habit.
8. Ibid., 228.
9. As Peirce says, ‘‘Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to
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free ourselves and pass into the state of belief’’ and ‘‘the irritation of doubt is the only
immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief ’’ (Peirce, Collected Papers, 5:372,
5:375). While the notion of doubt refers immediately to an uncertainty in habits of
thought, it can also permit us to understand uncertainty of action. As Douglas
Anderson puts it, doubt, ‘‘in leaving us without guidance for acting, puts us in an
unsettled state’’ (Strands of System [West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press,
1995], 94).
10. Kelly Parker, The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought (Nashville: Vanderbilt University
Press, 1998), 182. Parker also writes, ‘‘The ultimate purpose of ideas is thus to e√ect
habit-change.’’
11. Anderson explains Peircean belief as ‘‘not merely verbal assent to a proposition
but . . . a general conditional habit for conducting our lives given the circumstances of
the physical and social environment’’ (Strands of System, 94). Murray Murphy notes
that Peirce’s ideas about belief were derived from those of Alexander Bain. He cites
Bain to the e√ect that belief is ‘‘essentially related to Action, that is, volition. . . .
Preparedness to act upon what we a≈rm is admitted upon all hands to be the sole,
the genuine, the unmistakable criterion of belief. . . . The readiness to act is thus what
makes belief something more than fancy’’ (The Development of Peirce’s Philosophy
[Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961], 160).
12. Much has been written about the problem of memory in the collecting and analyzing
of oral histories. People’s memories are always shaped by subsequent experiences, and
it is impossible to reach back across the years and capture a perfect image of what
people felt then. At the same time, one should not replace an image of oral histories
as uncluttered truth about the past (uncluttered because personal, or subaltern, or
outside the state) with a counterimage of these memories as simply comments about
the present spoken in the past tense or ideological constructions intended to fulfill
some political purpose. The practice of narrating the past is much more complicated
than either of these notions would suggest. On the complexity of memory and
importance of ‘‘memory work,’’ see Ann Stoler and Karen Strassler, ‘‘Castings for the
Colonial: Memory Work in ‘New Order’ Java,’’ Comparative Studies in Society and
History 42, 1 (2000): 4–48. See also Paul Thompson, ‘‘Believe It or Not: Rethinking
the Historical Interpretation of Memory,’’ in Memory and History: Essays on Recalling
and Interpreting Experience, ed. Jaclyn Je√rey and Glenace Edwall, 1–16 (New York:
University Press of America, 1994); Peter Burke, ‘‘History as Social Memory,’’ in
Memory: History, Culture, and the Mind, ed. Thomas Butler, 97–115 (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1989); and Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. and trans.
Lewis Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). On oral history, see
Elizabeth Tonkin, Narrating Our Past: The Social Construction of Oral History (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Luisa Passerini, Fascism in Popular Mem-
ory: The Cultural Experience of the Turin Working Class (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988); Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982).
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13. This view of habit is a bit like Bourdieu’s description of habitus as structuring
structures that provide for possibilities of action. However, unlike Bourdieu, what I
want to highlight in thinking about reflective habits is thought as a part of practice.
While Bourdieu sees cognition as being part of practice, he sees habitus, ‘‘the durably
installed generative principles of regulated improvisations’’(Outline of a Theory of
Practice [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977], 78), as operating largely
‘‘unconsciously.’’ I do not mean to suggest as an alternative that people’s actions are
entirely self-conscious. Rather, I want to call attention to the ways in which thought
processes, beliefs, ideas are also part of ‘‘systems of durable, transposable dispositions’’
(72) and the ways in which they are fully practice. Potter argues that Peirce’s concep-
tion of habit is ‘‘flexible and allow[ing] for changes, modifications, growth and de-
velopment’’ (Norms and Ideals, 129), and is therefore more di√erentiated than Bour-
dieu’s notion of habitus. Conflict, contradiction, and distinction can be part of
habitual thought and action.
14. For those people who were working in other jobs or were o≈cers in one of the retired
civil service associations, I had plenty of opportunities to observe their interactions
with colleagues and members of the public and could confirm that habits recalled in
interviews were not simply created for that context.
15. On the complexity of historical memory, see Ted Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt:
The 1936–1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1995); Shahid Amin, Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chari Chaura,
1922–1992 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); and Daniel, Charred
Lullabies.
16. Even if people’s memories of how they acted as civil servants (that they were polite,
precise, etc.) may not always be accurate, they are evaluative statements about how
civil servants should act. Perhaps someone did not actually act as he now recalls, but
he has internalized those modes of behavior as being part of both his personal
subjectivity and the general practice of civil service. Perhaps someone told me certain
things because she thought it would make her look good to be seen as sympathetic,
e≈cient, or selfless—in that case it indicates the importance attributed to those
behaviors.
17. On the ‘‘silences’’ of history, see Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and
the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995); Ranajit Guha, ‘‘Discipline and
Mobilize,’’ in Subaltern Studies VII: Writing on South Asian History and Society, ed.
Partha Chatterjee and Gyanendra Pandey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992);
Gayatri Spivak, ‘‘Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography,’’ in In Other
Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics, 197–221 (New York: Routledge, 1988).
18. While I often felt that as people spoke to me they must be censoring their narratives
because I was a foreigner, other people told me that they thought people were more
willing to tell me things because of my outsider (and professional) status. My re-
search assistants, who helped me transcribe the tapes, often told me that people
would never tell them or other locals the things they told me.
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19. Many of the women I spoke to who were civil servants during the Mandate told me
their fathers were advocates for women’s rights who considered permitting their
daughters to work to be a form of activism.
20. Interview, Gaza City, 11 April 1999.
21. Interview, Gaza City, 19 April 1999.
22. Interview, Gaza City, 14 April 1999.
23. Interview, Gaza City, 12 November 1999.
24. Interview, Gaza City, 20 March 1999.
25. Interview, Gaza City, 28 February 1999.
26. As another retired civil servant put it, reiterating Salim’s position, ‘‘The good muwaz-
zaf commands the respect of his superiors and subordinates, as well as of the people.
People loved the decent muwazzaf. Why wouldn’t people love me as long as I am
good with them?’’ (Interview, Gaza City, 8 June 1999).
27. Many people told me stories of how, even in their retirement, they derived benefits
from their civil service respectability. For instance, Ibrahim Mahmoud told me a
story about receiving special treatment during a visit to the hospital, which illumi-
nates the currency generated by habits of respectability. While waiting in line to have
his wife seen, he was spotted by a former student who was now a doctor. His student
arranged for him to be taken out of the line, and he treated her right away. As
Ibrahim said, ‘‘This behavior is more worthwhile than any money in my viewpoint.
The physician appreciated me and . . . I consider this act as one of the advantages or
fruits of my work in teaching’’ (Interview, Gaza City, 20 March 1999).
28. Interview, Gaza City, 30 April 1999.
29. At times, though, being respectable meant biting your tongue, not challenging your
superiors. According to Muhammad Ghazi, ‘‘The word ‘Hadir’ [Yes, sir] is very
important. It is not wrong when he says that you are transferred to another place.
The employee has to accept this, and in any case will learn in the new position.’’
30. See Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman Civil O≈-
cialdom.
31. Another way in which the service relationship was supposed to be di√erent from the
patron-client relationship often described as central to social organization in the
Ottoman Middle East is that it was generalized: it is about categories, not individ-
uals, and any person can receive their service from any civil servant. Authority also
required not only the encounter or relationship itself, but the system which governed
service provision. On the question of patronage, see Ernest Gellner and John Water-
bury, eds., Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Society (Hanover: Duckworth, 1977);
S. N. Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger, Patrons, Clients, and Friends: Interpersonal Rela-
tions and the Structure of Trust in Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1984); Luis Roniger and Ayse Gunes-Ayata, eds., Democracy, Clientelism, and Civil
Society (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994). For a case study, see Edward Reeves, The
Hidden Government: Ritual, Clientelism, and Legitimation in Northern Egypt (Salt Lake
City: University of Utah Press, 1990).
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32. Interview, Gaza City, 7 June 1999.
33. The di√erences Hanan noted were not in fact preexisting distinctions between what
would become the groups native and refugee. Rather, they mark a di√erence between
the small urban elite of which she was a part and the broader population, both native
and refugee.
34. Rachelle Taqqu, ‘‘Arab Labor in Mandatory Palestine, 1920–1948’’ (diss., Columbia,
1977), 261. This description of Palestinian civil servants taking up British manners is
reminiscent of Homi Bhabha’s argument about colonial ‘‘mimic men’’—colonized
persons who were encouraged to become ‘‘white, but not quite’’—useful to colonial
rulers but not equal to them (‘‘Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial
Discourse,’’ in The Location of Culture, 85–92 [New York: Routledge, 1994]).
35. Taqqu, ‘‘Arab Labor in Mandatory Palestine,’’ 262.
36. Interview, Gaza City, 4 May 1999.
37. Interview, Gaza City, 14 February 1999.
38. Ibid. Under the British Mandate, when education remained relatively rare, teachers
were likely to be already privileged persons. During the Egyptian Administration
they might just as well have been children of illiterate peasants who benefited from
the Egyptian policy of universal education.
39. Throughout most of the Israeli occupation, people could make a great deal more
money working as a laborer inside Israel than they could working for government. It
was to these workers, now barred from going to Israel, that Abu Jamal referred.
40. Bseiso’s choice to go to the attorney general, rather than to the smc, with his com-
plaint may have been a strategic e√ort to involve an outside party in a local conflict.
41. isa, rg 2, file k/16/47, translation of Mustafa Bseiso’s complaint, 19 July 1947.
42. The government response to this petition, while maintaining that the complaint
overall had little merit, admonished the chief clerk to ‘‘maintain o≈cial o≈ce hours’’
(letter from Amin Abdul Hadi, for smc, to Chief Secretary, 15 October 1947).
43. It is, of course, much easier to criticize another department, another employee, than
to reflect critically on one’s own practice and success. In this light, some of the details
of Abu Jamal’s critique should be taken with a grain of salt. Nonetheless, the general
issue he raises of di√erent kinds of capacities being evident in di√erent government
departments is a very important one.
44. Interview, Gaza City, 4 May 1999.
45. The municipality, he said, ‘‘o√ered better services than any other governmental
department at the time of the Egyptians because it o√ered services such as cleaning,
sewage, water, and electricity. Accordingly, the citizen was connected to the munici-
pality . . . because it o√ered dozens of services for the citizen which were essential for
his daily life and which solved his problems.’’
46. Gazans today often complain that under the Palestinian Authority one cannot get a
job, a scholarship, or assistance without some kind of wasta. Great bitterness is
expressed about this by refugees in the camps, who feel they su√ered and struggled
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during the years of occupation and intifada and that the fruits of their struggles are
going to the well-placed returnees who have followed in the wake of the plo.
47. Interview, Gaza City, 7 June 1999.
48. For examples of this attention, see isa, rg 115, box 2024, files 14, 20, 27.
49. isa, rg 115, box 2024, file 3, mabahith report, 20 January 1962.
50. Interview, Gaza City, 8 March 1998.
51. For brevity’s sake, I describe only one example from each period, but this should not
be taken to mean that civil servants were more appreciated during the Administra-
tion or more condemned under the Mandate. During the Mandate, the newspaper
Mir’at al-Sharq, for example, praised both Arab and Jewish Palestinian civil servants
even as it complained about their lack of opportunities for advancement. All the best
positions went to the British, the paper argued, even though these o≈cials did not do
much work beyond putting ‘‘their honorable names on the papers which the national
civil servants exhausted themselves in preparing’’ (30 December 1926). And during
the Administration the press made complaints about the civil service. In 1949, Sawt
al-‘Uruba reported complaints that civil servants were taking bribes (14 October
1949).
52. Al-Difa‘ was founded in 1934 and was politically a≈liated with the Istiqlal party, a
pan-Arabist party (Qustandi Shomali, ‘‘al-Sahafa al-Filastiniyya fi ‘Ahd al-Intidab:
Jaridat Mir’at Al-Sharq (1919–1939).’’ Shu’un Filastiniyya no. 221–22 (August/Sep-
tember 1991): 72.
53. Al-Difa‘, 2 May 1935.
54. Sawt al-‘Uruba, 22 January 1950.
55. isa, rg 22, box 3589, file 5/78, petition to Director of Land Registry, 2 February
1945.
56. Ibid.
57. The complaint stated, ‘‘If you would only meet members of the public in Gaza or
converse with persons interested in transactions in the Land Registry or ask the
Fellahin about the reputation of the Land Registry in Gaza you would discover that
every person complains with bitterness of the behaviour of these two o≈cers.’’
58. Examples of such complaints can be found in the following files: isa, rg 115, box 1983,
files 1, 14; box 2007, file 2; and box 2024, file 10.
59. isa, rg 115, box 1983, file 1, letter from students to Director of Interior and Public
Security, 24 March 1958.
60. I thank Val Daniel for suggesting this phrase.
61. William Connolly, ‘‘The Dilemma of Legitimacy,’’ in Legitimacy and the State, 222–
49, 225.
62. That the occupation was short and that people were aware from the outset that it
might be certainly contributed to political beliefs trumping the duty of service in that
case. In 1967, when it was clear that the occupation might be very long, many more
civil servants did return to work.
63. Interview, Gaza City, 8 March 1998.
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64. I am talking here about low-level civil servants, not high level, nationally known
government o≈cials. Such people, while still technically forbidden to engage in
politics, were also recognized leaders and, given that British o≈cials needed someone
to talk to, a certain amount of activity was not only tolerated but almost necessary.
65. Interview, Gaza City, 19 April 1999.
66. Interview, Gaza City, 11 April 1999.
67. James Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1990).
68. Alexei Yurchak critiques Lisa Wedeen and others for producing such binary distinc-
tions (Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation
[Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006]).
69. On the activities of the underground Muslim Brotherhood in the first years of the
Administration, see Ibrahim Skeik, Ghazza ‘Abr al-Tarikh: Qita‘ Ghazza Taht al-
Idara al-Misriyya, 1948–1956 (1982).
70. Rema Hammami, ‘‘Between Heaven and Earth: Transformations in Religiosity and
Labor Among Southern Palestinian Peasant and Refugee Women, 1920–1993’’ (diss.,
Temple University, 1994), 125.
71. See Ziad Abu ‘Amr, Usul al-Harakal al-Siyasiyya fi Qita‘ Ghazza, 1948–1967 (’Akka:
Dar al-Aswar, 1987).
72. Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years, 131.
73. James Jankowski, Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 152.
74. Interview, Gaza City, 16 February 1999.
75. I already mentioned one report about communist teachers smoking during Rama-
dan. Another report indicated that non-communist teachers were being discrimi-
nated against in unrwa schools because the head of the education department was a
sympathizer (isa, rg 115, box 1983, file 1, report from Mabahithinspector to Director
of Interior and Public Security, 9 February 1958).
76. Box 1983, File; box 2007, file 2; box 2096, file 22.
77. Interview, Gaza City, 20 March 1999.
78. Among the many such descriptions I heard are ‘‘The period of Abdul Nasser was the
golden age for the Palestinian people’’ (interview, Gaza City, November 12, 1999);
‘‘The period between 1948 and 1967 was a golden period in the history of Gaza—to
the extent that thousands of students graduated from university’’ (interview, Gaza
City, March 8, 1998); and ‘‘Things [have] changed nowadays—the Sulta [pna] came
but the golden age was during the Egyptian period’’ (interview, Gaza City, 19 April
1999).
79. dw, Qawa’im al-Mushir, Group 41, file 90505, unrwa Sta√ Circular No. A/1, 1
September 1959.
80. Ibid., letter from State Minister for War Matters to Deputy Foreign Minister, 24
November 1959.
81. In January 1961, for example, a committee of Gazan unrwa employees petitioned
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the agency, asking that employees who wanted to run for National Union o≈ce be
allowed to do so (letter from committee of Arab unrwa employees to unrwa Gaza
representative, 4 January 1961). Further meetings between the Administration and
unrwa failed to resolve the issue.
82. One conversation I had with a retired unrwa teacher exemplified this attitude.
When talking about unrwa practice in general, Hamdi Hassan had nothing good to
say, but when it came to his personal work experience, he was quite proud of what he
had accomplished (interview, Gaza City, 10 March 1998).
83. Mary McGuire, in a 1996 dissertation, argues that civil service organizing in the
United States and Germany had significant, long-term e√ects on the structural
arrangement of the state, leading to the emergence of the state as ‘‘sovereign em-
ployer’’ as a means of containing such organizing (‘‘Disciplining the State: Organized
Civil Servants, State Formation and Citizenship in the United States and Germany,
1880–1925’’ [diss., University of Michigan, 1996]).
84. Ibid., 24.
85. isa, rg 2, u/38/37Vol. 1, memorandum on interview between members of proposed
association and Chief Secretary, 10 February 1927.
86. Ibid., letter from B. Lewis for Provisional Executive Committee of Association to
Chief Secretary, March 1927.
87. The terms Senior and Junior were later replaced by First and Second Division.
88. u/38/37, Annual Report of the President of the 1st Division Civil Service Associa-
tion for 1944.
89. In the aftermath of the strike, the high commissioner described his dismay at the
action, while at the same time a≈rming government’s general sympathy toward civil
servants. Outlining new policy recommendations, he said, the strike ‘‘was the result
in the main of a lack of confidence on the part of the Second Division Civil Service in
the Administration, for I can assure you that the recommendations I am making to
the Secretary of State would have been the same had the strike not taken place. I wish
to state that I am convinced that the foundation stone of any e≈cient public service is
that there should be confidence in carrying out their duties towards the public. It has
always been and will continue to be my earnest endeavour to establish these condi-
tions amongst those with whom I serve, fully appreciating that it entails the protec-
tion of their rights and the adjustment of reasonable grievances’’ (statement by High
Commissioner, issued by Chief Secretary, 26 April 1946). On the strike, see Zachary
Lockman, Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906–1948
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 332–35, and David De Vries, ‘‘Brit-
ish Rule and Arab-Jewish Coalescence of Interest: The 1946 Civil Servants’ Strike in
Palestine,’’ International Journal of Middle East Studies 36, 4 (2004): 613–38.
90. isa, rg 2, u/38/37, vol. 2, note by Shaw, n.d.
91. McGuire, ‘‘Disciplining the State,’’ 25.
92. Memorandum from Chief Secretary, 20 June 1944.
93. isa, rg 2, u/38/37 vol. 3, Palestine Civil Service (1st Division) Association: Circu-
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lar to all Members, Annual Report of the President of the Central Council for the
Year ended 31st December, 1945.
94. isa, rg 115, box 2007, file 15, letter from Chair of Executive Committee to Director of
unrwa, 24 February 1965.
95. Abu Sami, interview, Gaza City, 26 March 1998. Not surprisingly, it was not actually
possible to keep politics—or even the appearance of politics—entirely outside of the
workings of the association. A series of mabahith reports about a meeting held in
January 1960 for the purpose of electing new o≈cers for the association highlights the
tendentious internal politics of the organization, politics which were intimately
connected with the broader political conditions of the Gaza Strip (isa, rg 115, box
2007, file 17).
4. The Civil Service Career
The full citation for this chapter’s first epigraph is isa, rg 2, box 441, file u/16/3318,
Report by a Committee Concerning the Establishment of a Permanent and Pensionable
Cadre for the General Clerical Service, 31 July 1926.
1. Thomas Blom Hansen explores such repertoires in the context of India, though he
describes distinct sites of authority (informal authority, community, legality), while
here I am interested in di√erent deployments of authority within the civil service
(‘‘Sovereigns Beyond the State: On Legality and Authority in Urban India,’’ in
Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World, ed. Thomas
Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, 169–91 [Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2005]).
2. Here I mean disinterested in its positive sense of being impartial, not personally
motivated, etc., rather than disinterest as indi√erence in the sense described by
Michael Herzfeld, The Social Production of Indi√erence.
3. On the relationship between generalists and specialists (experts) in civil service, see
R. B. Upadhyaya and K. C. Sharma, Management of Conflict between Generalist and
Specialist Administrators in India (Jaipur: Shashi Publications, 1987); Jaleel Ahmed,
The Expert and the Administrator (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1959);
Gail Savage, The Social Construction of Expertise: The English Civil Service and Its
Influence, 1919–1939 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996); and, of
course, Max Weber, Economy and Society.
4. Roy MacLeod, ‘‘Introduction,’’ in Government and Expertise: Specialists, Administra-
tors and Professionals, 1860–1919, ed. Roy Macleod (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1988), 1.
5. It has been generally agreed that ‘‘the expert in the civil service is here to stay. . . . I do
not believe there is anybody who seriously thinks that a modern government can do
without the expert’’ (Ahmed, The Expert and the Administrator, 8).
6. There were, to be sure, experts in Gaza’s government, including doctors, religious
o≈cials, judges, and, to a certain extent, teachers, but they did not form the bulk of
the civil service.
Notes to Chapter 4 • 265
7. On the consolidation and contours of the colonial civil service, see Charles Je√ries,
The Colonial Empire and Its Civil Service (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1938).
8. Robert Heussler, Yesterday’s Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial Service (Syr-
acuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963), xx. A pamphlet published in 1950 as an
advertisement for the Colonial Service emphasized creativity, initiative, and enter-
prise, not particular skills, as the qualities needed to succeed as a colonial o≈cer. In
fact, the pamphlet warned potential applicants that their preservice training would
not su≈ce to make them ‘‘competent and reliable.’’ Whatever training one arrived
with, ‘‘in order to become a craftsman at your job, you must learn it from the
bottom. . . . you must face the fact that it will be some time before you can consider
yourself competent and experienced’’ (Kenneth Bradley, The Colonial Service as a
Career [London: His Majesty’s Stationery O≈ce, 1950], 23).
9. Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2002), 36. I explore the question of expertise in Gaza’s
government at greater length in ‘‘Government Without Expertise?’’
10. Thomas Osborne ‘‘Bureaucracy as a Vocation: Governmentality and Administration
in Nineteenth-Century Britain,’’ Journal of Historical Sociology 7 (1994): 289–313.
11. For consideration of the unethical outcomes of bureaucratic practice, see Kathleen
Ferguson, The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy (London: Sage, 1984); Zygmunt
Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989); and Heyman,
‘‘Putting Power in the Anthropology of Bureaucracy.’’ Bucking a general trend of
critiquing bureaucracy for its ethical absences, Paul du Guy (In Praise of Bureaucracy:
Weber, Organization, Ethics [London: Sage Publications, 2000]) o√ers a defense of
bureaucracy on precisely these grounds. My interest here is not so much in defending
bureaucracy from its critics, but in understanding the ways in which ethical concerns
shape its practices.
12. See Michel Foucault, The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality, volume 3, trans.
Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), and id., Ethics: Subjectivity and
Truth.
13. See, for example, Gayatri Spivak, ‘‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’’ in Marxism and the
Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Larry Grossberg, 271–313 (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1988), and Harald Fischer-Tiné and Michael Mann, eds.,
Colonialism as Civilizing Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India (London: Anthem
Press, 2004).
14. Foucault identifies ‘‘the care of the self’’ as central to an ancient Greek ethos—‘‘a way
of being and of behavior’’—that identified this care as central to the practice of
freedom (‘‘The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom,’’ in Ethics:
Subjectivity and Truth, 281–301). In the case of Gaza’s civil service, I am interested in
the how ‘‘care of the self’’ was seen as part of one’s service obligations.
15. Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 29.
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17. Letter from D. N. Strathie, Income Tax Advisor, to Chief Secretary, 3 July 1941, cited
in Taqqu, ‘‘Arab Labor in Mandatory Palestine,’’ 256.
18. Carter Findley notes that the formation of a new civil bureaucracy in the Ottoman
Empire demanded a restructuring of hiring practice. The older models of recruitment
into government—patronage and apprenticeship primarily—were no longer su≈cient
to meet the demands of an increasingly rationalized administrative structure. Partly in
order to meet this demand, widespread educational reform was undertaken. While
the e√ects of the changing educational system were felt outside of the pool of potential
civil servants, these schools were characterized by an ‘‘unabashed vocationalism’’
(Ottoman Civil O≈cialdom, 136). Consequently, Findley argues, ‘‘the advent of the
secular civil schools did encourage the idea—found throughout the Middle East ever
since—that they provided simply a way into o≈cial service’’ (ibid., 136).
19. co 733/3, file 31764, letter from High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 15 June
1921.
20. co 733/5, file 44554, letter from Secretary of State to High Commissioner, 22
September 1921.
21. isa, rg 2, box 8, file 220, Organization of Palestine Government, letter to High
Commissioner, 15 May 1924.
22. Ibid.
23. isa, rg 2, box 465, file u/766/3/45, letter from Acting District Commissioner to
Chief Sec., 30 October 1946.
24. Without previous civil service employment, it was nearly impossible to get a job, and,
given the severe financial di≈culties facing the Administration, even continuity of
service was not always enough to guarantee a job. See, for example, dw, Qawa’im al-
Mushir, group 8, which includes complaints of three persons who had worked for the
Egyptian army during the war and were asking for salaries and further work (17
September, 27 September, and 2 October 1949) and the response from Administra-
tion that the army was a separate administration and that work for it bestowed no
obligation on the Administration (6 November 1949); and unrwa, Annual Report of
the Director: Covering the Period 1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953. General Assembly, O≈cial
Records: Eighth Session—Supplement No. 12 (a/2470), 12: ‘‘There is a large surplus
among the refugees of ex-government clerks and senior employees for whom no work
can be found, farmers without land, former landowners without qualifications, and
labourers without trade or special skills of any kind.’’
25. The complaint described the intricacies of their case, as they had moved from
Beersheba to Gaza with the Egyptian army when it redeployed: ‘‘Those who came
directly to Gaza from Beersheba found work in Gaza. We, however, were refused,
being told that the budget did not allow for the transfer of those coming from the
Jordanian areas of Hebron and Bethlehem. This prohibition was not supposed to
include Beersheba employees’’ (dw, Qawa’im al-Mushir, group 8, complaint by
Beersheba employees to War Minister, 21 June 1949).
Notes to Chapter 4 • 267
26. Ibid., letter from Deputy Governor General to Governor General, 1 August 1949.
27. There is no further archival mention of these particular employees and their plight,
so it is not known if they eventually received Administration jobs. One general way
the Administration attempted to reconcile the desperate need for work with its
severe fiscal limitations was by reducing civil service salaries by one-quarter, thereby
stretching the budget (Salim Rashid, interview, Gaza City, 11 March 1999).
28. Personnel file held at Awqaf Ministry, Gaza City. Letter from [Hussam Abdullah] to
Khan Yunis Administrative Governor, 10 May 1958.
29. Letter from Awqaf director to Administrative Governor of Khan Yunis, 26 May 1958.
30. As late as 1959 an Administration report indicated that 87 percent of the population
of Gaza was unemployed (dw, Qawa’im al-Mushir, Group 42, file 91105. ‘‘Report on
Educational Situation in the Gaza Strip’’).
31. Interview, Gaza City, 24 March 1999.
32. Interview, Gaza City, 14 February 1999.
33. The precise e√ects on the job are hard to trace—not surprisingly, no one I spoke with
characterized their own work as less than meaningful or demanding. The e√ects of
these changes on the wider perception of civil service are more evident. As long as
there were few other opportunities for employment, civil service status remained
high. As the economy expanded and as more people sent remittances from work
abroad, civil service salaries were less exceptional, and its status went down.
34. Palestine Civil Service Second Division Association, ‘‘Report on the terms and
Conditions of Service of Second Division O≈cers (by the nominee of the association
on the Commission of Enquiry Mr. S Gadalla),’’ 1946.
35. isa, rg 2, box 466, file u/1738/45, letter from Director of Labor Department to
Chief Secretary, 5 November 1945.
36. Ibid., letter from Education Director to Chief Secretary, 25 January 1946.
37. isa, rg 2, box 460, file u/329/43, ‘‘Memorandum: Training of Messenger Boys,’’ 1
September 1943.
38. See, for example, pssa, personnel files #4327, 186/(24), 181/1274, and 124.
39. Interview, Gaza City, 24 April 1999.
40. Pierre Bourdieu, among others, calls attention to the crucial importance of spatial
relations in habit formation (Distinctions: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste,
trans. Richard Nice [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984]). For a
review of some of the literature on this question, see Setha Low, ‘‘Embodies Space(s):
Anthropological Theories of Body, Space, and Culture,’’ Space and Culture 6, 1
(2003): 9–18.
41. isa, rg 22, box 3395, file 53/44, report to Acting Director of Lands from Land
O≈cer, 4 August 1934.
42. isa, rg 22, box 3395, file ld 53/4/7a, ‘‘Accommodation of Land Registry Gaza in
Tegart Building,’’ letter from Director of Land Registry to Chief Secretary, 29 June
1942.
43. Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt, 13.
268 • Notes to Chapter 4
44. Interview, Gaza City, 17 March 1999.
45. The circumstances in Gaza occasionally led people to forego raises. For example,
after 1948 unrwa provided rations to refugees whose monthly income was below a
certain amount. One person told me he refused promotion so as not to lose these
rations: My salary was fourteen pounds and if I was promoted I would have taken
fifteen pounds, and then my rations would have been cut. Rations were much better
than a promotion’’ (interview, Gaza City, 7 June 1999).
46. isa, rg 2, box 441, file u/16/3318, Report by a Committee Concerning the Establishment
of a Permanent and Pensionable Cadre for the General Clerical Service, 31 July 1926. The
committee recommended a five-grade system with separate salary scales for men and
women such that, for men, ‘‘steady promotion and incremental progress will lead to
maximum salary in forty-two years.’’ For women the proposed time period was
thirty-six years. In both cases, the goal was that civil servants should reach retirement
age at the same time they reached their maximum salary potential. On the question
of separate salary scales for men and women, the reported noted, ‘‘We are aware that
among the female clerical o≈cers there is some feeling that salaries should be paid for
the amount of work performed and that, when man and woman perform the same
amount of work, there should be no di√erence in salary. . . . To equate salaries of men
and women is to weight the scales against marriage in the eyes of women, because,
taking the whole body economic such an arrangement places a woman entering
marriage at a decided economic disadvantage as against her employed sister or as
against herself employed prior to marriage. . . . We think, therefore, that Government
must strongly oppose attempts to equate women’s salaries with those of men.’’
47. ‘‘Report,’’ 9.
48. The Administration largely adopted the existing British procedure, though the
framework for this procedure was somewhat revised. While the specific cadres and
grades di√ered, the general principle remained the same. Raises and promotions were
supposed to occur according to seniority, with certain positions requiring particular
qualifications and abilities.
49. Interview, Gaza City, 4 May 1998.
50. Interview, Gaza City, 13 March 1999.
51. Interview, Shati camp, 14 March 1999.
52. Interview, Gaza City, 23 March 1999.
53. isa, rg2, box 459, u/126/43II, letter from General Manager of Palestine Railways to
Civil Service Commissioner, 1 November 1947. In this particular case, the dismissal
resulted from a history of problems and a charge of insubordination. In his complaint
about the dismissal, Farag Abadir did not entirely deny that there had been problems
but suggested that there was a cause for his behavior and that the response was
inappropriate. He furthermore argued that the context in which he appeared to be a
bad employee was fomented by individuals who had personal interests against him.
Disregarding Farag’s claims, the general manager stressed his incompetence and
noted that ‘‘this man is one of many engaged during the war years, when decent
Notes to Chapter 4 • 269
labour was at a premium. . . . As we are now faced with the necessity of reverting to
peace time establishments, it is impossible to contemplate the continued employ-
ment of such individuals.’’
54. isa, rg 2, box 459, file u/126/43II, letter from Khalil Ibrahim Hammanieh to Chief
Secretary, 15 January 1946.
55. Ibid., letter from General Manager, Palestine Railways to Chief Secretary, 4 February
1946.
56. An amendment to Article 206 of the Penal Code dated 1 August 1911 stated that in
cases of abduction and rape ‘‘if the act of marriage is celebrated with the girl so carried
away, and she is 20 years old, the prosecution will be suspended by her desistance, or
by that of her guardian if she is not 20 years old.’’ While the criminal code was revised
in 1927, that clause was not changed (cited in 21 November 1931, Supreme Court
decision, in Collection of Judgments of the Courts of Palestine, 1919–33: Including Judg-
ments of the Privy Council, Court of Appeal, High Court, Special Tribunal, District
Courts, Land Courts, Criminal Courts, etc. [Tel Aviv: L. M. Rotenberg, 1937], 557–58).
57. I have seen one account of such a dismissal in a file devoted to the investigation of an
employee of the Deir Belah village council (one ’Adel Mahmud) who was fired
because of a deficit in the village supply of lighting fuel (isa, rg 115, box 2014,
unnumbered file). ’Adel was hired in May 1959 but did not last long in the position. In
May 1960 he was sent the following letter: ‘‘It has been decided to end your employ-
ment as tax collector and treasurer for the Deir Belah village council, e√ective from
the beginning of May 1960. This is because of what was discovered in the investiga-
tion into the matter of missing lighting fuel belonging to the council. Please return to
us the accounts of expenditures and revenues as well as all correspondence, registers,
and other papers that you have in your possession’’ (letter from Administrative
Qa’immaqam, 9 May 1960).
58. pssa, Personnel File #1493.
59. Fines of up to one day’s salary could be imposed by a civil servant’s immediate
superior. Fines of more than a few days had to be approved by the governor-general.
60. Letter from Director of Health Administration to Director of Civil A√airs Admin-
istration, 5 July 1964.
61. pssa, Personnel File #841, letter from Director of Municipal and Village A√airs to
Director of Civil A√airs, 29 October 1964.
62. pssa, Personnel File #175/636, letter from Director of Civil A√airs to Governor
General, 25 February 1958.
63. Statement by [Da’ud Khaled], 31 March 1958.
64. In conversation after conversation people told me they or their fathers still received a
pension from the British government. People admired this respect for employee
‘‘rights’’ and contrasted it to their experiences with other administrators. For exam-
ple, one man told me, ‘‘Someone who was working in the graveyard for the English
receives his pension check in the mail until today. His rights are well-kept. . . . I, for
example, worked with the Egyptians and when I retired—and you saw me at the
270 • Notes to Chapter 4
retirees o≈ce—I was not able to get my due either from the Egyptians or from the
Palestinians except after long su√ering’’ (interview, Gaza City, 16 February 1999).
65. Letter from Postmaster General to Chief Secretary, 22 March 1929.
66. isa, rg 2, u/359/31, Gratuities to Pensionable women o≈cers on marriage.
67. Letter from Postmaster General to Chief Secretary, 22 March 1929.
68. This mention of embarrassment brings to mind Virginia Woolf’s discussion of the
‘‘odor’’ attached to the words ‘‘Miss’’ and ‘‘Mrs’’: ‘‘The word ‘Miss’ however delicious
its scent in the private house has a certain odor attached to it in Whitehall which is
disagreeable to the noses on the other side of the partition. . . . As for the word
‘Mrs,’ . . . such is the smell of it, so rank does it stink in the nostrils of Whitehall, that
Whitehall excludes it entirely’’ (Three Guineas [New York: Harcourt, 1938], 52).
69. Letter from Treasurer to Chief Secretary, 25 May 1936.
70. Near the end of the Mandate the practice of forcing married women to retire was
revoked, in light of similar changes in the British civil service (isa, rg 2, box 466, file
u/2011/45).
71. The Supreme Muslim Council, which held the authority to fire shari‘a court o≈cers,
had been established as part of an e√ort to respond to the anomaly of having a non-
Muslim body (in this case the Mandate legal department) serve as authority over
Muslim religious institutions, as happened when the British occupied Palestine and
ended Muslim Turkish rule over the country.
72. isa, rg 2, box 446, file u/417/36, letter from Amery to Chancellor, High Commis-
sioner, 11 December 1928.
73. Ibid., letter from Secretary of Palestine Senior Civil Servants Association to Chief
Secretary, 2 July 1929.
74. Haj Amin al-Husseini, head of the Supreme Muslim Council, expressed a similar
perspective in his correspondence with the high commissioner. He stressed that the
position and the conditions of service of shari‘a judges superseded any particular
government: ‘‘Centuries have passed and Governments have come and gone, yet the
rights of judges have been safeguarded in priority to all other o≈cials. The estab-
lished laws support this old practice.’’ He noted further that ‘‘o≈cials of Shari‘a
courts are considered as members of the Public Service in the Government which has
close relations with such Courts, since Government confirms the appointment of
senior o≈cials in Shari‘a Courts who are subject to medical examination in accor-
dance with the Government’s regulations; Audit o≈cers are entitled to inspect and
audit the books etc. of the Shari‘a Courts; Fees collected by Shari‘a Courts are paid
into the Treasury; Salaries of Shari‘a o≈cials form part of the Government’s budget;
and therefore any purchase or transfer of immovable properties is e√ected by Shari‘a
o≈cials, Shari‘a Courts apply to the Government for authority. O≈cials of Shari‘a
Courts are required to attend regularly and perform their duties daily with diligence’’
(letter from Haj Amin al-Husseini to High Commissioner, 9 June 1929).
75. In a response to the Civil Servants’ Association, the chief secretary admonished that
the association did not have appropriate jurisdiction over these employees: ‘‘They
Notes to Chapter 5 • 271
may not be regarded as Civil Servants for the purposes of your Association and
therefore the question of their claims to pensions is not one which your Association
can properly discuss with Government’’ (4 August 1929).
76. One government o≈cer, Ruhi Bey Abdul Hadi, suggested that government o√er pen-
sions on the condition that the Supreme Muslim Council cede authority for hiring and
dismissal (memorandum from Ruhi Bey Abdul Hadi, 10 January 1933). Yet another
(Musa Alami) argued, however, that the defining regulations of the council made it
impossible for it to make such a concession, given that one of the purposes for which the
council was created was to ensure that ‘‘the authority at least of the Qadis should emanate
from a Moslem body’’ (memorandum from Musa Alami, 24 January 1933). This need for
Muslim authority within a non-Muslim government created a circumstance whereby the
shari‘a court became ‘‘a Government department except for the point that the appoint-
ment and dismissal of the Qadis is with the S.M.C.’’
77. Decision of the Executive Council, 17 May 1933. After the enactment of the pension
law, the Supreme Muslim Council and government continued to tussle over the
question of authority and control over the o≈cers of the shari‘a court.
78. Personnel files held at the Awqaf Ministry in Gaza City attest to this practice.
79. Interview, Gaza City, 8 May 1999. Not surprisingly, those people who had purchased
land or houses with their money were much satisfied with the arrangement.
80. Interview, Gaza City, 3 May 1999.
5. Service in Crisis
In relation to the quotation in this chapter’s first epigraph, in Lords of the Lebanese
Marches: Violence and Narrative in an Arab Society (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1996), Michael Gilsenan discusses the narrative importance an orange acquired
in the context of this famine as experienced in the Akkar region of Lebanon—when a
man gave away an olive grove for one orange (120–24).
1. The elusiveness of such boundaries is discussed by Mitchell, ‘‘The Limits of the
State,’’ and Gupta, ‘‘Blurred Boundaries’’ and ‘‘Governing Population: The Inte-
grated Child Development Services Program in India,’’ in States of Imagination:
Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State, ed. Thomas Blom Hansen and
Finn Stepputat, 65–96 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001).
2. Carol Gilligan, In A Di√erent Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 62. Of course, according to
Gilligan’s argument, it is women who see the world as a web of relation and men who
imagine hierarchy.
3. Foucault, ‘‘The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom,’’ 287.
4. Ibid., 286.
5. Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate, trans.
Haim Watzman (London: Little, Brown, 2000), 19.
6. Municipality of Gaza, ‘‘Gaza Municipality: Between the Future and the Present’’
(1996), 9.
272 • Notes to Chapter 5
7. See the Shaw Commission Report (Report of the Commission on the Palestine Distur-
bances of August, 1929, Cmd. 3530, March 1930); the Hope-Simpson Report (Sir John
Hope-Simpson, Report on Immigration, Land Settlement, and Development in Pal-
estine, (Cmd. 3686, 1930); the Peel Commission Report (Palestine Royal Commission
Report, Cmd. 5479, July 1937); and A Survey of Palestine, prepared in December 1945
and January 1946 for the information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry
(reprint. Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991).
8. Survey of Palestine, 682.
9. Report of the Committee on Development and Welfare Services (1940).
10. unrwa, Special Report of the Director Concerning Other Claimants for Relief, a/2978/
Add.1.
11. For more on the problem of aid to native Gazans, see Ilana Feldman, ‘‘Di≈cult
Distinctions: Refugee Law, Humanitarian Practice, and Political Identification in
Gaza,’’ Cultural Anthropology 22, 1 (2007): 129–69.
12. Al-Ahram, 18 August 1951.
13. American Friends Service Committee materials, for instance, describe a population
in crisis but not without sociality.
14. Alison Brysk, and Gershon Shafir, People Out of Place: Globalization, Human Rights,
and the Citizenship Gap (New York: Routledge, 2004).
15. Christopher R. Duncan, ‘‘Unwelcome Guests: Relations between Internally Dis-
placed Persons and Their Hosts in North Sulawesi, Indonesia,’’ Journal of Refugee
Studies 18, 1 (2005): 25–46; Je√rey M. Peck, ‘‘Refugees as Foreigners: The Problem of
Becoming German and Finding Home,’’ in Mistrusting Refugees, ed. E. Valentine
Daniel and John Chr. Knudsen, 102–25 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1995). For more on the particular tensions of the Gazan refugee condition, see
Feldman ‘‘Di≈cult Distinctions.’’
16. isa, rg 115, box 2024, file 14, Department of General Supervision of Refugees,
Government Assistance, and Social A√airs, Annual Report 1953, 2.
17. unrwa, Annual Report for 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952, 5, 3.
18. unrwa, Annual Report for 1 July 1955 to 30 June 1956, 6.
19. unrwa, Annual Report for 1 July 1957 to 30 June 1958, 19. As late as 1964, the Annual
Report lamented the large number of men who were ‘‘not only unemployed but were
virtually unemployable’’ because of the limited work opportunities in Gaza (unrwa,
Annual Report for 1 July 1963 to 30 June 1964, 2).
20. Interview, Gaza City, March 11, 1999. Salim and others also suggested that unrwa
relief was part of a Western imperial plot to make Palestinians accept the loss of their
homeland.
21. Interview, Gaza City, 14 February 1999.
22. Interview, Gaza City, 19 April 1999.
23. As Hanan’s remarks suggest, tension between natives and refugees and concern about
refugees’ ‘‘character’’ have not entirely dissipated, even as the figure of the refugee has
become central to the Palestinian national imaginary.
Notes to Chapter 5 • 273
24. Description of Gaza by a Reverend Father Waggett, cited in Butt, Life at the Cross-
roads, 118.
25. The entire Levant su√ered from a severe famine during this period, so the experience
in Gaza was by no means unique. See Linda S. Schilcher, ‘‘The Famine of 1915–1918
in Greater Syria,’’ in Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective:
Essays in Honor of Albert Hourani, ed. John Spagnolo (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1992).
26. Interview, Rafah, 2 May 1999. See also Butt, Life in the Crossroads: ‘‘Because of the
succession of battles in and around Gaza, for example, the local population had had
little opportunity to work the land and harvest crops—or to attend to cattle. This all
contributed to a food shortage both among the [Turkish] military and the civilian
population’’ (113).
27. Interview, Khan Yunis, 15 June 1999.
28. Jaridat Filastin, 18 July 1918.
29. For a more extended discussion of what development meant in the context of the
Mandate, see Feldman ‘‘Government without Expertise?’’
30. isa, rg 2, 504, w/40/46, Summary of Col. Porteus’ Report of June 1936 on Gaza
Drainage.
31. The Gaza region as a whole had among the highest percentage of cultivatable land in
Palestine—30 percent (David Gurevitch, Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1929 [Jeru-
salem: Keren Hayesod, 1930], 78). It was not the most productive land. Sara Roy
notes that in 1935 ‘‘the Gaza District accounted for 70 percent of the total area under
barley cultivation but 30 percent of crop yield’’ (The Gaza Strip, 47)—but the capacity
to grow a wide variety of crops was important to the area’s economy and to people’s
eating habits.
32. Svetlana Boym describes the problematic of nostalgia that historians face: ‘‘On the
one hand, elusive nostalgic a√ects undermine the historians’ dispassionate attempts
to write their chronicles; on the other hand, these a√ects help them to understand
people’s relationship to the lived or imagined experience and the infatuation with
things past, because most of us experience history as nostalgia’’ (Common Places:
Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1994], 285). For further discussion of nostalgia and memories of home in pre-1948
Palestine, see Feldman ‘‘Home as a Refrain.’’
33. American Friends Service Committee [afsc] Archives, fs Sect Palestine #36, ‘‘Back-
ground Material on Mughazy,’’ 16 February 1949.
34. Hope-Simpson, Report on Immigration, Land Settlement, and Development in Pal-
estine, 143. The report declared that such conditions could be alleviated only by
improvements in ‘‘the method of cultivation . . . so that the fellah will be able to gain a
reasonable livelihood from a smaller area of land than that which has been essential
hitherto.’’ A few years later, the Peel Commission argued that while land loss was a
significant problem, in many other respects conditions had improved. According to
the report, ‘‘Despite the disproportion between their numbers and the amount of
cultivable land they occupy, the fellaheen are on the whole better o√ than they were in
274 • Notes to Chapter 5
1920. . . . The whole range of public services . . . has steadily developed, to the benefit
of the fellaheen’’ (Palestine Royal Commission Report, 128). For further discussion of
economic conditions during the Mandate, see Ylana Miller, Government and Society
in Rural Palestine, 1920–1948 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), and Sarah
Graham-Brown, ‘‘The Political Economy of Jabal Nablus, 1920–48,’’ in Studies in the
Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed.
Roger Owen, 88–176 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982). Roy
describes Gaza’s place in this broader dynamic in The Gaza Strip.
35. As a Quaker providing relief in Gaza in 1949 noted about one refugee, ‘‘He owned a
bit of fruit trees too and on his earnings they lived in relative comfort in the little
village before fright scattered them and their neighbors’’ (American Friends Service
Committee [afsc] Archives, fs Sect Palestine #36, ‘‘Background Material on Mu-
ghazy,’’ 16 February 1949).
36. A similar ‘‘simplicity’’ in eating habits was described in a 1930 report by the head of
the Zionist Agricultural Experimental Station of Tel-Aviv, Dr. Wilkansky, who
described the dietary state of the Palestinian fellah [peasant] as ‘‘poor and monoto-
nous.’’ He continued, ‘‘His staple food is ‘pittah’ . . . which he bakes every day. A few
pittahs, with onions or radishes form his morning and midday meals. . . . Most of his
requirements are provided by his own fields, and he buys but little outside. . . . The
fellah uses very little meat’’ (cited in Hope-Simpson Report, 65).
37. Joseph Massad describes the transformations in Jordanian eating habits under colo-
nial rule (Colonial E√ects). The Survey of Palestine described the challenges that
variations in eating habits among Palestine’s population caused for World War II
rationing: ‘‘The distribution of foodstu√s in Palestine is the more di≈cult on ac-
count of the lack of homogeneity of the population in regard to nutrition. There
exists a wide variety of standards of living, ranging from that of the nomadic Bedouin
in the desert areas to that of the cultivated Europeans in the larger towns’’ (A Survey
of Palestine, 817).
38. Interview, Khan Yunis, 15 June 1999.
39. Interview, Gaza City, 9 May 1999.
40. isa, rg 2, w/rd/74, Unemployment Relief.
41. Robert Vitalis and Steven Heydemann describe the role of the Middle East Supply
Centre (mesc) in regulating agricultural production (among other things) during the
war (‘‘War, Keynesianism, and Colonialism,’’ in War, Institutions, and Social Change in
the Middle East, ed. Steven Heydemann, 100–45 [Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2000], 105).
42. Survey of Palestine, 817.
43. Majdal was a town in the Gaza district that, after 1948, lay across the armistice line
from the Gaza Strip. The town was renamed Ashkelon, and the remaining Arab
inhabitants of Majdal were expelled by the Israeli army in 1950.
44. isa, rg 2, box 217, file g/5/4/42.
45. Letter from District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 2 September 1942.
Notes to Chapter 5 • 275
46. The proposals were approved, so the district commissioner’s argument appears to
have been accepted within government.
47. Interview, Gaza City, 22 March 1999.
48. Interview, Gaza City, 14 February 1999.
49. Interview, Khan Yunis, 15 June 1999.
50. Interview, Gaza City, 13 May 1999.
51. When Quaker volunteers arrived in Gaza they noted that ‘‘besides their own great
and everpressing misery, the refugees are creating problems, both current and future,
for the permanent population.’’ They described practices similar to those mentioned
by Im ‘Amir, among them that ‘‘lack of fuel has driven refugees to denuding the land
of every burnable thing, especially trees and shrubs.’’ They further noted that ‘‘this
drove a nearby landowner to shut o√ camp water taps until refugees promised not to
cut anymore from his trees’’ (afsc, #63 fsc Sect Palestine, ‘‘Background Material on
Rafah,’’ 1 February 1949).
52. De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 37.
53. Interview, Gaza City, 12 November 1999.
54. The establishment of unrwa was an implicit recognition that the problem would
not be solved immediately and that there had to be more than an ad hoc means of
providing assistance to the Palestinian refugees.
55. Interview, Shati camp, 16 March 1999.
56. Not only was Egypt uncertain about its relationship to Gaza, but its failure in 1948 to
‘‘save’’ Palestine meant that in the first years after 1948 apolitical humanitarianism
may have been the only credible mode of claiming to assist the Gazan population.
That Gazans would not be forever satisfied with simple humanitarianism from
Egypt was evident in the response of the Gazan press to the train’s arrival. Al-Raqib, a
local paper, took the opportunity to thank the Egyptian government for its assistance
and to remind it that Palestinians were also waiting for other trains—trains that
would return them to their villages, trains that would bring weapons and men ready
to fight for the liberation of Palestine (al-Raqib, 30 December 1952).
57. Interview, Shati camp, 16 March 1999.
58. afsc #41 fs Sect Palestine, letter from Howard Wriggins to Colin Bell, 18 February
1949.
59. The unrwa director’s report commented, ‘‘The regular monthly issues of flour,
butter, cheese and milk given by the Egyptian and United States (through care)
Governments provide only a basic 1,050 calories per person per day (compared to the
Agency’s basic provision of 1,500 to refugees in summer)’’ (Special Report). The
Egyptian Administration’s own Refugee and Government Assistance Administration
reported on its ration distribution program that ‘‘the Egyptian government recognized
the reality and began to provide assistance to 60,000 of the original inhabitants of the
Strip—whose total number is 86,000. . . . every person among the 60,000 receives flour
in the amount of 5–6 kilos per month. There is no doubt that this ration, in relation to
what people need, is not enough to live on, but it does help, and covers their needs for
276 • Notes to Chapter 5
flour’’ (isa, rg 115, box 2024, file 14, Administration of General Supervision of Refugees,
Government Aid, and Social A√airs: Annual Report, 1953, 31). Neither unrwa nor
Administration o≈cials deemed their rations su≈cient.
60. Native inhabitants of Gaza were just as hungry as the refugees. These people had lost
their lands and livelihoods, and many were, in fact, ‘‘in an even worse economic
position than the refugees’’ (unrwa, Annual Report 1952, 5). A 1955 report by the
unrwa director on ‘‘other claimants for relief ’’ emphasized native Gazans’ need for
assistance: ‘‘In the case of the Gaza Strip, nearly the whole population is therefore in
need as result of the establishment of the demarcation line and of the impossibility of
moving goods and persons across it legally’’ (Special Report).
61. Refugee A√airs Report, 31.
62. Ibid.
63. In this case, in order to assure stability of food provision, the bureau occasionally had
to borrow flour from unrwa. So even the apparently clear (and reiterated) distinc-
tion of jurisdiction was not always so clear, and unrwa, in a roundabout way did
provide food services to native Gazans.
64. afsc, #53 fs Sect Palestine, letter from afsc Gaza Unit to C. Pickett, afsc Head-
quarters, 12 October 1949.
65. Interview, Gaza City, 11 March 1999.
66. Some people, at least in retrospect, did argue that this dynamic and the acceptance of
unrwa services were damaging to Palestinian political aspirations. One person
recounted a story from the early days of unrwa that was meant to underscore this
point. He told me that a friend of his met an American working with unrwa who
tried to give him some political advice: ‘‘The American told my friend: ‘about this
food you eat from unrwa—I want to tell you something but do not say that I told
you. If you reject the provisions and do not eat and twenty people die of hunger, then
they will let you back soon to your homes.’ But we did not have that awareness. If we
told people to do so they would have refused’’ (interview, Gaza City, 13 March 1999).
67. co 733 group 4, file 33635, ‘‘Rebuilding of Gaza,’’ September 27, 1920, letter from
Herbert Samuel, High Commissioner, to Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of
State for Foreign A√airs.
68. Ibid.
69. In response to a proposal that the government guarantee a bank loan for Gaza, one
o≈cial commented, ‘‘I do not want to encourage the Palestine municipalities to think
they can reasonably expect advances from banks on security of this kind. The
amount is so small that the Bank probably would have done it if we pressed them, but
there can be no question that the transaction would be a thoroughly unsound one’’
(co 733, group 4, file 33635, ‘‘Rebuilding of Gaza,’’ Minutes, July 1921).
70. isa, rg 22, box 3464, file 7, 21 October 1930, Comment in Minutes on Secretariat File
No. L/132/32.
71. co 733, group 54, file 33039, ‘‘Rebuilding of Gaza,’’ 18 June 1923, letter from Governor
of Southern District to Chief Secretary.
Notes to Chapter 5 • 277
72. One o≈cial (Keith-Roach, the assistant chief secretary for administration) expressed
an extreme view that Gazans were so incapable as to render the entire scheme nearly
irrelevant: ‘‘We need not excite ourselves about this scheme of building houses on
sand. I doubt whether any sites will be sold and if sold whether the purchasers will
ante up with the cash. . . . I think all now serving in Palestine will have passed on
before the war damaged houses in Gaza have been repaired, judging by the local
apathy of the people and the lack of money among would be purchasers’’ (co 733,
group 65, file 12837 ‘‘Rebuilding of the town of Gaza,’’ comment in the minutes,
Keith-Roach). Keith-Roach suggested that the value of the plan, if there was one, lay
in its being a ‘‘big blu√,’’ providing a ready answer if ‘‘the Arabs complain and say Jews
would have and do get better treatment.’’
73. Among the causes for delay were ‘‘(a) stultification of the Town Plan by shiftings of
sand, (b) stultification of the Town Plan by encroachments of alleged Government
land, (c) part of the site proposed was claimed for the establishment of a Stud Farm
by Director of Agriculture, (d) demands for easier terms by prospective purchasers’’
(isa, rg 22, box 3464, file 7, 14 April 1930, letter from Commissioner of Southern
District to Chief Secretary).
74. isa, rg 22, Box 3464, File 7, 8 September 1932, letter from Acting Commissioner of
Southern District to Chief Secretary.
75. isa, Record Group 22, box 3464, file 7, 14 February 1941, ‘‘Memorandum on the
Gaza Development Scheme.’’
76. Ibid.
77. There is no evidence in the archival record to suggest that monies from the sale of
lands in ‘‘new Gaza’’ were actually deposited in a loan fund.
78. The idea of a government-supported housing plan did not entirely disappear, how-
ever. Records from the latter years of the Mandate indicate that Gaza’s mayor was
pushing for such a scheme and that the district commissioner rejected the idea on the
grounds that ‘‘there is no real need for such a scheme. Houses are badly required but
should be, and are being, erected by private enterprise’’ (isa, rg 2, box 513, file
wh/3/46, letter from District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 4 May 1946).
79. isa, rg 3, box 737, file 29/5 Minutes of Gaza District Town Planning Commission,
1940–47.
80. isa, rg 3, box 737, file 29/5A, Letter from Town Planning Advisor to Solicitor
General, 3 July 1945.
81. Commission Minutes, 18 October 1940. In an e√ort to cut down on construction
outside the confines of the plan, the commission restricted the issuance of building
permits and, on occasion, ordered the demolition of buildings that had been begun
before obtaining a permit (Commission Minutes, 7 April 1941).
82. Commission Minutes, 18 October 1940. Involving itself in the aesthetics of home
building as well, in 1942 the commission adopted a suggestion made by the town
planning advisor that ‘‘he should produce about twelve di√erent type plans of houses
to suit all pockets.’’ Each of these twelve designs would share certain fundamental
278 • Notes to Chapter 5
features, including: ‘‘1) Each house would have a loggia and terrace; 2) Plastering of
the outside walls would be compulsory; 3) Each type would have overhanging eaves
and tiled roofs, preferably ‘‘Roman’’ tiles, would be compulsory’’ (Commission Min-
utes, 30 June 1942). Most of the (now) old houses in the Rimal quarter of Gaza do
conform to this general design.
83. Commission Minutes, 19 June 1947.
84. Ibid.
85. Interview, Gaza City, 8 May 1999.
86. Interview, Rafah, 12 June 1999.
87. Interview, Khan Yunis, 15 June 1999.
88. One refugee told me that Gazans treated them like brothers: ‘‘They shared their
homes with us. He, whose house was small, told the women of the two families to
sleep together. And did the men. They shared everything they had, and we are
grateful for that. They o√ered us every service, every respect’’ (interview, Gaza City, 3
May 1999).
89. Interview, Gaza City, 16 February 1999. Another person recalled how the women of
Gaza mobilized to help the refugees: ‘‘All women participated in receiving refugees
and in helping them by putting them in schools, mosques, and empty places—until
we had the Quakers organization’’ (interview, Gaza City, 11 April 1999).
90. Personnel files of mosque imams maintained by the Awqaf Administration (now
Ministry) record their transfer to positions in other mosques for the period that
refugees were housed there, indicating that mosques were turned over entirely to the
project of housing refugees.
91. isa, rg 115, box 2024, file 14, Annual Report of General Supervision of Refugees,
Government Aid, and Social A√airs Administration, 1953.
92. Ibid.
93. These houses, in which many refugees still live, are made of concrete blocks and
roofed with asbestos.
94. The 1955 unrwa Annual Report noted, ‘‘The new camp construction programme in
Gaza was completed before the onset of the winter of 1954–55, and now no refugees
in camps in Gaza remain in tents. The Agency’s Gaza o≈cer has, however, some
2,800 applications for shelter from persons outside camps; in addition births, mar-
riages, and other social changes create a demand for shelter that has so far not been
met’’ (unrwa, Report of the Director Covering the Period 1 July 1954 to 30 June 1955, 3).
95. un a/1905 28 September 1951.
96. Ibid.
97. unrwa, Annual Report of the Director for the Period 1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954, 2.
98. unrwa Camp Regulations, Form c, n.d.
99. unrwa Camp Regulations and Administrative Instructions Concerning Contraven-
tions and Permits, 13 May 1961.
100. Many camps were created on the sites of World War II–era military camps. In
addition to state lands, however, refugees also settled on land owned by native
Notes to Chapter 6 • 279
Gazans. In 1953, the Administration authorized a tax exemption for landowners who
did not have use of their land because refugees were living on it. unrwa paid rent for
private lands on which it established camps (isa, rg 115, box 2024, file 11, correspon-
dence on tax exemptions, 1953).
101. Some people had initially settled in towns, whether using savings to rent houses or
staying with relatives or friends. Even as their funds began to dwindle and some
people sought to move into camps, limited space could not accommodate everyone.
unrwa reports noted pressure to increase camp size as those refugees ‘‘who owned
considerable property and other worldly goods under their former living conditions
. . . have reached, or are reaching, the end of their resources and are now living under
the ordinary conditions applying to refugees in the area’’ (un a/1451/Rev.1, 6 Octo-
ber 1950).
102. During the course of the Administration, five lotteries were held to distribute land.
The first two lotteries took place before the 1956 Israeli occupation, during which the
Israelis seized the records of these sales. In these first two lotteries approximately
twelve hundred one-dunam plots were made available at prices ranging from forty to
sixty pounds per plot, though no details are available as to who purchased the land
(Waqa’ i‘ al-Filastiniyya, #47, Announcement about sales of government lands to civil
servants, 10 May 1955; #58, Sales of government land to civil servants, second lottery,
9 January 1956). The Housing Ministry does, however, have registers from the last
three lotteries. These registers list the names and government departments of the
purchasers.
103. The deferred nation-state was Palestine, not Gaza alone. Gaza might have been ‘‘the
last independent part of Palestine,’’ as Egyptians liked to say, but it alone was not
enough to be Palestine.
104. One former civil servant told me, ‘‘The employee was very much relieved as they
[Egyptians] gave him a dunam of land for a symbolic price. The employee could sell
half of this dunam and build a building for himself or could sell it and work in trading
and so on. The employee at the time of the Egyptians was very lucky: he took a good
salary and owned a piece of land’’ (interview, Gaza City, 4 May 1999).
6. Servicing Everyday Life
1. This according to Ibrahim Skeik, a practicing local historian (Ghazza ‘Abr al-Tarikh:
Taht al-Intidab al-Britani [1981], 106).
2. Hilmi Abu Sha’aban, Tarikh Ghazza: Naqd wa Tahlil (Jerusalem: Matba‘at Bayt al-
Maqdis, 1943), 9.
3. Ibid., 58.
4. Donna Haraway, ‘‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the
Privilege of Partial Perspective,’’ in Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The
Reinvention of Nature, 183–202 (New York: Routledge, 1991).
5. It is precisely these kinds of practices that produce the relation with and sense of
place that is then transformed into ideology (or idea) in nationalist thought.
280 • Notes to Chapter 6
6. Michel de Certeau and Luce Giard refer to these creative possibilities as pluraliza-
tion: ‘‘Ordinary culture hides a fundamental diversity of situations, interests, and
contexts under the apparent repetition of objects that it uses. Pluralizationis born
from ordinary usage, from this immense reserve that the number and multiple of
di√erences constitute’’ (‘‘A Practical Science of the Singular,’’ in The Practice of Every-
day Life, Volume 2: Living and Cooking, ed. Luce Giard, trans. Timothy Tomasik,
251–56 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 256.
7. isa, Mandate Publications, box 4382, file 01/3/161, Report on Palestine Administra-
tion, July 1920–December 1921.
8. isa, rg 2, box 219, file g/37/45, telegram from heads of al-Agha, Zu’rub, al-Najjar,
al-Astal, and Abdallah families to Chief Secretary, 6 January 1946.
9. Government’s response to this complaint indicated that it had explored whether
municipal actions had contravened any of the regulations established by government
(whether it had stepped outside its domain, in other words). Finding that they had
not, it saw no reason to intervene (ibid., letter from Chief Secretary to Anton Atalla
[lawyer for the Khan Yunis families], 26 January 1946).
10. isa, rg 115, box 2014, file 4, letter from Qaimaqam to Governor General, 9 March
1960.
11. In fact, the administrative governors of the di√erent areas of the Gaza Strip were as
responsible as the councils for the maintenance of quiet and order. The details of this
responsibility were not identical to that of the councils, but there was a clear overlap.
According to the regulations, ‘‘Every administrative governor is responsible for se-
curity and order in the area . . . and for taking the necessary steps to secure peace and
security’’ (isa, rg 115, box 2024, file 21, Jurisdiction of the Administrative Governors,
1956). In order to secure this order, administrative governors were given a wide range
of tasks. They were supposed to submit monthly reports to the governor-general;
track public opinion in the area; forward local complaints to the appropriate authori-
ties; supervise police; oversee appointment of mukhtars; protect public buildings and
employees; and be in ‘‘constant contact’’ with local powers and cooperate with them
in activities on behalf of the common good. This last assignment at least partially
explains the interference about which Abu Sharkh complained, though it does not
tell us if the Deir Belah governor was acting inappropriately in the details of his
interventions.
12. Interview with former council member, Gaza City, 6 June 1999. See also minutes of
Legislative Council meetings, dw, Qawa’im al-Mushir, group 41, file 90205. Haidar
Abdul Shafi, a physician who founded the Gaza branch of the Palestinian Red
Crescent Society, was a major figure in Palestinian politics. He was one of the
Palestinian representatives in the 1991 Madrid Conference and in the negotiations
that followed (until the Oslo process took over). He was a member of the Legislative
Council and a cofounder of al-Mubadara, a new political movement founded during
the second intifada to provide an alternative to Fatah and Hamas. In no small part
due to what was perceived as his integrity—in a political landscape in which this is a
Notes to Chapter 6 • 281
rare trait—he was consistently one of the most respected figures on the Palestinian
political scene. Abdul Shafi died in September 2007.
13. See, for example, isa, rg 115, box 2007, unnumbered file, debate about purchasing a
cart to transport meat from Rafah slaughterhouse; isa, rg 115, box 2014, file 2, debate
about Deir Belah water project; isa, rg 115, box 2014, file 4, debate about paving
Rafah road.
14. Interview, Shati Camp, 15 March 1999.
15. Of course, there are still Palestinian villages which lack such services and provide
their own electricity with private generators. And during the summer even large cities
like Gaza and Hebron are without water much of the time.
16. Interview, Jabalya Camp, 13 May 1999.
17. This particular concentration of resources reminds us that even as government in
Gaza was incapable of large-scale concentrations on the order described by Timothy
Mitchell in Rule of Experts or invoked by Bourdieu in ‘‘Rethinking the State,’’ the
concept and practice of concentration were not foreign to its tactical government.
18. ‘Arif al-‘Arif, Tarikh Ghazza, 281.
19. In addition to municipal wells, both authors described the importance of private
wells—of which al-‘Arif said there were forty-eight in the city—in providing water for
the population. Abu Sha‘ban recounted how ‘‘most of the people drank from wells
that were next to their homes, or brought water from nearby wells in jugs or jars’’
(Abu Sha‘ban, 68).
20. Al-‘Arif, Tarikh Ghazza, 283.
21. Abu Sha‘ban, Naqd wa-Tahlil, 68.
22. Ibid., 68–69. Khan Yunis faced a similar issue about compelling people to pay fees
since ‘‘there are private wells from which families obtain their water.’’ Ultimately, as in
Gaza, a law was enacted ‘‘for the payment of water fees by all residents of Khan Yunis
whether water is supplied or not’’ (isa, rg 2, box 208, g/165/34, letter from District
Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 22 April 1935).
23. isa, rg 22, box 3464, file 7, 8 September 1932, letter from Acting Commissioner of
Southern District to Chief Secretary.
24. co 733, file 97471, letter from High Commissioner to Secretary of State for Colonies,
10 December 1932.
25. Unfortunately, there are no records that describe the well-digging process, how the
site was chosen, etc., details of which would no doubt shed considerable light on the
practical relations between government and municipality.
26. Al-‘Arif, Tarikh Ghazza, 382.
27. Abu Sha‘ban, Naqd wa-Tahlil, 70. In 1939, another well was dug that supplied water
to Rimal. This well, the Safa well, al-‘Arif described as supplying ‘‘the sweetest water
found in Gaza by far’’ (al-‘Arif, Tarikh Ghazza, 283).
28. isa, rg 2, box 504, file w/40/46, ‘‘Gaza Drainage—Summary of Col. Porteous’
Report of June 1936.’’ The report also noted, ‘‘There is no lack of under-ground
water, wells in and around the Municipal area being numerous.’’
282 • Notes to Chapter 6
29. Both Arturo Escobar and Jim Ferguson note the ways in which development dis-
course and practice identify local incapacities, which it can then ‘‘treat and reform.’’
Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third
World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), and James Ferguson, The Anti-
Politics Machine: ‘‘Development,’’ Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).
30. Gaza City Council, Minutes of 27 May 1936 Meeting.
31. There were plenty of instances during the Mandate when the central government did
take over municipal or village operations. Faluja is a case in point.
32. Minutes of 4 June 1936, meeting.
33. isa, rg 2, box 216, file g/25/41, Petition to Chief Secretary, 1 April 1941.
34. The petitioners complained that their quarter was being unfairly singled out for
meters (the other quarters of the city did not have them) and argued that the new
system was unfair to the poor, who would now be charged at the same rate as the
wealthy.
35. This woman explained to me that her father was a mukhtar, not an o≈cial one, but
someone recognized by other villagers as being a notable. This nobility was evident,
she suggested, in his water practices: ‘‘My father had a farm, there was a waterwheel
in our farm called the village’s basin. Everybody came to the basin. My father sat near
the waterwheel and welcomed everybody’’ (interview, Shati Camp, 16 March 1999).
36. Roy explains that ‘‘existing municipal services could not possibly keep pace with the
excess demand placed on them. . . . Gaza City, for example, with a prewar population
of 35,000 and an annual income of £P 100,000, now had to provide services to a
population of 170,000 on the same budget’’ (Gaza Strip, 78).
37. isa, rg 115, box 2024, file 14, Refugee A√airs Report. Under this system, camp resi-
dents were able to get ten liters of water a day per person. The report noted that
ordinary daily consumption for residents of Gaza City was thirty to forty liters a day.
38. Administrative Instructions concerning contravention and permits issued by Direc-
tor of Social A√airs and Refugees on 13 May 1961.
39. Interview, Gaza City, 8 May 1999.
40. New York Times, ‘‘Israel Ousts Mayor and Council of Gaza,’’ 23 October 1972.
41. Mosely Lesch, ‘‘Gaza: History and Politics.’’ She further indicates that when Shawwa
returned to his position in 1975 he claimed it was because Israeli agreed to ‘‘freeze’’
that order (232).
42. Interview, Gaza City, 4 May 1999.
43. Interview, Gaza City, 17 March 1999.
44. isa, rg 2, box 2024, file 20, Mabahith report on political activity in Gaza area for
period between 8 June and 20 June 1966.
45. When I interviewed Abu Jamal, he read me a long letter that he had written on
behalf of the Retired Civil Servants Association to the director of the Pensions
Administration, asking for higher pension payments for retirees.
46. Interview, Gaza City, 4 May 1999.
Notes to Chapter 6 • 283
47. This equivalence of water servicing has not been sustained in Gaza. At the time I was
doing my research, Gaza faced a severe water shortage. During the summer many
homes had no water at all during the day. If, however, one could a√ord a generator
and pump, it was possible to keep the water flowing. Additionally, the quality of the
water that flowed from the faucets was not generally acceptable for drinking, though
this quality varied from neighborhood to neighborhood.
48. De Certeau and Giard, ‘‘A Practical Science of the Singular,’’ 256.
49. Government o≈ces still follow this 8 a.m. to 2 p.m. schedule, though, unlike o≈ces in
the United States, they are open six days a week.
50. De Certeau and Giard, ‘‘A Practical Science of the Singular,’’ 256.
51. Nuseirat, Bureij, and Maghazi are known known collectively as the midcamps be-
cause of their position in the middle of the Strip.
52. isa, rg 115, box 2096, file 21.
53. Report from mabahith director to Director of Social A√airs and Refugees, 16 April
1967.
54. In all the statements, everyone, however strong their objection to the project, denied
having any knowledge of ‘Ali Harb’s destroying pumps in the camp. This despite the
conviction of the mabahith that he did so. In the absence of any other information on
this case, the facts are di≈cult to judge. It is certainly possible that the local mabahith
o≈cers were simply mistaken or were pinning the blame on Harb (an unrwa
employee) as a means of distancing the Administration from any responsibility for
the broken pumps. On the other hand, it is equally possible that the Nuseirat
residents, while willing to object to Harb’s plan, were not willing to denounce him, a
local, as a saboteur.
55. Report from police o≈cer to mabahith inspector, 4 April 1967.
56. A particular absence in the investigative record leaves me wondering. None of the
statements, with their objections to the plan, were taken from women. What might
these refugees, the ones who did the work of getting water from the pumps, have said
about the proposal to pipe water directly into their homes? I do not think it is a
foregone conclusion that women would have supported the project (I’m sure they
would have seen a lot of other uses for their ten pounds), but it would be extremely
interesting to be able to know what they said about it.
57. Statement from Block c resident, 20 April 1967.
58. Report from police o≈cer to mabahith inspector, 16 April 1967.
59. Interview, Gaza City, 20 March 1999.
60. Interview, Jabalya camp, 13 May 1999.
61. Interview, Gaza City, 7 June 1999.
62. isa, rg 2, box 484, file w/197/33, letter from Fahmi Husseini, Rushdi Shawa, Yousif
Sayegh, Musa El-Borno, Musa Sourani, Haj Raghib Abu Sha‘ban, ‘Abdel Nour
Franji, et al. to High Commissioner, 21 July 1933.
63. isa, rg 12, box 4101, file 9/33/1/1, memo from Public Works Department, 16 Octo-
ber 1946.
284 • Notes to Chapter 6
64. Ibid., letters between District Commissioner and Public Works Department, 27
November and 5 December 1944.
65. isa, rg 12, box 4100, file 9/33/1, ‘‘Extract from Arabic Press,’’ 14 December 1935.
66. isa, rg 2, box 485, file w/295/33, letter from Beersheba sheikhs to High Commis-
sioner, 29 November 1936.
67. Letter to Chief Secretary from Arab Chamber of Commerce, 15 February 1937.
68. Letter from the High Commissioner to the Chief Justice, Law Courts, 25 March
1938.
69. For example, an article from 18 June 1935 chastised the Majdal municipal authorities
for cleaning the streets only when government health inspectors came to town,
which, as the article said, ‘‘does not show concern for the people.’’
70. Al-Difa‘, 2 January 1935.
71. Al-Difa‘, 28 May 1935. The problem of restricted access to roads has returned with a
vengeance during the Israeli occupation, and now it is not simply the location of
roads that makes them exclusive, but a set of regulations that bar Palestinians from
using roads reserved for Israeli settlers.
72. Those who could not read or could not a√ord to purchase newspapers did often hear
these papers read aloud. For those living in a small village, this required that at least
someone in the village be able to read. As Abu Said recalled, ‘‘No one knew reading
or writing—only one . . . he read the newspaper . . . [the people] came to listen to the
news.’’
73. The political character of transportation services was evident during the 1936–39
revolt and after, when telephone lines and railroads became objects of attack in the
rebellion. As the years went on, these events became more frequent causes of service
interruption.
74. dw, Qawa’im al-Mushir, group 8, file 1–27/s g/14, ‘‘Administration of the Areas
Controlled by Egyptian Forces in Palestine,’’ memo on telephone/telegraph in Gaza-
Rafah Area, 17 July 1949.
75. In October 1949, the interior minister, at the request of military intelligence, agreed
to open the telephone lines between Gaza and Egypt (ibid., report on telephone
conversation between Interior Minister and representative of Military Intelligence).
76. dw, Qawa’im al-Mushir, group 42, file 99905, al-Tahrir, ‘‘The Train of Troubles and
the Transportation Problems,’’ 10 October 1959.
77. Ibid., letter from Inspector General for Transportation to Governor General, 14
October 1959.
78. Ibid., letter from Gaza and Southern Villages Car Company to Director of Public
Works and Transportation, 31 October 1959.
79. Interview, Shati Camp, 15 March 1999.
80. isa, rg 115, box 2024, file 3, report from police o≈cer to mabahith inspector, 10 July
1963.
81. isa, rg 115, box 2024, file 3, report from police o≈cer to mabahith inspector, 10 July
1966.
Notes to Chapter 7 • 285
82. This was not an isolated incident, and the mabahith report noted further that there
was a group of civil servants from the southern part of the Strip who were awaiting
the resolution of this matter in order to present their own similar petition.
7. Formations of Civic Life
The full citation of this chapter’s second epigraph is Bylaws of Arab unrwa Em-
ployees Association, isa, rg 115, box 2056, file 26, Bylaws of Arab unrwa Employees
Association, 3 March 1961.
1. For a discussion of security services in Gaza, see Ilana Feldman, ‘‘Interesting Times,
Insecure States: The Work of Government and the Making of Gaza in the British
Mandate and the Egyptian Administration, 1917–1967’’ (Ph.D. diss., University of
Michigan, 2002).
2. Pierre Mayol, ‘‘Propriety,’’ in The Practice of Everyday Life, 2:15–34, 17.
3. Ibid.
4. Colin Gordon, ‘‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduction,’’ in The Foucault E√ect:
Studies in Governmentality, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, 1–
51 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 2.
5. While Jewish and Christian services were also part of this public service domain,
given the almost entirely Muslim population of Gaza, my discussion is limited to
Islamic services.
6. Robert Eisenman, Islamic Law in Palestine and Israel: A History of the Survival of the
Tanzimat and Shari’a in the British Mandate and the Jewish State (Leiden: E.J. Brill,
1978), 12–19.
7. Associational life has been recognized as a crucial part of ‘‘the public sphere’’ (see
Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into
a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Berger [Cambridge: mit Press, 1989].
See also Geo√ Eley, ‘‘Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in
the Nineteenth Century,’’ in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun, 298
[Cambridge: mit Press, 1992]).
8. Gaza’s religious services were particular and inflected by its particularities but by no
means unique. Considering the case of Saudi Arabia, Talal Asad argues that Islamic
tradition o√ers a path for political-moral debate in the form of nasiha (moral advice):
‘‘[Nasiha] reflects the principle that a well-regulated polity depends on its members
being virtuous individuals who are partly responsible for one another’s moral condi-
tion—and therefore in part on continuous moral criticism’’ (‘‘The Limits of Religious
Criticism in the Middle East: Notes on Islamic Public Argument,’’ in Genealogies of
Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam, 233 [Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993]). Egyptian Islamists, who perceive themselves
as being in opposition to the Egyptian government (a perception shared by the
government) participate in a similar practice of moral advising, as do sanctioned
‘ulama’ in Saudi Arabia. Da‘wa, Charles Hirschkind writes, is ‘‘understood as an
ethical form of speech and action aimed at improving the moral conduct of one’s
286 • Notes to Chapter 7
fellow community members’’ (‘‘Civic Virtue and Religious Reason: An Islamic Coun-
terpublic,’’ Cultural Anthropology 16, 1 [2001]: 7).
9. For a detailed examination of the establishment and operations of the Supreme
Muslim Council in Mandate Palestine, see Uri M. Kupferschmidt, The Supreme
Muslim Council: Islam under the British Mandate for Palestine (New York: E. J. Brill,
1987).
10. See, in addition to Kupferschmidt, Michel Dumper, ‘‘Forty Years Without Slumber-
ing: Waqf Politics and Administration in the Gaza Strip, 1948–1967,’’ British Journal
of Middle East Studies 20, 2 (1993): 174–90.
11. Cited in Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim Council, 39.
12. Report by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of
Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Year 1936, Colonial no. 129 (1937), 39–40.
13. There was considerable overlap in these categories, as smc employees were often
considered community leaders and no doubt frequently joined these societies.
14. ‘Uthman al-Tabba‘, Ithaf al-A‘izza fi Tarikh Ghazza, ed. Abd al-Latif Abu Hashim
(Gaza: Maktabat al-Yaziji, 1999), fn. 1 (by Abu Hashim), 339.
15. Kupferschmidt, Supreme Muslim Council, 250
16. Al-Tabba‘, Ithaf al-A‘izza, 339.
17. Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). The index provides a quick glimpse of
this variety.
18. Asad, ‘‘Religious Criticism in the Middle East,’’ 216.
19. Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety, 61–62.
20. Al-Tabba‘, Ithaf al-A‘izza, 339.
21. Kupferschmidt indicates that active concern about missionary activity increased after
1929, partly connected, he suggests, to the fact that a missionary conference was held
in Jerusalem in 1928. He also notes that the number of converts was undoubtedly
small (The Supreme Muslim Council, 247–48).
22. This delineation of a Palestinian agenda should also make clear the complexity of
concerns during the Mandate. The conflict with Zionism was the most prominent
issue among Palestinians during this period, but it was by no means the only one.
23. Ibid., 250.
24. ut, Papers of Jam‘iyyat al-Amr bi-l -Ma‘ruf wa-l -Nahy ‘an al-Munkar, Ghazza.
25. Papers of Jam‘iyyat al-Amr bi-l -Ma‘ruf, letter from Society to head of smc, n.d.
26. Whether the society was formally granted authority over government preachers, I do
not know.
27. Weldon Matthews, Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation: Arab Nationalists
and Popular Politics in Mandate Palestine (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 138. Matthews
describes the Istiqlal party’s use of all of these terms in its articulation of the nation.
28. The current popularity of Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) as a nationalist
organization is a relatively recent phenomenon. See Jean-François Legrain, ‘‘The
Notes to Chapter 7 • 287
Islamic Movement and the Intifada,’’ in Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, ed. Jamal
R. Nasser and Roger Heacock, 175–89 (New York: Praeger, 1990); Lisa Taraki, ‘‘The
Islamic Resistance Movement in the Palestinian Uprising,’’ in Intifada: The Palestin-
ian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation, ed. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, 171–77
(Boston: South End Press, 1989); and Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestin-
ian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (Columbia: Columbia University Press,
2000).
29. Reporting on their e√orts, one group of mukhtars wrote to the society president in
January 1937 to say they had preached against abomination, had encouraged sincerity,
and called for struggle ‘‘to defend the nation and protect their lands’’ (letter from 5
mukhtars to President of Society, 9 January 1937). Not all preachers had the same
success. Hassan Hamad, who had been sent in April 1936 to preach in the main
mosque of the Shaja‘iyya quarter of Gaza City, reported that when he arrived at the
mosque his entrance was blocked by some of the worshipers. Not knowing who they
were and not wanting trouble in ‘‘God’s house,’’ Hassan left the scene. He was later
given the names of the objectors by witnesses to the incident and, in his report to the
society, he stated, ‘‘There were a large number of worshipers present and [the
objectors’] actions constitute a lack of respect for mosques, non-implementation of
the decisions of the Society, and a personal insult to me as the lecturer. I am
completely convinced that these troublemakers are motivated by personal interests.’’
Hassan closed by asking the society to inform government about what had happened
and ask it to take steps to prevent such behavior from continuing (letter from Hassan
Hamad to President of the Society, 5 April 1936).
30. Letter from Said Muhammad Allah to Society President, 26 February 1936.
31. In addition to preaching, the society also published calls to moral conduct. In a
bayan (declaration) published in late 1935 or early 1936, the society chastised the
people for their poor morals, saying ‘‘the majority of them are neglectful of prayer,
don’t give zakat, drink alcohol, partake of usury and gambling . . . they have crossed
the line and angered God who will deny them entrance into heaven’’ (announcement
from society, n.d.). The society published its announcement to encourage people to
return to God and religion, assuring them that ‘‘there is no doubt of God’s mercy if
they believe.’’
32. Ibid., letter from Society to High Commissioner, n.d.; Monthly Report for Sha‘ban
1355 from Gaza Society to Head of Central Society in Jerusalem, November 1936;
Monthly Report for Muharram 1356 from Gaza Society to Head of Central Society,
April 1937.
33. Letter to President of the Society, 25 May 1936.
34. This concern was evident in the society’s papers. In 1934, a member of the society
wrote to the head of the organization, telling him that ‘‘in Gaza there is an English
hospital and inside it there is a missionary school, which is spreading poison to the
children of this nation [umma]. It claims to be about education and cultivation of the
mind, but it is a mission—from the Protestant Missionary Association. Large num-
288 • Notes to Chapter 7
bers of Muslim children have joined the school. . . . I have great hope that you will ask
these people not to send their children to the school’’ (ut, Papers of Jam‘iyyat al-Amr
bi-l Ma’ruf, letter from member of Society to President, 11 March 1934).
35. Ibid., Society Monthly Report, April 1936.
36. Monthly Report, 17 June 1936—from Pres. of Assoc.—to the Head of Central Assoc.
37. See letter from preacher to Society, 16 December 1935; Society Monthly Report for
Shawwal 1355 [December/January 1936/7]; letter from preacher to Society 20 Rama-
dan 1355 [4 December 1936]; and Monthly Report for Muharram 1356 [March/April
1937].
38. This was how Salim Rashid, a civil servant discussed in chapter 2, described the best
civil service work.
39. Dumper, ‘‘Forty Years Without Slumbering,’’ 178.
40. Ibid., 179. The basic problem was that the smc was designed to be a national body
overseeing a number of di√erent ‘‘local’’ councils. Gaza being the only remnant of
Palestine, there was only one council to oversee.
41. Ibid., 180.
42. dw, Qawa’im al-Mushir, Group 8, file number 1–27/s g/14, folder 1 ‘‘Administration
of the Areas Controlled by Egyptian Forces in Palestine,’’ letter from Governor
General to Agent of Awqaf Ministry, October 1949.
43. Ibid., report about Palestine Administration, 26 October 1949.
44. Ibid. and letter from Governor General to Minister of Social A√airs, October 1949.
45. isa rg 115, box 2014, unnumbered file, Deir Belah council minutes, 25 August 1953;
isa, rg 115, box 2023, file 23, letter to Director of Municipal A√airs, 2 August 1957.
46. Despite the evident utility of the dispersal of religious services throughout the
departments of government, the transformation was not entirely smooth. For exam-
ple, authority over the entire shari‘a court system was transferred to the Appeals
Court, but the appointment of a sta√ to manage these responsibilities lagged behind.
In 1959, a member of Gaza’s Legislative Council expressed his frustration that the
court ‘‘has a large administrative responsibility without any administrative employ-
ees’’ (dw, Qawa’im al-Mushir, group 42, file 91215, Report on 5th Council Session). In
another redistribution of responsibility, in 1958, oversight for teachers of the Fallah
school, the premier waqf school in Gaza, was transferred to the Education Depart-
ment (pssa, file #183/2000, personnel file of Fallah schoolteacher). This transfer
engendered problems of equivalency among the personnel, specifically, how to calcu-
late the length of service for pension purposes of Fallah schoolteachers in relation to
teachers in secular schools, which had been part of the Education Department since
1948.
47. Rema Hammami, ‘‘Between Heaven and Earth: Transformations in Religiosity and
Labor Among Southern Palestinian Peasant and Refugee Women, 1920–1993’’ (diss.,
Temple University, 1994).
48. isa, rg 115, box 2007, file 22, Bylaws of the Society of the Followers of Sunna in Khan
Yunis, April 1953.
Notes to Chapter 7 • 289
49. Ibid., from Head of Khan Yunis Mabahith, to Administrative Governor of Khan
Yunis, 5 March 1959.
50. From Khan Yunis Administrative Governor to Director of Mabahith, 24 June 1959.
Restriction did not mean a total ban on social religious groups though. Police files
record, for instance, the case of a group of people who ‘‘claim to be Sufi’’ (isa, rg 115,
box 2096, file 13) being given permission to operate a zawiya (religious establishment)
after the members, including many civil servants, were personally interviewed by the
police director and after the group swore ‘‘that we will not allow any one who is
suspected or wanted to the security services to enter our place’’ (isa, rg 115, box 2096,
file 13, letter to Chief Judge of Shari‘a Appeals Court, 25 Sept. 1966; statement by
Zawiya, 29 October 1966). In this case, the group acquired its permission by agreeing
to take on the control functions of government itself. And since the permission was
conditional, the Administration could shut down this (and any other) organization if
it ever appeared threatening.
51. ‘‘Between Heaven and Earth,’’ 136–37.
52. Ibid., 141–42.
53. Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 78.
54. Hammami cites a passage from a 1965 textbook that underscores this point: ‘‘We
treated among the subjects that the Islamic religion is the religion of happiness and
respect, and that it is the religion for individual life, and for the family, and for the
group, for the community and for all’’ (‘‘Between Heaven and Earth,’’ 142).
55. isa, rg 115, box 2096, file 21, from Awqaf Commissioner to preachers and teachers in
mosques, 21 May 1967.
56. Education is crucial for governments of all kinds. Colonial states, as Homi Bhabha
has argued, sought to produce a class of educated ‘‘natives’’ who would mimic English
ways and be ‘‘almost the same, but not quite’’ (‘‘Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambiva-
lence of Colonial Discourse,’’ in The Location of Culture [New York: Routledge,
1994], 86). Education has also been undeniably important for the development of
bureaucratic government (Ian Hunter, Rethinking the School: Subjectivity, Bureaucracy,
Criticism [St Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1994]). In the Middle East,
‘‘secular’’ schools were created as mechanisms for producing government personnel
(see Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire).
57. James Holtson and Arjun Appadurai, ‘‘Introduction: Cities and Citizenship,’’ in
Cities and Citizenship, ed. James Holston, 6 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press,
1999).
58. Miller, Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 92.
59. As Miller notes, the terms of the Mandate itself ‘‘protected the right of each commu-
nity to educate its own children’’ (ibid., 90). The only way it would have been
possible to create a single school system would have been to have already created the
broad Palestinian society that joint schooling could have promoted.
60. Precise statistics about the number of schools in the Gaza district (later subdistrict)
290 • Notes to Chapter 7
during the Mandate are di≈cult to come by. As a general guide, the Annual Reports
of the Department of Education provide some information. The 1925–26 report, for
example, indicated that in the Gaza subdistrict there were thirty government schools,
with a total of 1,788 students (1,436 boys and 352 girls) (Government of Palestine,
Department of Education, Annual Report for the Scholastic Year 1925–1926 [Jeru-
salem, 1927]). A 1946 report by A. L. Tibawi on the conclusion of his tenure as
education inspector for the Southern district (made up at that point of the Lydda
and Gaza subdistricts) attests that, whatever the number of schools in Gaza, it was
not enough to meet the demand: ‘‘The admission of pupils to the three types of
schools combined [government, foreign missionary, and private Arab] left every year
an appreciable number of pupils without places in school’’ (Report on Education in the
Southern District, February 1941–October 1946, by A. L. Tibawi, Submitted to the
Director of Education, Government of Palestine). Secondary schooling in Gaza was
limited, as of 1941, to one school in Gaza City, which o√ered two years of postele-
mentary education. By 1945, Majdal was able to o√er one year of such schooling. For
the most part, Gaza students who wanted to pursue their education beyond elemen-
tary schooling had to hope to obtain one of the few seats available in a Jerusalem high
school. As for girls’ education, Tibawi placed the number of village schools for girls at
fourteen, ten of which had been built just in the five years previous. In terms of
overall numbers, he indicated that in 1945 there were 5,161 girls in school in the entire
Southern District (out of a total of 24,584), compared to 3,563 in 1941 (out of a total
of 16,574).
61. Interview, Gaza City, 8 March 1998.
62. Interview, Gaza City, 14 February 1999.
63. Interview, Gaza City, 19 April 1999.
64. The restrictions on political participation continued to rankle after the Mandate. In
1951 the Gazan newspaper al-Raqib published a complaint about an unrwa regula-
tion that its teachers get permission before publishing anything in the papers. This
policy resembled the British restrictions on participation, restrictions which were,
the paper argued, ‘‘part of an e√ort to distance civil servants from their society and to
make of these civil servants human machines, with no right to act except with
permission of their boss’’ (Al-Raqib, 27 November 1951).
65. See Palestine Government, Education Department, Curriculum for Government Ele-
mentary Boys’ Schools in Cities and Villages (1921) and Department of Education,
Elementary School Curriculum (1927).
66. Humphrey Bowman, Middle-East Window (London: Longmans, Green, 1942), 279.
67. Tibawi, Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine: A Study of Three Decades of British
Administration (London: Luzac, 1956), 86–87.
68. Ibid., 88. British o≈cials also came to recognize some of the inadequacies of the
curriculum in Arab schools. The 1940 ‘‘Report of the Committee on Development
and Welfare Services’’ noted the importance of producing textbooks with ‘‘local
knowledge.’’ The report indicated that an English publisher had agreed to take on
Notes to Chapter 7 • 291
this project, and it further commented, ‘‘Until these books become available for
pupils the teaching of history and geography in the whole Arab system must remain
largely ine√ective.’’
69. Interview, Gaza City, 19 April 1999.
70. Interview, Gaza City, 8 March 1998.
71. Government of Palestine, ‘‘Education Ordinance, no. 1 of 1933,’’ Ordinances: Annual
Volume for 1933.
72. Palestine Royal Commission Report, Cmd. 5479 (July 1937), 97.
73. A teacher could not so easily escape repercussions from political activity. Skeik noted
that punishment for misbehavior or conflict at work was often transfer to a post far
from home (Ghazza ‘Abr al-Tarikh: Dhikrayat wa-Intaba‘at ‘an Ghazza Qabl Nusf
Qarn (n.d.), 80).
74. Tibawi, Report on Education in the Southern District.
75. Hammami argues that ‘‘by the end of the 1950s, Nasserist Arabism was the hege-
monic political ideology in Gaza.’’ and she cites education as one of the most impor-
tant factors in ‘‘creating consent for the Egyptian regime, if not always for the local
authority that represented it’’ (‘‘Between Heaven and Earth,’’ 139).
76. Interview, Gaza City, 12 November 1999.
77. Interview, Gaza City, 3 May 1999.
78. Interview, Gaza City, 13 March 1999.
79. Interview, Gaza City, 15 April 1999. Indeed, the afsc did support a schooling pro-
gram as part of their relief work.
80. This phenomenon was also noted by Quakers, afsc, #60 fs Sect Palestine, Report
on Education Activities for December 1949. In addition to employing Palestinians,
the Egyptians brought teachers from Egypt to meet the demand for education, which
initially exceeded the local capacity to provide educators. Eventually, Gazans who
had benefited from the expanded educational opportunities took over teaching and
became an important source of teachers for other parts of the Arab world.
81. One native Gazan described to me how the interest in education among refugees had
enabled them to get ahead, even of native Gazans: ‘‘Then the refugees exceeded us in
education, and civilization. They took high positions outside [the country], but
when they came back during the pna period, they all came millionaires. In my house
I have water and electricity, but he is living in a shack, so he says to himself, ‘Why do
not I go to Saudi Arabia and bring money?’ Of course he studied and worked. They
loved to be educated more than we were. The refugee says that he lost his home and
education, so he had to study. The native says that his father has an orchard so why
should he study. The refugee says, ‘I want to have a better social status. I want to
leave the shack. I want a good house. I want to have a car. I want to marry a beautiful
woman.’ That is why they are more educated than we are’’ (interview, Gaza City, 23
March 1999).
82. For more on the distinctions and tensions between refugees and natives, see Feld-
man, ‘‘Di≈cult Distinctions.’’
292 • Notes to Chapter 7
83. Al-Raqib, 17 May 1952.
84. dw, Qawa’im al-Mushir, Group 42, file 91105, ‘‘Report of the technical committee’s
visit to some of the elementary schools in Gaza from January 4–8, 1959.’’ The
committee noted that a few government classes used local books (which may well
have been Mandate leftovers) and that all unrwa schools used Egyptian books.
85. dw, Qawa’im al-Mushir, Group 41, file 90505, letter from Director of Palestine
A√airs Administration to Governor General, 7 March 1960.
86. Ibid.
87. dw, Qawa’im al-Mushir, Group 42, file 91105, ‘‘Report on Education in Gaza,’’ 1959.
88. Given the di≈culties in creating an economic infrastructure inside the Strip, it was
also nearly impossible to develop educational services that were truly equipped to
meet these immediate needs. The recommendations of the report indicate this di≈-
culty. The best suggestion it could come up with was neither to change education in
the Strip, nor to improve the economy there (both worthwhile but seemingly impos-
sible goals), but rather to increase work opportunities for Gazans abroad and then
impose a tax on those salaries.
89. For the most part unrwa, seeing work as part of the basket of services provided by
the agency, employed refugees only. Ibrahim had a college degree when he began
working in 1952 (a rarity at the time), and he told me that those qualifications
overrode the hiring restrictions (interview, Gaza City, 20 March 1999).
90. Ibrahim commented that the committee also worked to establish a parents’ council
to give parents advice about how to raise their children in ways that would comple-
ment the work of the schools.
91. Ibrahim’s description of his work closely resembles Gregory Starrett’s discussion of
education in Egypt at this time: ‘‘Education was not merely for the amelioration of
illiteracy, but the ‘enculturation of the children of the nation’s masses,’ ‘leading them
to an appropriate national life’ ’’ (Putting Islam to Work, 78). Gaza’s schoolbooks came
from Egypt, so this convergence is not surprising.
92. isa, rg 115, box 1983, file 1, memo from Education Director to school principals, 7
January 1958; file 2, Report from police o≈cer to police inspector on meeting held
between Governor General and school principals, 2 October 1959.
93. isa, rg 115, box 2007, file 2.
94. Statement by Bureij School teacher, 12 October 1959; letter from Deir Belah Gover-
nor to Mabahith Director, 17 October 1959.
95. Report to police inspector, 4 January 1960; Police Inspector memo, 9 January 1960.
96. Mu’in Basisu, Descent into the Water: Palestinian Notes from Arab Exile (Wilmette,
Ill.: Medina Press, 1980), 32–40.
97. On party activity in Gaza during this time, see Ziad Abu ‘Amr, Usul al-Harakat al-
Siyasiyya fi Qita‘ Ghazza.
98. While Basisu was a communist, Ibrahim said that he and many other teachers were
falsely accused of party a≈liation. His only crime, he insisted, was to demand
support for the Palestinian struggle. Basisu notes how closely connected teacher and
Notes to Chapter 8 • 293
communist were in the Administration’s imagination. Describing interrogation, he
says that when a teacher identified himself as such the response was, ‘‘Teacher? That
means Communist, you son of a bitch’’ (Descent into the Water, 68).
99. un Archives, s-0530-0151, file c-32, letter from un General Counsel to Under Secre-
tary and Legal Counsel, 22 April 1965.
100. Sayigh, ‘‘Escalation or Containment?’’
101. un Archives, s-0530-0151, file c-32, Palestine Gazette (al-Waqai‘ al-Filastiniyya), Law
Number 4 of 1965 Concerning Military and National Service, 10 March 1965 (un
Translation).
8. Conclusion
1. Nikolas Rose, ‘‘Governing ‘Advanced’ Liberal Democracies,’’ in Foucault and Political
Reason, 37–64, 46. See also Michel Foucault, ‘‘The Birth of Biopolitics.’’
2. See Ann Stoler and Fred Cooper, eds., Tensions of Empire; Gyan Prakash, Another
Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1999); Mehta, Liberalism and Empire.
3. This point has long since been taught us by feminist historians. For a classic example,
see Joan Kelly-Gadol, ‘‘Did Women Have a Renaissance?’’ in Becoming Visible:
Women in European History, ed. Renate Bridenthal and Claudia Koonz, 148–52
(Boston, 1977).
4. See Homi Bhabha, ‘‘In a Spirit of Calm Violence,’’ in After Colonialism, ed. Gyan
Prakash, 326–43 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Suleri, The Rhetoric
of English India; Ann Stoler, ‘‘Sexual A√ronts and Racial Frontiers: European Identi-
ties and the Cultural Politics of Exclusion in Colonial Southeast Asia,’’ Comparative
Studies in Society and History 34 (1992): 514–51; Cooper, ‘‘Colonizing Time.’’
5. Coronil, The Magical State, 116.
6. Das, ‘‘The Signature of the State.’’
7. See, for example, Eric Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity
in Modern Iraq (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Meeker, A Nation of
Empire; Martin van Beek, ‘‘Public Secrets, Conscious Amnesia, and the Celebration
of Autonomy for Ladakh,’’ in States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the
Postcolonial State (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001).
8. For a damning account of U.S. governing practices in Iraq, see Rajiv Chandrase-
karan, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone (New York: Knopf,
2006).
9. Weber, Economy and Society, 989.
10. For discussions of Gaza under Israeli occupation, see, in addition to Roy, The Gaza Strip;
Butt, Life at the Crossroads; Paul Cossali and Clive Robson, Stateless in Gaza (London:
Zed Books, 1986); Richard Locke and Antony Stewart, Bantustan Gaza (London: Zed
Books, 1985).
11. Nimrod Raphaeli, ‘‘Gaza Under Four Administrations,’’ Public Administration in
Israel and Abroad 9 (1968): 40–51, 47.
294 • Notes to Chapter 8
12. Quote from Israeli Army magazine, December 1968; cited in Raphaeli, Gaza Under
Four Administrations, 48.
13. Interview, Gaza City, 13 March 1999.
14. ‘‘Arabs Get Ultimatum to Turn in Arms,’’ New York Times, 20 June 1967.
15. ‘‘Dayan Visits Gaza and Wins Arab Aid,’’ New York Times, 22 June 1967.
16. Mosely Lesch, ‘‘Gaza: History and Politics,’’ 229.
17. Ibid., 229–30; and Roy, The Gaza Strip, 104–6.
18. The mayor and council had been dismissed once before, in January 1971. See Mosely
Lesch, ‘‘Gaza: History and Politics,’’ 231. The councils outside Gaza City seem to
have been permitted to continue, but details about their operations are lacking. See
Muhammad al-Khass, ‘‘Municipal Legal Structure in Gaza,’’ in A Palestinian Agenda
for the West Bank and Gaza, ed. Emile A. Nakhleh, 102–6 (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute, 1980).
19. Roy, The Gaza Strip, 105.
20. As the New York Times reported at the time, ‘‘The Israelis, without major publicity
and without making their ultimate intentions completely clear, are evicting families
from the three most crowded camps here, o√ering them other quarters—mostly in El
Arish, south of the Gaza Strip—and bulldozing their homes’’ (‘‘Gaza a Monument to
Wretchedness Caused in Mideast,’’ 20 August 1971).
21. Recognition of the politics of moving refugees did not always stop people from
appreciating these new houses. After his move one refugee told a reporter, ‘‘This
house is bigger, better and cleaner than the old one. . . . We have electricity, running
water and room to breathe here.’’ But another insisted, ‘‘I had no choice. . . . They
came and said I had to go. . . . It’s a miserable place with only three small rooms’’ (New
York Times, ‘‘Israel’s Refugee-Resettling Project Is Transforming Gaza Strip,’’ 2 April
1973).
22. For discussion of Israeli work with space, see Rafi Segal and Eyal Weizman, eds., A
Civilian Occupation: The Politics of Israeli Architecture (London: Verso, 2003).
23. Tom Segev, 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East, trans.
Jessica Cohen (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), 455.
24. Pursuant to the Oslo Accords the West Bank and Gaza were divided into three
categories: Area a (approximately 65 percent of Gaza and 3 percent of the West
Bank), where Palestinians had both security and civil control; Area b (about 23
percent of the West Bank), where Palestinians had civil control and the Israelis
retained military control; and Area c, where Israel had full control.
25. In the years since, an electricity plant was built in Gaza and then was destroyed by
Israeli forces in the summer of 2006.
26. Serge Schmemann, ‘‘Palestinians Say Israeli Aim Was to Destroy Framework, from
Archives to Hard Drives,’’ New York Times, 16 April 2002. These would have been
West Bank records.
27. According to a New York Times report from fall 2005, Eyad Sarraj, founder and head
of the Gaza Community Mental Health Program, diagnosed a near total breakdown:
Notes to Chapter 8 • 295
‘‘ ‘Who rules Gaza?’ He asked. ‘It’s certainly not the central Palestinian Authority.’
There is no law or security here, he said, adding, ‘The reality is that the Gaza Strip is
controlled from outside by Israel and from inside by groups intertwined with se-
curity forces and tribes’ ’’ (Steve Erlanger, ‘‘In Unruly Gaza, Clans Compete in Power
Void,’’ New York Times, 17 October 2005).
28. For discussions of how to conceptualize ‘‘modernity,’’ in its di√erent guises, see Talal
Asad,’’Conscripts of Western Civilization,’’ in Civilization in Crisis: Anthropological
Perspectives, ed. Christine Gailey, 333–51 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press,
1992); Timothy Mitchell, ed., Questions of Modernity, (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2000); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the
Wake of Subaltern Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); and Bruce
Knauft, ed., Critically Modern: Alternatives, Alterities, Anthropologies (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2002).
29. James Ferguson, Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order (Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006); Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Muta-
tions in Citizenship and Sovereignty (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006);
Rose, Powers of Freedom.
30. Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, ‘‘Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of
Neoliberal Governmentality,’’ American Ethnologist 29, 4 (2002): 981–1002; Jamie
Peck and Adam Tickell, ‘‘Neoliberalizing Space,’’ Antipode 34, 3 (2002): 380–404;
Benjamin Chesluk, ‘‘ ‘Visible Signs of a City Out of Control’: Community Policing in
New York City,’’ Cultural Anthropology 19, 2 (2004): 250–75.
31. Trouillot, Global Transformations, 95. Trouillot does not argue that bureaucracy is an
inappropriate object of anthropological inquiry. His point is that anthropology is
especially well suited to investigate other sorts of state e√ects. My contention is that
anthropological techniques can in fact illuminate features of bureaucratic practice to
which other approaches might not pay attention.
32. George Marcus, ‘‘Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-
Sited Ethnography,’’ in Ethnography through Thick and Thin, 79–104 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998).
33. See Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception; Victoria Bernal, ‘‘Eritrea Goes Global: Reflec-
tions on Nationalism in a Transnational Era,’’ Cultural Anthropology 19, 1 (2004):
3–25.
34. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights.




American Friends Service Committee Archives [afsc], Philadelphia
Dar al-Kutub, Egyptian National Library, Cairo
Dar al-Watha’iq (dw), Egyptian National Archives, Cairo
Israel State Archives (isa), Jerusalem
Jewish National Library, Jerusalem
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
The National Archives [formerly Public Record O≈ce], London
New York Public Library, New York, N.Y.
‘Omari Mosque Library, Gaza City
United Nations Archives, New York, N.Y.
Government Offices and Private Papers
Awqaf Administration (aa), Palestinian National Authority, Gaza City
Gaza City Municipal Council, Gaza City
Housing Ministry, Palestinian National Authority, Gaza City
Pensions and Social Security Administration (pssa), Palestinian National Authority,
Gaza City
Papers of ‘Uthman al-Tabba‘ (ut)
Government Publications
Gaza City Municipality. Gaza Municipality: Between the Future and the Present, 1996.
Palestine Government. Annual Report to the Council of the League of Nations on the
Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 1924–39.
Palestine Government Education Department. Curriculum for Government Elementary
Boys’ Schools in Cities and Villages, 1921.
———. Elementary School Curriculum, 1927.
298 • Bibliography
———. Annual Reports, 1925–39.
Palestine Police Force. Annual Administrative Reports, 1934–38.
Palestine Royal Commission Report. Cmd. 5479, July 1937.
Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929. Cmd. 3530. London,
March 1930.
Sir John Hope-Simpson, Report on Immigration, Land Settlement, and Development in
Palestine. Cmd. 3686, 1930.
A Survey of Palestine, Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the Information of the
Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Reprinted Washington D.C.: Institute for Pal-
estine Studies, 1991.
United Arab Republic. Gaza: Springboard for the liberation of Palestine. Cairo: Information
Department, n.d.
United Nations Publications
Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine. Supplement No. 11
(a/648), 1948.
Progress Report of the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine. un, ed. Supple-
ment No. 11a (a/689, a/689/Corr. 1 and a/689/Add. 1), 1948.
Refugees and Stateless Persons and Problems of Assistance to Refugees: Report of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. un O≈cial Records: Sixth Ses-
sion—Supplement No. 19 (a/2011), 1952.
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East
[unrwa]. Annual Reports, 1951–67.
———. Special Report of the Director Concerning Other Claimants for Relief. a/2978/Add. 1,
1955.













Abdel-Malek, Anouar. Egypt: Military Society, the Army Regime, the Left, and Social
Change Under Nasser. New York: Random House, 1968.
Bibliography • 299
Abrams, Philip. ‘‘Notes on the Di≈culty of Studying the State.’’ Journal of Historical
Sociology 1 (1988 [1977]): 58–89.
Abu ‘Amr, Ziad. Usul al-Harakat al-Siyasiyyah fi Qita‘ Ghazza, 1948–1967. Akka: Dar al-
Aswar, 1987.
Abu-Ghazaleh, Adnan. Arab Cultural Nationalism in Palestine. Beirut: Institute for Pal-
estine Studies, 1973.
Abu Naml, Husayn. ‘‘Harb al-Fida’iyyin fi Qita‘ Ghazza.’’ Shu’un Filastiniyya 62 (January
1979): 177–99.
———. Qita‘ Ghazza, 1948–1967: Tatawwurat Iqtisadiyya wa-Siyasiyya wa-Ijtima‘iyya wa-
Askariyya. Beirut: plo Research Center, 1979.
Abu Sha‘ban, Hilmi. Tarikh Ghazza: Naqd wa Tahlil. Jerusalem: Matba‘at Bayt al-
Maqdis, 1943.
Ahmed, Jaleel. The Expert and the Administrator. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1959.
Alsberg, P. A. Guide to the Archives in Israel. Volume 1: The Israel State Archives. Jeru-
salem: Israel Archives Association, 1991.
Amin, Shahid. Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chari Chaura, 1922–1992. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1995.
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. New York: Verso, 1991.
Anderson, Douglas R. Strands of System: The Philosophy of Charles Peirce. West Lafayette,
Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1995.
Anghie, Antony. ‘‘Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty,
Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations.’’ nyu Journal of Interna-
tional Law and Politics 34 (2001–2): 513–633.
al-‘Arif, ‘Arif. Tarikh Ghazza. Jerusalem: Dar al-Aytam al-Islamiyya, 1943.
Arono√, Myron, ed. The Frailty of Authority. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books,
1986.
Asad, Talal. ‘‘The Limits of Religious Criticism in the Middle East: Notes on Islamic
Public Argument.’’ In Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Chris-
tianity and Islam, 200–238. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.
‘Ashur, Said. Ghazza Hashim. Amman: Dar al-Diya’, 1988.
Ayubi, Nazih. Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East. London: I.
B. Tauris, 1995.
al-Barghouthi, Omar Bey Salih. ‘‘Local Self-Government—Past and Present.’’ In Pal-
estine: A Decade of Development, edited by Harry Vitales and Khalil Totah, 34–38.
Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1932.
Barry, Andrew, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose. ‘‘Introduction.’’ In Foucault and
Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism and Rationalities of Government, edited by
Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose, 1–17. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1996.
Basisu, Mu’in. Descent into the Water: Palestinian Notes from Arab Exile. Wilmette, Ill.:
Medina Press, 1980.
300 • Bibliography
Bauman, Zygmunt. Modernity and the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989.
Beattie, Kirk. Egypt During the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, Civil Society. Boulder:
Westview Press, 1994.
Beetham, David. Bureaucracy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
Bentwich, Norman, and Helen Bentwich. Mandate Memories: 1918–1948. London:
Hogarth Press, 1965.
Berger, Morroe. Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt: A Study of the Higher Civil
Service. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
Bernal, Victoria. ‘‘Eritrea Goes Global: Reflections on Nationalism in a Transnational
Era.’’ Cultural Anthropology 19, 1 (2004): 3–25.
Bhabha, Homi. ‘‘Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse.’’ In The
Location of Culture, 85–92. New York: Routledge, 1994.
———. ‘‘In a Spirit of Calm Violence.’’ In After Colonialism, edited by Gyan Prakash, 326–
43. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Blau, Peter, and Marshall Meyer. Bureaucracy in Modern Society. New York: Random
House, 1971.
Bourdieu, Pierre. ‘‘Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic
Field.’’ In State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn, edited by George
Steinmatz, 53–75. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.
———. Distinctions: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice. Cam-
bridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1984.
———. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
Bowman, Humphrey. Middle-East Window. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1942.
Boym, Svetlana. Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994.
Bradley, Kenneth. The Colonial Service as a Career. London: His Majesty’s Stationary
O≈ce, 1950.
Brand, Laurie. ‘‘Nasir’s Egypt and the Reemergence of the Palestinian National Move-
ment.’’ Journal of Palestine Studies, 17, 2 (1998):29–45.
Britan, Gerald, and Ronald Cohen. Hierarchy and Society: Anthropological Perspectives on
Bureaucracy. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1980.
Brysk, Alison, and Gershon Shafir. People Out of Place: Globalization, Human Rights, and
the Citizenship Gap. New York: Routledge, 2004.
Buerhig, Edward. The un and the Palestinian Refugees: A Study in Nonterritorial Admin-
istration. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971.
Burke, Peter. ‘‘History as Social Memory.’’ In Memory: History, Culture, and the Mind,
edited by Thomas Butler, 97–115. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.
Butler, Judith. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York: Routledge, 1997.
Butt, Gerald. Life at the Crossroads: A History of Gaza. Nicosia, Cyprus: Rimal Publica-
tions, 1995.
Caplan, Jane, and John Torpey, eds. Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of
State Practices in the Modern World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Bibliography • 301
Caplan, Neil. ‘‘A Tale of Two Cities: The Rhodes and Lausanne Conferences, 1949.’’
Journal of Palestine Studies 21, 3 (spring 1992): 5–34.
Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone. New
York: Knopf, 2006.
Chatterjee, Partha. The Nation and Its Fragments. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1993.
Chesluk, Benjamin. ‘‘ ‘Visible Signs of a City Out of Control’: Community Policing in
New York City.’’ Cultural Anthropology 19, 2 (2004): 250–75.
Cole, Juan. ‘‘Printing and Urban Islam in the Mediterranean World, 1890–1920.’’ In
Modernity and Culture from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, 1890–1920, edited
by Leila Fawaz and C. A. Bayly, 344–64. New York: Columbia University Press,
2002.
———. Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt’s
’Urabi Movement. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
Comaro√, John L. ‘‘Reflections on the Colonial State, in South Africa and Elsewhere:
Factions, Fragments, Facts and Fictions.’’ Social Identities 4, 3 (1998): 321–61.
Connolly, William. ‘‘The Dilemma of Legitimacy.’’ In Legitimacy and the State, ed. Wil-
liam Connolly, 222–49.
Connolly, William, ed. Legitimacy and the State. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.
Cook, Michael. Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Cooper, Frederick. Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History. Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 2005.
———. ‘‘Colonizing Time: Work Rhythms and Labor Conflict in Colonial Mombasa.’’ In
Colonialism and Culture, ed. Nicholas Dirks, 209–46. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1992.
Coronil, Fernando. The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.
Corrigan, Philip, and Derek Sayer. The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural
Revolution. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985.
Cossali, Paul, and Clive Robson. Stateless in Gaza. London: Zed Books, 1986.
Crawford, Neta. Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Hu-
manitarian Intervention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Daniel, E. Valentine. Charred Lullabies: Chapters in an Anthropography of Violence. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Das, Veena. ‘‘The Signature of the State: The Paradox of Illegibility.’’ In Anthropology in
the Margins of the State, edited by Veena Das and Deborah Poole, 225–52. Santa Fe:
sar Press, 2004.
Davis, Eric. Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.
Davis, Mike. City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles. New York: Vintage,
1990.
302 • Bibliography
de Certeau, Michel. The Writing of History. Translated by Tom Conley. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1988.
———. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
de Certeau, Michel, Luce Giard, and Pierre Mayoal. The Practice of Everyday Life. Vol-
ume 2: Living and Cooking. Translated by Timothy Tomasik. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1998.
de Certeau Michel, and Luce Giard. ‘‘A Practical Science of the Singular.’’ In The Practice
of Everyday Life, 2:251–56.
Derrida, Jacques. Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression. Translated by Eric Prenowitz.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
———. ‘‘Signature, Event, Context.’’ In Limited Inc. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University
Press, 1988.
De Vries, David. ‘‘British Rule and Arab-Jewish Coalescence of Interest: The 1946 Civil
Servants’ Strike in Palestine.’’ International Journal of Middle East Studies 36, 4 (2004):
613–38.
Dirks, Nicholas. Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2001.
———. ‘‘Colonial Histories and Native Informants: Biography of an Archive.’’ In Oriental-
ism and the Post-Colonial Predicament, edited by Carol Breckenridge and Peter van der
Veer, 279–313. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993.
du Guy, Paul. In Praise of Bureaucracy: Weber, Organization, Ethics. London: Sage Publica-
tions, 2000.
Dumper, Michael. ‘‘Forty Years Without Slumbering: Waqf Politics and Administration
in the Gaza Strip, 1948–1967.’’ British Journal of Middle East Studies 20, 2 (1993): 174–
90.
Duncan, Christopher R. ‘‘Unwelcome Guests: Relations between Internally Displaced
Persons and Their Hosts in North Sulawesi, Indonesia.’’ Journal of Refugee Studies 18,
1 (2005): 25–46.
Echevarría, Roberto. Myth and Archive: A Theory of Latin American Narrative. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Eisenman, Robert. Islamic Law in Palestine and Israel: A History of the Survival of the
Tanzimat and Shari‘a in the British Mandate and the Jewish State. Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1978.
Eisenstadt, S. N., and Luis Roniger. Patrons, Clients, and Friends: Interpersonal Relations
and the Structure of Trust in Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Eley, Geo√. ‘‘Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nine-
teenth Century.’’ In Habermas and the Public Sphere, edited by Craig Calhoun, 289–
339. Cambridge, Mass.: mit Press, 1992.
Engels, Dagmar, and Shula Marks. Contesting Colonial Hegemony: State and Society in
Africa and India. London: I. B. Tauris, 1994.
Escobar, Arturo. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third
World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Bibliography • 303
Evans, Ivan. Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa. Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1997.
Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press, 1963.
Feldman, Ilana. ‘‘Di≈cult Distinctions: Refugee Law, Humanitarian Practice, and Politi-
cal Identification in Gaza.’’ Cultural Anthropology 22, 1 (2007): 129–69.
———. ‘‘Observing the Everyday: Policing and the Conditions of Possibility in Gaza (1948–
67).’’ Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies 9, 3 (2007): 415–34.
———. ‘‘Home as a Refrain: Remembering and Living Displacement in Gaza.’’ History and
Memory 18, 2 (2006): 10–47.
———. ‘‘Everyday Government in Extraordinary Times: Persistence and Authority in
Gaza’s Civil Service (1917–1967).’’ Comparative Studies in Society and History 47, 4
(2005): 863–91.
———. ‘‘Government Without Expertise?: Competence, Capacity, and Civil Service Prac-
tice in Gaza (1917–1967).’’ International Journal of Middle East Studies 37, 4 (November
2005): 485–507.
———. ‘‘Interesting Times, Insecure States: The Work of Government and the Making of
Gaza in the British Mandate and the Egyptian Administration, 1917–1967.’’ Ph.D.
diss., University of Michigan, 2002.
Ferguson, James. Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order. Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 2006.
———. The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘‘Development,’’ Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in
Lesotho. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Ferguson, Kathleen. The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy. London: Sage, 1984.
Findley, Carter. ‘‘The Ottoman Administrative Legacy and the Modern Middle East.’’ In
Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, edited by L.
Carl Brown, 158–74. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
———. Ottoman Civil O≈cialdom: A Social History. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1989.
———. Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
Fischer-Tiné, Harald, and Michael Mann, eds. Colonialism as Civilizing Mission: Cultural
Ideology in British India. London: Anthem Press, 2004.
Foucault, Michel. ‘‘The Birth of Biopolitics.’’ In Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, edited by
Paul Rabinow, 73–80. New York: Free Press, 1997.
———. ‘‘The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom.’’ In Ethics:
Subjectivity and Truth, edited by Paul Rabinow, 281–301.
———. Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Edited by Paul Rabinow. New York: New Press, 1994.
———. ‘‘Governmentality.’’ In The Foucault E√ect: Studies in Governmentality, edited by
Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, 87–104. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1991.
———. ‘‘Questions of Method.’’ In The Foucault E√ect, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin
Gordon, and Peter Miller, 73–86.
304 • Bibliography
———. The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality. Volume 3, translated by Robert Hurley.
New York: Vintage Books, 1986.
———. The History of Sexuality. Volume 1: An Introduction. New York: Vintage Books, 1980.
———. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New
York: Vintage Books, 1979.
———. ‘‘The Discourse on Language.’’ Appendix to Archeology of Knowledge. Translated by
A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972.
Gellner, Ernest, and John Waterbury, eds. Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Society.
Hanover: Duckworth, 1977.
Gerges, Fawaz. ‘‘Egypt and the 1948 War: Internal Conflict and Regional Ambition.’’ In
The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948, edited by Eugene Rogan and Avi
Shlaim, 151–77. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Gilligan, Carol. In a Di√erent Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982.
Gilsenan, Michael. Lords of the Lebanese Marches: Violence and Narrative in an Arab
Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
Gordon, Colin. ‘‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduction.’’ In The Foucault E√ect:
Studies in Governmentality, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, 1–
51. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Gordon, Joel. Nasser’s Blessed Movement: Egypt’s Free O≈cers and the July Revolution. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Graham-Brown, Sarah. ‘‘The Political Economy of Jabal Nablus, 1920–48.’’ In Studies in
the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,
edited by Roger Owen, 88–176. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982.
Guha, Ranajit. ‘‘Discipline and Mobilize.’’ In Subaltern Studies VII: Writing on South
Asian History and Society, edited by Partha Chatterjee and Gyanendra Pandey. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Gupta, Akhil. ‘‘Governing Population: The Integrated Child Development Services Pro-
gram in India.’’ In States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial
State, edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, 65–96. Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 2001.
———. ‘‘Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the
Imagined State.’’ American Ethnologist 22 2 (1995): 375–402.
Gupta, Akhil, and James Ferguson. ‘‘Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of
Neoliberal Governmentality.’’ American Ethnologist 29, 4 (2002): 981–1002.
Habermas, Jürgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a
Category of Bourgeois Society. Translated by Thomas Berger. Cambridge, Mass.: mit
Press, 1989.
Haines, David W. ‘‘Conformity in the Face of Ambiguity: A Bureaucratic Dilemma.’’
Semiotica 78, 3/4 (1990): 249–69.
Halbwachs, Maurice. On Collective Memory, edited by and translated by Lewis Coser.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
Bibliography • 305
Hammami, Rema. ‘‘Between Heaven and Earth: Transformations in Religiosity and
Labor among Southern Palestinian Peasant and Refugee Women, 1920–1993.’’ Ph.D.
diss., Temple University, 1994.
Handelman, Don. ‘‘Introduction: A Recognition of Bureaucracy.’’ In Bureaucracy and
World View: Studies in the Logic of O≈cial Interpretation, edited by Don Handelman
and Elliott Leyton, 1–14. St. John’s: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1978.
Hansen, Thomas Blom. ‘‘Sovereigns beyond the State: On Legality and Authority in
Urban India.’’ In Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial
World, edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, 169–91. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2005.
Haraway, Donna. ‘‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the
Privilege of Partial Perspective.’’ In Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The
Reinvention of Nature, 183–202. New York: Routledge, 1991.
Heper, Metin. ‘‘The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative and Historical
Perspective.’’ Comparative Studies in Society and History 27, 1 (1985): 86–110.
Herscovitz, Scott. ‘‘Legitimacy, Democracy, and Razian Authority.’’ Legal Theory 9
(2003): 201–20.
Herzfeld, Michael. The Social Production of Indi√erence: Exploring the Symbolic Roots of
Western Bureaucracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
Heussler, Robert. Yesterday’s Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial Service. Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1963.
Heyman, Josiah McC. ‘‘Putting Power in the Anthropology of Bureaucracy.’’ Current
Anthropology 36, 2 (1995): 261–87.
Hirschkind, Charles. ‘‘Civic Virtue and Religious Reason: An Islamic Counterpublic.’’
Cultural Anthropology 16, 1 (2001): 3–34.
Holston, James. The Modernist City: An Anthropological Critique of Brasilia. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1989.
Holston, James, and Arjun Appadurai. ‘‘Introduction: Cities and Citizenship.’’ In Cities
and Citizenship, edited by James Holston, 1–20. Durham, N.C.: Duke University
Press, 1999.
Hull, Matthew. ‘‘The File: Agency, Authority, and Autography in an Islamabad Bu-
reaucracy.’’ Language and Communication 23,3 (2003): 287–314.
Hunter, Ian. Rethinking the School: Subjectivity, Bureaucracy, Criticism. St. Leonards, Aus-
tralia: Allen and Unwin, 1994.
Hurewitz, J. C. The Struggle for Palestine. New York: Schocken Books, 1976.
Jacoby, Henry. The Bureaucratization of the World. Translated by Eveline L. Kanes.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.
Jankowski, James. Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic. Boul-
der: Lynne Rienner, 2002.
Jarbawi, ‘Ali. ‘‘Al-Baladiyyat al-Filastiniyya (Min al-Nasha’ Hata al-‘Am 1967).’’ Shu’un
Filastiniyya 221–22 (1991): 49–72.
Je√ries, Sir Charles. The Colonial Empire and Its Civil Service. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1938.
306 • Bibliography
Johnson, Nels. Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism. London:
Kegan Paul International, 1982.
Katz, Elihu, and Brenda Danet. ‘‘Introduction: Bureaucracy as a Problem for Sociology
and Society.’’ In Bureaucracy and the Public: A Reader in O≈cial-Client Relations, edited
by Elihu Katz and Brenda Danet, 3–30. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
Katz, Elihu, and Brenda Danet, eds. Bureaucracy and the Public: A Reader in O≈cial-Client
Relations. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
Kayyali, A. W. Palestine: A Modern History. London: Croom Helm, 1970.
Kelly-Gadol, Joan. ‘‘Did Women Have a Renaissance?’’ In Becoming Visible: Women in
European History, edited by Renate Bridenthal and Claudia Koonz, 148–52. Boston:
Houghton MiΔin, 1977.
Khalidi, Rashid. Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
al-Khass, Muhammad. ‘‘Municipal Legal Structure in Gaza.’’ In A Palestinian Agenda for
the West Bank and Gaza, edited by Emile A. Nakhleh, 102–06. Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute, 1980.
Knauft, Bruce, ed. Critically Modern: Alternatives, Alterities, Anthropologies. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2002.
Kupferschmidt, Uri M. The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam under the British Mandate for
Palestine. New York: E. J. Brill, 1987.
Legrain, Jean-François. ‘‘The Islamic Movement and the Intifada.’’ In Intifada: Palestine at
the Crossroads, edited by Jamal R. Nasser and Roger Heacock, 175–89. New York:
Praeger, 1990.
Lesch, Ann Mosely. ‘‘Gaza: History and Politics.’’ In Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinians:
From Camp David to Intifada, edited by Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler, 223–37.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989.
Lipsky, Michael. Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980.
Locke, Richard, and Antony Stewart. Bantustan Gaza. London: Zed Books, 1985.
Lockman, Zachary. Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906–
1948. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
Lockman, Zachary, and Joel Beinin, eds. Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli
Occupation. Boston: South End Press, 1989.
Low, Setha. ‘‘Embodied Space(s): Anthropological Theories of Body, Space, and Cul-
ture.’’ Space and Culture 6, 1 (2003): 9–18.
Ludtke, Alf, ed. The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and
Ways of Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
MacLeod, Roy. ‘‘Introduction.’’ In Government and Expertise: Specialists, Administrators
and Professionals, 1860–1919, edited by Roy Macleod, 1–24. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988.
Mahmood, Saba. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2005.
Bibliography • 307
Mamdani, Mahmood. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late
Colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Marcus, George. ‘‘Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited
Ethnography.’’ In Marcus, Ethnography through Thick and Thin, 79–104. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998.
Massad, Joseph. Colonial E√ects: The Making of a National Identity in Jordan. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2001.
Massey, Doreen. Space, Place, and Gender. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.
Matthews, Weldon. Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation: Arab Nationalists and
Popular Politics in Mandate Palestine. London: I. B. Tauris, 2006.
Mayol, Pierre. ‘‘Propriety.’’ In The Practice of Everyday Life. Volume 2: Living and Cooking.
Edited by Luce Giard, 15–34. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.
McGuire, Mary. ‘‘Disciplining the State: Organized Civil Servants, State Formation and
Citizenship in the United States and Germany, 1880–1925.’’ Ph.D. diss., University of
Michigan, 1996.
Meeker, Michael. A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity. Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 2002.
Mehta, Uday. Liberalism and Empire: A Study of Nineteenth-Century British Liberal
Thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
Meouchy, Nadine, and Peter Sluglett, eds. The British and French Mandates in Compara-
tive Perspectives. Leiden: Brill, 2004.
Messick, Brinkley. The Calligraphic State. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
Meyer, Martin A. History of the City of Gaza from Earliest Times to the Present Day. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1907.
Miller, Ylana. Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 1920–1948. Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1985.
Mishal, Shaul, and Avraham Sela. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexis-
tence. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2000.
Mitchell, Timothy. Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity. Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 2002.
———. ‘‘The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics.’’ American
Political Science Review 85, 1 (March 1991): 77–96.
———. Colonising Egypt. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
Morris, Benny. Israel’s Border Wars, 1949–1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and
the Countdown to the Suez War. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
al-Mubayyid, Salim. Ghazza wa-Qita‘uha: Dirasa fi Khulud al-Makan wa-Hadarat al-
Sukkan min al-‘Asr al-Hajari Hatta al-Harb al-‘Alamiyya al-Ula. Cairo: al-Haya al-
Misriyya al-‘Amma lil-Kitab, 1987.
Mundy, Martha. Domestic Government: Kinship, Community and Polity in North Yemen.
London: I. B. Tauris, 1995.
Murphy, Murray. The Development of Peirce’s Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1961.
308 • Bibliography
Muslih, Muhammad. The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1990.
Nasser, Jamal, and Roger Heacock, eds. Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads. New York:
Praeger, 1990.
Navaro-Yashin, Yael. Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2002.
Ong, Aihwa. Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. Dur-
ham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006.
Ortner, Sherry. ‘‘Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties.’’ Comparative Studies in
Society and History 26 10 (1984): 126–66.
Osborne, Thomas. ‘‘Bureaucracy as a Vocation: Governmentality and Administration in
Nineteenth-Century Britain.’’ Journal of Historical Sociology 7 (1994): 289–313.
Papailias, Penelope. Genres of Recollection: Archival Poetics and Modern Greece. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
Pappe, Ilan. The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947–51. London: I. B. Tauris, 1992.
Pardo, Italo, ed. Morals of Legitimacy: Between Agency and System. New York: Berghahn
Books, 2000.
Parker, Kelly. The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1998.
Passerini, Luisa. Fascism in Popular Memory: The Cultural Experience of the Turin Working
Class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Peck, Jamie, and Adam Tickell. ‘‘Neoliberalizing Space.’’ Antipode 34, 3 (2002): 380–404.
Peck, Je√rey M. ‘‘Refugees as Foreigners: The Problem of Becoming German and Find-
ing Home.’’ In Mistrusting Refugees, edited by E. Valentine Daniel and John Chr.
Knudsen, 102–25. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
Pedersen, Susan. ‘‘Settler Colonialism at the Bar of the League of Nations.’’ In Settler
Colonialism in the Twentieth Century, edited by Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen,
113–34. New York: Routledge, 2005.
Peirce, Charles Sanders. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1935.
Pels, Peter, and Oscar Salemink. Colonial Subjects: Essays on the Practical History of Anthro-
pology. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999.
Peters, B. Guy. The Politics of Bureaucracy. New York: Longman, 1989.
Potter, Pitman. ‘‘Origin of the System of Mandates under the League of Nations.’’
American Political Science Review 16, no 4 (1922): 563–83.
Potter, Vincent. Charles S. Peirce on Norms and Ideals. Amherst: University of Mas-
sachusetts Press, 1967.
Prakash, Gyan. Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1999.
Quandt, William, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch. The Politics of Palestinian Na-
tionalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.
Rabinow, Paul. French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1989.
Bibliography • 309
Raphaeli, Nimrod. ‘‘Gaza Under Four Administrations.’’ Public Administration in Israel
and Abroad 9 (1968): 40–51.
Rashid, Harun Hashim. Qissat Madinat Ghazza. Al-Munazzama al-‘Arabiyya lil-Tar-
biyya w-al Thaqafa w-al-‘Ulum, nd.
Raz, Joseph, ed. Authority. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.
Reeves, Edward. The Hidden Government: Ritual, Clientelism, and Legitimation in North-
ern Egypt. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990.
Roniger, Luis, and Ayse Gunes-Ayata, eds. Democracy, Clientelism, and Civil Society.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994.
Rose, Nikolas. Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999.
———. ‘‘Governing ‘Advanced’ Liberal Democracies.’’ In Foucault and Political Reason: Liber-
alism, Neo-liberalism and Rationalities of Government, edited by Andrew Barry,
Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose, 37–64. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1996.
Roy, Sara. ‘‘Why Peace Failed: An Oslo Autopsy.’’ Current History, 101, 651 (2002): 8–16.
———. The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-development. Washington, D.C.: In-
stitute for Palestine Studies, 1995.
Rutherford, Danilyn. Raiding the Land of the Foreigners: The Limits of the Nation on an
Indonesian Frontier. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.
Sassen, Saskia. Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
Savage, Gail. The Social Construction of Expertise: The English Civil Service and Its Influence,
1919–1939. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996.
Sayigh, Yezid. ‘‘Escalation or Containment? Egypt and the Palestine Liberation Army,
1964–67.’’ International Journal of Middle East Studies 30, 1 (1998): 97–116.
Schi√, Benjamin N. Refugees unto the Third Generation: un Aid to Palestinians. Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1995.
Schilcher, Linda S. ‘‘The Famine of 1915–1918 in Greater Syria.’’ In Problems of the
Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective: Essays in Honor of Albert Hourani, edited
by John Spansolo. Reading: Ithaca Press, 1992.
Scholch, Alexander. Palestine in Transformation 1856–1882: Studies in Social, Economic and
Political Development. Translated by William C. Young and Michael C. Gerrity.
Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993.
Scott, David. Refashioning Futures: Criticism After Postcoloniality. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999.
Scott, James. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition
Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
———. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1990.
Segal, Rafi, and Eyal Weizman, eds. A Civilian Occupation: The Politics of Israeli Architec-
ture. London: Verso, 2003.
310 • Bibliography
Segev, Tom. 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East. Trans-
lated by Jessica Cohen. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007.
———. One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate. Translated by
Haim Watzman. Boston: Little, Brown, 2000.
Sennett, Richard. Authority. New York: W. W. Norton, 1980.
Shaw, Stanford. The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Otto-
man Egypt, 1517–1798. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.
Sherman, A. J. Mandate Days: British Lives in Palestine, 1918–1948. New York: Thames
and Hudson, 1997.
Shlaim, Avi. ‘‘The Rise and Fall of the All-Palestine Government in Gaza.’’ Journal of
Palestine Studies 20 no. 1 (Fall 1990): 37–53.
Shomali, Qustandi. ‘‘al-Sahafa al-Filastiniyya fi ‘Ahd al-Intidab: Jaridat Mir’at al-Sharq
(1919–1939).’’ Shu’un Filastiniyya no. 221–22 (September 1991).
Skeik, Ibrahim. Ghazza ‘Abr al-Tarikh: Taht al-Intidab al-Britani. 1981.
———. Ghazza ‘Abr al-Tarikh: Qita‘ Ghazza Taht al-Idara al-Masriyya, 1948–1956. 1982.
———. Ghazza ‘Abr Al-Tarikh: Dhikrayat wa-Intaba‘at ‘An Ghazzah Qabl Nusf Qarn. n.d.
Spivak, Gayatri. ‘‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’’ In Marxism and the Interpretation of Litera-
ture, edited by Cary Nelson and Larry Grossberg, 271–313. Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1988.
———. ‘‘Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography.’’ In Spivak, In Other Worlds:
Essays in Cultural Politics, 197–221. New York: Routledge, 1988.
Starrett, Gregory. Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation
in Egypt. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
Stoler, Ann. ‘‘Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty.’’ Public Culture 18, 1 (2006): 125–46.
———. ‘‘Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance.’’ Archival Science 2, 1–2 (2002): 87–
109.
———. ‘‘Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American History
and (Post)Colonial Studies.’’ Journal of American History 88, 3 (2001): 829–65.
———. ‘‘ ‘In Cold Blood’: Hierarchies of Credibility and the Politics of Colonial Narratives.’’
Representations 37 (1992): 151–87.
———. ‘‘Sexual A√ronts and Racial Frontiers: European Identities and the Cultural Politics
of Exclusion in Colonial Southeast Asia.’’ Comparative Studies in Society and History
34, 3 (July 1992): 514-51.
Stoler, Ann, and Fred Cooper, ed. Tensions of Empire. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1996.
Stoler, Ann, and Karen Strassler. ‘‘Castings for the Colonial: Memory Work in ‘New
Order’ Java.’’ Comparative Studies in Society and History 42, 1 (2000): 4–48.
Stoyansky, J. The Mandate for Palestine: A Contribution to the Theory and Practice of
International Mandates. London: Longmans, Green, 1928.
Suleri, Sara. The Rhetoric of English India. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
Swedenburg, Ted. Memories of Revolt: The 1936–1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian Past.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995.
Bibliography • 311
al-Tabba‘, ‘Uthman, Ithaf al-A’izza fi Tarikh Ghazza, ed. ‘Abd al-Latif Hashim. Gaza:
Maktabat al-Yaziji, 1999.
Takkenberg, Lex. The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law. Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1998.
Taqqu, Rachelle. ‘‘Arab Labor in Mandatory Palestine, 1920–1948.’’ Ph.D. diss., Colum-
bia University, 1977.
Taraki, Lisa. ‘‘The Islamic Resistance Movement in the Palestinian Uprising.’’ In Intifada:
The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation, edited by Zachary Lockman and
Joel Beinin, 171–77. Boston: South End Press, 1989.
Taussig, Michael. The Magic of the State. New York: Routledge, 1997.
Thomas, Richard. Imperial Archive: Knowledge and Fantasy of Empire. London: Verso,
1993.
Thompson, Paul. ‘‘Believe It or Not: Rethinking the Historical Interpretation of Mem-
ory.’’ In Memory and History: Essays on Recalling and Interpreting Experience, edited by
Jaclyn Je√rey and Glenace Edwall, 1–16. New York: University Press of America,
1994.
———. The Voice of the Past. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
Tibawi, A. L. Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine: A Study of Three Decades of British
Administration. London: Luzac, 1956.
Tonkin, Elizabeth. Narrating Our Past: The Social Construction of Oral History. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. Global Transformations: Anthropology and the Modern World.
New York: Palgrave, 2003.
———. Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. Boston: Beacon Press, 1995.
Upadhyaya, R. B., and K. C. Sharma. Management of Conflict between Generalist and
Specialist Administrators in India. Jaipur: Shashi Publications, 1987.
Upthegrove, Campbell L. Empire by Mandate: A History of the Relations of Great Britain
with the Permanent Mandates Commissions of the League of Nations. New York: Brook-
man Associates, 1954.
van Beek, Martin. ‘‘Public Secrets, Conscious Amnesia, and the Celebration of Auton-
omy for Ladakh.’’ In States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial
State, edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, 365–90. Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 2001.
Vitalis, Robert, and Steven Heydemann. ‘‘War, Keynesianism, and Colonialism.’’ In War,
Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East, edited by Steven Heydemann, 100–
45. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
Wasserstein, Bernard. The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the Arab-
Jewish Conflict, 1917–1929. London: Royal Historical Society, 1978.
Waterbury, John. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Edited by Guen-
ther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
312 • Bibliography
———. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Edited by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.
Wedeen, Lisa. Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary
Syria. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
White, Freda. Mandates. London: Jonathan Cape, 1926.
White, Hayden. The Content of the Form. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1987.
Wright, Gwendolyn. ‘‘Tradition in the Service of Modernity: Architecture and Urbanism
in French Colonial Policy, 1900–1930.’’ Journal of Modern History 59 (1994): 291–316.
Wright, Quincy. Mandates Under the League of Nations. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1930.
———. ‘‘Sovereignty of the Mandates.’’ American Journal International Law 17, 4 (1923):
691–703.
Yurchak Alexei. Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Genera-
tion. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
index
Page references in italics indicate illustra-
tions.
abeyance of legitimacy: through crisis ser-
vices, 125, 135, 154; through distraction
and deferral, 28, 172, 179, 191; e√ective-
ness and limits of, 160, 166–67, 191,
210, 217–18; general practice of, 82; ju-
risdiction and, 160, 172; through tacti-
cal government, 17–18, 20
Abu Hashim, Abdul Latif, 195
Abu Sha’ban, Hilmi, Tarikh Ghazza:
Naqd wa-Tahlil, 155–56, 162–64, 168
Abu Sharkh, Said, 158–59, 280n11
Accounts Clearance O≈ce, 58–59
Alami, Musa, 271n76
alcohol consumption, 197–98
Alexander the Great, 238n8
All-Palestinian Government, 8, 241n34
amr bil ma’ruf, 195
analytics of power, 242n45
Anderson, Douglas, 257n9, 257n11
Anghie, Antony, 6
anthropology of government, 219–35,
243n55
Appadurai, Arjun, 204
Arab Chamber of Commerce, 180
Arabic prose, 41–42, 252n33
Arab-Israeli War (1948). See nakba
Arab National Union (Gaza), 9, 86, 217
Arafat, Yasser, 231, 237n3
archives: Derrida on, 250n9; ethnography
of and in, 250n8; as extractive/exclu-
sionary, 34, 250n12; files and, 33–37,
57, 250n13, 255nn70–71; government
authority and, 33; hierarchical relations
in, 34, 250n13; as institutions and pro-
cesses, 250n8. See also Israel State Ar-
chives
al-’Arif, ’Arif, 65, 256n4; Tarikh Ghazza,
155–56, 162–64, 281n19, 281n27
Armistice Lines (1949), xvi, 7, 22
army, 179
Asad, Talal, 195, 285n8
al-Asad, Hafiz, 18
Ashkelon (Gaza district). See Majdal
authority: accumulation of, and files, 35,
48–52; archives and, 33; of civil ser-
vants, 13; discursive, 16, 244n64; of ex-
pansiveness, 32; of files, 32–33, 35, 38,
42, 47, 251n24; legitimacy vs., 17–18,
61, 64, 93, 123; of Qur’an, 250n15; reit-
erative/bureaucratic, 14–17, 90–92,
119–20, 219–21, 225, 234, 244n60; re-
314 • Index
authority (cont.)
pertoires of, 92, 98, 264n1. See also civil
service competence and career trajec-
tory





Basisu, Mu’in, 217, 292–93n98
Ba’th party, 85, 216, 225
Beersheba, 179–80
Berger, Morroe, 256n1
Bhabha, Homi, 260n34, 289n56
Bourdieu, Pierre, 258n13, 281n17
Boym, Svetlana, 273n32
British Mandate (1917–48): acceptance of,
237n1; administrative di≈culties and
limitations of, 19, 246n80; authority of,
15; British vs. Ottoman municipal or-
ganization under, 21, 246–47nn83–84;
centralized government under, 48–49,
157–58, 165–66, 282n31; Chief Secre-
tariat’s regulations on filing under, 38–
41, 52–55, 57, 252n27, 252n29; crises
during, 126–27; as crisis time for Pales-
tinian peasants, 21, 131–33, 274n36;
documentary materials from, 25–26,
248n100; dual obligations of British
under, 6–7, 19, 239nn21–22; end of, 7,
38, 59, 127, 210, 240n25; Gaza as dis-
trict under, 5–6; information flow un-
der, 55; jurisdictional struggles under,
157–58; legitimacy of, 17–18; map of,
xiv; military rule during, 237n1; Pal-
estine as a colony under, 6–7; pensions
and, 116, 269–70n64; persistence via
bureaucracy, 14; on promotions for
civil servants, 110, 268n46; relationship
of, with place, 24; riots and revolt dur-
ing, 126, 133, 284n73; taxation under,
247n91; temporal insecurity of, 19;
town and housing planning during,
142–47, 153–54, 277nn72–73, 277n78,
277n81, 277–78n82; Zionist settler–
Palestinian Arab conflict under, 7, 126,
239–40nn23–24. See also crisis ser-
vices; files; Gaza district; Palestine; Su-
preme Muslim Council
bureaucracy: authority and, 14–17, 90–92,
119–20, 219–21, 225, 234, 244n60; cita-
tion and, 16; as everyday life, 233; im-
portance of, 225; inculcation of, 16,
245n68; present-day vs. Mandate/Ad-
ministration, 26–27; as regime of prac-
tices, 12–14, 233–34; across regimes, 1–
2; rule vs. reason in, 16–17; Weber on,
1–2, 15–17, 52, 66, 220, 225, 226. See
also civil servants; civil service compe-
tence and career trajectory; files
Bureij Middle School for Refugees, 216
Bureij refugee camp (Gaza), 283n51
buses, 183–84
Butler, Judith, 16, 244n64
Cairo, 222





citizenship and nationality, 204–5, 207–8,
210
civic life, as shaped by community ser-
vices. See community services
civil servants (muwazzafin), 63–79; asso-
ciations of and organizing by, 87–90,
263n87, 263n89, 264n95; authority of,
challenges to, 13; on bad habits of col-
leagues, 76–79, 260nn42–43, 260
n.45; benefits of vs. tensions in service,
65, 73–76; British manners taken up
by, 74–75, 260n34; class and social sta-
Index • 315
tus of, 65, 70, 73–75; definitions and
characterizations of, 64–65, 116, 256n1;
on duty for good of nation, family, self,
70–72, 87; evaluation via writing of,
42, 253n37; female, 70, 116–17, 259n19,
268n46, 270n70; Gazan vs. British/
Egyptian, 27, 59, 249n104; interviews
with, 67–68, 258n18; under Israeli oc-
cupation, 227; land sold to, 152–53,
279n102, 279n104; memory processes
of, 68–69, 258n16; newspaper com-
mentaries on, 79–80, 261n51; number
and divisions of, 65, 256n4; other gov-
ernment workers vs., 65; overview of,
63–66; pensions for, 116–18, 269–
70n64, 270–71n75, 271n77, 271n79;
personnel records of, 45, 58–59, 109,
249n4, 253nn43–44; political life of,
82–87, 261n62, 261n64, 262–63n81,
263n82, 290n64; promotion of, 43–44,
253nn38–39; public attitudes toward,
79–81, 261n51, 261n57; reflective habits
of, 65–68, 258n14; relationship of, with
public, 74–75, 77–78, 259n31, 260n33;
repetitive habits of, 15–16; respectabil-
ity and etiquette of, 72–73, 259nn26–
27, 259n29; retired, 68–70, 111; salaries
and allowances of, 45, 65, 71, 75,
253nn43–44, 267n27, 267n33,
268nn45–46; sense of service of, 69–
76; shari’a court employees as, 116–18,
192, 270n71, 270n74, 270–71n75,
271nn76–77; strike by (1946), 88,
263n89; Weber on, 17. See also civil ser-
vice; civil service competence and ca-
reer trajectory; files
Civil Servants’ Association (Gaza), 34
civil service: associations and organizing
in, 87–90, 263n83, 263n87, 263n89,
264n95; Egyptian control of political
activity and, 9, 84–87, 215–16; growth
of, during World War II, 65; origins
and expansion of, 8–9, 73–74, 103;
place and, 24–25; regulation of, 81–90;
as welfare provider, 101–3, 114. See also
civil servants; civil service competence
and career trajectory
Civil Service Commission, 58–59
civil service competence and career trajec-
tory, 91–120; career advancement and,
109–12, 268n46, 268n48; definition of
bureaucratic competence and, 93–98;
education and training and, 92, 98,
103–5, 266n18; ethical competence, 93,
96–97; hiring and acclimated appli-
cants, 92, 98–103, 266n18, 266nn24–
25, 267n27, 267n33; local knowledge
and, 93–95; overview of, 91–92;
punishment for incompetence, disobe-
dience, and disrespect, 112–16, 268–
69n53, 269n57, 269n59; retirement
benefits and, 116–19, 268n46, 269–
70n64, 270–71nn75, 271nn76–77,
271n79; self-cultivation and, 96–98;
social competence, 93, 95–96; spaces
of service and, 105–9; technical com-
petence and expertise, 93–95, 99–101,
264nn5–6, 265n8
Coalition Provisional Authority (cpa;
Iraq), 225
Cole, Juan, 252n33, 253n37
colonialism: consent-coercion relation in,
10–11; governance and, 10–11, 52–53,
94, 224; insecurity of colonial states
under, 224; ‘‘mimic men’’ and, 260n34,
289n56; moral self-justifications for,
96. See also mandates
Colonial Service, 94, 265n8
Comaro√, John, 11
communications, 178, 183, 284n75
Communist Party, 84–85, 211, 216
community services, 189–218; civic asso-
ciations and, 191; community leaders
and, 194, 286n13; definition of commu-
316 • Index
community services (cont.)
nity and, 191; educational services,
190–91, 204–17, 212–13, 289–
90nn59–60, 290–91n68, 291nn80–81,
292n88; moral improvement and, 193,
195, 198, 285–86n8, 287n31; overview
of, 189–92; propriety and, 190–92; re-
ligious associations and, 194–200,
286n13, 287n29, 287n31, 287–88n34;
religious services, 190–203, 285–86n8,
285n5, 288n46; surveillance of educa-
tion and, 216; surveillance of religious




Coronil, Fernando, 245–46n76, 248n99
crisis services, 123–54; contours of crisis
and, 126–30; definitions of needs and,
132; development projects and, 126–27,
131, 273–74n34; ethic of care and, 125,
131, 133–38, 142, 153; as exceptional, 221;
flour distribution, 140–41, 276n63;
food services after 1948, 134–42, 139,
141, 275n56, 275–76n59, 276n60,
276n63, 276n66; food services by
Quakers, 134, 137–38; food services
during British Mandate, 123, 131–35,
153–54; housing service as social ser-
vice, 147–54, 150, 278nn93–94, 278–
79n100, 279n101; mukhtars’ role in,
140; municipal control of, 134–35,
144–47, 275n46; for native Gazans vs.
refugees, 127–28; overview of, 123–26;
relief e√orts and, 126–27; security con-
cerns surrounding, 124, 126, 142, 153;
stealing and, 136–37, 275n51; town and
housing planning during British Man-
date, 142–47, 153–54, 277nn72–73,
277n78, 277–78n81, 278n82; unrwa
on, 275–76n59, 276n60; water ser-
vices, 145
da’wa, 285–86n8
de Certeau, Michel: on citation, 16; on
ordinary practices, 174; on pluraliza-
tion, 280n6; on tactics, 18–19
deferral and distraction. See distraction
and deferral
Deir Belah Council, 201
Deir Belah (Gaza), 158–59, 159, 177,
280n11
Department of Refugee Supervision, Gov-
ernment Assistance, and Social A√airs,
170
Derrida, Jacques, 16, 244n64, 250n9
development discourse, 164, 282n29
diet, eating habits, 132–33, 274nn36–37.
See also crisis services
al-Difa’, 79, 181–82, 261n52, 284n69
disciplinary writing, 32–33, 249n3
distraction and deferral: through crisis ser-
vices, 125, 135, 148, 152–53; e√ectiveness
and limits of, 172, 179, 210, 217, 222;
through everyday services, 182; impor-
tance of, to Mandate government, 7;
meaning of, 20; propriety and, 191; tac-
tical mobilization of, 28
District Town Planning Commission,
146–47, 277–78n81, 278n82
Dumper, Michael, 200
education: agricultural training school,
214; for civil service, 92, 98, 103–5,
266n18; curricula, 207–8, 210–11, 213–
14, 290–91n68; in Egypt, 202–3,
289n54, 292n91; for girls, 290n60; im-
portance of, to governments, 289n56;
Jewish vs. Arab schools, 205, 289n59;
number of schools, 289–90n60; par-
ents’ role in, 292n90; of refugees, 19–
20, 23, 211–12, 211–12, 216, 291nn80–
81; secular civil schools, 266n18; ser-
vices, 190–91, 204–17, 212–13, 289–
90n59, 290n60, 290–91n68, 291nn80–
Index • 317
81, 292n88; surveillance of, 216; text-
books and, 212–13, 292n84; unrwa’s
role in, 210, 213–15; vocational, 214. See
also Egyptian Administration; teachers
Education Ordinance (1933), 208
Egypt: education in, 292n91; end of mon-
archy in, 240n27; Gaza’s reconnection
with, 183–85, 284n75; Islamists in,
285n8; Nasser’s governmental agenda
in, 8–9; o≈ce life in, 107–8; politics
in, 84–85; religious education in, 202–
3, 289n54; security concerns of, 9, 45–
46, 128, 210–11
Egyptian Administration (1948–67), 1;
administrative di≈culties and limita-
tions of, 19, 246n80; All-Palestinian
Government supported by, 8; author-
ity of, 15, 17, 152; border-crossing refu-
gees under, 22–23; bureaucracy and
rationalization of, 140–42; centralized
government under, 158–59; civil service
expansion under, 8–9; colonialism vs.,
11; corruption in, 78, 111, 247n95; crisis
relief by, 128–29; documentary mate-
rials from, 25–26, 248n100, 248n102;
education under, 23, 105, 152–53, 191,
210–17, 212–13, 260n38; Egyptian sus-
picions of Gazans under, 22–23; end
of, 8, 59; establishment of, 7; finances
of, 101, 110–11, 267n27; food services
by, 138–39, 275–76n59, 276n60; Gaza’s
uncertain status under, 7–9, 11, 240–
41n31; as golden age, 86, 211, 262n78;
humanitarianism of, 139–40, 154,
275n56; information flow under, 55–
56; jurisdictional struggles under, 157–
58; land sold to employees of, 152–53,
279n102, 279n104; legitimacy of, 8, 11,
17–18; military conscription under, 9,
217, 241n40; persistence via bu-
reaucracy under, 14; political repres-
sion by, 9, 84–87, 215–16; on
promotions for civil servants, 110–11,
268n48; relationship with place and,
24; religious services and, 200–203,
288n46; temporal insecurity of, 19;
town planning by, 19–20; unemploy-
ment and impoverishment under, 22–
24; and unrwa, 9–10, 84, 118–19,
149–51, 160, 169. See also crisis services;
Gaza Strip; wasta
Egyptian Awqaf Ministry, 200–201
Egyptian Social A√airs Ministry, 201




ethic of care, 24. See also crisis services
Europe, advanced liberalism of, 233
everyday services, 155–88, 221; al-’Arif ’s vs.
Abu Sha’ban’s history of Gaza and,
155–56, 162–64, 281n19; boundaries
and pressures of, 169–78, 170,
282nn36–37; communications, 178–87,
284n75; concentration of resources,
162, 281n17; under Israeli occupation,
228; and jurisdiction and locality, 156–
60, 159, 170–71, 280n9, 280n11; ordi-
nary incapacities and service obliga-
tions, 167–69, 282n34; overview of,
155–57, 279–80n5, 280n6; politics of,
165–67; public responsibility for water
and, 168, 282n35; to refugee camps,
169–72, 170, 175–78, 228, 282n37;
transportation, 178–87, 284n69,
284n71, 284n73, 285n82; unrwa’s role
in, 159–60, 169–72; water department
and municipal service practice, 172–75,
283n47; water-pipe project in Nuseirat,
175–78, 283n54, 283n56; water services,
162–65, 281n19, 281n22, 281nn27–28;
water services and boundaries of gov-
ernment, 160–69, 281n15
exceptionalism, 12, 221, 243n52
318 • Index
expertise, 94, 264nn5–6. See also civil ser-
vice competence and career trajectory




Ferguson, Jim, 233, 282n29
fida’iyyin (guerilla) units, 23
Filastin, 179
files, 31–61; access to and control of, 36–
37, 52–57, 255n61; accumulation of au-
thority and, 35, 48–52; Administration
filing practices, 31, 36, 41–42, 53–54,
59–60, 255n59, 255n61; Administra-
tion writing practices and, 37, 41–42;
administrative conversation in, 39–41,
252nn29–30; archives and, 33–37, 57,
250n13, 255nn70–71; audience for, 37;
authority of, 32–33, 35, 38, 42, 47,
251n24; autonomy of filing, 60–61;
Chief Secretariat’s regulations on, 38–
41, 52–55, 57, 252n27, 252n29; circula-
tion of, 52, 54–57; civil servants’ writ-
ings about themselves in, 42–44,
253nn38–39; compilation of, and cate-
gories of people and place, 48–52; con-
tent and style of writing of, 37, 39,
251n20; copies of, 38, 54–55, 251n24;
criminal records, 56–57; definition of,
34; disruption and loss and, 33; elite’s
use of, 50; on Gaza locality, 48–51, 49,
51, 254nn50–51; generality of conven-
tions and technology of, 31–32; hier-
archy of producers of, 34, 250n13;
horizontal vs. vertical relations in, 34;
indexing of, 57–58; interviews, 251n17;
Israeli seizure of, 34–35, 230–31; land
claim and registry, 106, 254n51, 255n72;
limits of content of, 45–47; Mandate
filing practices, 31, 36, 38–41, 40, 52–
53, 59, 251n18, 251n22, 255n61; Mandate
writing practices and, 37; memos, 41–
42; minutes, 39–41, 40, 252n27,
252n30; as mundane and quotidian, 35;
Ottoman filing practices, 31–32,
249n4; overview of, 31–33; of Palestine
government correspondence, 39–40;
personnel records, 45, 58–59, 109,
249n4, 253nn43–44; police reports
and surveillance, 45–47, 46, 253nn45–
46, 254n48; privacy concerns and, 56–
57, 107; production of, 37–52; reg-
ularity and uniformity of, 16, 32–33,
38–39, 42, 220; secret, 52–54, 254–
55n58, 255n59; storage and destruction
of, 57–60, 255n70, 255n72; town plan-
ning, 254n51; types of, 33, 35, 250n10;
Weber on, 31
Findley, Carter, 32, 249n4, 266n18
First Division Association, 88–89
food services. See under crisis services
Foucault, Michel: on analytics of power,
242n45; on care of self, 125, 265n14; on
disciplinary writing, 32–33, 249n3; on
ethical self-cultivation, 96–97; on gov-
ernmentality, 12; on imprisonment,
244n59; on lowering of threshold of
knowledge, 254n49
Free O≈cers revolution (1952), 85, 240n27
Gaza: Alexander’s conquest of, 238n8;
bank loan proposal for, 276n69; cultiv-
able land in, 131, 273–74n34, 273n31;
curfew in, 4; as district under Man-
date, 5–6; documentary materials and,
25–26, 36, 248n100, 248n102, 251n16;
economic decline of, 4–5; Egypt’s re-
connection with, 183–85, 284n75; gov-
ernment practice and shaping of, 20–
26, 28, 248–49n103; history of disrup-
tion in, 5–10, 238n8; improvement
projects in, 4; intifada (second) and, 5;
Israeli closure of, 4–5, 230; Israeli oc-
Index • 319
cupation of (1956–57), 8, 248n102; Is-
raeli occupation of (1967), 171, 177–78,
203, 226–32, 248n102, 294n20,
294nn24–25, 295n27; Israeli settlers
evacuated from, 231; Jewish settlers in,
5, 238n5; maps of, xiv–xvi; meanings
of, 2–3; nakba’s transformation of, 2, 7,
169; Palestinian land seized in, 5; pop-
ulation fluctuations in, 7, 135, 238n8;
real estate market in, 106; refugees in,
9–10; violence in, 223
Gaza-Beersheba road, 179–81
Gaza Building Society, 144–45
Gaza City, 2; Ottoman municipal council
of, 21, 246–47n83, 247n84; peasant
population of, 21; population of,
256n4; prosperity of, 21, 130–31; soap
and pottery production in, 22; water
services in, 282nn36–37; World War
I’s decimation of, 130–31, 143
Gaza City Council, 165–66
Gaza Development Scheme, 144–46,
277n72
Gaza district: backwardness and provin-
cialism of, 21–22, 48, 223, 254n50;
cultivable land in, 273n31; Palestine
and, 2; population of, 256n4
Gaza Emigration (1917), 126
Gaza Executive Council, 56
Gaza-Ja√a road, 181
Gaza Strip: corruption in, 78, 111, 247n95;
economic improvement in, 23; estab-
lishment of, 22; as free-trade zone, 23;
isolation of, 2; Israeli attacks on, 23;
population of, 7; provisional bound-
aries defined, 7–8; tourism in, 23;
transportation within, 185–86. See also
Egyptian Administration; wasta
general strike (1936), 165–66
German colonies, 6
Giard, Luce, 174, 280n6
Gilligan, Carol, 125, 133, 271n2
globalization, 224
governmentality, 12, 219, 243nn53–54,
295n30
government practice, 1–28; analytics of gov-
ernment, 10–14; authority and, 3; over-
view of, 1–5; persistence of, 1–2; reitera-
tive and bureaucratic authority, 14–17,
90–92, 119–20, 244n60; ruling histories
and, 5–10; shaping of Gaza and, 20–26,
28, 248–49n103; shaping of place and,
24, 248n99; tactical government and
abeyance of legitimacy, 17–20; without
stable state structure, 10–12. See also
abeyance of legitimacy; civil service com-
petence and career trajectory
government vs. state, 242n51
Great Britain, 6–7, 126. See also British
Mandate
Gulf War (1991), 230
Gurney, Henry, 59
habit: of action vs. thought, 66–67, 256–
57n9, 257n10, 258n13; bad habits of
civil servants, 76–79, 260n45,
260nn42–43; of complaint and com-
ment, 79–81, 261n51, 261n57; definition
of, 256n5; doubt vs., 66, 90, 256–57n9;
as nonreflective, 67; Peirce on, 66,
256n5, 256n7, 258n13; politics and re-
pose of, 81–90; reflective, 65–68,
258n14; vitality of, 256n7; Weber on,
66. See also civil service competence
and career trajectory
Hadi, Ruhi Bey Abdul, 271n76
Hamas: election of, 5, 231–32; popularity
of, 231, 286n28
Hammami, Rema, 85, 201–2, 289n54,
291n75
Haniyeh, Ismail, 232, 238n7
Hansen, Thomas Blom, 264n1
Haram al-Sharif (Jerusalem), 126
Haraway, Donna, 156–57
320 • Index
Herzfeld, Michael, 15, 264n2
Heussler, Robert, 94




Hope-Simpson, Sir John, 132, 273n34
housing: planning of, during British Man-
date, 142–47, 153–54, 277n78,
277nn72–73, 277–78n81, 278n82; as
social service, 147–54, 150, 278nn93–
94, 278–79n100, 279n101
al-Husseini, Haj Amin, 270n74
Idarat al-Mabahith al-’Amma (General In-
vestigations or Criminal Investigations
Department), 46–47
Interior and Public Security Administra-
tion, 46–47, 56
intifada (1987–93), 229
intifada (2000– ), 5, 230–32, 238n3
Iraq, 225–26
Iraqi revolution (1958), 85
isa. See Israel State Archives
Islamic services, 192. See also religious ser-
vices; Supreme Muslim Council
Islamic societies, 195. See also religious as-
sociations
Islamic tradition, 195, 285n8
Israel: border crossing by refugees and,
22–23, 128; establishment of, 22; files
seized by, 34–35, 230–31; Gaza Strip
attacks by, 23; Hamas vs., 232; occupa-
tion by (1956–57), 8, 248n102; occupa-
tion by (1967), 171, 177–78, 203, 226–
32, 248n102, 294n20, 294nn24–25,
295n27
Israel-Egypt Armistice Agreement (1949),
7–8. See also Egyptian Administration
Israel State Archives (isa), 25–26, 36–37,
248n102, 251n18
Istiqlal party, 261n52




Khan Yunis (Gaza district), 21, 101, 139,
150, 158, 202, 280n9, 281n22
King David Hotel bombing (Jerusalem,
1946), 38
knowledge, lowering of threshold of, 48,
254n49
Kupferschmidt, Uri M., 196, 286n21
laborers, 75, 260n39
land sales: to civil servants, 152–53,
279n102, 279n104; to Zionists, 199
Land Settlement Department, 145
League of Nations, 6, 37, 238–39n11
Lebanon, 150
Legislative Council (Gaza), 9, 159–60,
229, 231–32, 280n12
legitimacy, 17–20; of Administration, 8, 11,
17–18; authority and tenacity of gov-
ernment and, 13, 153; authority vs., 17–
18, 61, 64, 93, 123; bureaucratic repeti-
tion as promoting, 16; in colonial con-
ditions, 10; crisis services’ role in, 138,
142–44, 153; files’ authority and, 32;
government without, 220; of Israeli oc-
cupation, 226; of Mandate, 7, 17–18;
through nation-state, 134; of pna, 229;
tactical government as deflecting ques-
tions of, 14, 18, 20; trusteeship and, 6;
of un planned partition, 7; of U.S. oc-
cupation of Iraq, 225–26. See also abey-
ance of legitimacy; distraction and
deferral
Lesch, Ann Mosely, 171, 247n95, 282n41
license plates, 4
liquor licenses, 198
‘‘The Literature of Memos’’ (Adab al-
Mudhakkirat), 41–42
Index • 321
mabahith (cid) reports, 175–77, 185–87,
283n54, 285n82
Madrid Conference (1991), 280n12
Maghazi refugee camp (Gaza), 283n51
Mahmood, Saba, 97, 195
Majallat al-Muwazzafin, 41, 252n34
Majdal (Gaza district), 22, 134, 136, 161,
274n43, 290n60
Mamdani, Mahmood, 243n52
mandates: classes of, 6, 239n19; develop-
ment of, 6, 239n19; League of Nations’
authority over, 6, 37, 238–39n11; sov-





McGuire, Mary, 88, 263n83
memory and oral histories, 257n12
memory processes, 68–69, 258n16
mercy trains (qitarat al-rahma), 139, 275n56
Messick, Brinkley, 250n15, 251n24
midcamps (Gaza), 175, 283n51
Miller, Ylana, 205
millet (religious community), 191
Mir’at al-Sharq, 261n51
missionaries, 195, 198–99, 286n21, 287–
88n34
Mitchell, Timothy, 94, 281n17
moral improvement, 193, 195, 198, 285–
86n8, 287n31
mosque management, 193, 200–201, 203
al-Mubadara, 280n12
mukhtars (village leaders), 10, 47, 140, 157–
58, 198, 287n29
Municipal Corporations Ordinance, 21
Murphy, Murray, 257n11
Muslim Brotherhood, 84–85, 201–2, 211,
216
nakba (‘‘the catastrophe’’; Arab-Israeli
War of 1948), 240n25; connection ser-
vices a√ected by, 183; dispossession and
displacement of population following,
22, 100, 131–32, 135–36; division of Pal-
estine following, 22; Egypt’s defeat in,
240n27; ending of, 7; Gaza’s transfor-
mation by, 2, 7, 169; humiliation of,
71–72, 137–38. See also Gaza Strip; Is-
rael; refugees, Palestinian; West Bank
Napoléon Bonaparte, 238n8
nasiha (moral advice), 285n8
Nasser, Gamal Abdul: assassination at-
tempt on, 85; government agenda of,
8–9; on pla, 217; on plo, 9; presi-
dency of, 85
Nasserism, 211, 216, 291n75
nationalism, 166, 193, 196–97, 204–5,
208–10, 215
National Union (Egypt), 9, 217
nation-state, 6, 9, 11, 15, 17, 224, 234–35
neighborhood, 190–91
neoliberalism, 233
newspaper readership, 182, 284n72
nongovernmental states, 233
nostalgia, 273n32
Nuseirat refugee camp (Gaza), 175–78,
283n51, 283n54, 283n56
o≈ce layout, organization, 105–8
Ong, Aihwa, 233
Osborne, Thomas, 96–97
Oslo Accords, 4, 229–30, 237–38n3,
294n24
Ottoman Empire, 6, 21; filing practices of,
31–32, 249n4; hiring practices of, 98,
266n18; religious vs. secular govern-
mental functions in, 192–93; starvation
under, 123, 131, 273n26
Palestine: as colony under Mandate, 6–7;
deferred independence of, 152–53,
279n103; isolation of territories in, 4;
map of, xiv; nationalism and national
322 • Index
Palestine (cont.)
conflict in, 237n2; un partition plan
for, 7, 240n25. See also distraction and
deferral
Palestine Liberation Army (pla), 9, 217
Palestine Liberation Organization (plo):
establishment of, 9, 217; popularity of,
231; returnees, 238n6
Palestine Research Center (Beirut), 34
Palestinian Civil Service Association, 117–
18, 270–71n75
Palestinian National Authority. See pna
Palestinian Red Crescent Society, 280n12
Palestinians: diet and eating habits of, in
crisis conditions, 132–33, 274nn36–37;
returnees, 5, 238n6; travel restrictions
for, 4; on Zionism, 237n2. See also cri-
sis services; nationalism; refugees, Pal-
estinian
Parker, Kelly, 257n10
patron-client relationships, 74, 259n31
peasants (fellahin), 21, 131–33, 274n36
Peel Commission Report, 189, 208–9,
239n22, 246n83, 273–74n34
Peirce, C. S.: on belief, 66, 257n11; on
doubt, 256–57n9; on habit, 66, 256n5,
256n7, 258n13
performatives, 244n64
Personal Investigation Bureau, 56, 59–60
personnel records, 45, 58–59, 109, 249n4,
253nn43–44
pla (Palestine Liberation Army), 9, 217
place, 24–25, 248n99
Planning Commission. See District Town
Planning Commission
plo. See Palestine Liberation Organization
pluralization, 280n6
pna (Palestinian National Authority): au-
thority of, 230, 232; collapse of, 231;
corruption of, 4, 111; disillusionment
with, 5; establishment of, 4, 229;
Hamas takeover of, 231–32; viability
of, following arrest of leaders, 238n7
police reports, surveillance, 45–47, 46,
253nn45–46, 254n48
Potter, Vincent, 258n13
poverty, 131–32, 135. See also crisis services
practice of care. See crisis services
print technology, 42, 252n33
propriety, 190–92
Qasim, ’Abd al-Karim, 85










Refugee A√airs Department, 140–42, 149
Refugee and Government Assistance Ad-
ministration, 275–76n59
refugees, Palestinian: armistice lines
crossed by, 22–23; deferral of return of,
152; definition of, 128; education of, 19–
20, 23, 211–12, 211–12, 216, 291nn80–81;
everyday services to camps of, 169–72,
170, 175–78, 228, 282n37; hardships and
displacement of, 22–24, 128–30, 135–
36, 274n35; housed in mosques, 148–
49, 278n90; native Gazans and, 69,
129–30, 148–49, 152, 272n23, 275n60,
278nn88–89; rations for, 1; relocation
of, 228, 294n21; sociality of, 128, 272n13;
social mobility of, 23; unrwa on be-
havior of, 129; unrwa relief for, 9, 137,
242n41, 242n43, 268n45, 272n20,
275n54; unrwa’s role in housing for,
150–51, 278nn93–94, 278–79n100,
279n101. See also crisis services; nakba
religious activities, surveillance of, 202,
289n50
Index • 323
religious associations, 194–200, 286n13,
287n29, 287n31, 287–88n34
religious services, 190–203, 285n5, 285–
86n8, 288n46. See also Supreme Mus-
lim Council
Report by the Department of Refugee Su-
pervision, Government Assistance,
and Social A√airs (1953), 170
‘‘Report of the Committee on Develop-
ment and Welfare Services,’’ 290–
91n68
‘‘Report on Education in Gaza,’’ 214
reservoir, municipal, 163
Retired Arab unrwa Employees’ Asso-
ciation, 68
Retired Civil Servants’ Association, 68,
172–73, 282n45
rhythms of history, 2, 25, 27, 224
Rida, Rashid, 195
Rimal (Gaza), 146, 164, 167–68, 278n82,
281n27, 282n34
roads, 24, 179–82, 228, 284n69, 284n71
Rose, Nikolas, 233
routine, 77, 184
Roy, Sara, 228, 273n31, 282n36
Samuel, Herbert, 98–99, 143, 194
Sarraj, Eyad, 295n27
Sassen, Saskia, 234
Saudi Arabian Islamic tradition, 195, 285n8
Sawt al-’Uruba, 80, 261n51
Sayigh, Yezid, 217
Second Division Civil Service Associa-
tion, 88, 263n89
Sennett, Richard, 15
Shafi, Haidar Abdul, 159, 280–81n12
shari’a court, 193, 288n46. See also under
civil servants
Sharon, Ariel, 227–28
Shati refugee camp (Gaza), 170, 171–72, 228
Shaw, J. W., 88–89
Shawwa, Mayor, 171, 282n41
Shawwa family, 21, 78
Shlaim, Avi, 241n34
Skeik, Ibrahim, 209, 291n73
smc. See Supreme Muslim Council
Society for Amr bi-l -Ma’ruf wa-l -Nahy ’an
al-Munkar (Society for the Preserva-
tion of Public Morals), 195–200,
287n29, 287n31, 287–88n34
Society of the Followers of Sunna in Khan
Yunis, 202
Sourani family, 21
Southern District. See Gaza district
sovereignty, graduated, 233
Starrett, Gregory, 202–3, 292n91
starvation, 123, 131, 273n26
state. See colonialism; government prac-
tice; nation-state
Stoler, Ann, 250n12
strike of 1936, 165–66
Sunna, 202
Supreme Muslim Council (smc), 117, 193–
94, 196, 200–201, 270n71, 270n74,
270–71n75, 271nn76–77, 286n13,
288n40
surveillance: of education, 216; for police
reports, 45–47, 46, 253nn45–46,
254n48; of religious activities, 202,
289n50
Syria, 18, 150
tactical government: constraints on, 221–
22; definition of, 3; as exceptional, 221;
importance of, 225; meaning of, 18–19;
as self-contradictory, 218; technical
competence and, 93; tenacity of gov-
ernment via, 3, 18. See also abeyance of




Tarikh Ghazza (al-’Arif), 155–56, 162–64,
281n19, 281n27
Tarikh Ghazza: Naqd wa-Tahlil (Abu




teachers: dual curriculum taught by, 204–
5; excess of, 103; influence of, 206–7;
political life of, 85–86, 208, 211, 215–17,
290n64, 291n73; privileged status of,
75, 206, 260n38; student complaints
against, 81
telegraph lines, 183
telephone lines, 183, 284n73, 284n75
Tibawi, A. L., 207, 209, 290n60
town and housing planning, during British
Mandate, 142–47, 153–54, 277nn72–
73, 277n78, 277–78n81, 278n82
Town Planning Commission. See District
Town Planning Commission
transportation, 178–87, 284n69, 284n71,
284n73, 285n82
Trouillot, Michel-Rolph, 233, 295n31
’ulama’ (religious scholars), 195, 285n8
unemployment, 23–24, 100–101, 129,
267n30, 272n19
United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (unhcr), 9–10
United Nations partition plan, 7, 240n25
United Nations Relief and Works
Agency. See unrwa
United States, 225–26, 233
unrwa (United Nations Relief and
Works Agency): Administration and,
9–10, 84, 118–19, 149–51, 160, 169;
Arab National Union vs., 86; on crisis
services, 275–76n59, 276n60; defini-
tion of refugees, 128; educational role
of, 210, 213–15; employees’ association,
89, 189; establishment of, 275n54; pen-
sions for retired employees of, 118–19,
271n79; policy of, on civil servants’ po-
litical neutrality, 86–87, 262–63n81,
263n82, 290n64; refugees educated by,
19–20; relief services of, 142, 276n63,
276n66; on unemployment, 129,
272n19; water-pipe project in Nuseirat
and, 175–78, 283n54, 283n56. See also
under refugees, Palestinian
U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment, 4
waqf administration, 193
wasta (connections), 77–78, 111, 260–
61n46
water meters, 167–68, 282n34
water services, 145. See also under everyday
services
waterskins, 163
wazifa muqaddasa (holy o≈ce), 196
Weber, Max: on authority, 17; on bu-
reaucracy, 1–2, 15–17, 52, 220, 225, 226;
on filing, 31; on habit and persistence
of bureaucracies, 66; on o≈cial secrecy,
52
Wedeen, Lisa, 18
wells, 162–64, 172, 281n19, 281n22,
281nn27–28
West Bank: annexation of, by Jordan, 8;
establishment of, 22; improvement
projects in, 4; Israeli occupation of,
228, 294n24
Wilkansky, Dr., 274n36
women: as civil servants, 70, 116–17,
259n19, 268n46, 270n70; in mosque
movement, 195; pensions for, 116–17,
270n70; pregnancy and, 117; travel by,
178
Woolf, Virginia, 270n68
workday hours for government o≈ces,
174, 283n49
World War I, 130–31, 143
World War II, 65, 133–34
Yibna (Gaza), 161
zakat (charity), 133
Zionism, 7, 126, 199, 237n2, 239–40n23,
240n24

Ilana Feldman is assistant professor of anthropology and international a√airs at George
Washington University.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Feldman, Ilana
Governing Gaza : bureaucracy, authority, and the work of rule, 1917–1967 /
Ilana Feldman.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isbn-13: 978-0-8223-4222-9 (cloth : alk. paper)
isbn-13: 978-0-8223-4240-3 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Gaza Strip—Politics and government—20th century.
2. Representative government and representation—Gaza Strip. I. Title.
ds110.g3f45 2008
953%.1—dc22 2007046082
